selinux: Fix security_compute_av() to not return unknown class errors when in permissive mode
RFC PATCH v2 1/1 selinux: Fix security_compute_av() to not return unknown class errors when in permissive mode
It is possible security_compute_av() to return -EINVAL, even when in permissive mode, due to unknown object classes and SIDs. This patch fixes this by doing away with the return value for security_compute_av() and treating unknown classes and SIDs as permission denials.
NOTE: I've only tested this on Fedora/Rawhide using the standard policy, so while I'm fairly confident there are no regressions in the common case the error case hasn't been fully tested yet; I'm posting this to solicit comments on the basic approach.
--- security/selinux/avc.c | 11 +++-------- security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 +++--- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
security/selinux/avc.c +3 -8
@@ -731,7 +731,6 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,struct avc_node *node;struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd;int rc =0 ; -u32 denied;BUG_ON (!requested);
@@ -746,9 +745,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,else avd = &avd_entry; - rc =security_compute_av (ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); -if (rc) - goto out; +security_compute_av (ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);rcu_read_lock (); node =avc_insert (ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); }else {
@@ -757,9 +754,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, avd = &node->ae.avd; } - denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed); - -if (denied) { +if (requested & ~(avd->allowed)) {if (flags &AVC_STRICT ) rc = -EACCES ;else if (!selinux_enforcing || (avd->flags &AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE ))
@@ -770,7 +765,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, }rcu_read_unlock (); -out: +return rc; }
security/selinux/include/security.h +3 -3
@@ -96,9 +96,9 @@ struct av_decision {/* definitions of av_decision.flags */ #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001 -int security_compute_av (u32 ssid,u32 tsid, -u16 tclass,u32 requested, -struct av_decision *avd); +void security_compute_av (u32 ssid,u32 tsid, +u16 tclass,u32 requested, +struct av_decision *avd); int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
security/selinux/ss/services.c +14 -13
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, avd->flags =0 ;if (unlikely (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) { -if (printk_ratelimit ()) +if (!policydb.allow_unknown &&printk_ratelimit ())printk (KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n" , tclass);return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -929,14 +929,12 @@ static int security_compute_av_core(u32 ssid,* * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass. -* Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid or %0 -* if the access vector decisions were computed successfully. */ -int security_compute_av (u32 ssid, -u32 tsid, -u16 orig_tclass, -u32 orig_requested, -struct av_decision *avd) +void security_compute_av (u32 ssid, +u32 tsid, +u16 orig_tclass, +u32 orig_requested, +struct av_decision *avd) {u16 tclass;u32 requested;
@@ -949,24 +947,27 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, requested =unmap_perm (orig_tclass, orig_requested); tclass =unmap_class (orig_tclass); -if (unlikely (orig_tclass && !tclass)) { + rc =security_compute_av_core (ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); +if (unlikely (rc !=0 )) {if (policydb.allow_unknown) goto allow; - rc = -EINVAL ; + avd->allowed =0 ; + avd->auditallow =0 ; + avd->auditdeny =0xffffffff ; + avd->seqno = latest_granting; +/* preserve any avd->flags from security_compute_av_core() */ goto out; } - rc =security_compute_av_core (ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);map_decision (orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown); out:read_unlock (&policy_rwlock); -return rc; +return ; allow: avd->allowed =0xffffffff ; avd->auditallow =0 ; avd->auditdeny =0xffffffff ; avd->seqno = latest_granting; avd->flags =0 ; - rc =0 ; goto out; }
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Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
It is possible
security_compute_av()to return-EINVAL, even when in permissive mode, due to unknown object classes and SIDs. This patch fixes this by doing away with the return value forsecurity_compute_av()and treating unknown classes and SIDs as permission denials.NOTE: I've only tested this on Fedora/Rawhide using the standard policy, so while I'm fairly confident there are no regressions in the common case the error case hasn't been fully tested yet; I'm posting this to solicit comments on the basic approach.
Looks ok to me.
Signature · 7 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 6 lines · James Morris
Quoted 5 lines · Paul Moore
It is possible
security_compute_av()to return-EINVAL, even when in permissive mode, due to unknown object classes and SIDs. This patch fixes this by doing away with the return value forsecurity_compute_av()and treating unknown classes and SIDs as permission denials.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
NOTE: I've only tested this on Fedora/Rawhide using the standard policy, so while I'm fairly confident there are no regressions in the common case the error case hasn't been fully tested yet; I'm posting this to solicit comments on the basic approach.
