Secure IPL Support for SCSI Scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi Devices
cover Secure IPL Support for SCSI Scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi Devices
# Description
This patch series is an external requirement by Linux distribution partners to verify secure IPL process. Additional secure IPL checks are also included in this series to address security holes in the original secure IPL design to prevent malicious actors to boot modified or unsigned code despite secure IPL being enforced.
Secure IPL is enabled when the QEMU options for secure IPL are specified in the command line.
During this process, additional security checks are performed to ensure system integrity.
As components are loaded from disk, DIAG 508 subcode 2 performs signature verification if a signature entry is identified. Upon successful verification, DIAG 320 subcode 2 will request the corresponding certificate from QEMU key store to the BIOS.
Secure IPL will continue until all the components are loaded if no error occurs during True secure IPL mode or in Audit mode (see explanation below).
After that, an IPL Information report block (IIRB) is initialized immediately following an IPL Parameter Information Block. The IIRB is populated with information about the components, verification results and certificate data.
Finally, the guest system proceeds to boot.
Only List-Directed-IPL contains the relevant zIPL data structures to perform secure IPL. This patch series only adds support for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices. Secure IPL for other device types will be considered as follow-up work at a later date.
** Note: “secure IPL” and “secure boot” are used interchangeably throughout the design. **
# True Secure IPL Mode and Audit Mode
## True Secure IPL Mode
When secure IPL is enabled and certificates are provided, all the secure IPL checks will performed. The boot process will abort if any error occurs during the secure IPL checks.
## Audit Mode
When the secure IPL option is not selected and certificates are provided, all the secure IPL checks will still be performed. However, the boot process will continue if any errors occur, with messages logged to the console during the secure IPL checks.
The audit mode is also considered as simulated secure IPL because it is less pervasive, and allows the guest to boot regardless of the secure checking results.
# How to Enable Secure IPL
## QEMU Build Notes
When building QEMU, enable the cryptographic libraries.
Run configure script in QEMU repository with either parameter:
./configure … --enable-nettle or --enable-gcrypt
## Create Certificates via Openssl
openssl req -new -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout mykey.priv -outform DER -out mycert.der -days 36500 -subj "/CN=My Name/" -nodes
Use an RSA private key for signing.
It is recommended to store the certificate(s) in the /…/qemu/certs directory for easy identification.
## Sign Kernel and Prepare zipl
All actions must be performed on a KVM guest.
Copy the sign-file script (located in Linux source repository), generated private key(s), and certificate(s) to guest’s file system.
Sign guest image(s) and stage3 binary:
./sign-file sha256 mykey.priv mycert.der /boot/vmlinuz-… ./sign-file sha256 mykey.priv mycert.der /usr/lib/s390-tools/stage3.bin
Run zipl with secure boot enabled.
zipl --secure 1 -V
Guest image(s) are now signed, stored on disk, and can be verified.
## New QEMU Command Options for Secure IPL
To enable secure IPL and provide certificates for signature verification via QEMU command line.
Enables secure IPL/boot, this option defaults to off if it is not provided for the command line options.
-secure-boot [on|off]
Provides a path to either a directory or a single boot certificate. A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths.
-boot-certificates <file>
Example:
qemu-system-s390x ... \ -secure-boot on \ -boot-certificates /.../qemu/certs:/another/path/cert.der
Secure IPL command options overview:
If neither the -secure-boot nor the -boot-certificates options are specified, the guest will boot in normal mode, and no security checks will be conducted.
If the -secure-boot option is not specified or is set to off, and the -boot-certificates option is provided, the guest will boot in audit mode. In this mode, all security checks are performed; however, any errors encountered will not interrupt the boot process.
If the -secure-boot option is set to on and the -boot-certificates option is provided, the guest will boot in true secure IPL mode. In this mode, all security checks are performed, and any errors encountered will terminate the boot process.
- If the -boot-certificates option is not provided in true secure IPL mode, the boot process will fail for the corresponding device.
## Constraints
- certificates must be in X.509 DER format
- only sha256 encryption is supported
- only support for SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices
- The boot process will terminate if secure boot is enabled without
specifying a boot device.
- If enabling secure boot with multiple boot devices, any
unsupported devices or non-eligible devices will cause the entire boot process terminating early with an error logged to the console.
- attempting to perform secure IPL outside of these constraints will result in a failure.
# DIAGNOSE 508 - KVM IPL Extensions
Signature verification is performed during IPL via DIAG 508. Component address, component length, signature address and signature length are obtained in the BIOS and pass to DIAG 508 subcode 2 to perform signature verification in QEMU. If verification succeeds, DIAG 508 subcode 2 (signature verification) will return the length and index of the certificate in the QemuCertificateStore that was used for verification.
## Data Structures
Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock (SVB) — stores addresses and lengths of the component and signature to be used for signature verification. Upon verification, an index and the length of the certificate used is stored.
# QEMU and Libvirt Interface Discussion
While libvirt provides a secure boot interface
(https://libvirt.org/kbase/secureboot.html), it is not directly reusable for secure boot design on s390x.The current implementation appears to be designed for x86 systems, where secure boot is enabled via the <firmware> tag and keys can be specified using the <nvram> tag.
<os firmware='efi'>
<firmware>
<feature enabled='yes' name='enrolled-keys'/>
<feature enabled='yes' name='secure-boot'/>
</firmware>
<loader secure='yes' type='pflash'>...</loader>
<nvram template='...'>...</nvram>
</os>We may be able to reuse some existing tags. However, there is no efficient way to provide certificates on the host file system for both QEMU and libvirt.
Ideally, if the QEMU interface for secure IPL is acceptable, we could introduce new tags specifically for certificates on s390x or potentially add a new <secureboot> tag to enable secure boot and provide certificates.
Below are my proposed designs for the secure boot interface in libvirt.
Design #1
<os firmware='s390-ccw'> <type arch='s390x' machine='s390-ccw-virtio-9.2'>hvm</type> <firmware> <feature enabled='yes' name='secure-boot'/> </firmware> <certificate path='path/to/cert:cert.der' /> <boot dev='hd'/> </os>
Design #2
<os> <type arch='s390x' machine='s390-ccw-virtio-9.2'>hvm</type> <secureboot enabled='yes'> <certificates path='path/to/cert:cert.der'/> </secureboot> <boot dev='hd'/> </os>
I would appreciate any suggestions or feedback on both QEMU and libvirt interface designs.
Collin L. Walling (4):
s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 2 for signature verification
Zhuoying Cai (20):
Add -boot-certificates /path/dir:/path/file option in QEMU command
line
hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS) s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block hw/s390x/ipl: Set iplb->len to maximum length of IPL Parameter Block
s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_load_segment function pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure boot in audit
mode
s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility
(SCLAF)
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot Add -secure-boot on|off option in QEMU command line hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without specifying a boot device
hw/s390x/cert-store.c | 249 ++++++++++ hw/s390x/cert-store.h | 50 ++ hw/s390x/ipl.c | 65 ++- hw/s390x/ipl.h | 12 + hw/s390x/meson.build | 1 + hw/s390x/sclp.c | 2 + include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 103 ++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 42 ++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 9 +- include/hw/s390x/sclp.h | 4 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 696 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 9 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 188 +++++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c | 6 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 111 ++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c | 8 +- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 14 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 51 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 7 + qemu-options.hx | 19 + system/vl.c | 43 ++ target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 5 + target/s390x/cpu_features.h | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 5 + target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 6 + target/s390x/diag.c | 457 +++++++++++++++++- target/s390x/gen-features.c | 3 + target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 36 ++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 4 + 29 files changed, 2150 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.c create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.h create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH 1/24 Add -boot-certificates /path/dir:/path/file option in QEMU command line
The -boot-certificates /path/dir:/path/file option is implemented to provide path to either a directory or a single certificate.
Multiple paths can be delineated using a colon.
--- qemu-options.hx | 11 +++++++++++ system/vl.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
qemu-options.hx +11 -0
@@ -1251,6 +1251,17 @@ SRST Set system UUID. ERST +DEF("boot-certificates", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_boot_certificates, + "-boot-certificates /path/directory:/path/file\n" + " Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate.\n" + " A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths.\n", + QEMU_ARCH_S390X) +SRST +``-boot-certificates /path/directory:/path/file`` + Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate. + A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths. +ERST + DEFHEADING() DEFHEADING(Block device options:)
system/vl.c +22 -0
@@ -510,6 +510,20 @@ static QemuOptsList qemu_action_opts = { }, }; +static QemuOptsList qemu_boot_certificates_opts = { + .name ="boot-certificates" , + .implied_opt_name ="boot-certificates" , + .merge_lists = true, + .head =QTAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER (qemu_boot_certificates_opts.head), + .desc = { + { + .name ="boot-certificates" , + .type =QEMU_OPT_STRING , + }, + {/* end of list */ } + }, +}; +const char *qemu_get_vm_name (void ) {return qemu_name;
@@ -2879,6 +2893,7 @@ void qemu_init(int argc, char **argv)qemu_add_opts (&qemu_semihosting_config_opts);qemu_add_opts (&qemu_fw_cfg_opts);qemu_add_opts (&qemu_action_opts); +qemu_add_opts (&qemu_boot_certificates_opts);qemu_add_run_with_opts ();module_call_init (MODULE_INIT_OPTS );
@@ -3024,6 +3039,13 @@ void qemu_init(int argc, char **argv)case QEMU_OPTION_boot:machine_parse_property_opt (qemu_find_opts ("boot-opts" ),"boot" , optarg);break ; +case QEMU_OPTION_boot_certificates: + opts =qemu_opts_parse_noisily (qemu_find_opts ("boot-certificates" ), + optarg, true); +if (!opts) { +exit (1 ); + } +break ;case QEMU_OPTION_fda:case QEMU_OPTION_fdb: drive_add(IF_FLOPPY, popt->index - QEMU_OPTION_fda,
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 01/24] Add -boot-certificates /path/dir:/path/file option in QEMU command line
Quoted 19 lines · Zhuoying Cai
The
-boot-certificates /path/dir:/path/fileoption is implemented to provide path to either a directory or a single certificate.Multiple paths can be delineated using a colon.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- qemu-options.hx | 11 +++++++++++ system/vl.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)qemu-options.hx +0
-0@@ -1251,6 +1251,17 @@ SRST Set system UUID. ERST
qemu-options.hx SRST · line 1263
Quoted 10 lines
qemu-options.hx +10
-0+DEF("boot-certificates", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_boot_certificates, + "-boot-certificates /path/directory:/path/file\n" + " Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate.\n" + " A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths.\n", + QEMU_ARCH_S390X) +SRST +``-boot-certificates /path/directory:/path/file`` + Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate. + A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths. +ERST
Unless there is a really, really good reason for introducing new top-level options to QEMU, this should rather be added to one of the existing options instead.
I assume this is very specific to s390x, isn't it? So the best way is likely to add this as a parameter of the machine type option, so that the user would specify:
qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certificates=/path/to/certs
See the other object_class_property_add() statements in ccw_machine_class_init() for some examples how to do this.
Thomas
Re: [PATCH v1 01/24] Add -boot-certificates /path/dir:/path/file option in QEMU command line
Quoted 34 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 18 lines · Zhuoying Cai
The
-boot-certificates /path/dir:/path/fileoption is implemented to provide path to either a directory or a single certificate.Multiple paths can be delineated using a colon.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- qemu-options.hx | 11 +++++++++++ system/vl.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)qemu-options.hx +0
-0@@ -1251,6 +1251,17 @@ SRST Set system UUID. ERSTqemu-options.hx SRST · line 1262
Quoted 10 lines
qemu-options.hx +10
-0+DEF("boot-certificates", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_boot_certificates, + "-boot-certificates /path/directory:/path/file\n" + " Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate.\n" + " A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths.\n", + QEMU_ARCH_S390X) +SRST +``-boot-certificates /path/directory:/path/file`` + Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate. + A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths. +ERSTUnless there is a really, really good reason for introducing new top-level options to QEMU, this should rather be added to one of the existing options instead.
Quoted 8 lines
I assume this is very specific to s390x, isn't it? So the best way is likely to add this as a parameter of the machine type option, so that the user would specify:
qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certificates=/path/to/certs
See the other
object_class_property_add()statements inccw_machine_class_init()for some examples how to do this.
With other arches that use EDK2 (x86, arm64, riscv64, loongarch64) we pass this info via fw_cfg
-fw_cfg name=etc/edk2/https/cacerts,file=<certdb>
Assuming this series is trying to implement a pre-existing s390x machine standard for passing certs, then it seems inevitable that it will need a different config approach than we use for EDK2.
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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Re: [PATCH v1 01/24] Add -boot-certificates /path/dir:/path/file option in QEMU command line
Quoted 39 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 38 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 18 lines · Zhuoying Cai
The
-boot-certificates /path/dir:/path/fileoption is implemented to provide path to either a directory or a single certificate.Multiple paths can be delineated using a colon.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- qemu-options.hx | 11 +++++++++++ system/vl.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)qemu-options.hx +0
-0@@ -1251,6 +1251,17 @@ SRST Set system UUID. ERSTqemu-options.hx SRST · line 1262
Quoted 10 lines
qemu-options.hx +10
-0+DEF("boot-certificates", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_boot_certificates, + "-boot-certificates /path/directory:/path/file\n" + " Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate.\n" + " A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths.\n", + QEMU_ARCH_S390X) +SRST +``-boot-certificates /path/directory:/path/file`` + Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate. + A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths. +ERSTUnless there is a really, really good reason for introducing new top-level options to QEMU, this should rather be added to one of the existing options instead.
I assume this is very specific to s390x, isn't it? So the best way is likely to add this as a parameter of the machine type option, so that the user would specify:
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certificates=/path/to/certs
See the other
object_class_property_add()statements inccw_machine_class_init()for some examples how to do this.With other arches that use EDK2 (x86, arm64, riscv64, loongarch64) we pass this info via
fw_cfg
s/this info/this kind of info/
because technically the stuff below is certs for PXE boot downloads, not certs for secureboot. The latter are hardcoded in the EDK varstore at boot time, so any setup of certs for secureboot is out of band from QEMU startup
Quoted 15 lines
-fw_cfg name=etc/edk2/https/cacerts,file=<certdb>
Assuming this series is trying to implement a pre-existing s390x machine standard for passing certs, then it seems inevitable that it will need a different config approach than we use for EDK2.
With regards,
DanielSignature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
Re: [PATCH v1 01/24] Add -boot-certificates /path/dir:/path/file option in QEMU command line
In reply to Daniel P. BerrangéQuoted 47 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 34 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 18 lines · Zhuoying Cai
The
-boot-certificates /path/dir:/path/fileoption is implemented to provide path to either a directory or a single certificate.Multiple paths can be delineated using a colon.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- qemu-options.hx | 11 +++++++++++ system/vl.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)qemu-options.hx +0
-0@@ -1251,6 +1251,17 @@ SRST Set system UUID. ERSTqemu-options.hx SRST · line 1262
Quoted 10 lines
qemu-options.hx +10
-0+DEF("boot-certificates", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_boot_certificates, + "-boot-certificates /path/directory:/path/file\n" + " Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate.\n" + " A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths.\n", + QEMU_ARCH_S390X) +SRST +``-boot-certificates /path/directory:/path/file`` + Provide a path to a directory or a boot certificate. + A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths. +ERSTUnless there is a really, really good reason for introducing new top-level options to QEMU, this should rather be added to one of the existing options instead.
Quoted 8 lines
I assume this is very specific to s390x, isn't it? So the best way is likely to add this as a parameter of the machine type option, so that the user would specify:
qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certificates=/path/to/certs
See the other
object_class_property_add()statements inccw_machine_class_init()for some examples how to do this.With other arches that use EDK2 (x86, arm64, riscv64, loongarch64) we pass this info via
fw_cfg
Quoted 8 lines
-fw_cfg name=etc/edk2/https/cacerts,file=<certdb>
Assuming this series is trying to implement a pre-existing s390x machine standard for passing certs, then it seems inevitable that it will need a different config approach than we use for EDK2.
With regards,
Daniel
Thank you for your feedback.
The -boot-certificates option aims to provide a path to either a directory or a single certificate on the host. The certificate(s) will be loaded into the key store and used during signature verification.
s390x will likely need to handle certificates differently from other architectures.
Regards,
Joy
PATCH 2/24 hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
In reply to Zhuoying CaiCreate a certificate store for boot certificates used for secure IPL.
Load certificates from the -boot-certificate option into the cert store.
Currently, only x509 certificates in DER format and uses SHA-256 hashing algorithm are supported, as these are the types required for secure boot on s390.
--- hw/s390x/cert-store.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ hw/s390x/cert-store.h | 50 ++++++++ hw/s390x/ipl.c | 9 ++ hw/s390x/ipl.h | 3 + hw/s390x/meson.build | 1 + include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 3 + 6 files changed, 315 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.c create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.h
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +249 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +/* +* S390 certificate store implementation +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "cert-store.h" +#include "qemu/error-report.h" +#include "qemu/option.h" +#include "qemu/config-file.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ebcdic.h" +#include "qemu/cutils.h" +#include "cert-store.h" + +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +#include <gnutls/x509.h> +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> +#endif /* #define CONFIG_GNUTLS */ + +static const char *s390_get_boot_certificates (void ) +{ +QemuOpts *opts; +const char *path; + + opts =qemu_find_opts_singleton ("boot-certificates" ); + path =qemu_opt_get (opts,"boot-certificates" ); + +return path; +} + +static size_t cert2buf (char *path,size_t max_size,char **cert_buf) +{ +size_t size; + g_autofree char *buf; + buf =g_malloc (max_size); + +if (!g_file_get_contents (path, &buf, &size,NULL ) || + size ==0 || size > max_size) { +return 0 ; + } + + *cert_buf =g_steal_pointer (&buf); + +return size; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +int g_init_cert (uint8_t *raw_cert,size_t cert_size,gnutls_x509_crt_t *g_cert) +{ +int rc; + +if (gnutls_x509_crt_init (g_cert) <0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +gnutls_datum_t datum_cert = {raw_cert, cert_size}; + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (*g_cert, &datum_cert,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ); +if (rc) { +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (*g_cert); +return rc; + } + +return 0 ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_GNUTLS */ + +static int init_cert_x509_der (size_t size,char *raw,S390IPLCertificate **qcert) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +gnutls_x509_crt_t g_cert =NULL ; + g_autofree S390IPLCertificate *q_cert; +size_t key_id_size; +size_t hash_size; +int rc; + + rc =g_init_cert ((uint8_t *)raw, size, &g_cert); +if (rc) { +if (rc ==GNUTLS_E_ASN1_TAG_ERROR ) { +error_report ("The certificate is not in DER format" ); + } +return -1 ; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_id (g_cert,GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA256 ,NULL , &key_id_size); +if (rc !=GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER ) { +error_report ("Failed to get certificate key ID size" ); + goto out; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint (g_cert,GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256 ,NULL , &hash_size); +if (rc !=GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER ) { +error_report ("Failed to get certificate hash size" ); + goto out; + } + + q_cert =g_malloc (sizeof (*q_cert)); + q_cert->size = size; + q_cert->key_id_size = key_id_size; + q_cert->hash_size = hash_size; + q_cert->raw = raw; + q_cert->format =GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ; + *qcert =g_steal_pointer (&q_cert); + +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (g_cert); + +return 0 ; +out: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (g_cert); +return -1 ; +#else + error_report("Cryptographic library is not enabled") +return -1 ; +#endif /* #define CONFIG_GNUTLS */ +} + +static int check_path_type (const char *path) +{ +struct stat path_stat; + +stat (path, &path_stat); + +if (S_ISDIR (path_stat.st_mode)) { +return S_IFDIR ; + }else if (S_ISREG (path_stat.st_mode)) { +return S_IFREG ; + }else { +return -1 ; + } +} + +static int init_cert (char *paths,S390IPLCertificate **qcert) +{ +char *buf; +char vc_name[VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES ]; +const gchar *filename; +size_t size; + + filename =g_path_get_basename (paths); + + size =cert2buf (paths,CERT_MAX_SIZE , &buf); +if (size ==0 ) { +error_report ("Failed to load certificate: %s" , paths); +return -1 ; + } + +if (init_cert_x509_der (size, buf, qcert) <0 ) { +error_report ("Failed to initialize certificate: %s" , paths); +return -1 ; + } + +/* +* Left justified certificate name with padding on the right with blanks. +* Convert certificate name to EBCDIC. +*/ +strpadcpy (vc_name,VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES , filename,' ' ); +ebcdic_put ((*qcert)->vc_name, vc_name,VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES ); + +return 0 ; +} + +static void update_cert_store (S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store, +S390IPLCertificate *qcert) +{ +size_t data_size; + + data_size = qcert->size + qcert->key_id_size + qcert->hash_size; + +if (cert_store->max_cert_size < data_size) { + cert_store->max_cert_size = data_size; + } + + cert_store->certs[cert_store->count] = *qcert; + cert_store->total_bytes += data_size; + cert_store->count++; +} + +static GPtrArray *get_cert_paths (void ) +{ +const char *path; +gchar **paths; +int path_type; +GDir *dir =NULL ; +const gchar *filename; +GPtrArray *cert_path_builder; + + cert_path_builder =g_ptr_array_new (); + + path =s390_get_boot_certificates (); +if (path ==NULL ) { +return cert_path_builder; + } + + paths =g_strsplit (path,":" ,-1 ); +while (*paths) { +/* skip empty certificate path */ +if (!strcmp (*paths,"" )) { + paths +=1 ; +continue ; + } + + path_type =check_path_type (*paths); +if (path_type ==S_IFREG ) { +g_ptr_array_add (cert_path_builder, (gpointer) *paths); + }else if (path_type ==S_IFDIR ) { + dir =g_dir_open (*paths,0 ,NULL ); + +while ((filename =g_dir_read_name (dir))) { +gchar *cert_path =NULL ; + cert_path =g_build_filename (*paths, filename,NULL ); +g_ptr_array_add (cert_path_builder, (gpointer ) cert_path); + } + +g_dir_close (dir); + } + + paths +=1 ; + } + +return cert_path_builder; +} + +void s390_ipl_create_cert_store (S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store) +{ +GPtrArray *cert_path_builder; + + cert_path_builder =get_cert_paths (); +if (cert_path_builder->len ==0 ) { +g_ptr_array_free (cert_path_builder, true); +return ; + } + + cert_store->max_cert_size =0 ; + cert_store->total_bytes =0 ; + +for (int i =0 ; i < cert_path_builder->len; i++) { +S390IPLCertificate *qcert =NULL ; +if (init_cert ((char *) cert_path_builder->pdata[i], &qcert) <0 ) { +continue ; + } + +update_cert_store (cert_store, qcert); + } + +g_ptr_array_free (cert_path_builder, true); +}
hw/s390x/cert-store.h new file +50 -0
50 lines not on this page · raw message
hw/s390x/ipl.c +9 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@#include "qemu/option.h" #include "qemu/ctype.h" #include "standard-headers/linux/virtio_ids.h" +#include "cert-store.h" #define KERN_IMAGE_START 0x010000UL#define LINUX_MAGIC_ADDR 0x010008UL
@@ -423,6 +424,13 @@ void s390_ipl_convert_loadparm(char *ascii_lp, uint8_t *ebcdic_lp) } } +S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store (void ) +{ +S390IPLState *ipl =get_ipl_device (); + +return &ipl->cert_store; +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;
@@ -716,6 +724,7 @@ void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu)if (!ipl->kernel || ipl->iplb_valid) { cpu->env.psw.addr = ipl->bios_start_addr; +s390_ipl_create_cert_store (&ipl->cert_store);if (!ipl->iplb_valid) { ipl->iplb_valid =s390_init_all_iplbs (ipl); }else {
hw/s390x/ipl.h +3 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#ifndef HW_S390_IPL_H #define HW_S390_IPL_H +#include "cert-store.h" #include "cpu.h" #include "exec/address-spaces.h" #include "hw/qdev-core.h"
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ int s390_ipl_pv_unpack(void);void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu (S390CPU *cpu);IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb (void );IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb_pv (void ); +S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store (void );enum s390_reset {/* default is a reset not triggered by a CPU e.g. issued by QMP */
@@ -59,6 +61,7 @@ struct S390IPLState {IplParameterBlock iplb;IplParameterBlock iplb_pv;QemuIplParameters qipl; +S390IPLCertificateStore cert_store;uint64_t start_addr;uint64_t compat_start_addr;uint64_t bios_start_addr;
hw/s390x/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ s390x_ss.add(files( 'sclpcpu.c', 'sclpquiesce.c', 'tod.c', + 'cert-store.c', )) s390x_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_KVM', if_true: files( 'tod-kvm.c',
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +3 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@#define LOADPARM_LEN 8#define NO_LOADPARM "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0" +#define MAX_CERTIFICATES 64 +#define CERT_MAX_SIZE (1024 * 8) +/* * The QEMU IPL Parameters will be stored at absolute address * 204 (0xcc) which means it is 32-bit word aligned but not
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 02/24] hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
Quoted 10 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Create a certificate store for boot certificates used for secure IPL.
