vfs: new FROM_ACCESS flag
PATCH 1/1 vfs: new FROM_ACCESS flag
This new acc_mode flag is just to tell the security system this inode permission check is from the access system call. The security system can use this information as it finds appropriete. In particular SELinux plans to use this flag to alter what we choose to audit and what we do not choose to audit.
---
fs/open.c | 2 +- include/linux/fs.h | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
fs/open.c +1 -1
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(faccessat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, int, mode) goto out_path_release; } - res =inode_permission (inode, mode |MAY_ACCESS ); + res =inode_permission (inode, mode |MAY_ACCESS |FROM_ACCESS );/* SuS v2 requires we report a read only fs too */ if (res || !(mode &S_IWOTH ) ||special_file (inode->i_mode)) goto out_path_release;
include/linux/fs.h +5 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ struct inodes_stat_t {*/ #define MAY_ACCESS 16#define MAY_OPEN 32 +/* +* This flag is only set in the access() and accessat() syscalls and can +* be used by the security system as it deems reasonable. +*/ +#define FROM_ACCESS 64/* * flags in file.f_mode. Note that FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE must correspond
Quoted 5 lines · Eric Paris
This new
acc_modeflag is just to tell the security system this inode permission check is from the access system call. The security system can use this information as it finds appropriete. In particular SELinux plans to use this flag to alter what we choose to audit and what we do not choose to audit.
Does "as it finds appropriate" mean robust applications should try an operation anyway even if access() says no from now on?
Btw, since you're looking at access(), the kernel could do with euidaccess() or a flag ACCESS_EUID. (Either would be trivial to implement).
Glibc provides eaccess/euidaccess functions, but they work by calling stat() and checking the mode bits when euid != ruid || egid != rgid, which is clearly not very nice with ACLs, and perhaps not ideal for SELinux's auditing of access calls either.
-- Jamie
Quoted 5 lines · Eric Paris
This new
acc_modeflag is just to tell the security system this inode permission check is from the access system call. The security system can use this information as it finds appropriete. In particular SELinux plans to use this flag to alter what we choose to audit and what we do not choose to audit.
I think you're better off splitting the existing MAY_ACCESS flag and only using MAY_ACCESS for calles from access() insteaf of introducing a FROM_ACCESS flag and causing lots of naming confusion.
Quoted 10 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 5 lines · Eric Paris
This new
acc_modeflag is just to tell the security system this inode permission check is from the access system call. The security system can use this information as it finds appropriete. In particular SELinux plans to use this flag to alter what we choose to audit and what we do not choose to audit.I think you're better off splitting the existing
MAY_ACCESSflag and only usingMAY_ACCESSfor calles fromaccess()insteaf of introducing aFROM_ACCESSflag and causing lots of naming confusion.
What would you think of a new, MUST_REVALIDATE_PERMS which will do what MAY_ACCESS does today. MAY_ACCESS would be just for access(2) and would be the flag that I use for SELinux?
-Eric
Quoted 6 lines · Eric Paris
Quoted 2 lines
only using
MAY_ACCESSfor calles fromaccess()insteaf of introducing aFROM_ACCESSflag and causing lots of naming confusion.What would you think of a new,
MUST_REVALIDATE_PERMSwhich will do whatMAY_ACCESSdoes today.MAY_ACCESSwould be just for access(2) and would be the flag that I use for SELinux?
Yeah, something like this. I don't like the MUST_REVALIDATE_PERMS name too much, but unless someone comes up with a better one I can live with it.
Quoted 11 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 6 lines · Eric Paris
Quoted 2 lines
only using
MAY_ACCESSfor calles fromaccess()insteaf of introducing aFROM_ACCESSflag and causing lots of naming confusion.What would you think of a new,
MUST_REVALIDATE_PERMSwhich will do whatMAY_ACCESSdoes today.MAY_ACCESSwould be just for access(2) and would be the flag that I use for SELinux?Yeah, something like this. I don't like the
MUST_REVALIDATE_PERMSname too much, but unless someone comes up with a better one I can live with it.
MAY_ACCESS is used in only these places:
- access/faccessat
- chdir/fchdir
- chroot
And it is checked in only two easy to change places: nfs/dir.c and fuse/dir.c.
Therefore how about MAY_CHDIR.
-- Jamie