Looks ok to me.
Me too. I tested today with a hacked Fedora/Rawhide policy that didn't have the tun_socket class; it worked as expected both when set to allow and deny unknown classes. As far as I'm concerned you can feel free to merge this patch when appropriate.
Andrew, I'll make sure this applies cleanly to 2.6.32 tomorrow, if not I'll send you a backported patch.
Signature · 7 lines
paul moore linux @ hp -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 66 lines · Paul Moore
It is possible
security_compute_av()to return-EINVAL, even when in permissive mode, due to unknown object classes and SIDs. This patch fixes this by doing away with the return value forsecurity_compute_av()and treating unknown classes and SIDs as permission denials.NOTE: I've only tested this on Fedora/Rawhide using the standard policy, so while I'm fairly confident there are no regressions in the common case the error case hasn't been fully tested yet; I'm posting this to solicit comments on the basic approach.
Reported-by Andrew Worsley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>---
security/selinux/avc.c | 11 +++--------security/selinux/include/security.h| 6 +++---security/selinux/ss/services.c| 27 ++++++++++++++-------------3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)security/selinux/avc.c +0
-1@@ -731,7 +731,6 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, struct avc_node *node; struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd; int rc = 0; - u32 denied; BUG_ON(!requested);@@ -746,9 +745,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,else
avd =&avd_entry;- rc =
security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);rcu_read_lock();
node =avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
} else {security/selinux/avc.c +2
-4@@ -757,9 +754,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, avd = &node->ae.avd; } - denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed); - - if (denied) { + if (requested & ~(avd->allowed)) { if (flags & AVC_STRICT) rc = -EACCES; else if (!selinux_enforcing || (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))@@ -770,7 +765,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, } rcu_read_unlock(); -out: + return rc; }security/selinux/include/security.h +0
-0
security/selinux/include/security.h struct av_decision { · line 101
Quoted 9 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h +3
-3@@ -96,9 +96,9 @@ struct av_decision { /* definitions of av_decision.flags */ #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001 -int security_compute_av (u32 ssid,u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd); +void security_compute_av (u32 ssid,u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + struct av_decision *avd);
requested argument can be dropped - a legacy of the security server interface support for partial computation of access vectors based on what was requested, obsoleted when the decided vector was dropped.
Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h +0
-0int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,security/selinux/ss/services.c +0
-0
security/selinux/ss/services.c static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, · line 638
Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +1
-1@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, avd->flags = 0; if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) { - if (printk_ratelimit()) + if (!policydb.allow_unknown && printk_ratelimit()) printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass); return -EINVAL; }
I don't think this is correct, or the change to the allow_unknown handling later. This function gets called both upon userspace access to /selinux/access for userspace object managers and by the kernel. We want to distinguish userspace passing an invalid class to the kernel (still an error even in the allow_unknown case, as the userspace AVC performs the mapping and deals with allow_unknown based on /selinux/deny_unknown) from the kernel not being able to map the class.
Quoted 21 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +5
-7@@ -929,14 +929,12 @@ static int security_compute_av_core(u32 ssid,* * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass. -* Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid or %0 -* if the access vector decisions were computed successfully. */ -int security_compute_av (u32 ssid, - u32 tsid, - u16 orig_tclass, - u32 orig_requested, - struct av_decision *avd) +void security_compute_av (u32 ssid, + u32 tsid, + u16 orig_tclass, + u32 orig_requested, + struct av_decision *avd) { u16 tclass; u32 requested;
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, · line 952
Quoted 4 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +0
-1@@ -949,24 +947,27 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, requested = unmap_perm(orig_tclass, orig_requested); tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); - if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
Here we detect the specific case of a legitimate (non-zero) class value that could not be mapped to a policy value due to a lack of a definition in the policy, and handle it according to allow_unknown.