Load certificates from the -boot-certificate option into the cert store.
Currently, only x509 certificates in DER format and uses SHA-256 hashing algorithm are supported, as these are the types required for secure boot on s390.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>---
...
Quoted 5 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +5
-0+static size_t cert2buf (char *path,size_t max_size,char **cert_buf) +{ +size_t size; + g_autofree char *buf; + buf =g_malloc (max_size);
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 49
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10
-0+ +if (!g_file_get_contents (path, &buf, &size,NULL ) || + size ==0 || size > max_size) { +return 0 ; + } + + *cert_buf =g_steal_pointer (&buf); + +return size; +}
This function looks quite wrong to me. Why is there a g_malloc() in here if g_file_get_contents() already allocates the memory?
And why do we need a max_size here? If there is a reason, please add a proper comment in the source code.
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +int g_init_cert(uint8_t *raw_cert, size_t cert_size, gnutls_x509_crt_t *g_cert)
Please don't use a "g_" prefix here - otherwise that way the function could be confused with the functions from the glib.
Quoted 9 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +9
-0+{ +int rc; + +if (gnutls_x509_crt_init (g_cert) <0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +gnutls_datum_t datum_cert = {raw_cert, cert_size}; + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (*g_cert, &datum_cert,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER );
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 71
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10
-0+if (rc) { +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (*g_cert); +return rc; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_GNUTLS */ + +static int init_cert_x509_der (size_t size,char *raw,S390IPLCertificate **qcert)
I'd maybe rather use "S390IPLCertificate *" as return type instead of "int" and return a NULL in case of errors.
Quoted 7 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +7
-0+{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +gnutls_x509_crt_t g_cert =NULL ; + g_autofree S390IPLCertificate *q_cert; +size_t key_id_size; +size_t hash_size; +int rc;
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 88
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10
-0+ + rc =g_init_cert ((uint8_t *)raw, size, &g_cert); +if (rc) { +if (rc ==GNUTLS_E_ASN1_TAG_ERROR ) { +error_report ("The certificate is not in DER format" ); + } +return -1 ; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_id (g_cert,GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA256 ,NULL , &key_id_size);
Is that documented somewhere that you can call gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_id() like this? The docs that I found about this function do not say anything about passing NULL here, they rather recommend to use a buffer of size 20 by default?
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 94
Quoted 6 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +6
-0+if (rc !=GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER ) { +error_report ("Failed to get certificate key ID size" ); + goto out; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint (g_cert,GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256 ,NULL , &hash_size);
For this function, the NULL pointer handling is documented, so here it seems to be OK.
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 100
Quoted 6 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +6
-0+if (rc !=GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER ) { +error_report ("Failed to get certificate hash size" ); + goto out; + } + + q_cert =g_malloc (sizeof (*q_cert));
Please use g_new() for allocating memory for structures instead.
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 106
Quoted 6 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +6
-0+ q_cert->size = size; + q_cert->key_id_size = key_id_size; + q_cert->hash_size = hash_size; + q_cert->raw = raw; + q_cert->format =GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ; + *qcert =g_steal_pointer (&q_cert);
If there is no "return" between the allocation and the final "return 0", you can also drop the g_autofree and g_steal_pointer from this function.
Quoted 18 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +18
-0+gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (g_cert); + +return 0 ; +out: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (g_cert); +return -1 ; +#else + error_report("Cryptographic library is not enabled") +return -1 ; +#endif /* #define CONFIG_GNUTLS */ +} + +static int check_path_type (const char *path) +{ +struct stat path_stat; + +stat (path, &path_stat); +
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 135
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10
-0+if (S_ISDIR (path_stat.st_mode)) { +return S_IFDIR ; + }else if (S_ISREG (path_stat.st_mode)) { +return S_IFREG ; + }else { +return -1 ; + } +} + +static int init_cert (char *paths,S390IPLCertificate **qcert)
as with previous function, use "S390IPLCertificate *" as return type instead of "int" ?
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 142
Quoted 7 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +7
-0+{ +char *buf; +char vc_name[VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES ]; +const gchar *filename; +size_t size; + + filename =g_path_get_basename (paths);
g_path_get_basename() returns an allocated string. You've finally got to free it again to avoid leaking memory. I'd suggest declaring filename with g_autofree.
Quoted 44 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +44
-0+ size =cert2buf (paths,CERT_MAX_SIZE , &buf); +if (size ==0 ) { +error_report ("Failed to load certificate: %s" , paths); +return -1 ; + } + +if (init_cert_x509_der (size, buf, qcert) <0 ) { +error_report ("Failed to initialize certificate: %s" , paths); +return -1 ; + } + +/* +* Left justified certificate name with padding on the right with blanks. +* Convert certificate name to EBCDIC. +*/ +strpadcpy (vc_name,VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES , filename,' ' ); +ebcdic_put ((*qcert)->vc_name, vc_name,VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES ); + +return 0 ; +} + +static void update_cert_store (S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store, +S390IPLCertificate *qcert) +{ +size_t data_size; + + data_size = qcert->size + qcert->key_id_size + qcert->hash_size; + +if (cert_store->max_cert_size < data_size) { + cert_store->max_cert_size = data_size; + } + + cert_store->certs[cert_store->count] = *qcert; + cert_store->total_bytes += data_size; + cert_store->count++; +} + +static GPtrArray *get_cert_paths (void ) +{ +const char *path; +gchar **paths; +int path_type; +GDir *dir =NULL ; +const gchar *filename;
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 197
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10
-0+GPtrArray *cert_path_builder; + + cert_path_builder =g_ptr_array_new (); + + path =s390_get_boot_certificates (); +if (path ==NULL ) { +return cert_path_builder; + } + + paths =g_strsplit (path,":" ,-1 );
Free the memory that has been allocated by the g_strsplit at the end of the function?
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 207
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10
-0+while (*paths) { +/* skip empty certificate path */ +if (!strcmp (*paths,"" )) { + paths +=1 ; +continue ; + } + + path_type =check_path_type (*paths); +if (path_type ==S_IFREG ) { +g_ptr_array_add (cert_path_builder, (gpointer) *paths);
... that should likely g_strdup(*paths) when we want to free paths at the end.
Quoted 25 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +25
-0+ }else if (path_type ==S_IFDIR ) { + dir =g_dir_open (*paths,0 ,NULL ); + +while ((filename =g_dir_read_name (dir))) { +gchar *cert_path =NULL ; + cert_path =g_build_filename (*paths, filename,NULL ); +g_ptr_array_add (cert_path_builder, (gpointer ) cert_path); + } + +g_dir_close (dir); + } + + paths +=1 ; + } + +return cert_path_builder; +} + +void s390_ipl_create_cert_store (S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store) +{ +GPtrArray *cert_path_builder; + + cert_path_builder =get_cert_paths (); +if (cert_path_builder->len ==0 ) { +g_ptr_array_free (cert_path_builder, true);
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 242
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10
-0+return ; + } + + cert_store->max_cert_size =0 ; + cert_store->total_bytes =0 ; + +for (int i =0 ; i < cert_path_builder->len; i++) { +S390IPLCertificate *qcert =NULL ; +if (init_cert ((char *) cert_path_builder->pdata[i], &qcert) <0 ) { +continue ;
Maybe invert the logic to call update_cert_store() in case of success, than you don't need the "continue" anymore?
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 249
Quoted 7 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +7
-0+ } + +update_cert_store (cert_store, qcert); + } + +g_ptr_array_free (cert_path_builder, true); +}
Thomas
Re: [PATCH v1 02/24] hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
In reply to Zhuoying CaiQuoted 38 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Create a certificate store for boot certificates used for secure IPL.
Load certificates from the -boot-certificate option into the cert store.
Currently, only x509 certificates in DER format and uses SHA-256 hashing algorithm are supported, as these are the types required for secure boot on s390.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- hw/s390x/cert-store.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ hw/s390x/cert-store.h | 50 ++++++++ hw/s390x/ipl.c | 9 ++ hw/s390x/ipl.h | 3 + hw/s390x/meson.build | 1 + include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 3 + 6 files changed, 315 insertions(+) create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.c create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.hhw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +12
-0@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +/* +* S390 certificate store implementation +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +*/ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" +#include "cert-store.h" +#include "qemu/error-report.h"
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 22
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10
-0+#include "qemu/option.h" +#include "qemu/config-file.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ebcdic.h" +#include "qemu/cutils.h" +#include "cert-store.h" + +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +#include <gnutls/x509.h> +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> +#endif /* #define CONFIG_GNUTLS */
It is bad practice to directly use GNUTLS in any QEMU code except for under the 'crypto/' directory (and its test suites). We must define internal APIs for accessing the info we need and then call those instead of gnutls.
Quoted 66 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +66
-0+ +static const char *s390_get_boot_certificates (void ) +{ +QemuOpts *opts; +const char *path; + + opts =qemu_find_opts_singleton ("boot-certificates" ); + path =qemu_opt_get (opts,"boot-certificates" ); + +return path; +} + +static size_t cert2buf (char *path,size_t max_size,char **cert_buf) +{ +size_t size; + g_autofree char *buf; + buf =g_malloc (max_size); + +if (!g_file_get_contents (path, &buf, &size,NULL ) || + size ==0 || size > max_size) { +return 0 ; + } + + *cert_buf =g_steal_pointer (&buf); + +return size; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +int g_init_cert (uint8_t *raw_cert,size_t cert_size,gnutls_x509_crt_t *g_cert) +{ +int rc; + +if (gnutls_x509_crt_init (g_cert) <0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +gnutls_datum_t datum_cert = {raw_cert, cert_size}; + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_import (*g_cert, &datum_cert,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ); +if (rc) { +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (*g_cert); +return rc; + } + +return 0 ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_GNUTLS */ + +static int init_cert_x509_der (size_t size,char *raw,S390IPLCertificate **qcert) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +gnutls_x509_crt_t g_cert =NULL ; + g_autofree S390IPLCertificate *q_cert; +size_t key_id_size; +size_t hash_size; +int rc; + + rc =g_init_cert ((uint8_t *)raw, size, &g_cert); +if (rc) { +if (rc ==GNUTLS_E_ASN1_TAG_ERROR ) { +error_report ("The certificate is not in DER format" ); + } +return -1 ; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_id (g_cert,GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA256 ,NULL , &key_id_size);
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 98
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10
-0+if (rc !=GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER ) { +error_report ("Failed to get certificate key ID size" ); + goto out; + } + + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint (g_cert,GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256 ,NULL , &hash_size); +if (rc !=GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER ) { +error_report ("Failed to get certificate hash size" ); + goto out; + }
We already have qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint() to avoid direct use of gnutls. That API could be extended to optionally also report the key id.
hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 109
Quoted 11 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +11
-0+ + q_cert =g_malloc (sizeof (*q_cert)); + q_cert->size = size; + q_cert->key_id_size = key_id_size; + q_cert->hash_size = hash_size; + q_cert->raw = raw; + q_cert->format =GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ; + *qcert =g_steal_pointer (&q_cert); + +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (g_cert); +
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
PATCH 3/24 s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDIAG 320 is supported when the certificate-store (CS) facility is installed.
Availability of CS facility is determined by byte 134 bit 5 of the SCLP Read Info block.
--- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 1 + target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +1 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,break ;case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 :clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 )->bit, data); +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 )->bit, data);break ;default :return ;
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1 -0
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 134 (bit numbers relative to byte-134) */ DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") +DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "diag320", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functions") /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2 -0
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)if (s390_is_pv ()) {switch (feat) {case S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 : +case S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 :case S390_FEAT_HPMA2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_F2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_SKEY :
@@ -505,6 +506,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_PTFF_STOUE, S390_FEAT_MULTIPLE_EPOCH }, { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/gen-features.c +1 -0
@@ -696,6 +696,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN14_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_HPMA2 ,S390_FEAT_SIE_KSS ,S390_FEAT_GROUP_MULTIPLE_EPOCH_PTFF , + S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, };#define full_GEN14_GA2 EmptyFeat
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +2 -0
@@ -2487,6 +2487,8 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 , model->features); } +set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 03/24] s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
Quoted 8 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 is supported when the certificate-store (CS) facility is installed.
Availability of CS facility is determined by byte 134 bit 5 of the SCLP Read Info block.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>---
...
Quoted 29 lines
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +1
-0@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,break ;case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 :clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 )->bit, data); +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 )->bit, data);break ;default :return ;target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1
-0@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 134 (bit numbers relative to byte-134) */ DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") +DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "diag320", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functions") /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")target/s390x/cpu_models.c +0
-0
target/s390x/cpu_models.c bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat) · line 251
Quoted 4 lines
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +1
-0@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)if (s390_is_pv ()) {switch (feat) {case S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 : +case S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 :
So secure IPL is not available with secure execution? That's surprising. Could you add a comment to the patch description why this is the case?
target/s390x/cpu_models.c static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) · line 509
Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +1
-0case S390_FEAT_HPMA2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_F2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_SKEY :@@ -505,6 +506,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_PTFF_STOUE, S390_FEAT_MULTIPLE_EPOCH }, { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB },
Please also add a comment to the patch description why this feature needs S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB.
target/s390x/gen-features.c static uint16_t full_GEN14_GA1[] = { · line 699
Quoted 12 lines
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +0
-0{ S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },target/s390x/gen-features.c +1
-0@@ -696,6 +696,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN14_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_HPMA2 ,S390_FEAT_SIE_KSS ,S390_FEAT_GROUP_MULTIPLE_EPOCH_PTFF , + S390_FEAT_DIAG_320,
Is it available with the z14 already? https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/linux-on-systems?topic=linux-secure-boot seems to indicate a z15 instead??
Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/gen-features.c +0
-0};#define full_GEN14_GA2 EmptyFeattarget/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +0
-0
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp) · line 2493
Quoted 7 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +2
-0@@ -2487,6 +2487,8 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 , model->features); } +set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Thomas
Re: [PATCH v1 03/24] s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
Quoted 32 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 8 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 is supported when the certificate-store (CS) facility is installed.
Availability of CS facility is determined by byte 134 bit 5 of the SCLP Read Info block.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>---
...
Quoted 22 lines
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +1
-0@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,break ;case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 :clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 )->bit, data); +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 )->bit, data);break ;default :return ;target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1
-0@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 134 (bit numbers relative to byte-134) */ DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") +DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "diag320", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functions")
Quoted 15 lines
target/s390x/cpu_models.c bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat) · line 251
Quoted 11 lines
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +0
-0/* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")target/s390x/cpu_models.c +1
-0@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)if (s390_is_pv ()) {switch (feat) {case S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 : +case S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 :So secure IPL is not available with secure execution? That's surprising. Could you add a comment to the patch description why this is the case?
Secure IPL is not available for Secure Execution (SE) guests, as their images are already integrity protected, and an additional protection of the kernel by secure IPL is not necessary.
I'll provide more context in the patch description for the next iteration.
Quoted 47 lines
target/s390x/cpu_models.c static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) · line 509
Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +1
-0case S390_FEAT_HPMA2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_F2 :case S390_FEAT_SIE_SKEY :@@ -505,6 +506,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_PTFF_STOUE, S390_FEAT_MULTIPLE_EPOCH }, { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB },Please also add a comment to the patch description why this feature needs
S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB.target/s390x/gen-features.c static uint16_t full_GEN14_GA1[] = { · line 699
Quoted 12 lines
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +0
-0{ S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },target/s390x/gen-features.c +1
-0@@ -696,6 +696,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN14_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_HPMA2 ,S390_FEAT_SIE_KSS ,S390_FEAT_GROUP_MULTIPLE_EPOCH_PTFF , + S390_FEAT_DIAG_320,Is it available with the z14 already?
https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/linux-on-systems?topic=linux-secure-boot seems to indicate a z15 instead??Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/gen-features.c +0
-0};#define full_GEN14_GA2 EmptyFeattarget/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +0
-0target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp) · line 2493
Quoted 7 lines
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +2
-0@@ -2487,6 +2487,8 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 , model->features); } +set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);Thomas
PATCH 4/24 s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility
In reply to Zhuoying CaiFrom: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
DIAGNOSE 320 is introduced to support certificate store facility, which includes operations such as query certificate storage information and provide certificates in the certificate store.
Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query a bitmap of which subcodes are supported.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.h | 1 + include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 19 ++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 14 +++++++++++++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 72 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h
hw/s390x/ipl.h +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include "cpu.h" #include "exec/address-spaces.h" #include "hw/qdev-core.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h" #include "qom/object.h"
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h new file +19 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 320 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or (at +* your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the top-level +* directory. +*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG320_H +#define S390X_DIAG320_H + +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 + +#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 + +#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +36 -0
@@ -192,3 +192,39 @@ out:break ; } } + +void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) +{ +S390CPU *cpu =env_archcpu (env); +uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3]; +uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1]; +int rc; + +if (env->psw.mask &PSW_MASK_PSTATE ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_PRIVILEGED , ra); +return ; + } + +if (r1 &1 ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + +switch (subcode) { +case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : +uint64_t ism =0 ; + +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, (uint8_t )r1, &ism, +be64_to_cpu (sizeof (ism)))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } + + rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ; +break ; +default : +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc; +}
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +14 -0
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@#define DIAG_TIMEREVENT 0x288#define DIAG_IPL 0x308#define DIAG_SET_CONTROL_PROGRAM_CODES 0x318 +#define DIAG_CERT_STORE 0x320#define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL 0x500#define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT 0x501
@@ -1561,6 +1562,16 @@ static void handle_diag_318(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run) } } +static void kvm_handle_diag_320 (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run) +{ +uint64_t r1, r3; + + r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x00f0 ) >>4 ; + r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x000f ; + +handle_diag_320 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); +} +#define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffffstatic int handle_diag (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run,uint32_t ipb)
@@ -1591,6 +1602,9 @@ static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)case DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT : r =handle_sw_breakpoint (cpu, run);break ; +case DIAG_CERT_STORE : +kvm_handle_diag_320 (cpu, run); +break ;default :trace_kvm_insn_diag (func_code);kvm_s390_program_interrupt (cpu,PGM_SPECIFICATION );
target/s390x/s390x-internal.h +2 -0
@@ -400,6 +400,8 @@ int mmu_translate_real(CPUS390XState *env, target_ulong raddr, int rw,int handle_diag_288 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3);void handle_diag_308 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra); +void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3, +uintptr_t ra);/* translate.c */
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 04/24] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility
Quoted 1 line · Zhuoying Cai
From: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
...
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
So the patch is from Collin, but S-o-b only by you? Looks weird, this should either have an additional S-o-b by Collin, too, or not have that "From:" line at all?
...
Quoted 6 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h new file +0
-0
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h line 9
Quoted 9 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h new file +9
-0@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 320 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]> +* +* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or (at +* your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the top-level +* directory.
By the way, new files need a SPDX-License-Identifier nowadays to make scripts/checkpatch.pl happy.
Quoted 15 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h new file +10
-0+*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG320_H +#define S390X_DIAG320_H + +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 + +#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 + +#endif target/s390x/diag.c +0
-0
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 201
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0@@ -192,3 +192,39 @@ out:break ; } } + +void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) +{ +S390CPU *cpu =env_archcpu (env); +uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3]; +uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1]; +int rc;
Do we also need a s390_has_feat(S390_FEAT_DIAG_320) check here?
Quoted 5 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +5
-0+if (env->psw.mask &PSW_MASK_PSTATE ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_PRIVILEGED , ra); +return ; + } +
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 217
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+if (r1 &1 ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + +switch (subcode) { +case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : +uint64_t ism =0 ; + + if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, (uint8_t)r1, &ism,
I think you could drop the (uint8_t) here?
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 218
Quoted 1 line
target/s390x/diag.c +1
-0+ be64_to_cpu(sizeof(ism)))) {
be64_to_cpu() looks very wrong here!
Thomas
Re: [PATCH v1 04/24] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility
Quoted 9 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 1 line · Zhuoying Cai
From: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
...
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>So the patch is from Collin, but S-o-b only by you? Looks weird, this should either have an additional S-o-b by Collin, too, or not have that "From:" line at all?
Joy took over the bulk of this item as I had to shift priorities. The initial version of this patch was mine, but the work now reflects hers. The "from" line should not be there.
@Joy, when you go through your rebasing/patch fixup, make sure this gets a git commit ... --reset-author so it reflects you as the proper owner.
[...]
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH 5/24 s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check
In reply to Zhuoying CaiFrom: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
Create a function to validate the address parameter of DIAGNOSE.
Refactor the function for reuse in the next patch, which allows address validation in read or write operation of DIAGNOSE.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.h | 6 ++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
hw/s390x/ipl.h +6 -0
@@ -114,6 +114,12 @@ QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong");#define S390_IPLB_MIN_FCP_LEN 384#define S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN 200 +static inline bool diag_parm_addr_valid (uint64_t addr,size_t size,bool write) +{ +return address_space_access_valid (&address_space_memory, addr, + size, write,MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED ); +} +static inline bool iplb_valid_len (IplParameterBlock *iplb) {return be32_to_cpu (iplb->len) <=sizeof (IplParameterBlock);
target/s390x/diag.c +1 -3
@@ -64,9 +64,7 @@ static int diag308_parm_check(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t addr,s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra);return -1 ; } -if (!address_space_access_valid (&address_space_memory, addr, -sizeof (IplParameterBlock), write, -MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED )) { +if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr,sizeof (IplParameterBlock), write)) {s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra);return -1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH 6/24 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully.
--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +25 -0
@@ -13,7 +13,32 @@#define S390X_DIAG320_H #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_320_RC_NOMEM 0x0202 + +#define VCSSB_MAX_LEN 128 +#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128 +#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64 + +#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x4000000000000000 + +struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock { +uint32_t length; +uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint32_t reserved1[6 ]; +uint16_t totalvc; +uint16_t maxvc; +uint32_t reserved3[7 ]; +uint32_t maxvcelen; +uint32_t reserved4[3 ]; +uint32_t largestvcblen; +uint32_t totalvcblen; +uint32_t reserved5[10 ]; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock \ +VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock ;#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +38 -1
@@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ out:void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) {S390CPU *cpu =env_archcpu (env); +S390IPLCertificateStore *qcs =s390_ipl_get_certificate_store ();uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3];uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1];int rc;
@@ -210,7 +211,7 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)switch (subcode) {case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : -uint64_t ism =0 ; +uint64_t ism =DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI ;if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, (uint8_t )r1, &ism,be64_to_cpu (sizeof (ism)))) {
@@ -218,6 +219,42 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)return ; } + rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ; +break ; +case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI : +VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock vcssb; + +if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr,sizeof (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock), + true)) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra); +return ; + } + +if (!qcs || !qcs->count) { + vcssb.length =4 ; + }else { + vcssb.length =VCSSB_MAX_LEN ; + vcssb.version =0 ; + vcssb.totalvc = qcs->count; + vcssb.maxvc =MAX_CERTIFICATES ; + vcssb.maxvcelen =VCE_HEADER_LEN + qcs->max_cert_size; + vcssb.largestvcblen =VCB_HEADER_LEN + vcssb.maxvcelen; + vcssb.totalvcblen =VCB_HEADER_LEN + qcs->count *VCE_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->total_bytes; + } + +if (vcssb.length <128 ) { + rc =DIAG_320_RC_NOMEM ; +break ; + } + +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, (uint8_t )r1, &vcssb, +be64_to_cpu ( +sizeof (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock) + ))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ;break ;default :
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 06/24] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
Quoted 40 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +15
-0@@ -13,7 +13,32 @@#define S390X_DIAG320_H #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_320_RC_NOMEM 0x0202 + +#define VCSSB_MAX_LEN 128 +#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128 +#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64 + +#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x4000000000000000 + +struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock { +uint32_t length; +uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint32_t reserved1[6 ]; +uint16_t totalvc;
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h line 42
Quoted 10 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +10
-0+uint16_t maxvc; +uint32_t reserved3[7 ]; +uint32_t maxvcelen; +uint32_t reserved4[3 ]; +uint32_t largestvcblen; +uint32_t totalvcblen; +uint32_t reserved5[10 ]; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock \ +VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock ;
That's quite a long name, maybe shorten to VerificationCertStorageBlock or something similar?
Quoted 15 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +0
-0#endif target/s390x/diag.c +1
-0@@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ out:void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) {S390CPU *cpu =env_archcpu (env); +S390IPLCertificateStore *qcs =s390_ipl_get_certificate_store ();uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3];uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1];int rc;
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 214
Quoted 5 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +1
-1@@ -210,7 +211,7 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)switch (subcode) {case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : -uint64_t ism =0 ; +uint64_t ism =DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI ;
That likely should be a cpu_to_be64(DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI) instead.
Quoted 19 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +12
-0if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, (uint8_t )r1, &ism,be64_to_cpu (sizeof (ism)))) {@@ -218,6 +219,42 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)return ; } + rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ; +break ; +case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI : +VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock vcssb; + +if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr,sizeof (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock), + true)) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra); +return ; + } + +if (!qcs || !qcs->count) {
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 243
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ vcssb.length =4 ; + }else { + vcssb.length =VCSSB_MAX_LEN ; + vcssb.version =0 ; + vcssb.totalvc = qcs->count; + vcssb.maxvc =MAX_CERTIFICATES ; + vcssb.maxvcelen =VCE_HEADER_LEN + qcs->max_cert_size; + vcssb.largestvcblen =VCB_HEADER_LEN + vcssb.maxvcelen; + vcssb.totalvcblen =VCB_HEADER_LEN + qcs->count *VCE_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->total_bytes;
You also need cpu_to_beXX() for these values here, too.
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 252
Quoted 9 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +9
-0+ } + +if (vcssb.length <128 ) { + rc =DIAG_320_RC_NOMEM ; +break ; + } + + if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, (uint8_t)r1, &vcssb, + be64_to_cpu(
And that be64_to_cpu() is wrong here.
Thomas
Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +5
-0+ sizeof(VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock) + ))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ;break ;default :
Re: [PATCH v1 06/24] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
Quoted 46 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 45 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +20
-0@@ -13,7 +13,32 @@#define S390X_DIAG320_H #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_320_RC_NOMEM 0x0202 + +#define VCSSB_MAX_LEN 128 +#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128 +#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64 + +#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x4000000000000000 + +struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock { +uint32_t length; +uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint32_t reserved1[6 ]; +uint16_t totalvc; +uint16_t maxvc; +uint32_t reserved3[7 ]; +uint32_t maxvcelen; +uint32_t reserved4[3 ]; +uint32_t largestvcblen;
Quoted 9 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h line 42
Quoted 5 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +5
-0+uint32_t totalvcblen; +uint32_t reserved5[10 ]; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock \ +VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock ;That's quite a long name, maybe shorten to VerificationCertStorageBlock or something similar?
I think it would benefit many of the data structures using the "VerificationCertificate" prefix to be short-handed to "VC".
[...]
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v1 06/24] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
In reply to Zhuoying CaiQuoted 91 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +25
-0@@ -13,7 +13,32 @@#define S390X_DIAG320_H #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_320_RC_NOMEM 0x0202 + +#define VCSSB_MAX_LEN 128 +#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128 +#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64 + +#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x4000000000000000 + +struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock { +uint32_t length; +uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint32_t reserved1[6 ]; +uint16_t totalvc; +uint16_t maxvc; +uint32_t reserved3[7 ]; +uint32_t maxvcelen; +uint32_t reserved4[3 ]; +uint32_t largestvcblen; +uint32_t totalvcblen; +uint32_t reserved5[10 ]; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock \ +VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock ;#endif target/s390x/diag.c +16
-1@@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ out:void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) {S390CPU *cpu =env_archcpu (env); +S390IPLCertificateStore *qcs =s390_ipl_get_certificate_store ();uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3];uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1];int rc;@@ -210,7 +211,7 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)switch (subcode) {case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : -uint64_t ism =0 ; +uint64_t ism =DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI ;if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, (uint8_t )r1, &ism,be64_to_cpu (sizeof (ism)))) {@@ -218,6 +219,42 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)return ; } + rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ; +break ; +case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI : +VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock vcssb; + +if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr,sizeof (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock), + true)) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra); +return ; + } + +if (!qcs || !qcs->count) { + vcssb.length =4 ; + }else {
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 245
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ vcssb.length =VCSSB_MAX_LEN ; + vcssb.version =0 ; + vcssb.totalvc = qcs->count; + vcssb.maxvc =MAX_CERTIFICATES ; + vcssb.maxvcelen =VCE_HEADER_LEN + qcs->max_cert_size; + vcssb.largestvcblen =VCB_HEADER_LEN + vcssb.maxvcelen; + vcssb.totalvcblen =VCB_HEADER_LEN + qcs->count *VCE_HEADER_LEN + + qcs->total_bytes; + } +
Do we need this if check below? or can we move it above where we check for !qcs || !qcs->count?
Quoted 15 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +12
-0+if (vcssb.length <128 ) { + rc =DIAG_320_RC_NOMEM ; +break ; + } + +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, (uint8_t )r1, &vcssb, +be64_to_cpu ( +sizeof (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock) + ))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ;break ;default :
PATCH 7/24 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
In reply to Zhuoying CaiDIAG 320 subcode 2 provides certificates that are in the certificate store.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The verification-certificate-block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. VCB includes a common header followed by zero or more verification-certificate entries (VCEs).
--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 59 +++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 227 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 285 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +59 -0
@@ -14,15 +14,24 @@#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC 2#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001#define DIAG_320_RC_NOMEM 0x0202 +#define DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCB_LEN 0x0204 +#define DIAG_320_RC_BAD_RANGE 0x0302#define VCSSB_MAX_LEN 128#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x4000000000000000 +#define DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC 0x2000000000000000 + +#define DIAG_320_VCE_FLAGS_VALID 0x80 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_KEYTYPE_SELF_DESCRIBING 0 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_FORMAT_X509_DER 1 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_HASHTYPE_SHA2_256 1struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock {uint32_t length;
@@ -41,4 +50,54 @@ struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock {typedef struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock \VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock ; +struct vcb_header { +uint32_t vcbinlen; +uint32_t reserved0; +uint16_t fvci; +uint16_t lvci; +uint32_t reserved1; +uint32_t cstoken; +uint32_t reserved2[3 ]; +uint32_t vcboutlen; +uint8_t reserved3[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint16_t svcc; +uint16_t rvcc; +uint32_t reserved4[5 ]; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct vcb_header vcb_header ; + +struct VerficationCertificateBlock { +vcb_header vcb_hdr; +uint8_t vcb_buf[]; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct VerficationCertificateBlock VerficationCertificateBlock ; + +struct vce_header { +uint32_t len; +uint8_t flags; +uint8_t keytype; +uint16_t certidx; +uint32_t name[16 ]; +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved0; +uint16_t keyidlen; +uint8_t reserved1; +uint8_t hashtype; +uint16_t hashlen; +uint32_t reserved2; +uint32_t certlen; +uint32_t reserved3[2 ]; +uint16_t hashoffset; +uint16_t certoffset; +uint32_t reserved4[7 ]; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct vce_header vce_header ; + +struct VerificationCertificateEntry { +vce_header vce_hdr; +uint8_t cert_data_buf[]; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct VerificationCertificateEntry VerificationCertificateEntry ; +#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +226 -1
251 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 07/24] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
Quoted 10 lines · Zhuoying Cai
DIAG 320 subcode 2 provides certificates that are in the certificate store.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.
The verification-certificate-block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. VCB includes a common header followed by zero or more verification-certificate entries (VCEs).
Please add a comment stating that only x509 certificates in DER format and SHA-256 hash type are recognized.
Further, I would further explain what this 320 SC 2 implementation is doing either in this commit message or where appropriate as comments:
- DIAG 320 uses a one-origin index for cert entries
- Describe the data structures in some more detail (mainly the more
obscure fields)
- Describe why the VCB header is written to userspace last
- Describe which fields are taken from the certificate and stored in
the data structures
- State that these certificates are retrieved from your cert store impl
Quoted 44 lines
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h | 59 +++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 227 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 285 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +14
-0@@ -14,15 +14,24 @@#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM 0#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI 1 +#define DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC 2#define DIAG_320_RC_OK 0x0001#define DIAG_320_RC_NOMEM 0x0202 +#define DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCB_LEN 0x0204 +#define DIAG_320_RC_BAD_RANGE 0x0302#define VCSSB_MAX_LEN 128#define VCE_HEADER_LEN 128#define VCB_HEADER_LEN 64#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI 0x4000000000000000 +#define DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC 0x2000000000000000 + +#define DIAG_320_VCE_FLAGS_VALID 0x80 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_KEYTYPE_SELF_DESCRIBING 0 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_FORMAT_X509_DER 1 +#define DIAG_320_VCE_HASHTYPE_SHA2_256 1struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock {uint32_t length;@@ -41,4 +50,54 @@ struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock {typedef struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock \VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock ; +struct vcb_header { +uint32_t vcbinlen; +uint32_t reserved0; + uint16_t fvci;> + uint16_t lvci; +uint32_t reserved1;
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock { · line 67
Quoted 10 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +10
-0+uint32_t cstoken; +uint32_t reserved2[3 ]; +uint32_t vcboutlen; +uint8_t reserved3[3 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint16_t svcc; +uint16_t rvcc; +uint32_t reserved4[5 ]; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct vcb_header vcb_header ;
s/vcbinlen/in_len
s/vcboutlen/out_len
s/fvci/first_vc_index
s/lvci/last_vc_index
s/cstoken/cs_token, which I guess we don't make use of at all... does it make sense to just remove it and combine the reserved fields?
s/svcc/stored_ct
s/rvcc/remain_ct
This will make things much easier to understand.
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock { · line 72
Quoted 4 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +4
-0+ +struct VerficationCertificateBlock { +vcb_header vcb_hdr; +uint8_t vcb_buf[];
s/vcb_buf/vce_buf
What is the justification of having a separate header struct? Can't we just put everything in the VerificationCertificateBlock? It would make some of the accessing in the functions below a LOT cleaner.
Quoted 11 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +11
-0+}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct VerficationCertificateBlock VerficationCertificateBlock ; + +struct vce_header { +uint32_t len; +uint8_t flags; +uint8_t keytype; +uint16_t certidx; +uint32_t name[16 ]; +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved0;
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock { · line 93
Quoted 10 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +10
-0+uint16_t keyidlen; +uint8_t reserved1; +uint8_t hashtype; +uint16_t hashlen; +uint32_t reserved2; +uint32_t certlen; +uint32_t reserved3[2 ]; +uint16_t hashoffset; +uint16_t certoffset; +uint32_t reserved4[7 ];
Use underscores to separate words in these fields to make them easier on the eyes.
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h struct VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock { · line 99
Quoted 6 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +6
-0+}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct vce_header vce_header ; + +struct VerificationCertificateEntry { +vce_header vce_hdr; +uint8_t cert_data_buf[];
s/cert_data_buf/cert_buf
and same comments as above w.r.t. to putting all header fields in here
Quoted 27 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +3
-0+} QEMU_PACKED; +typedef struct VerificationCertificateEntry VerificationCertificateEntry ; +#endif target/s390x/diag.c +8
-0@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include "s390x-internal.h" #include "hw/watchdog/wdt_diag288.h" #include "system/cpus.h" +#include "hw/s390x/cert-store.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl.h" #include "hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h" #include "system/kvm.h" @@ -191,6 +192,94 @@ out: } } +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +static bool diag_320_is_cert_valid (gnutls_x509_crt_t cert) +{ +time_t now; + +if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_version (cert) <0 ) { +return false;
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 211
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ } + + now =time (0 ); +if (!((gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (cert) < now) && + (gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (cert) > now))) { +return false; + } + +return true; +}
qcrypto_tls_creds_check_cert_times may suffice for now.
Quoted 59 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +59
-0+#endif /* CONFIG_GNUTLS */ + +static int diag_320_get_cert_info (VerificationCertificateEntry *vce, +S390IPLCertificate qcert,bool *is_valid, +unsigned char **key_id_data,void **hash_data) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +unsigned int algo; +unsigned int bits; +int hash_type; +int rc; + +gnutls_x509_crt_t g_cert =NULL ; +if (g_init_cert ((uint8_t *)qcert.raw, qcert.size, &g_cert)) { +return -1 ; + } + +/* VCE flag (validity) */ + *is_valid =diag_320_is_cert_valid (g_cert); + +/* key-type */ + algo =gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm (g_cert, &bits); +if (algo ==GNUTLS_PK_RSA ) { + vce->vce_hdr.keytype =DIAG_320_VCE_KEYTYPE_SELF_DESCRIBING ; + } + +/* VC format */ +if (qcert.format ==GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ) { + vce->vce_hdr.format =DIAG_320_VCE_FORMAT_X509_DER ; + } + +/* key id and key id len */ + *key_id_data =g_malloc0 (qcert.key_id_size); + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_id (g_cert,GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA256 , + *key_id_data, &qcert.key_id_size); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_report ("Fail to retrieve certificate key ID" ); + goto out; + } + vce->vce_hdr.keyidlen = (uint16_t )qcert.key_id_size; + +/* hash type */ + hash_type =gnutls_x509_crt_get_signature_algorithm (g_cert); +if (hash_type ==GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_SHA256 ) { + vce->vce_hdr.hashtype =DIAG_320_VCE_HASHTYPE_SHA2_256 ; + } + +/* hash and hash len */ + *hash_data =g_malloc0 (qcert.hash_size); + rc =gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint (g_cert,GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256 , + *hash_data, &qcert.hash_size); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_report ("Fail to retrieve certificate hash" ); + goto out; + } + vce->vce_hdr.hashlen = (uint16_t )qcert.hash_size; + +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (g_cert); +
target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 280
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+return 0 ; +out: +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (g_cert); +g_free (*key_id_data); +g_free (*hash_data); + +return -1 ; +#else +return -1 ; +#endif /* CONFIG_GNUTLS */
As per Daniel's suggestion, let's move all gnutls functions to somewhere in the crypto/* directory. There seems to be a file aptly titled "x509-utils.c" that may be a good starting point to contribute to.
A lot of this function should get offloaded to new/existing qcrypto functions, so I'll reserve my comments for now.
Quoted 26 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +11
-1+} +void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) {S390CPU *cpu =env_archcpu (env);@@ -211,7 +300,7 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)switch (subcode) {case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM : -uint64_t ism =DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI ; +uint64_t ism =DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI |DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC ;if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, (uint8_t )r1, &ism,be64_to_cpu (sizeof (ism)))) {@@ -257,6 +346,142 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) } rc =DIAG_320_RC_OK ;break ; +case DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC : +VerficationCertificateBlock *vcb; +size_t vce_offset =VCB_HEADER_LEN ; +size_t remaining_space; +size_t vce_hdr_offset; +int i; + +unsigned char *key_id_data =NULL ;
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 366
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+void *hash_data =NULL ; +bool is_valid = false; + + vcb =g_new0 (VerficationCertificateBlock,1 ); +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read (cpu, addr, (uint8_t )r1, vcb,sizeof (*vcb))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } + +if (vcb->vcb_hdr.vcbinlen %4096 !=0 ) {
I think you want to use TARGET_PAGE_MASK here instead of the explicit 4096.
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 372
Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +6
-0+ rc =DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCB_LEN ; +g_free (vcb); +break ; + } + +if (1 > vcb->vcb_hdr.fvci || vcb->vcb_hdr.fvci > vcb->vcb_hdr.lvci) {
This is no longer entirely correct for vc index 0. If first and last indexes are both 0, no certificates are returned and rc should be OK. We may not use this feature in this patch series, but we need to be compliant.
Additionally, it's valid to have first == 0 and last > first. In this case, index 0 is skipped since the DIAG 320 cert store uses a one-origin index.
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 382
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ rc =DIAG_320_RC_BAD_RANGE ; +g_free (vcb); +break ; + } + + vcb->vcb_hdr.vcboutlen =VCB_HEADER_LEN ; + vcb->vcb_hdr.version =0 ; + vcb->vcb_hdr.svcc =0 ; + vcb->vcb_hdr.rvcc =0 ; +
g_new0 initalizes all fields to 0, so no need to do that here.
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
Quoted 4 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +4
-0+ remaining_space = vcb->vcb_hdr.vcbinlen -VCB_HEADER_LEN ; + +for (i = vcb->vcb_hdr.fvci -1 ; i < vcb->vcb_hdr.lvci; i++) { + VerificationCertificateEntry vce;> +
S390IPLCertificate qcert;
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 395
Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +8
-0+ +/* +* If cert index goes beyond the highest cert +* store index (count - 1), then exit early +*/ +if (i >= qcs->count) { +break ; + }
May make sense to just toss this in with the loop condition and then initialize qcert = qcs->certs[i]; above.
Quoted 41 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +41
-0+ + qcert = qcs->certs[i]; + +/* +* If there is no more space to store the cert, +* set the remaining verification cert count and +* break early. +*/ +if (remaining_space < qcert.size) { + vcb->vcb_hdr.rvcc = vcb->vcb_hdr.lvci - i; +break ; + } + +/* Construct VCE */ + vce.vce_hdr.len =VCE_HEADER_LEN ; + vce.vce_hdr.certidx = i +1 ; + vce.vce_hdr.certlen = qcert.size; + +strncpy ((char *)vce.vce_hdr.name, (char *)qcert.vc_name,VC_NAME_LEN_BYTES ); + + rc =diag_320_get_cert_info (&vce, qcert, &is_valid, &key_id_data, &hash_data); +if (rc) { +continue ; + } + + vce.vce_hdr.len += vce.vce_hdr.keyidlen; + vce.vce_hdr.len += vce.vce_hdr.hashlen; + vce.vce_hdr.len += vce.vce_hdr.certlen; + + vce.vce_hdr.hashoffset =VCE_HEADER_LEN + vce.vce_hdr.keyidlen; + vce.vce_hdr.certoffset =VCE_HEADER_LEN + vce.vce_hdr.keyidlen + + vce.vce_hdr.hashlen; + + vce_hdr_offset = vce_offset; + vce_offset +=VCE_HEADER_LEN ; + +/* Write Key ID */ +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr + vce_offset, (uint8_t )r1, key_id_data, +be16_to_cpu (vce.vce_hdr.keyidlen))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ;
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 446
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ } + vce_offset += vce.vce_hdr.keyidlen; + +/* Write Hash key */ +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr + vce_offset, (uint8_t )r1, hash_data, +be16_to_cpu (vce.vce_hdr.hashlen))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } + vce_offset += vce.vce_hdr.hashlen;
Leading space.
Quoted 20 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +20
-0+ +/* Write VCE cert data */ +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr + vce_offset, (uint8_t )r1, qcert.raw, +be32_to_cpu (vce.vce_hdr.certlen))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + } + vce_offset += qcert.size; + +/* The certificate is valid and VCE contains the certificate */ +if (is_valid) { + vce.vce_hdr.flags |=DIAG_320_VCE_FLAGS_VALID ; + } + +/* Write VCE Header */ +if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr + vce_hdr_offset, (uint8_t )r1, &vce, +be32_to_cpu (VCE_HEADER_LEN ))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + }
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 476
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+ + vcb->vcb_hdr.vcboutlen += vce.vce_hdr.len; + remaining_space -= vce.vce_hdr.len; + vcb->vcb_hdr.svcc++; + +g_free (key_id_data); +g_free (hash_data); + } + +/* Finally, write the header */
/* Write VCB Header */
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0+if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write (cpu, addr, (uint8_t )r1, vcb, +be32_to_cpu (VCB_HEADER_LEN ))) { +s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc (cpu, ra); +return ; + }> + rc = DIAG_320_RC_OK; +g_free (vcb); +break ;default :s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra);return ;
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH 8/24 s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations
In reply to Zhuoying CaiFrom: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
In order to support secure IPL (aka secure boot) for the s390-ccw BIOS, a new s390 DIAGNOSE instruction is introduced to leverage QEMU for handling operations such as signature verification and certificate retrieval.
Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query a bitmap of which subcodes are supported.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.h | 1 + include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 60 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h
hw/s390x/ipl.h +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include "exec/address-spaces.h" #include "hw/qdev-core.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h" #include "qom/object.h"
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h new file +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 508 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Collin Walling <[email protected]> +* +* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or (at +* your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the top-level +* directory. +*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG508_H +#define S390X_DIAG508_H + +#define DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC 0x0000 + +#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +26 -0
@@ -488,3 +488,29 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) } env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc; } + +void handle_diag_508 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) +{ +uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3]; +int rc; + +if (env->psw.mask &PSW_MASK_PSTATE ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_PRIVILEGED , ra); +return ; + } + +if ((subcode & ~0x0ffffULL ) || (r1 &1 )) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + +switch (subcode) { +case DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC : + rc =0 ; +break ; +default : +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc; +}
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +14 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@#define DIAG_CERT_STORE 0x320#define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL 0x500#define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT 0x501 +#define DIAG_SECURE_IPL 0x508#define ICPT_INSTRUCTION 0x04#define ICPT_PROGRAM 0x08
@@ -1572,6 +1573,16 @@ static void kvm_handle_diag_320(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run)handle_diag_320 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); } +static void kvm_handle_diag_508 (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run) +{ +uint64_t r1, r3; + + r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x00f0 ) >>4 ; + r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa &0x000f ; + +handle_diag_508 (&cpu->env, r1, r3,RA_IGNORED ); +} +#define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffffstatic int handle_diag (S390CPU *cpu,struct kvm_run *run,uint32_t ipb)
@@ -1605,6 +1616,9 @@ static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)case DIAG_CERT_STORE :kvm_handle_diag_320 (cpu, run);break ; +case DIAG_SECURE_IPL : +kvm_handle_diag_508 (cpu, run); +break ;default :trace_kvm_insn_diag (func_code);kvm_s390_program_interrupt (cpu,PGM_SPECIFICATION );
target/s390x/s390x-internal.h +2 -0
@@ -402,6 +402,8 @@ void handle_diag_308(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra);void handle_diag_320 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra); +void handle_diag_508 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3, +uintptr_t ra);/* translate.c */
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 08/24] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations
Quoted 60 lines · Zhuoying Cai
From: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
In order to support secure IPL (aka secure boot) for the s390-ccw BIOS, a new s390 DIAGNOSE instruction is introduced to leverage QEMU for handling operations such as signature verification and certificate retrieval.
Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query a bitmap of which subcodes are supported.
Signed-off-by Collin Walling <[email protected]>--- hw/s390x/ipl.h | 1 + include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ target/s390x/s390x-internal.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 60 insertions(+)create mode 100644
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.hhw/s390x/ipl.h +1
-0@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include "exec/address-spaces.h" #include "hw/qdev-core.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h" +#include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h" #include "hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h" #include "qom/object.h" include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h new file +17
-0@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* +* S/390 DIAGNOSE 508 definitions and structures +* +* Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. +* Author(s): Collin Walling <[email protected]> +* +* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or (at +* your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the top-level +* directory. +*/ + +#ifndef S390X_DIAG508_H +#define S390X_DIAG508_H + +#define DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC 0x0000 + +#endif target/s390x/diag.c +0
-0
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 495
Quoted 8 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +5
-0@@ -488,3 +488,29 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) } env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc; } + +void handle_diag_508 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) +{ +uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3]; +int rc;
Do we need to check some feature bit here? e.g. check s390_has_feat(S390_FEAT_DIAG_320) here, too?
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+if (env->psw.mask &PSW_MASK_PSTATE ) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_PRIVILEGED , ra); +return ; + } + +if ((subcode & ~0x0ffffULL ) || (r1 &1 )) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } +
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 516
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+switch (subcode) { +case DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC : + rc =0 ; +break ; +default : +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra); +return ; + } + env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc; +}
Thomas
PATCH 9/24 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 2 for signature verification
In reply to Zhuoying CaiFrom: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
DIAG 508 subcode 2 performs signature-verfication on signed components. A signed component may be a Linux kernel image, or any other signed binary. **Verification of initrd is not supported.**
The instruction call expects two item-pairs: an address of a device component, an address of the analogous signature file (in PKCS#7 format), and their respective lengths. All of this data should be encapsulated within a Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock, with the CertificateStoreInfo fields ignored. The DIAG handler will read from the provided addresses to retrieve the necessary data, parse the signature file, then perform the signature-verification. Because there is no way to correlate a specific certificate to a component, each certificate in the store is tried until either verification succeeds, or all certs have been exhausted.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-to-left-most bit of a 2-byte field.
A return code of 1 indicates success, and the index and length of the corresponding certificate will be set in the CertificateStoreInfo portion of the SigVerifBlock. The following values indicate failure:
0x0402: component data is invalid 0x0502: certificate is not in x509 format 0x0602: signature is not in PKCS#7 format 0x0702: signature-verification failed
--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 25 +++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h +25 -0
@@ -13,5 +13,30 @@#define S390X_DIAG508_H #define DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC 0x0000 +#define DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF 0x4000 + +#define DIAG_508_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_508_RC_NO_CERTS 0x0102 +#define DIAG_508_RC_CERT_NOT_FOUND 0x0202 +#define DIAG_508_RC_NO_MEM_FOR_CERT 0x0302 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_COMP_DATA 0x0402 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_X509_CERT 0x0502 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_PKCS7_SIG 0x0602 +#define DIAG_508_RC_FAIL_VERIF 0x0702 + +struct Diag508CertificateStoreInfo { +uint8_t idx; +uint64_t len; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct Diag508CertificateStoreInfo Diag508CertificateStoreInfo ; + +struct Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock { +Diag508CertificateStoreInfo csi; +uint64_t comp_len; +uint64_t comp_addr; +uint64_t sig_len; +uint64_t sig_addr; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock ;#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +130 -1
152 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 09/24] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 2 for signature verification
Quoted 97 lines · Zhuoying Cai
From: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
DIAG 508 subcode 2 performs signature-verfication on signed components. A signed component may be a Linux kernel image, or any other signed binary. **Verification of initrd is not supported.**
The instruction call expects two item-pairs: an address of a device component, an address of the analogous signature file (in PKCS#7 format), and their respective lengths. All of this data should be encapsulated within a Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock, with the CertificateStoreInfo fields ignored. The DIAG handler will read from the provided addresses to retrieve the necessary data, parse the signature file, then perform the signature-verification. Because there is no way to correlate a specific certificate to a component, each certificate in the store is tried until either verification succeeds, or all certs have been exhausted.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-to-left-most bit of a 2-byte field.
A return code of 1 indicates success, and the index and length of the corresponding certificate will be set in the CertificateStoreInfo portion of the SigVerifBlock. The following values indicate failure:
0x0402: component data is invalid 0x0502: certificate is not in x509 format 0x0602: signature is not in PKCS#7 format 0x0702: signature-verification failedSigned-off-by Collin Walling <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 25 +++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h +25
-0@@ -13,5 +13,30 @@#define S390X_DIAG508_H #define DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC 0x0000 +#define DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF 0x4000 + +#define DIAG_508_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_508_RC_NO_CERTS 0x0102 +#define DIAG_508_RC_CERT_NOT_FOUND 0x0202 +#define DIAG_508_RC_NO_MEM_FOR_CERT 0x0302 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_COMP_DATA 0x0402 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_X509_CERT 0x0502 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_PKCS7_SIG 0x0602 +#define DIAG_508_RC_FAIL_VERIF 0x0702 + +struct Diag508CertificateStoreInfo { +uint8_t idx; +uint64_t len; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct Diag508CertificateStoreInfo Diag508CertificateStoreInfo ; + +struct Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock { +Diag508CertificateStoreInfo csi; +uint64_t comp_len; +uint64_t comp_addr; +uint64_t sig_len; +uint64_t sig_addr; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock ;#endif target/s390x/diag.c +12
-0@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@#include "target/s390x/kvm/pv.h" #include "qemu/error-report.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +#include <gnutls/x509.h> +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> +#include <gnutls/pkcs7.h> +#endif /* CONFIG_GNUTLS */ int handle_diag_288 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3) {@@ -489,9 +494,67 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +#define datum_init (datum, data, size) \ + datum = (gnutls_datum_t){data, size} + +static int diag_508_init_comp (gnutls_datum_t *comp, +Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock *svb) +{
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 513
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10
-0+uint8_t *svb_comp =NULL ; + +if (!svb->comp_len || !svb->comp_addr) { +error_report ("No component data." ); +return -1 ; + } + +/* +* corrupted size vs. prev_size in fastbins, occurs during 2nd iteration, +* allocating 1mil bytes.
I don't understand that comment - could you elaborate?
Quoted 50 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +41
-0+*/ + svb_comp =g_malloc0 (svb->comp_len); +cpu_physical_memory_read (svb->comp_addr, svb_comp, svb->comp_len); + +/* +* Component data is not written back to the caller, +* so no need to do a deep copy. Comp is freed when +* svb is freed. +*/ +datum_init (*comp, svb_comp, svb->comp_len); +return 0 ; +} + +static int diag_508_init_signature (gnutls_pkcs7_t *sig, +Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock *svb) +{ +gnutls_datum_t datum_sig; +uint8_t *svb_sig =NULL ; + +if (!svb->sig_len || !svb->sig_addr) { +error_report ("No signature data" ); +return -1 ; + } + + svb_sig =g_malloc0 (svb->sig_len); +cpu_physical_memory_read (svb->sig_addr, svb_sig, svb->sig_len); + +if (gnutls_pkcs7_init (sig) <0 ) { +error_report ("Failed to initalize pkcs7 data." ); +return -1 ; + } + +datum_init (datum_sig, svb_sig, svb->sig_len); +return gnutls_pkcs7_import (*sig, &datum_sig,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ); + +} +#endif /* CONFIG_GNUTLS */ +void handle_diag_508 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) { +S390IPLCertificateStore *qcs =s390_ipl_get_certificate_store (); +size_t csi_size =sizeof (Diag508CertificateStoreInfo);uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3]; +uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1];int rc;if (env->psw.mask &PSW_MASK_PSTATE ) {@@ -506,7 +569,73 @@ void handle_diag_508(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)switch (subcode) {
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_508(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 579
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +8
-1case DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC : - rc =0 ; + rc =DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ; +break ; +case DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF : +size_t svb_size =sizeof (Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock); +Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock *svb; + +if (!qcs || !qcs->count) { +error_report ("No certificates in cert store." );
Not sure whether we should print an error by default here ... it's likely better to use a trace_...() function here, I think.
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_508(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 591
Quoted 12 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +12
-0+ rc =DIAG_508_RC_NO_CERTS ; +break ; + } + +if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr, svb_size, false) || + !diag_parm_addr_valid (addr, csi_size, true)) { +s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra); +return ; + } + + svb =g_new0 (Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock,1 ); +cpu_physical_memory_read (addr, svb, svb_size);
Do you need to byteswap the read values with be_to_cpuXX() here?
Quoted 39 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +39
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +gnutls_pkcs7_t sig =NULL ; +gnutls_datum_t comp; +int i; + +if (diag_508_init_comp (&comp, svb) <0 ) { + rc =DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_COMP_DATA ; +g_free (svb); +break ; + } + +if (diag_508_init_signature (&sig, svb) <0 ) { + rc =DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_PKCS7_SIG ; +gnutls_pkcs7_deinit (sig); +g_free (svb); +break ; + } + + rc =DIAG_508_RC_FAIL_VERIF ; +/* +* It is uncertain which certificate contains +* the analogous key to verify the signed data +*/ +for (i =0 ; i < qcs->count; i++) { +gnutls_x509_crt_t g_cert =NULL ; +if (g_init_cert ((uint8_t *)qcs->certs[i].raw, qcs->certs[i].size, &g_cert)) { +continue ; + } + +if (gnutls_pkcs7_verify_direct (sig, g_cert,0 , &comp,0 ) ==0 ) { + svb->csi.idx = i; + svb->csi.len = qcs->certs[i].size; +cpu_physical_memory_write (addr, &svb->csi, +be32_to_cpu (csi_size)); + rc =DIAG_508_RC_OK ; +break ; + } + +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (g_cert);
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_508(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 641
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0+ } + +gnutls_pkcs7_deinit (sig); +#else + rc =DIAG_508_RC_FAIL_VERIF ; +#endif /* CONFIG_GNUTLS */ +g_free (svb);break ;default :s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra);
Thomas
Re: [PATCH v1 09/24] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 2 for signature verification
Quoted 102 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 101 lines · Zhuoying Cai
From: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
DIAG 508 subcode 2 performs signature-verfication on signed components. A signed component may be a Linux kernel image, or any other signed binary. **Verification of initrd is not supported.**
The instruction call expects two item-pairs: an address of a device component, an address of the analogous signature file (in PKCS#7 format), and their respective lengths. All of this data should be encapsulated within a Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock, with the CertificateStoreInfo fields ignored. The DIAG handler will read from the provided addresses to retrieve the necessary data, parse the signature file, then perform the signature-verification. Because there is no way to correlate a specific certificate to a component, each certificate in the store is tried until either verification succeeds, or all certs have been exhausted.
The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-to-left-most bit of a 2-byte field.
A return code of 1 indicates success, and the index and length of the corresponding certificate will be set in the CertificateStoreInfo portion of the SigVerifBlock. The following values indicate failure:
0x0402: component data is invalid 0x0502: certificate is not in x509 format 0x0602: signature is not in PKCS#7 format 0x0702: signature-verification failedSigned-off-by Collin Walling <[email protected]>--- include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h | 25 +++++++ target/s390x/diag.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h +25
-0@@ -13,5 +13,30 @@#define S390X_DIAG508_H #define DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC 0x0000 +#define DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF 0x4000 + +#define DIAG_508_RC_OK 0x0001 +#define DIAG_508_RC_NO_CERTS 0x0102 +#define DIAG_508_RC_CERT_NOT_FOUND 0x0202 +#define DIAG_508_RC_NO_MEM_FOR_CERT 0x0302 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_COMP_DATA 0x0402 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_X509_CERT 0x0502 +#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_PKCS7_SIG 0x0602 +#define DIAG_508_RC_FAIL_VERIF 0x0702 + +struct Diag508CertificateStoreInfo { +uint8_t idx; +uint64_t len; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct Diag508CertificateStoreInfo Diag508CertificateStoreInfo ; + +struct Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock { +Diag508CertificateStoreInfo csi; +uint64_t comp_len; +uint64_t comp_addr; +uint64_t sig_len; +uint64_t sig_addr; +}QEMU_PACKED ; +typedef struct Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock ;#endif target/s390x/diag.c +16
-0@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@#include "target/s390x/kvm/pv.h" #include "qemu/error-report.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +#include <gnutls/x509.h> +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> +#include <gnutls/pkcs7.h> +#endif /* CONFIG_GNUTLS */ int handle_diag_288 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3) {@@ -489,9 +494,67 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) env->regs[r1 +1 ] = rc; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +#define datum_init (datum, data, size) \ + datum = (gnutls_datum_t){data, size} + +static int diag_508_init_comp (gnutls_datum_t *comp, +Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock *svb) +{ +uint8_t *svb_comp =NULL ; + +if (!svb->comp_len || !svb->comp_addr) { +error_report ("No component data." );
Quoted 9 lines
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 513
Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +6
-0+return -1 ; + } + +/* +* corrupted size vs. prev_size in fastbins, occurs during 2nd iteration, +* allocating 1mil bytes. I don't understand that comment - could you elaborate?