Quoted 30 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +7
-2+ rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); + if (unlikely(rc != 0)) { if (policydb.allow_unknown) goto allow; - rc = -EINVAL; + avd->allowed = 0; + avd->auditallow = 0; + avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; + avd->seqno = latest_granting; + /* preserve any avd->flags from security_compute_av_core() */ goto out; } - rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
- return rc;
+ return;
allow:
avd->allowed =0xffffffff;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny =0xffffffff;
avd->seqno =latest_granting;
avd->flags = 0;
- rc = 0;
goto out;
}
Quoted 5 lines
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Quoted 70 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 69 lines · Paul Moore
It is possible
security_compute_av()to return-EINVAL, even when in permissive mode, due to unknown object classes and SIDs. This patch fixes this by doing away with the return value forsecurity_compute_av()and treating unknown classes and SIDs as permission denials.NOTE: I've only tested this on Fedora/Rawhide using the standard policy, so while I'm fairly confident there are no regressions in the common case the error case hasn't been fully tested yet; I'm posting this to solicit comments on the basic approach.
Reported-by Andrew Worsley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/avc.c | 11 +++-------- security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 +++--- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)security/selinux/avc.c +2
-6@@ -731,7 +731,6 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,struct avc_node *node;struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd;int rc =0 ; -u32 denied;BUG_ON (!requested);@@ -746,9 +745,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,else avd = &avd_entry; - rc =security_compute_av (ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); - if (rc) - goto out; +security_compute_av (ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);rcu_read_lock (); node =avc_insert (ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); }else {@@ -757,9 +754,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, avd = &node->ae.avd; } - denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed); - -if (denied) { +if (requested & ~(avd->allowed)) {if (flags &AVC_STRICT ) rc = -EACCES ; else if (!selinux_enforcing || (avd->flags &
AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE)) @@ -770,7 +765,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, }rcu_read_unlock();security/selinux/avc.c +1
-1-out: +return rc; }(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/security/selinux/include/security.hindex 2553266..7dab870 100644security/selinux/include/security.h +0
-0@@ -96,9 +96,9 @@ struct av_decision {/* definitions of av_decision.flags */ #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h struct av_decision { · line 101
Quoted 6 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h +3
-3-int security_compute_av (u32 ssid,u32 tsid, -u16 tclass,u32 requested, -struct av_decision *avd); +void security_compute_av (u32 ssid,u32 tsid, +u16 tclass,u32 requested, +struct av_decision *avd);requested argument can be dropped - a legacy of the security server interface support for partial computation of access vectors based on what was requested, obsoleted when the decided vector was dropped.
Good catch, saw it was used by functions called inside security_compute_av() and never bothered to follow it all the way down. Fixed.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h +0
-0int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/security/selinux/ss/services.cindex b3efae2..6e4904d 100644security/selinux/ss/services.c +0
-0@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, avd->flags =0 ;
Quoted 15 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, · line 638
Quoted 6 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +1
-1if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) { - if (printk_ratelimit()) + if (!policydb.allow_unknown && printk_ratelimit()) printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass); return -EINVAL; }I don't think this is correct, or the change to the
allow_unknownhandling later. This function gets called both upon userspace access to /selinux/access for userspace object managers and by the kernel. We want to distinguish userspace passing an invalid class to the kernel (still an error even in theallow_unknowncase, as the userspace AVC performs the mapping and deals withallow_unknownbased on /selinux/deny_unknown) from the kernel not being able to map the class.
I was under the impression that we would want to do the same for both the kernel and userspace (I like consistency), but I understand your point. Fixed.
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 22 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +5
-7@@ -929,14 +929,12 @@ static int security_compute_av_core(u32 ssid,* * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass. -* Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid or %0 -* if the access vector decisions were computed successfully. */ -int security_compute_av (u32 ssid, -u32 tsid, -u16 orig_tclass, -u32 orig_requested, -struct av_decision *avd) +void security_compute_av (u32 ssid, +u32 tsid, +u16 orig_tclass, +u32 orig_requested, +struct av_decision *avd) {u16 tclass;u32 requested;@@ -949,24 +947,27 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, · line 952
Quoted 3 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +0
-1requested =unmap_perm (orig_tclass, orig_requested); tclass =unmap_class (orig_tclass); -if (unlikely (orig_tclass && !tclass)) {Here we detect the specific case of a legitimate (non-zero) class value that could not be mapped to a policy value due to a lack of a definition in the policy, and handle it according to
allow_unknown.
Fixed.
Signature · 7 lines
paul moore linux @ hp -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.