Elaboration: developer (me) forgot to remove this comment from an early implementation. It is irrelevant to the code presented here, sorry.
If you're curious:
<irrelevant>
I may be incorrect here, but from what I was able to gather, this issue was encountered during a memory allocation, specifically without properly freeing the previous component.
When allocating memory for the 2nd component (also the 2nd invocation/iteration of this function), I would see the "corrupted size vs prev_size in fastbins" error. I think this is because the previous component wasn't properly freed and there was a conflict between the amount of space needed for the new component and however much was available in the fastbins... debugging showed it was requesting 1mil bytes.
This has been corrected.
</irrelevant>
Quoted 49 lines
Quoted 49 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +41
-0+*/ + svb_comp =g_malloc0 (svb->comp_len); +cpu_physical_memory_read (svb->comp_addr, svb_comp, svb->comp_len); + +/* +* Component data is not written back to the caller, +* so no need to do a deep copy. Comp is freed when +* svb is freed. +*/ +datum_init (*comp, svb_comp, svb->comp_len); +return 0 ; +} + +static int diag_508_init_signature (gnutls_pkcs7_t *sig, +Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock *svb) +{ +gnutls_datum_t datum_sig; +uint8_t *svb_sig =NULL ; + +if (!svb->sig_len || !svb->sig_addr) { +error_report ("No signature data" ); +return -1 ; + } + + svb_sig =g_malloc0 (svb->sig_len); +cpu_physical_memory_read (svb->sig_addr, svb_sig, svb->sig_len); + +if (gnutls_pkcs7_init (sig) <0 ) { +error_report ("Failed to initalize pkcs7 data." ); +return -1 ; + } + +datum_init (datum_sig, svb_sig, svb->sig_len); +return gnutls_pkcs7_import (*sig, &datum_sig,GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ); + +} +#endif /* CONFIG_GNUTLS */ +void handle_diag_508 (CPUS390XState *env,uint64_t r1,uint64_t r3,uintptr_t ra) { +S390IPLCertificateStore *qcs =s390_ipl_get_certificate_store (); +size_t csi_size =sizeof (Diag508CertificateStoreInfo);uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3]; +uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1];int rc;if (env->psw.mask &PSW_MASK_PSTATE ) {@@ -506,7 +569,73 @@ void handle_diag_508(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
Quoted 15 lines
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_508(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 579
Quoted 11 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +8
-1switch (subcode) {case DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC : - rc =0 ; + rc =DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ; +break ; +case DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF : +size_t svb_size =sizeof (Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock); +Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock *svb; + +if (!qcs || !qcs->count) { +error_report ("No certificates in cert store." );Not sure whether we should print an error by default here ... it's likely better to use a trace_...() function here, I think.
The return value is likely sufficient enough, and the caller can decide if it's necessary to print a message or handle it some other way.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +6
-0+ rc =DIAG_508_RC_NO_CERTS ; +break ; + } + +if (!diag_parm_addr_valid (addr, svb_size, false) || + !diag_parm_addr_valid (addr, csi_size, true)) {
Quoted 9 lines
target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_508(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 591
Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +6
-0+s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_ADDRESSING , ra); +return ; + } + + svb =g_new0 (Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock,1 ); +cpu_physical_memory_read (addr, svb, svb_size);Do you need to byteswap the read values with
be_to_cpuXX()here?
For cross-arch compliance, yeah... I'll fix that for next time.
Quoted 53 lines
Quoted 39 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +39
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS +gnutls_pkcs7_t sig =NULL ; +gnutls_datum_t comp; +int i; + +if (diag_508_init_comp (&comp, svb) <0 ) { + rc =DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_COMP_DATA ; +g_free (svb); +break ; + } + +if (diag_508_init_signature (&sig, svb) <0 ) { + rc =DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_PKCS7_SIG ; +gnutls_pkcs7_deinit (sig); +g_free (svb); +break ; + } + + rc =DIAG_508_RC_FAIL_VERIF ; +/* +* It is uncertain which certificate contains +* the analogous key to verify the signed data +*/ +for (i =0 ; i < qcs->count; i++) { +gnutls_x509_crt_t g_cert =NULL ; +if (g_init_cert ((uint8_t *)qcs->certs[i].raw, qcs->certs[i].size, &g_cert)) { +continue ; + } + +if (gnutls_pkcs7_verify_direct (sig, g_cert,0 , &comp,0 ) ==0 ) { + svb->csi.idx = i; + svb->csi.len = qcs->certs[i].size; +cpu_physical_memory_write (addr, &svb->csi, +be32_to_cpu (csi_size)); + rc =DIAG_508_RC_OK ; +break ; + } + +gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (g_cert);target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_508(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 641
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +7
-0+ } + +gnutls_pkcs7_deinit (sig); +#else + rc =DIAG_508_RC_FAIL_VERIF ; +#endif /* CONFIG_GNUTLS */ +g_free (svb);break ;default :s390_program_interrupt (env,PGM_SPECIFICATION , ra);Thomas
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH 10/24 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe IPL information report block (IIRB) contains information used to locate IPL records and to report the results of signature verification of one or more secure components of the load device.
IIRB is stored immediately following the IPL Parameter Block. Results on component verification in any case (failure or success) are stored.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +62 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,68 @@ extern QemuIplParameters qipl; extern IplParameterBlock iplb __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));extern bool have_iplb; +struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader { +uint32_t len; +uint8_t iirb_flags; +uint8_t reserved1[2 ]; +uint8_t version; +uint8_t reserved2[8 ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader IplInfoReportBlockHeader ; + +struct IplInfoBlockHeader { +uint32_t len; +uint8_t ibt; +uint8_t reserved1[3 ]; +uint8_t reserved2[8 ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplInfoBlockHeader IplInfoBlockHeader ; + +enum IplIbt { +IPL_IBT_CERTIFICATES =1 , +IPL_IBT_COMPONENTS =2 , +}; + +struct IplSignatureCertificateEntry { +uint64_t addr; +uint64_t len; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplSignatureCertificateEntry IplSignatureCertificateEntry ; + +struct IplSignatureCertificateList { +IplInfoBlockHeader ipl_info_header; +IplSignatureCertificateEntry cert_entries[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplSignatureCertificateList IplSignatureCertificateList ; + +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC 0x80 +#define S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_CSV 0x40 + +struct IplDeviceComponentEntry { +uint64_t addr; +uint64_t len; +uint8_t flags; +uint8_t reserved1[5 ]; +uint16_t cert_index; +uint8_t reserved2[8 ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplDeviceComponentEntry IplDeviceComponentEntry ; + +struct IplDeviceComponentList { +IplInfoBlockHeader ipl_info_header; +IplDeviceComponentEntry device_entries[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplDeviceComponentList IplDeviceComponentList ; + +#define COMP_LIST_MAX sizeof(IplDeviceComponentList) +#define CERT_LIST_MAX sizeof(IplSignatureCertificateList) + +struct IplInfoReportBlock { +IplInfoReportBlockHeader hdr; +uint8_t info_blks[COMP_LIST_MAX +CERT_LIST_MAX ]; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplInfoReportBlock IplInfoReportBlock ; +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00#define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02#define S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI 0xff
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH 11/24 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThis patch is necessary because of the architectural design of IPL Parameter Block (IPLB) and IPL Information Report Block (IIRB). IIRB will be introduced in the next patch.
Define a memory space for both IPL Parameter Block (IPLB) and IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) since IIRB is stored immediately following IPLB.
Convert IPLB to pointer and it points to the start of the defined memory space. IIRB points to the end of IPLB.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 12 ++++++++++-- pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c | 6 +++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++--------------- pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c | 8 ++++---- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +10 -2
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@#include <string.h> extern QemuIplParameters qipl; -extern IplParameterBlock iplb __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +extern IplParameterBlock *iplb;extern bool have_iplb;struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader {
@@ -85,6 +85,14 @@ struct IplInfoReportBlock { } __attribute__ ((packed));typedef struct IplInfoReportBlock IplInfoReportBlock ; +struct IplBlocks { +IplParameterBlock iplb; +IplInfoReportBlock iirb; +} __attribute__ ((packed)); +typedef struct IplBlocks IplBlocks ; + +extern IplBlocks ipl_data __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +#define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00#define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02#define S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI 0xff
@@ -127,7 +135,7 @@ static inline bool load_next_iplb(void) qipl.index++; next_iplb = (IplParameterBlock *) qipl.next_iplb; -memcpy (&iplb, next_iplb,sizeof (IplParameterBlock)); +memcpy (iplb, next_iplb,sizeof (IplParameterBlock)); qipl.chain_len--; qipl.next_iplb = qipl.next_iplb +sizeof (IplParameterBlock);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c +3 -3
@@ -43,11 +43,11 @@ int jump_to_IPL_code(uint64_t address)* The IPLB for QEMU SCSI type devices must be rebuilt during re-ipl. The * iplb.devno is set to the boot position of the target SCSI device. */ -if (iplb.pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI ) { - iplb.devno = qipl.index; +if (iplb->pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI ) { + iplb->devno = qipl.index; } -if (have_iplb && !set_iplb (&iplb)) { +if (have_iplb && !set_iplb (iplb)) {panic ("Failed to set IPLB" ); }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +19 -15
@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@static SubChannelId blk_schid = { .one =1 };static char loadparm_str[LOADPARM_LEN +1 ];QemuIplParameters qipl; -IplParameterBlock iplb __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +/* Ensure that IPLB and IIRB are page aligned and sequential in memory */ +IplBlocks ipl_data; +IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */
@@ -51,7 +53,7 @@ void write_subsystem_identification(void)void write_iplb_location (void ) {if (cutype ==CU_TYPE_VIRTIO &&virtio_get_device_type () !=VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { - lowcore->ptr_iplb =ptr2u32 (&iplb); + lowcore->ptr_iplb =ptr2u32 (iplb); } }
@@ -162,7 +164,7 @@ static void menu_setup(void)return ; } -switch (iplb.pbt) { +switch (iplb->pbt) {case S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW :case S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI : menu_set_parms(qipl.qipl_flags & BOOT_MENU_FLAG_MASK,
@@ -191,8 +193,8 @@ static void boot_setup(void) {char lpmsg[] ="LOADPARM=[________]\n" ; -if (have_iplb &&memcmp (iplb.loadparm,NO_LOADPARM ,LOADPARM_LEN ) !=0 ) { -ebcdic_to_ascii ((char *) iplb.loadparm, loadparm_str,LOADPARM_LEN ); +if (have_iplb &&memcmp (iplb->loadparm,NO_LOADPARM ,LOADPARM_LEN ) !=0 ) { +ebcdic_to_ascii ((char *) iplb->loadparm, loadparm_str,LOADPARM_LEN ); }else {sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (loadparm_str); }
@@ -216,21 +218,21 @@ static bool find_boot_device(void)VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();bool found = false; -switch (iplb.pbt) { +switch (iplb->pbt) {case S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW : vdev->scsi_device_selected = false; -debug_print_int ("device no. " , iplb.ccw.devno); - blk_schid.ssid = iplb.ccw.ssid &0x3 ; +debug_print_int ("device no. " , iplb->ccw.devno); + blk_schid.ssid = iplb->ccw.ssid &0x3 ;debug_print_int ("ssid " , blk_schid.ssid); - found =find_subch (iplb.ccw.devno); + found =find_subch (iplb->ccw.devno);break ;case S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI : vdev->scsi_device_selected = true; - vdev->selected_scsi_device.channel = iplb.scsi.channel; - vdev->selected_scsi_device.target = iplb.scsi.target; - vdev->selected_scsi_device.lun = iplb.scsi.lun; - blk_schid.ssid = iplb.scsi.ssid &0x3 ; - found =find_subch (iplb.scsi.devno); + vdev->selected_scsi_device.channel = iplb->scsi.channel; + vdev->selected_scsi_device.target = iplb->scsi.target; + vdev->selected_scsi_device.lun = iplb->scsi.lun; + blk_schid.ssid = iplb->scsi.ssid &0x3 ; + found =find_subch (iplb->scsi.devno);break ;default :puts ("Unsupported IPLB" );
@@ -311,10 +313,12 @@ static void probe_boot_device(void)void main (void ) { + iplb = &ipl_data.iplb; +copy_qipl ();sclp_setup ();css_setup (); - have_iplb =store_iplb (&iplb); + have_iplb =store_iplb (iplb);if (!have_iplb) {boot_setup ();probe_boot_device ();
pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c +4 -4
@@ -488,11 +488,11 @@ static bool virtio_setup(void)*/ enable_mss_facility (); -if (have_iplb ||store_iplb (&iplb)) { -IPL_assert (iplb.pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ,"IPL_TYPE_CCW expected" ); - dev_no = iplb.ccw.devno; +if (have_iplb ||store_iplb (iplb)) { +IPL_assert (iplb->pbt ==S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ,"IPL_TYPE_CCW expected" ); + dev_no = iplb->ccw.devno;debug_print_int ("device no. " , dev_no); - net_schid.ssid = iplb.ccw.ssid &0x3 ; + net_schid.ssid = iplb->ccw.ssid &0x3 ;debug_print_int ("ssid " , net_schid.ssid); found =find_net_dev (&schib, dev_no); }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH 12/24 hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block to determine if IPL needs to perform securely and if IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) exists.
Secure boot in audit mode will perform if certificate(s) exist in the key store. IIRB will exist and results of verification will be stored in IIRB.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +20 -0
@@ -431,6 +431,13 @@ S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store(void)return &ipl->cert_store; } +static bool s390_has_certificate (void ) +{ +S390IPLState *ipl =get_ipl_device (); + +return ipl->cert_store.count >0 ; +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;
@@ -488,6 +495,19 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)s390_ipl_convert_loadparm ((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm); iplb->flags |=DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID ; +/* +* Secure boot in audit mode will perform +* if certificate(s) exist in the key store. +* +* IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) will exist +* for secure boot in audit mode. +* +* Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB. +*/ +if (s390_has_certificate ()) { + iplb->hdr_flags |=DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; + } +return true; }
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +5 -1
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@#define MAX_CERTIFICATES 64#define CERT_MAX_SIZE (1024 * 8) +#define DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL 0x40 +#define DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR 0x20 +/* * The QEMU IPL Parameters will be stored at absolute address * 204 (0xcc) which means it is 32-bit word aligned but not
@@ -104,7 +107,8 @@ typedef struct IplBlockQemuScsi IplBlockQemuScsi;union IplParameterBlock {struct {uint32_t len; -uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t hdr_flags; +uint8_t reserved0[2 ];uint8_t version;uint32_t blk0_len;uint8_t pbt;
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 12/24] hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
...snip...
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h line 28
Quoted 12 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +3
-0@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@#define MAX_CERTIFICATES 64#define CERT_MAX_SIZE (1024 * 8) +#define DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL 0x40 +#define DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR 0x20 +
nit: We have a diag308 flag defined here https://github.com/qemu/qemu/blob/master/hw/s390x/ipl.h#L22. It would be easier if we had the flags defined in one place.
Quoted 13 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +2
-1/* * The QEMU IPL Parameters will be stored at absolute address * 204 (0xcc) which means it is 32-bit word aligned but not @@ -104,7 +107,8 @@ typedef struct IplBlockQemuScsi IplBlockQemuScsi;union IplParameterBlock {struct {uint32_t len; -uint8_t reserved0[3 ]; +uint8_t hdr_flags; +uint8_t reserved0[2 ];uint8_t version;uint32_t blk0_len;uint8_t pbt;
PATCH 13/24 hw/s390x/ipl: Set iplb->len to maximum length of IPL Parameter Block
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) immediately follows the IPL Parameter Block (IPLB).
The IPLB struct is allocated 4KB in memory, and iplb->len indicates the amount of memory currently used by the IPLB.
To ensure proper alignment of the IIRB and prevent overlap, set iplb->len to the maximum length of the IPLB, allowing alignment constraints to be determined based on its size.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 6 +++--- hw/s390x/ipl.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +3 -3
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)if (scsi_lp &&strlen (scsi_lp) >0 ) { lp = scsi_lp; } - iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN ); + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); iplb->blk0_len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN -S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN ); iplb->pbt =S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI ;
@@ -471,14 +471,14 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb) iplb->scsi.ssid = ccw_dev->sch->ssid &3 ;break ;case CCW_DEVTYPE_VFIO : - iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN ); + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); iplb->pbt =S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ; iplb->ccw.devno =cpu_to_be16 (ccw_dev->sch->devno); iplb->ccw.ssid = ccw_dev->sch->ssid &3 ;break ;case CCW_DEVTYPE_VIRTIO_NET :case CCW_DEVTYPE_VIRTIO : - iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN ); + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); iplb->blk0_len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN -S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN ); iplb->pbt =S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ;
hw/s390x/ipl.h +1 -0
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong");#define S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN 200#define S390_IPLB_MIN_FCP_LEN 384#define S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN 200 +#define S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN 4096static inline bool diag_parm_addr_valid (uint64_t addr,size_t size,bool write) {
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 13/24] hw/s390x/ipl: Set iplb->len to maximum length of IPL Parameter Block
Quoted 36 lines · Zhuoying Cai
The IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) immediately follows the IPL Parameter Block (IPLB).
The IPLB struct is allocated 4KB in memory, and
iplb->lenindicates the amount of memory currently used by the IPLB.To ensure proper alignment of the IIRB and prevent overlap, set
iplb->lento the maximum length of the IPLB, allowing alignment constraints to be determined based on its size.Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 6 +++--- hw/s390x/ipl.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)hw/s390x/ipl.c +2
-2@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)if (scsi_lp &&strlen (scsi_lp) >0 ) { lp = scsi_lp; } - iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN ); + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); iplb->blk0_len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN -S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN ); iplb->pbt =S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI ;@@ -471,14 +471,14 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb) iplb->scsi.ssid = ccw_dev->sch->ssid &3 ;break ;case CCW_DEVTYPE_VFIO : - iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN ); + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); iplb->pbt =S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ;
hw/s390x/ipl.c static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb) · line 484
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/ipl.c +1
-1iplb->ccw.devno =cpu_to_be16 (ccw_dev->sch->devno); iplb->ccw.ssid = ccw_dev->sch->ssid &3 ;break ;case CCW_DEVTYPE_VIRTIO_NET :case CCW_DEVTYPE_VIRTIO : - iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN ); + iplb->len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN ); iplb->blk0_len =cpu_to_be32 (S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN -S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN ); iplb->pbt =S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW ;
Wouldn't it make sense to only do this iff the secure IPL is also used?
Thomas
Re: [PATCH v1 13/24] hw/s390x/ipl: Set iplb->len to maximum length of IPL Parameter Block
Quoted 43 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 42 lines · Zhuoying Cai
The IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) immediately follows the IPL Parameter Block (IPLB).
The IPLB struct is allocated 4KB in memory, and
iplb->lenindicates the amount of memory currently used by the IPLB.To ensure proper alignment of the IIRB and prevent overlap, set
iplb->lento the maximum length of the IPLB, allowing alignment constraints to be determined based on its size.Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>---
hw/s390x/ipl.c| 6 +++---
hw/s390x/ipl.h| 1 +2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)hw/s390x/ipl.c +1
-1@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb) if (scsi_lp && strlen(scsi_lp) > 0) { lp = scsi_lp; } - iplb->len = cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN); + iplb->len = cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN);
iplb->blk0_len=cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN - S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN);iplb->pbt=S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI;hw/s390x/ipl.c +0
-0@@ -471,14 +471,14 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb) iplb->scsi.ssid = ccw_dev->sch->ssid & 3; break;case
CCW_DEVTYPE_VFIO:
-iplb->len=cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN); +iplb->len=cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN);iplb->pbt=S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW;iplb->ccw.devno=cpu_to_be16(ccw_dev->sch->devno);iplb->ccw.ssid=ccw_dev->sch->ssid& 3; break;
caseCCW_DEVTYPE_VIRTIO_NET:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
case
CCW_DEVTYPE_VIRTIO:
-iplb->len=cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN);
+iplb->len=cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN);iplb->blk0_len=
cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN - S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN);iplb->pbt=S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW;Wouldn't it make sense to only do this iff the secure IPL is also used?
The size of the IPLB struct itself is always the 4K max length, just that most of it is (currently) unused reserved space at the end. With secure IPL this matters for alignment, because the next block (IIRB) must follow immediately after the IPLB in memory, but I think in general the length of the IPLB as a whole should be 4K anyway, since that is what's actually allocated for the IplParameterBlock struct.
Quoted 3 lines
Thomas
PATCH 14/24 s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIntroduce Secure-IPL (SIPL) facility.
Use the abbreviation CBL (Consolidated-Boot-Loader facility at bit 0 of byte 136) to represent bytes 136 and 137 for IPL device facilities of the SCLP Read Info block.
Availability of SIPL facility is determined by byte 136 bit 1 of the SCLP Read Info block.
When SIPL facility is installed, the IPL Parameter Block length must contains value that is multiple of 8 bytes.
--- hw/s390x/sclp.c | 2 ++ include/hw/s390x/sclp.h | 4 +++- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 3 +++ target/s390x/cpu_features.h | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 3 +++ target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 1 + target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 3 +++ 8 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/s390x/sclp.c +2 -0
@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ static void read_SCP_info(SCLPDevice *sclp, SCCB *sccb)if (s390_has_feat (S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB )) {s390_get_feat_block (S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 , &read_info->fac134); +s390_get_feat_block (S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CBL , + read_info->cbl); } read_info->facilities = cpu_to_be64(SCLP_HAS_CPU_INFO |
include/hw/s390x/sclp.h +3 -1
@@ -136,7 +136,9 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint32_t hmfai;uint8_t _reserved7[134 -128 ];/* 128-133 */ uint8_t fac134; -uint8_t _reserved8[144 -135 ];/* 135-143 */ +uint8_t _reserved8; +uint8_t cbl[2 ];/* 136-137 */ +uint8_t _reserved9[144 -137 ];/* 138-143 */ struct CPUEntry entries[];/* * When the Extended-Length SCCB (ELS) feature is enabled the
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +3 -0
@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 )->bit, data);clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 )->bit, data);break ; +case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CBL : +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SIPL )->bit, data); +break ;default :return ; }
target/s390x/cpu_features.h +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ typedef enum {S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 , +S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CBL ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CPU ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_MISC , S390_FEAT_TYPE_PLO,
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +3 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "diag320", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functions") +/* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */ +DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_CBL, 1, "Seucre-IPL facility") + /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)") DEF_FEAT(SIE_SKEY, "skey", SCLP_CPU, 5, "SIE: Storage-key facility")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2 -0
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)case S390_FEAT_SIE_CMMA :case S390_FEAT_SIE_PFMFI :case S390_FEAT_SIE_IBS : +case S390_FEAT_SIPL :case S390_FEAT_CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY :return false;break ;
@@ -507,6 +508,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SIPL, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/gen-features.c +1 -0
@@ -697,6 +697,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN14_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_SIE_KSS ,S390_FEAT_GROUP_MULTIPLE_EPOCH_PTFF ,S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , + S390_FEAT_SIPL, };#define full_GEN14_GA2 EmptyFeat
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +3 -0
@@ -2517,6 +2517,9 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , model->features); +/* Secure-IPL facility is handled entirely within QEMU */ +set_bit (S390_FEAT_SIPL , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 14/24] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility
Quoted 14 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Introduce Secure-IPL (SIPL) facility.
Use the abbreviation CBL (Consolidated-Boot-Loader facility at bit 0 of byte 136) to represent bytes 136 and 137 for IPL device facilities of the SCLP Read Info block.
Availability of SIPL facility is determined by byte 136 bit 1 of the SCLP Read Info block.
When SIPL facility is installed, the IPL Parameter Block length must contains value that is multiple of 8 bytes.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>---
...
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s · line 144
Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +2
-0@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "diag320", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functions") +/* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */ +DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_CBL, 1, "Seucre-IPL facility")
s/Seucre/Secure/
Thomas
Re: [PATCH v1 14/24] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility
In reply to Zhuoying CaiQuoted 5 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Introduce Secure-IPL (SIPL) facility.
Use the abbreviation CBL (Consolidated-Boot-Loader facility at bit 0 of byte 136) to represent bytes 136 and 137 for IPL device facilities of the SCLP Read Info block.
This should *not* be used to label these bytes! This facility is represented by a specific bit on the entire byte, and the other bits are used for multiple things unrelated to CBL.
Just use the generic byte-naming scheme (e.g. fac136) for now until these bits are defined and a better name comes up. Further, you only need byte 136 for the secure IPL bit.
Further, explain the significance for the dependency of ELS in the commit message:
"Byte 136's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency."
Quoted 133 lines
Availability of SIPL facility is determined by byte 136 bit 1 of the SCLP Read Info block.
When SIPL facility is installed, the IPL Parameter Block length must contains value that is multiple of 8 bytes.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- hw/s390x/sclp.c | 2 ++ include/hw/s390x/sclp.h | 4 +++- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 3 +++ target/s390x/cpu_features.h | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 3 +++ target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 1 + target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 3 +++ 8 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)hw/s390x/sclp.c +2
-0@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ static void read_SCP_info(SCLPDevice *sclp, SCCB *sccb)if (s390_has_feat (S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB )) {s390_get_feat_block (S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 , &read_info->fac134); +s390_get_feat_block (S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CBL , + read_info->cbl); } read_info->facilities = cpu_to_be64(SCLP_HAS_CPU_INFO |include/hw/s390x/sclp.h +3
-1@@ -136,7 +136,9 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint32_t hmfai;uint8_t _reserved7[134 -128 ];/* 128-133 */ uint8_t fac134; -uint8_t _reserved8[144 -135 ];/* 135-143 */ +uint8_t _reserved8; +uint8_t cbl[2 ];/* 136-137 */ +uint8_t _reserved9[144 -137 ];/* 138-143 */ struct CPUEntry entries[];/* * When the Extended-Length SCCB (ELS) feature is enabled the target/s390x/cpu_features.c +3
-0@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_318 )->bit, data);clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 )->bit, data);break ; +case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CBL : +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SIPL )->bit, data); +break ;default :return ; }target/s390x/cpu_features.h +1
-0@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ typedef enum {S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134 , +S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CBL ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CPU ,S390_FEAT_TYPE_MISC , S390_FEAT_TYPE_PLO,target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +3
-0@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes") DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "diag320", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functions") +/* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */ +DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_CBL, 1, "Seucre-IPL facility") + /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)") DEF_FEAT(SIE_SKEY, "skey", SCLP_CPU, 5, "SIE: Storage-key facility")target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2
-0@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)case S390_FEAT_SIE_CMMA :case S390_FEAT_SIE_PFMFI :case S390_FEAT_SIE_IBS : +case S390_FEAT_SIPL :case S390_FEAT_CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY :return false;break ;@@ -507,6 +508,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SIPL, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },target/s390x/gen-features.c +1
-0@@ -697,6 +697,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN14_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_SIE_KSS ,S390_FEAT_GROUP_MULTIPLE_EPOCH_PTFF ,S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , + S390_FEAT_SIPL, };#define full_GEN14_GA2 EmptyFeattarget/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +3
-0@@ -2517,6 +2517,9 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)set_bit (S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 , model->features); +/* Secure-IPL facility is handled entirely within QEMU */ +set_bit (S390_FEAT_SIPL , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH 15/24 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
In reply to Zhuoying CaiRefactor to enhance readability before enabling secure IPL in later patches.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +34 -24
@@ -674,6 +674,38 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)return 0 ; } +static int zipl_run_normal (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || + entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + +/* Secure boot is off, so we skip signature entries */ +if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + entry++; +continue ; + } + +if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { +return -1 ; + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > (tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE )) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + } + +if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { +puts ("No EXEC entry" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +write_reset_psw (entry->compdat.load_psw); +return 0 ; +} +/* Run a zipl program */ static int zipl_run (ScsiBlockPtr *pte) {
@@ -700,34 +732,12 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); -while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || - entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { - -/* We don't support secure boot yet, so we skip signature entries */ -if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { - entry++; -continue ; - } - -if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { -return -1 ; - } - entry++; - -if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > (tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE )) { -puts ("Wrong entry value" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } - } - -if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { -puts ("No EXEC entry" ); -return -EINVAL ; +if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; }/* should not return */ -write_reset_psw (entry->compdat.load_psw);jump_to_IPL_code (0 );return -1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH 16/24 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_load_segment function
In reply to Zhuoying CaiMake the address variable a parameter of zipl_load_segment.
Modify this function for reuse in the next patch, which allows loading segment or signature data to the destination memory address.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +2 -4
@@ -613,19 +613,17 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void)* IPL a SCSI disk */ -static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry) +static int zipl_load_segment (ComponentEntry *entry,uint64_t address) {const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE /sizeof (ScsiBlockPtr));ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec;const int bprs_size =sizeof (sec);block_number_t blockno; -uint64_t address;int i;char err_msg[] ="zIPL failed to read BPRS at 0xZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ" ;char *blk_no = &err_msg[30 ];/* where to print blockno in (those ZZs) */ blockno = entry->data.blockno; - address = entry->compdat.load_addr;debug_print_int ("loading segment at block" , blockno);debug_print_int ("addr" , address);
@@ -685,7 +683,7 @@ static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)continue ; } -if (zipl_load_segment (entry)) { +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr)) {return -1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH 17/24 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure boot in audit mode
In reply to Zhuoying CaiEnable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a comp_len variable to store the length of a segment in zipl_load_segment. comp_len variable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.
Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 344 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 9 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 68 +++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 9 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 10 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 43 +++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 + 7 files changed, 486 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +341 -3
@@ -30,6 +30,13 @@/* Scratch space */ static uint8_t sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE*4] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +/* sector for storing certificates */ +static uint8_t certs_sec[CERT_MAX_SIZE *MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +/* sector for storing signatures */ +static uint8_t sig_sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); + +uint8_t vcb_data[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE * 4] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +uint8_t vcssb_data[VCSSB_MAX_LEN] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));const uint8_t el_torito_magic[] ="EL TORITO SPECIFICATION" "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0" ;
@@ -622,6 +629,7 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)int i;char err_msg[] ="zIPL failed to read BPRS at 0xZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ" ;char *blk_no = &err_msg[30 ];/* where to print blockno in (those ZZs) */ +int comp_len =0 ; blockno = entry->data.blockno;
@@ -660,6 +668,9 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)*/ break ; } + + comp_len += (uint64_t )bprs->size * ((uint64_t )bprs[i].blockct +1 ); + address =virtio_load_direct (cur_desc[0 ], cur_desc[1 ],0 , (void *)address);if (!address) {
@@ -669,6 +680,305 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) } }while (blockno); +return comp_len; +} + +int get_vcssb (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock *vcssb) +{ +int rc; + +/* avoid retrieving vcssb multiple times */ +if (vcssb->length ==VCSSB_MAX_LEN ) { +return 0 ; + } + + rc =diag320 (vcssb,DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI ); +if (rc !=DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static inline uint32_t request_certificate (uint64_t *cert,uint8_t index) +{ +VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; +VerficationCertificateBlock *vcb; +VerificationCertificateEntry *vce; +uint64_t rc =0 ; +uint32_t cert_len =0 ; + + vcssb = (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock *)vcssb_data; + vcb = (VerficationCertificateBlock *)vcb_data; + +/* Get Verification Certificate Storage Size block with DIAG320 subcode 1 */ +if (get_vcssb (vcssb)) { +return 0 ; + } + +/* +* Request single entry +* Fill input fields of single-entry VCB +*/ + vcb->vcb_hdr.vcbinlen =ROUND_UP (vcssb->largestvcblen,PAGE_SIZE ); + vcb->vcb_hdr.fvci = index +1 ; + vcb->vcb_hdr.lvci = index +1 ; + + rc =diag320 (vcb,DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC ); +if (rc ==DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { + vce = (VerificationCertificateEntry *)vcb->vcb_buf; + cert_len = vce->vce_hdr.certlen; +memcpy (cert, (uint8_t *)vce + vce->vce_hdr.certoffset, vce->vce_hdr.certlen); +/* clear out region for next cert(s) */ +memcpy (vcb_data,0 ,sizeof (vcb_data)); + } + +return cert_len; +} + +static int cert_table_add (uint64_t **cert_table,uint64_t **cert, +uint64_t cert_len,uint8_t cert_idx) +{ +if (request_certificate (*cert, cert_idx)) { +/* save certificate address to cert_table */ + cert_table[cert_idx] = *cert; +/* update cert address for the next certificate */ + *cert += cert_len; + }else { +puts ("Could not get certificate" ); +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static void cert_list_add (IplSignatureCertificateList *certs,int cert_index, +uint64_t *cert,uint64_t cert_len) +{ +if (cert_index >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +printf ("Warning: Ignoring cert entry [%d] because it's over 64 entires\n" , + cert_index +1 ); +return ; + } + + certs->cert_entries[cert_index].addr = (uint64_t )cert; + certs->cert_entries[cert_index].len = cert_len; + certs->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (certs->cert_entries[cert_index]); +} + +static void comp_list_add (IplDeviceComponentList *comps,int comp_index, +int cert_index,uint64_t comp_addr, +uint64_t comp_len,uint8_t flags) +{ +if (comp_index >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +printf ("Warning: Ignoring comp entry [%d] because it's over 64 entires\n" , + comp_index +1 ); +return ; + } + + comps->device_entries[comp_index].addr = comp_addr; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].len = comp_len; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].flags = flags; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cert_index = cert_index; + comps->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (comps->device_entries[comp_index]); +} + +static int update_iirb (IplDeviceComponentList *comps,IplSignatureCertificateList *certs) +{ +IplInfoReportBlock *iirb; +IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list; +IplSignatureCertificateList *cert_list; + +if (iplb->len %8 !=0 ) { +puts ("IPL parameter block length field value is not multiple of 8 bytes" ); +return -1 ; + } + +/* IIRB immediately follows IPLB */ + iirb = &ipl_data.iirb; + iirb->hdr.len =sizeof (IplInfoReportBlockHeader); + +/* Copy IPL device component list after IIRB Header */ + comp_list = (IplDeviceComponentList *) iirb->info_blks; +memcpy (comp_list, comps, comps->ipl_info_header.len); + +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += comps->ipl_info_header.len; + +/* Copy IPL sig cert list after IPL device component list */ + cert_list = (IplSignatureCertificateList *) (iirb->info_blks + + comp_list->ipl_info_header.len); +memcpy (cert_list, certs, certs->ipl_info_header.len); + +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += certs->ipl_info_header.len; + +return 0 ; +} + +static bool secure_ipl_supported (void ) +{ +if (!sclp_is_sipl_on ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!is_secure_ipl_extension_supported ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL extensions are not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!(sclp_is_diag320_on () &&is_cert_store_facility_supported ())) { +puts ("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +return true; +} + +static void init_lists (IplDeviceComponentList *comps,IplSignatureCertificateList *certs) +{ + comps->ipl_info_header.ibt =IPL_IBT_COMPONENTS ; + comps->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (comps->ipl_info_header); + + certs->ipl_info_header.ibt =IPL_IBT_CERTIFICATES ; + certs->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (certs->ipl_info_header); +} + +static bool check_sig_entry (ComponentEntry *entry,uint32_t *sig_len) +{ +if ((entry +1 )->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD ) { +puts ("Next component does not contain signed binary code" ); +return false; + } + +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, (uint64_t )sig_sec) <0 ) { +return false; + }; + +if (entry->compdat.sig_info.format !=DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT ) { +puts ("Signature is not in DER format" ); +return false; + } + + *sig_len = entry->compdat.sig_info.sig_len; +return true; +} + +static int perform_sig_verf (uint64_t comp_addr,uint64_t comp_len,uint64_t sig_len, +uint64_t *cert_table[],uint64_t **cert, +IplDeviceComponentList *comps, +IplSignatureCertificateList *certs, +int comp_index,int cert_index, +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *)) +{ +uint64_t cert_len =-1 ; +uint8_t cert_idx =-1 ; +bool verified; + + verified =verify_signature (comp_len, comp_addr, sig_len, (uint64_t )sig_sec, + &cert_len, &cert_idx); + +if (verified) { +if (cert_table[cert_idx] ==0 ) { +if (cert_table_add (cert_table, cert, cert_len, cert_idx)) { +return -1 ; + } + } + +puts ("Verified component" ); +cert_list_add (certs, cert_index, cert_table[cert_idx], cert_len); +comp_list_add (comps, comp_index, cert_index, comp_addr, comp_len, +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC |S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_CSV ); + }else { +comp_list_add (comps, comp_index,-1 , comp_addr, comp_len, +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC ); +print_func (verified,"Could not verify component" ); + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +bool found_signature = false; +struct IplDeviceComponentList comps; +struct IplSignatureCertificateList certs; +uint64_t *cert = (uint64_t *)certs_sec; +int cert_index =0 ; +int comp_index =0 ; +int comp_len; +bool valid_sig; +uint32_t sig_len; +/* +* Store address of certificate to prevent allocating +* the same certificate multiple times. +*/ +uint64_t *cert_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; + +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *) =NULL ; + print_func = &IPL_check; + +if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) { +return -1 ; + } + +init_lists (&comps, &certs); + + valid_sig = false; +while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || + entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + +if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + valid_sig =check_sig_entry (entry, &sig_len); +if (!valid_sig) { +return -1 ; + } + }else { + comp_len =zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr); +if (comp_len <0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +if (valid_sig) { +perform_sig_verf (entry->compdat.load_addr, comp_len, sig_len, cert_table, + &cert, &comps, &certs, comp_index, cert_index, + print_func); + + cert_index++; + found_signature = true; +/* +* complete signature verification for current component, +* reset variable for the next signature entry. +*/ + valid_sig = false; + } + + comp_index++; + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > (tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE )) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + } + +if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { +puts ("No EXEC entry" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +if (!found_signature) { +print_func (found_signature,"Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ); + } + +if (update_iirb (&comps, &certs)) { +print_func (false,"Failed to write IPL Information Report Block" ); + } +write_reset_psw (entry->compdat.load_psw); +return 0 ; }
@@ -683,7 +993,7 @@ static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)continue ; } -if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr)) { +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr) <0 ) {return -1 ; }
@@ -731,8 +1041,17 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); -if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { -return -1 ; +switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE : +if (zipl_run_secure (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; + } +break ; +case ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE : +if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; + } +break ; }/* should not return */
@@ -1091,17 +1410,32 @@ static int zipl_load_vscsi(void)* IPL starts here */ +int zipl_mode (void ) +{ +uint32_t cert_len; + + cert_len =request_certificate ((uint64_t *)certs_sec,0 ); + +return (cert_len >0 ) ?ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE :ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE ; +} +void zipl_load (void ) {VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" ); + }ipl_iso_el_torito ();puts ("Failed to IPL this ISO image!" );return ; }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" ); + }netmain ();puts ("Failed to IPL from this network!" );return ;
@@ -1112,6 +1446,10 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("ECKD boot device does not support secure boot!" ); + } +switch (virtio_get_device_type ()) {case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK :zipl_load_vblk ();
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +9 -0
@@ -88,9 +88,18 @@ typedef struct BootMapTable {BootMapPointer entry[]; } __attribute__ ((packed)) BootMapTable; +#define DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT 1 + +typedef struct SignatureInformation { +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved[3 ]; +uint32_t sig_len; +} __attribute__((packed))SignatureInformation ; +typedef union ComponentEntryData {uint64_t load_psw;uint64_t load_addr; +SignatureInformation sig_info; }ComponentEntryData ; typedef struct ComponentEntry {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +68 -0
84 lines not on this page · raw message
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +9 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */ +int boot_mode;#define LOADPARM_PROMPT "PROMPT "#define LOADPARM_EMPTY " "
@@ -272,9 +273,17 @@ static int virtio_setup(void)static void ipl_boot_device (void ) { +if (boot_mode ==0 ) { + boot_mode =zipl_mode (); + } +switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Passthrough (vfio) device does not support secure boot!" ); + } +dasd_ipl (blk_schid, cutype);break ;case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO :
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +10 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64;#define MIN_NON_ZERO (a, b) ((a) == 0 ? (b) : \ ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b))))#endif +#ifndef ROUND_UP +#define ROUND_UP (n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) & -(0 ? (n) : (d))) +#endif #define ARRAY_SIZE (a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))
@@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string);void sclp_set_write_mask (uint32_t receive_mask,uint32_t send_mask);void sclp_setup (void );void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm); +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* virtio.c */
@@ -76,6 +81,11 @@ int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr);/* bootmap.c */ void zipl_load (void ); +#define ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE 1 +#define ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE 2 + +int zipl_mode (void ); +/* jump2ipl.c */ void write_reset_psw (uint64_t psw);int jump_to_IPL_code (uint64_t address);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +43 -0
49 lines not on this page · raw message
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +6 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader { } __attribute__((packed)) SCCBHeader;#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader)) +#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4 +#define SCCB_CBL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;
@@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint8_t rnsize;uint8_t reserved[13 ];uint8_t loadparm[LOADPARM_LEN ]; +uint8_t reserved1[102 ]; +uint8_t fac134; +uint8_t reserved2; +uint16_t cbl; } __attribute__((packed)) ReadInfo; typedef struct SCCB {
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 17/24] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure boot in audit mode
Quoted 159 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a
comp_lenvariable to store the length of a segment inzipl_load_segment.comp_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 344 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 9 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 68 +++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 9 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 10 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 43 +++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 + 7 files changed, 486 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +103
-0@@ -30,6 +30,13 @@/* Scratch space */ static uint8_t sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE*4] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +/* sector for storing certificates */ +static uint8_t certs_sec[CERT_MAX_SIZE *MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +/* sector for storing signatures */ +static uint8_t sig_sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); + +uint8_t vcb_data[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE * 4] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +uint8_t vcssb_data[VCSSB_MAX_LEN] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));const uint8_t el_torito_magic[] ="EL TORITO SPECIFICATION" "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0" ;@@ -622,6 +629,7 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)int i;char err_msg[] ="zIPL failed to read BPRS at 0xZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ" ;char *blk_no = &err_msg[30 ];/* where to print blockno in (those ZZs) */ +int comp_len =0 ; blockno = entry->data.blockno;@@ -660,6 +668,9 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)*/ break ; } + + comp_len += (uint64_t )bprs->size * ((uint64_t )bprs[i].blockct +1 ); + address =virtio_load_direct (cur_desc[0 ], cur_desc[1 ],0 , (void *)address);if (!address) {@@ -669,6 +680,305 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) } }while (blockno); +return comp_len; +} + +int get_vcssb (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock *vcssb) +{ +int rc; + +/* avoid retrieving vcssb multiple times */ +if (vcssb->length ==VCSSB_MAX_LEN ) { +return 0 ; + } + + rc =diag320 (vcssb,DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI ); +if (rc !=DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static inline uint32_t request_certificate (uint64_t *cert,uint8_t index) +{ +VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; +VerficationCertificateBlock *vcb; +VerificationCertificateEntry *vce; +uint64_t rc =0 ; +uint32_t cert_len =0 ; + + vcssb = (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock *)vcssb_data; + vcb = (VerficationCertificateBlock *)vcb_data; + +/* Get Verification Certificate Storage Size block with DIAG320 subcode 1 */ +if (get_vcssb (vcssb)) { +return 0 ; + } + +/* +* Request single entry +* Fill input fields of single-entry VCB +*/ + vcb->vcb_hdr.vcbinlen =ROUND_UP (vcssb->largestvcblen,PAGE_SIZE ); + vcb->vcb_hdr.fvci = index +1 ; + vcb->vcb_hdr.lvci = index +1 ; + + rc =diag320 (vcb,DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC ); +if (rc ==DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { + vce = (VerificationCertificateEntry *)vcb->vcb_buf; + cert_len = vce->vce_hdr.certlen; +memcpy (cert, (uint8_t *)vce + vce->vce_hdr.certoffset, vce->vce_hdr.certlen); +/* clear out region for next cert(s) */ +memcpy (vcb_data,0 ,sizeof (vcb_data)); + } + +return cert_len; +} + +static int cert_table_add (uint64_t **cert_table,uint64_t **cert, +uint64_t cert_len,uint8_t cert_idx) +{ +if (request_certificate (*cert, cert_idx)) { +/* save certificate address to cert_table */ + cert_table[cert_idx] = *cert; +/* update cert address for the next certificate */ + *cert += cert_len; + }else { +puts ("Could not get certificate" ); +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static void cert_list_add (IplSignatureCertificateList *certs,int cert_index, +uint64_t *cert,uint64_t cert_len) +{ +if (cert_index >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +printf ("Warning: Ignoring cert entry [%d] because it's over 64 entires\n" , + cert_index +1 ); +return ; + } + + certs->cert_entries[cert_index].addr = (uint64_t )cert; + certs->cert_entries[cert_index].len = cert_len; + certs->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (certs->cert_entries[cert_index]); +} + +static void comp_list_add (IplDeviceComponentList *comps,int comp_index, +int cert_index,uint64_t comp_addr, +uint64_t comp_len,uint8_t flags) +{ +if (comp_index >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { + printf("Warning: Ignoring comp entry [%d] because it's over 64 entires\n",
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 784
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ comp_index + 1); +return ; + } + + comps->device_entries[comp_index].addr = comp_addr; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].len = comp_len; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].flags = flags; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cert_index = cert_index; + comps->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (comps->device_entries[comp_index]); +}
Use MAX_CERTIFICATES in the warnings as well, rather than hard coding the 64.
Quoted 59 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +59
-0+ +static int update_iirb (IplDeviceComponentList *comps,IplSignatureCertificateList *certs) +{ +IplInfoReportBlock *iirb; +IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list; +IplSignatureCertificateList *cert_list; + +if (iplb->len %8 !=0 ) { +puts ("IPL parameter block length field value is not multiple of 8 bytes" ); +return -1 ; + } + +/* IIRB immediately follows IPLB */ + iirb = &ipl_data.iirb; + iirb->hdr.len =sizeof (IplInfoReportBlockHeader); + +/* Copy IPL device component list after IIRB Header */ + comp_list = (IplDeviceComponentList *) iirb->info_blks; +memcpy (comp_list, comps, comps->ipl_info_header.len); + +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += comps->ipl_info_header.len; + +/* Copy IPL sig cert list after IPL device component list */ + cert_list = (IplSignatureCertificateList *) (iirb->info_blks + + comp_list->ipl_info_header.len); +memcpy (cert_list, certs, certs->ipl_info_header.len); + +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += certs->ipl_info_header.len; + +return 0 ; +} + +static bool secure_ipl_supported (void ) +{ +if (!sclp_is_sipl_on ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!is_secure_ipl_extension_supported ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL extensions are not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!(sclp_is_diag320_on () &&is_cert_store_facility_supported ())) { +puts ("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +return true; +} + +static void init_lists (IplDeviceComponentList *comps,IplSignatureCertificateList *certs) +{ + comps->ipl_info_header.ibt =IPL_IBT_COMPONENTS ; + comps->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (comps->ipl_info_header); +
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 853
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ certs->ipl_info_header.ibt =IPL_IBT_CERTIFICATES ; + certs->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (certs->ipl_info_header); +} + +static bool check_sig_entry (ComponentEntry *entry,uint32_t *sig_len) +{ +if ((entry +1 )->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD ) { +puts ("Next component does not contain signed binary code" ); +return false; + }
I think it is best to avoid accessing the n+1 index directly.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 865
Quoted 12 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +12
-0+ +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, (uint64_t )sig_sec) <0 ) { +return false; + }; + +if (entry->compdat.sig_info.format !=DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT ) { +puts ("Signature is not in DER format" ); +return false; + } + + *sig_len = entry->compdat.sig_info.sig_len; +return true;
This could be simplified with an int return value, and returning the length on success or a negative RC on error.
Quoted 71 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +71
-0+} + +static int perform_sig_verf (uint64_t comp_addr,uint64_t comp_len,uint64_t sig_len, +uint64_t *cert_table[],uint64_t **cert, +IplDeviceComponentList *comps, +IplSignatureCertificateList *certs, +int comp_index,int cert_index, +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *)) +{ +uint64_t cert_len =-1 ; +uint8_t cert_idx =-1 ; +bool verified; + + verified =verify_signature (comp_len, comp_addr, sig_len, (uint64_t )sig_sec, + &cert_len, &cert_idx); + +if (verified) { +if (cert_table[cert_idx] ==0 ) { +if (cert_table_add (cert_table, cert, cert_len, cert_idx)) { +return -1 ; + } + } + +puts ("Verified component" ); +cert_list_add (certs, cert_index, cert_table[cert_idx], cert_len); +comp_list_add (comps, comp_index, cert_index, comp_addr, comp_len, +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC |S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_CSV ); + }else { +comp_list_add (comps, comp_index,-1 , comp_addr, comp_len, +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC ); +print_func (verified,"Could not verify component" ); + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +bool found_signature = false; +struct IplDeviceComponentList comps; +struct IplSignatureCertificateList certs; +uint64_t *cert = (uint64_t *)certs_sec; +int cert_index =0 ; +int comp_index =0 ; +int comp_len; +bool valid_sig; +uint32_t sig_len; +/* +* Store address of certificate to prevent allocating +* the same certificate multiple times. +*/ +uint64_t *cert_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; + +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *) =NULL ; + print_func = &IPL_check; + +if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) { +return -1 ; + } + +init_lists (&comps, &certs); + + valid_sig = false; +while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || + entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + +if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + valid_sig =check_sig_entry (entry, &sig_len); +if (!valid_sig) { +return -1 ; + }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 946
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ }else { + comp_len =zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr); +if (comp_len <0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +if (valid_sig) { +perform_sig_verf (entry->compdat.load_addr, comp_len, sig_len, cert_table, + &cert, &comps, &certs, comp_index, cert_index, + print_func);
Since this function is only called here and rather short anyway, might it be better to do it in-line and avoid needing 9 arguments?
Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +9
-0+ + cert_index++; + found_signature = true; +/* +* complete signature verification for current component, +* reset variable for the next signature entry. +*/ + valid_sig = false; + }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 965
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+ + comp_index++; + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > (tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE )) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }
Is it intended that this check happens after incrementing the entry?
Quoted 348 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +47
-3+ } + +if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { +puts ("No EXEC entry" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +if (!found_signature) { +print_func (found_signature,"Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ); + } + +if (update_iirb (&comps, &certs)) { +print_func (false,"Failed to write IPL Information Report Block" ); + } +write_reset_psw (entry->compdat.load_psw); +return 0 ; }@@ -683,7 +993,7 @@ static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)continue ; } -if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr)) { +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr) <0 ) {return -1 ; }@@ -731,8 +1041,17 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); -if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { -return -1 ; +switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE : +if (zipl_run_secure (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; + } +break ; +case ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE : +if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; + } +break ; }/* should not return */ @@ -1091,17 +1410,32 @@ static int zipl_load_vscsi(void)* IPL starts here */ +int zipl_mode (void ) +{ +uint32_t cert_len; + + cert_len =request_certificate ((uint64_t *)certs_sec,0 ); + +return (cert_len >0 ) ?ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE :ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE ; +} +void zipl_load (void ) {VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" ); + }ipl_iso_el_torito ();puts ("Failed to IPL this ISO image!" );return ; }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" ); + }netmain ();puts ("Failed to IPL from this network!" );return ;@@ -1112,6 +1446,10 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("ECKD boot device does not support secure boot!" ); + } +switch (virtio_get_device_type ()) {case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK :zipl_load_vblk ();pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +9
-0@@ -88,9 +88,18 @@ typedef struct BootMapTable {BootMapPointer entry[]; } __attribute__ ((packed)) BootMapTable; +#define DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT 1 + +typedef struct SignatureInformation { +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved[3 ]; +uint32_t sig_len; +} __attribute__((packed))SignatureInformation ; +typedef union ComponentEntryData {uint64_t load_psw;uint64_t load_addr; +SignatureInformation sig_info; }ComponentEntryData ; typedef struct ComponentEntry {pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +68
-0@@ -16,12 +16,15 @@#define QEMU_PACKED __attribute__((packed))#endif +#include <diag320.h> +#include <diag508.h> #include <qipl.h> #include <string.h> extern QemuIplParameters qipl;extern IplParameterBlock *iplb;extern bool have_iplb; +extern int boot_mode;struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader {uint32_t len;@@ -143,4 +146,69 @@ static inline bool load_next_iplb(void)return true; } +static inline uint64_t diag320 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) +{ + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; + + asmvolatile ("diag %0,%2,0x320\n" + :"+d" (addr),"+d" (rc) + :"d" (subcode) + :"memory" ,"cc" ); +return rc; +} + +static inline uint64_t get_320_subcodes (uint64_t *ism) +{ +return diag320 (ism,DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM ); +} + +static inline bool is_cert_store_facility_supported (void ) +{ +uint64_t d320_ism; +get_320_subcodes (&d320_ism); +return (d320_ism &DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI ) && + (d320_ism &DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC ); +} + +static inline uint64_t _diag508 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) +{ + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; + + asmvolatile ("diag %0,%2,0x508\n" + :"+d" (addr),"+d" (rc) + :"d" (subcode) + :"memory" ,"cc" ); + return rc; +} + +static inline uint64_t get_508_subcodes (void ) +{ +return _diag508 (NULL ,DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC ); +} + +static inline bool is_secure_ipl_extension_supported (void ) +{ +uint64_t d508_subcodes; + + d508_subcodes =get_508_subcodes (); +return d508_subcodes &DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ; +} + +static inline bool verify_signature (uint64_t comp_len,uint64_t comp_addr, +uint64_t sig_len,uint64_t sig_addr, +uint64_t *cert_len,uint8_t *cert_idx) +{ +Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock svb = {{}, comp_len, comp_addr, + sig_len, sig_addr }; + +if (_diag508 (&svb,DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ) ==DIAG_508_RC_OK ) { + *cert_len = svb.csi.len; + *cert_idx = svb.csi.idx; +return true; + } +return false; +} +#endif /* IPLB_H */ pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +9
-0@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */ +int boot_mode;#define LOADPARM_PROMPT "PROMPT "#define LOADPARM_EMPTY " "@@ -272,9 +273,17 @@ static int virtio_setup(void)static void ipl_boot_device (void ) { +if (boot_mode ==0 ) { + boot_mode =zipl_mode (); + } +switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Passthrough (vfio) device does not support secure boot!" ); + } +dasd_ipl (blk_schid, cutype);break ;case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO :pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +10
-0@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64;#define MIN_NON_ZERO (a, b) ((a) == 0 ? (b) : \ ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b))))#endif +#ifndef ROUND_UP +#define ROUND_UP (n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) & -(0 ? (n) : (d))) +#endif #define ARRAY_SIZE (a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))@@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string);void sclp_set_write_mask (uint32_t receive_mask,uint32_t send_mask);void sclp_setup (void );void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm); +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* virtio.c */ @@ -76,6 +81,11 @@ int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr);/* bootmap.c */ void zipl_load (void ); +#define ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE 1 +#define ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE 2 + +int zipl_mode (void ); +/* jump2ipl.c */ void write_reset_psw (uint64_t psw);int jump_to_IPL_code (uint64_t address);pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +43
-0@@ -113,6 +113,49 @@ void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm) } } +static void sclp_get_fac134 (uint8_t *fac134) +{ + +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + *fac134 = sccb->fac134; + } +} + +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ) +{ +uint8_t fac134 =0 ; + +sclp_get_fac134 (&fac134); +return fac134 &SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT ; +} + +/* +* Get cbl (byte 136 and byte 137 of the SCLP Read Info block) for IPL device facilities. +*/ +static void sclp_get_cbl (uint16_t *cbl) +{ + +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + *cbl = sccb->cbl; + } +} + +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void ) +{ +uint16_t cbl =0 ; + +sclp_get_cbl (&cbl); +return cbl &SCCB_CBL_SIPL_BIT ; +} +int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count) {ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +6
-0@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader { } __attribute__((packed)) SCCBHeader;#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader)) +#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4 +#define SCCB_CBL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;@@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint8_t rnsize;uint8_t reserved[13 ];uint8_t loadparm[LOADPARM_LEN ]; +uint8_t reserved1[102 ]; +uint8_t fac134; +uint8_t reserved2; +uint16_t cbl; } __attribute__((packed)) ReadInfo; typedef struct SCCB {
Re: [PATCH v1 17/24] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure boot in audit mode
In reply to Zhuoying CaiQuoted 9 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.
Add a
comp_lenvariable to store the length of a segment inzipl_load_segment.comp_lenvariable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.
Quoted 8 lines
Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).
Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
By the end of this patch series, the secure IPL related functions end up comprising about 1/3 of the code in bootmap.c Pretty neat :) I think that provides a good enough reason to house it all under its own roof, if possible. Maybe a pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c|h
It might make sense to put the diag320 & 508 code in there as well. Please keep functions that relate to a specific facility grouped and aptly named.
I ..think.. zipl_run_secure could go in there as well, not sure atm.
The print_func could be global to the file so you won't need to pass it as a parameter to various functions.
Quoted 47 lines
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 344 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 9 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 68 +++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 9 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 10 ++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 43 +++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 + 7 files changed, 486 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +11
-0@@ -30,6 +30,13 @@/* Scratch space */ static uint8_t sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE*4] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +/* sector for storing certificates */ +static uint8_t certs_sec[CERT_MAX_SIZE *MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +/* sector for storing signatures */ +static uint8_t sig_sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); + +uint8_t vcb_data[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE * 4] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); +uint8_t vcssb_data[VCSSB_MAX_LEN] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));const uint8_t el_torito_magic[] ="EL TORITO SPECIFICATION" "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0" ;@@ -622,6 +629,7 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)int i;char err_msg[] ="zIPL failed to read BPRS at 0xZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ" ;char *blk_no = &err_msg[30 ];/* where to print blockno in (those ZZs) */ +int comp_len =0 ; blockno = entry->data.blockno;@@ -660,6 +668,9 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)*/ break ; } + + comp_len += (uint64_t )bprs->size * ((uint64_t )bprs[i].blockct +1 ); + address =virtio_load_direct (cur_desc[0 ], cur_desc[1 ],0 , (void *)address);if (!address) {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 683
Quoted 4 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +1
-0@@ -669,6 +680,305 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) } }while (blockno); +return comp_len;
This changes the return behavior of the function without really explaining it. You refactor it in a previous patch. I would suggest making the comp_len change there and explain its significance in the commit message.
Quoted 102 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +102
-0+} + +int get_vcssb (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock *vcssb) +{ +int rc; + +/* avoid retrieving vcssb multiple times */ +if (vcssb->length ==VCSSB_MAX_LEN ) { +return 0 ; + } + + rc =diag320 (vcssb,DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI ); +if (rc !=DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static inline uint32_t request_certificate (uint64_t *cert,uint8_t index) +{ +VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; +VerficationCertificateBlock *vcb; +VerificationCertificateEntry *vce; +uint64_t rc =0 ; +uint32_t cert_len =0 ; + + vcssb = (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock *)vcssb_data; + vcb = (VerficationCertificateBlock *)vcb_data; + +/* Get Verification Certificate Storage Size block with DIAG320 subcode 1 */ +if (get_vcssb (vcssb)) { +return 0 ; + } + +/* +* Request single entry +* Fill input fields of single-entry VCB +*/ + vcb->vcb_hdr.vcbinlen =ROUND_UP (vcssb->largestvcblen,PAGE_SIZE ); + vcb->vcb_hdr.fvci = index +1 ; + vcb->vcb_hdr.lvci = index +1 ; + + rc =diag320 (vcb,DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC ); +if (rc ==DIAG_320_RC_OK ) { + vce = (VerificationCertificateEntry *)vcb->vcb_buf; + cert_len = vce->vce_hdr.certlen; +memcpy (cert, (uint8_t *)vce + vce->vce_hdr.certoffset, vce->vce_hdr.certlen); +/* clear out region for next cert(s) */ +memcpy (vcb_data,0 ,sizeof (vcb_data)); + } + +return cert_len; +} + +static int cert_table_add (uint64_t **cert_table,uint64_t **cert, +uint64_t cert_len,uint8_t cert_idx) +{ +if (request_certificate (*cert, cert_idx)) { +/* save certificate address to cert_table */ + cert_table[cert_idx] = *cert; +/* update cert address for the next certificate */ + *cert += cert_len; + }else { +puts ("Could not get certificate" ); +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static void cert_list_add (IplSignatureCertificateList *certs,int cert_index, +uint64_t *cert,uint64_t cert_len) +{ +if (cert_index >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +printf ("Warning: Ignoring cert entry [%d] because it's over 64 entires\n" , + cert_index +1 ); +return ; + } + + certs->cert_entries[cert_index].addr = (uint64_t )cert; + certs->cert_entries[cert_index].len = cert_len; + certs->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (certs->cert_entries[cert_index]); +} + +static void comp_list_add (IplDeviceComponentList *comps,int comp_index, +int cert_index,uint64_t comp_addr, +uint64_t comp_len,uint8_t flags) +{ +if (comp_index >MAX_CERTIFICATES -1 ) { +printf ("Warning: Ignoring comp entry [%d] because it's over 64 entires\n" , + comp_index +1 ); +return ; + } + + comps->device_entries[comp_index].addr = comp_addr; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].len = comp_len; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].flags = flags; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cert_index = cert_index; + comps->ipl_info_header.len +=sizeof (comps->device_entries[comp_index]); +} +
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 795
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+static int update_iirb (IplDeviceComponentList *comps,IplSignatureCertificateList *certs) +{ +IplInfoReportBlock *iirb; +IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list; +IplSignatureCertificateList *cert_list; + +if (iplb->len %8 !=0 ) { +puts ("IPL parameter block length field value is not multiple of 8 bytes" ); +return -1 ; + }
Shouldn't this have a greater consequence than return -1 and then the caller assert/warn? Also, you should add a check somewhere to ensure there is enough space to hold all components and certs in the IIRB.
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 803
Quoted 8 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +8
-0+ +/* IIRB immediately follows IPLB */ + iirb = &ipl_data.iirb; + iirb->hdr.len =sizeof (IplInfoReportBlockHeader); + +/* Copy IPL device component list after IIRB Header */ + comp_list = (IplDeviceComponentList *) iirb->info_blks; +memcpy (comp_list, comps, comps->ipl_info_header.len);
I think this would read better as iirb_comps
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +7
-0+ +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += comps->ipl_info_header.len; + +/* Copy IPL sig cert list after IPL device component list */ + cert_list = (IplSignatureCertificateList *) (iirb->info_blks + + comp_list->ipl_info_header.len);> + memcpy(cert_list, certs, certs->ipl_info_header.len);
Same as above: iirb_certs
Quoted 47 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +47
-0+ +/* Update IIRB length */ + iirb->hdr.len += certs->ipl_info_header.len; + +return 0 ; +} + +static bool secure_ipl_supported (void ) +{ +if (!sclp_is_sipl_on ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!is_secure_ipl_extension_supported ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL extensions are not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +if (!(sclp_is_diag320_on () &&is_cert_store_facility_supported ())) { +puts ("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } + +return true; +} + +static void init_lists (IplDeviceComponentList *comps,IplSignatureCertificateList *certs) +{ + comps->ipl_info_header.ibt =IPL_IBT_COMPONENTS ; + comps->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (comps->ipl_info_header); + + certs->ipl_info_header.ibt =IPL_IBT_CERTIFICATES ; + certs->ipl_info_header.len =sizeof (certs->ipl_info_header); +} + +static bool check_sig_entry (ComponentEntry *entry,uint32_t *sig_len) +{ +if ((entry +1 )->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD ) { +puts ("Next component does not contain signed binary code" ); +return false; + } + +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, (uint64_t )sig_sec) <0 ) { +return false; + }; +
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 868
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+if (entry->compdat.sig_info.format !=DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT ) { +puts ("Signature is not in DER format" ); +return false; + } + + *sig_len = entry->compdat.sig_info.sig_len; +return true; +} + +static int perform_sig_verf(uint64_t comp_addr, uint64_t comp_len, uint64_t sig_len,
/s/verf/verif
Quoted 39 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +39
-0+ uint64_t *cert_table[], uint64_t **cert, + IplDeviceComponentList *comps, + IplSignatureCertificateList *certs, + int comp_index, int cert_index, + void (*print_func)(bool, const char *)) +{ + uint64_t cert_len = -1; +uint8_t cert_idx =-1 ; +bool verified; + + verified =verify_signature (comp_len, comp_addr, sig_len, (uint64_t )sig_sec, + &cert_len, &cert_idx); + +if (verified) { +if (cert_table[cert_idx] ==0 ) { +if (cert_table_add (cert_table, cert, cert_len, cert_idx)) { +return -1 ; + } + } + +puts ("Verified component" ); +cert_list_add (certs, cert_index, cert_table[cert_idx], cert_len); +comp_list_add (comps, comp_index, cert_index, comp_addr, comp_len, +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC |S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_CSV ); + }else { +comp_list_add (comps, comp_index,-1 , comp_addr, comp_len, +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC ); +print_func (verified,"Could not verify component" ); + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec) +{ +bool found_signature = false; +struct IplDeviceComponentList comps; +struct IplSignatureCertificateList certs; +uint64_t *cert = (uint64_t *)certs_sec;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) · line 917
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0+int cert_index =0 ; +int comp_index =0 ; +int comp_len; +bool valid_sig; +uint32_t sig_len; +/* +* Store address of certificate to prevent allocating +* the same certificate multiple times. +*/ +uint64_t *cert_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ];
I'm not so sure if we necessarily need to store so much of the cert info in a separate table in order to avoid duplication within the IIRB's cert list.
Each component in the comp_list has a field indicating which cert in the cert_list was used to verify it. If the cert already exists in the list, then we don't need to add it (in the case where a single cert was used to verify multiple components).
Since the certs are index-based in the cert store, you could just keep a table of which indices have already been added to the cert_list. Then, after diag508 returns the index of the cert used to verify, cert_list_add just checks the index against the table. If the cert was already added, skip! Otherwise, retrieve it and add it in. Then store the comp with the cert idx as you do.
Quoted 99 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +76
-3+ +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *) =NULL ; + print_func = &IPL_check; + +if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) { +return -1 ; + } + +init_lists (&comps, &certs); + + valid_sig = false; +while (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD || + entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + +if (entry->component_type ==ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE ) { + valid_sig =check_sig_entry (entry, &sig_len); +if (!valid_sig) { +return -1 ; + } + }else { + comp_len =zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr); +if (comp_len <0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + +if (valid_sig) { +perform_sig_verf (entry->compdat.load_addr, comp_len, sig_len, cert_table, + &cert, &comps, &certs, comp_index, cert_index, + print_func); + + cert_index++; + found_signature = true; +/* +* complete signature verification for current component, +* reset variable for the next signature entry. +*/ + valid_sig = false; + } + + comp_index++; + } + + entry++; + +if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1 ]) > (tmp_sec +MAX_SECTOR_SIZE )) { +puts ("Wrong entry value" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + } + +if (entry->component_type !=ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC ) { +puts ("No EXEC entry" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +if (!found_signature) { +print_func (found_signature,"Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ); + } + +if (update_iirb (&comps, &certs)) { +print_func (false,"Failed to write IPL Information Report Block" ); + } +write_reset_psw (entry->compdat.load_psw); +return 0 ; }@@ -683,7 +993,7 @@ static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)continue ; } -if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr)) { +if (zipl_load_segment (entry, entry->compdat.load_addr) <0 ) {return -1 ; }@@ -731,8 +1041,17 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)/* Load image(s) into RAM */ entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]); -if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { -return -1 ; +switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE : +if (zipl_run_secure (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; + } +break ; +case ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE : +if (zipl_run_normal (entry, tmp_sec)) { +return -1 ; + } +break ; }/* should not return */ @@ -1091,17 +1410,32 @@ static int zipl_load_vscsi(void)* IPL starts here */
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_load_vscsi(void) · line 1421
Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +9
-0+int zipl_mode (void ) +{ +uint32_t cert_len; + + cert_len =request_certificate ((uint64_t *)certs_sec,0 ); + +return (cert_len >0 ) ?ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE :ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE ; +} +
I think it will suffice to just check the iplb flags, as you do when you enable secure mode. IIUC, if only DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR is set, we're in audit mode. If DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL is set as well, we're in secure mode. If neither are set, we're in "normal" mode.
If certs are missing by the time we get to signature-verification, then that case should be handled accordingly at that time.
Hint: DIAG 508 has a return code for no certs found ;)
(though, DIAG 320 sc 1 has better inspection of the cert store -- handle it however it make sense)
Quoted 198 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10
-0void zipl_load (void ) {VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" ); + }ipl_iso_el_torito ();puts ("Failed to IPL this ISO image!" );return ; }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" ); + }netmain ();puts ("Failed to IPL from this network!" );return ;@@ -1112,6 +1446,10 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("ECKD boot device does not support secure boot!" ); + } +switch (virtio_get_device_type ()) {case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK :zipl_load_vblk ();pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +9
-0@@ -88,9 +88,18 @@ typedef struct BootMapTable {BootMapPointer entry[]; } __attribute__ ((packed)) BootMapTable; +#define DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT 1 + +typedef struct SignatureInformation { +uint8_t format; +uint8_t reserved[3 ]; +uint32_t sig_len; +} __attribute__((packed))SignatureInformation ; +typedef union ComponentEntryData {uint64_t load_psw;uint64_t load_addr; +SignatureInformation sig_info; }ComponentEntryData ; typedef struct ComponentEntry {pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +68
-0@@ -16,12 +16,15 @@#define QEMU_PACKED __attribute__((packed))#endif +#include <diag320.h> +#include <diag508.h> #include <qipl.h> #include <string.h> extern QemuIplParameters qipl;extern IplParameterBlock *iplb;extern bool have_iplb; +extern int boot_mode;struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader {uint32_t len;@@ -143,4 +146,69 @@ static inline bool load_next_iplb(void)return true; } +static inline uint64_t diag320 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) +{ + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; + + asmvolatile ("diag %0,%2,0x320\n" + :"+d" (addr),"+d" (rc) + :"d" (subcode) + :"memory" ,"cc" ); +return rc; +} + +static inline uint64_t get_320_subcodes (uint64_t *ism) +{ +return diag320 (ism,DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM ); +} + +static inline bool is_cert_store_facility_supported (void ) +{ +uint64_t d320_ism; +get_320_subcodes (&d320_ism); +return (d320_ism &DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI ) && + (d320_ism &DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC ); +} + +static inline uint64_t _diag508 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) +{ + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; + + asmvolatile ("diag %0,%2,0x508\n" + :"+d" (addr),"+d" (rc) + :"d" (subcode) + :"memory" ,"cc" ); + return rc; +} + +static inline uint64_t get_508_subcodes (void ) +{ +return _diag508 (NULL ,DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC ); +} + +static inline bool is_secure_ipl_extension_supported (void ) +{ +uint64_t d508_subcodes; + + d508_subcodes =get_508_subcodes (); +return d508_subcodes &DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ; +} + +static inline bool verify_signature (uint64_t comp_len,uint64_t comp_addr, +uint64_t sig_len,uint64_t sig_addr, +uint64_t *cert_len,uint8_t *cert_idx) +{ +Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock svb = {{}, comp_len, comp_addr, + sig_len, sig_addr }; + +if (_diag508 (&svb,DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF ) ==DIAG_508_RC_OK ) { + *cert_len = svb.csi.len; + *cert_idx = svb.csi.idx; +return true; + } +return false; +} +#endif /* IPLB_H */ pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +9
-0@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ IplParameterBlock *iplb;bool have_iplb;static uint16_t cutype;LowCore *lowcore;/* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */ +int boot_mode;#define LOADPARM_PROMPT "PROMPT "#define LOADPARM_EMPTY " "@@ -272,9 +273,17 @@ static int virtio_setup(void)static void ipl_boot_device (void ) { +if (boot_mode ==0 ) { + boot_mode =zipl_mode (); + } +switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +panic ("Passthrough (vfio) device does not support secure boot!" ); + } +dasd_ipl (blk_schid, cutype);break ;case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO :pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +5
-0@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64;#define MIN_NON_ZERO (a, b) ((a) == 0 ? (b) : \ ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b))))#endif +#ifndef ROUND_UP +#define ROUND_UP (n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) & -(0 ? (n) : (d))) +#endif #define ARRAY_SIZE (a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))@@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string);void sclp_set_write_mask (uint32_t receive_mask,uint32_t send_mask);void sclp_setup (void );void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm); +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* virtio.c */
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr); · line 87
Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +4
-0@@ -76,6 +81,11 @@ int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr);/* bootmap.c */ void zipl_load (void ); +#define ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE 1 +#define ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE 2 + +int zipl_mode (void );
I think this would look better as an enum:
enum ZiplBootMode {
ZIPL_BOOT_INVALID = -1
ZIPL_BOOT_NORMAL = 1,
ZIPL_BOOT_AUDIT = 2,
ZIPL_BOOT_SECURE = 3, (later patch)
};
or something like that.
zipl_mode should return a ZiplBootMode
Quoted 82 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +1
-0+/* jump2ipl.c */ void write_reset_psw (uint64_t psw);int jump_to_IPL_code (uint64_t address);pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +43
-0@@ -113,6 +113,49 @@ void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm) } } +static void sclp_get_fac134 (uint8_t *fac134) +{ + +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + *fac134 = sccb->fac134; + } +} + +bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void ) +{ +uint8_t fac134 =0 ; + +sclp_get_fac134 (&fac134); +return fac134 &SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT ; +} + +/* +* Get cbl (byte 136 and byte 137 of the SCLP Read Info block) for IPL device facilities. +*/ +static void sclp_get_cbl (uint16_t *cbl) +{ + +ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; + +memset ((char *)_sccb,0 ,sizeof (ReadInfo)); + sccb->h.length =SCCB_SIZE ; +if (!sclp_service_call (SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO , sccb)) { + *cbl = sccb->cbl; + } +} + +bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void ) +{ +uint16_t cbl =0 ; + +sclp_get_cbl (&cbl); +return cbl &SCCB_CBL_SIPL_BIT ; +} +int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count) {ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +6
-0@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader { } __attribute__((packed)) SCCBHeader;#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader)) +#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4 +#define SCCB_CBL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;@@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {uint8_t rnsize;uint8_t reserved[13 ];uint8_t loadparm[LOADPARM_LEN ]; +uint8_t reserved1[102 ]; +uint8_t fac134; +uint8_t reserved2; +uint16_t cbl; } __attribute__((packed)) ReadInfo; typedef struct SCCB {
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
PATCH 18/24 s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility (SCLAF) provides additional security during IPL.
Availability of SCLAF is determined by byte 136 bit 3 of the SCLP Read Info block.
--- target/s390x/cpu_features.c | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 1 + target/s390x/cpu_models.c | 2 ++ target/s390x/gen-features.c | 1 + target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +1 -0
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,break ;case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CBL :clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SIPL )->bit, data); +clear_be_bit (s390_feat_def (S390_FEAT_SCLAF )->bit, data);break ;default :return ;
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1 -0
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "diag320", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functio /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */ DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_CBL, 1, "Seucre-IPL facility") +DEF_FEAT(SCLAF, "sclaf", SCLP_CBL, 3, "Seucre-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility") /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */ DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2 -0
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)case S390_FEAT_SIE_PFMFI :case S390_FEAT_SIE_IBS :case S390_FEAT_SIPL : +case S390_FEAT_SCLAF :case S390_FEAT_CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY :return false;break ;
@@ -509,6 +510,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model) { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_DIAG_320, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_SIPL, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, + { S390_FEAT_SCLAF, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB }, { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR }, { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING }, { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/gen-features.c +1 -0
@@ -698,6 +698,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN14_GA1[] = {S390_FEAT_GROUP_MULTIPLE_EPOCH_PTFF ,S390_FEAT_DIAG_320 ,S390_FEAT_SIPL , + S390_FEAT_SCLAF, };#define full_GEN14_GA2 EmptyFeat
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +3 -0
@@ -2520,6 +2520,9 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)/* Secure-IPL facility is handled entirely within QEMU */ set_bit (S390_FEAT_SIPL , model->features); +/* Secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility is handled entirely within QEMU */ +set_bit (S390_FEAT_SCLAF , model->features); +/* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */ query_uv_feat_guest (model->features);
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 18/24] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)
Quoted 8 lines · Zhuoying Cai
The secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility (SCLAF) provides additional security during IPL.
Availability of SCLAF is determined by byte 136 bit 3 of the SCLP Read Info block.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>---
...
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "diag320", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functio · line 145
Quoted 9 lines
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1
-0@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(DIAG_320, "diag320", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Provide Certificate Store functio /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */ DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_CBL, 1, "Seucre-IPL facility") +DEF_FEAT(SCLAF, "sclaf", SCLP_CBL, 3, "Seucre-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility")
s/Seucre/Secure/
Thomas
PATCH 19/24 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
In reply to Zhuoying CaiAdd additional checks to ensure that components do not overlap with signed components when loaded into memory.
Add additional checks to ensure the load addresses of unsigned components are greater than or equal to 0x2000.
When the secure IPL code loading attributes facility (SCLAF) is installed, all signed components must contain a secure code loading attributes block (SCLAB).
The SCLAB provides further validation of information on where to load the signed binary code from the load device, and where to start the execution of the loaded OS code.
When SCLAF is installed, its content must be evaluated during secure IPL. However, a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode. The SCALB checking will be skipped in this case.
Add IPL Information Error Indicators (IIEI) and Component Error Indicators (CEI) for IPL Information Report Block (IIRB).
When SCLAF is installed, additional secure boot checks are performed during zipl and store results of verification into IIRB.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 281 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 43 +++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 1 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 8 + pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 331 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +280 -1
@@ -683,6 +683,207 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)return comp_len; } +typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRange { +bool is_signed; +uint64_t start_addr; +uint64_t end_addr; +}SecureIplCompAddrRange ; + +static bool is_comp_overlap (SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range,int addr_range_index, +uint64_t start_addr,uint64_t end_addr) +{ +/* neither a signed nor an unsigned component can overlap with a signed component */ +for (int i =0 ; i < addr_range_index; i++) { +if ((comp_addr_range[i].start_addr <= end_addr && + start_addr <= comp_addr_range[i].end_addr) && + comp_addr_range[i].is_signed) { +return true; + } + } + +return false; +} + +static void comp_addr_range_add (SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range, +int addr_range_index,bool is_signed, +uint64_t start_addr,uint64_t end_addr) +{ + comp_addr_range[addr_range_index].is_signed = is_signed; + comp_addr_range[addr_range_index].start_addr = start_addr; + comp_addr_range[addr_range_index].end_addr = end_addr; +} + +static void unsigned_addr_check (uint64_t load_addr,IplDeviceComponentList *comps, +int comp_index,void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *)) +{ +bool is_addr_valid; + + is_addr_valid = load_addr >=0x2000 ; +if (!is_addr_valid) { + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |= +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_UNSIGNED_ADDR ; +print_func (is_addr_valid,"Load address is less than 0x2000" ); + } +} + +static void addr_overlap_check (SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range, +int *addr_range_index, +uint64_t start_addr,uint64_t end_addr, +bool is_signed,void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *)) +{ +bool overlap; + + overlap =is_comp_overlap (comp_addr_range, *addr_range_index, + start_addr, end_addr); +if (!overlap) { +comp_addr_range_add (comp_addr_range, *addr_range_index, is_signed, + start_addr, end_addr); + *addr_range_index +=1 ; + }else { +print_func (!overlap,"Component addresses overlap" ); + } +} + +static void valid_sclab_check (SclabOriginLocator *sclab_locator, +IplDeviceComponentList *comps,int comp_index, +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *)) +{ +bool is_magic_match; +bool is_len_valid; + +/* identifies the presence of SCLAB */ + is_magic_match =magic_match (sclab_locator->magic,ZIPL_MAGIC ); +if (!is_magic_match) { + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |=S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ; + +/* a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode */ +return ; + } + + is_len_valid = sclab_locator->len >=32 ; +if (!is_len_valid) { + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |=S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_LEN ; + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |=S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ; +print_func (is_len_valid,"Invalid SCLAB length" ); + } +} + +static void sclab_format_check (SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab, +IplDeviceComponentList *comps,int comp_index, +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *)) +{ +bool valid_format; + + valid_format = sclab->format ==0 ; +if (!valid_format) { + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |= +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_FORMAT ; + } +print_func (valid_format,"Format-0 SCLAB is not being used" ); +} + +static void sclab_opsw_check (SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab, +int *global_sclab_count,uint64_t *sclab_load_psw, +IplDeviceComponentList *comps,int comp_index, +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *)) +{ +bool is_load_psw_zero; +bool is_ola_on; +bool has_one_glob_sclab; + +/* OPSW is zero */ +if (!(sclab->flags &S390_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OPSW )) { + is_load_psw_zero = sclab->load_psw ==0 ; +if (!is_load_psw_zero) { + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |= +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW_NOT_ZERO ; +print_func (is_load_psw_zero, +"Load PSW is not zero when Override PSW bit is zero" ); + } + }else { + is_ola_on = sclab->flags &S390_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OLA ; +if (!is_ola_on) { + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |= +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_SCLAB_OLA_NOT_ONE ; +print_func (is_ola_on, +"Override Load Address bit is not set to one in the global SCLAB" ); + } + + *global_sclab_count +=1 ; +if (*global_sclab_count ==1 ) { + *sclab_load_psw = sclab->load_psw; + }else { + has_one_glob_sclab = false; + comps->ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_MORE_GLOBAL_SCLAB ; +print_func (has_one_glob_sclab,"More than one global SCLAB" ); + } + } +} + +static void sclab_ola_check (SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab, +uint64_t load_addr,IplDeviceComponentList *comps, +int comp_index,void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *)) +{ +bool is_load_addr_zero; +bool is_matched; + +/* OLA is zero */ +if (!(sclab->flags &S390_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OLA )) { + is_load_addr_zero = sclab->load_addr ==0 ; +if (!is_load_addr_zero) { + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |= +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR_NOT_ZERO ; +print_func (is_load_addr_zero, +"Load Address is not zero when Override Load Address bit is zero" ); + } + }else { + is_matched = sclab->load_addr == load_addr; +if (!is_matched) { + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |= +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR ; +print_func (is_matched, +"Load Address does not match with component load address" ); + } + } +} + +static bool is_psw_valid (uint64_t psw,SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range, +int range_index) +{ +uint32_t addr = psw &0x3FFFFFFF ; + +/* PSW points to the beginning of a signed binary code component */ +for (int i =0 ; i < range_index; i++) { +if (comp_addr_range[i].is_signed && comp_addr_range[i].start_addr == addr) { +return true; + } + } +return false; +} + +static void load_psw_check (SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range,int addr_range_index, +uint64_t sclab_load_psw,uint64_t load_psw, +IplDeviceComponentList *comps,int comp_index, +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *)) +{ +bool is_valid; +bool is_matched; + + is_valid =is_psw_valid (sclab_load_psw, comp_addr_range, addr_range_index) && +is_psw_valid (load_psw, comp_addr_range, addr_range_index); +if (!is_valid) { + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |=S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_LOAD_PSW ; +print_func (is_valid,"Invalid PSW" ); + } + + is_matched = load_psw == sclab_load_psw; +if (!is_matched) { + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |= +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW ; +print_func (is_matched,"Load PSW does not match with PSW in component" ); + } +} +int get_vcssb (VerificationCertificateStorageSizeBlock *vcssb) {int rc;
@@ -833,6 +1034,12 @@ static bool secure_ipl_supported(void)return false; } +if (!sclp_is_sclaf_on ()) { +puts ("Secure IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility is not supported by" \ +" the hypervisor!" ); +return false; + } +return true; }
@@ -899,6 +1106,39 @@ static int perform_sig_verf(uint64_t comp_addr, uint64_t comp_len, uint64_t sig_return 0 ; } +static void check_unsigned_comp (uint64_t comp_addr,struct IplDeviceComponentList *comps, +int comp_index,int cert_index,uint64_t comp_len, +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *)) +{ +unsigned_addr_check (comp_addr, comps, comp_index, print_func); + +comp_list_add (comps, comp_index, cert_index, comp_addr, comp_len,0x00 ); +} + +static void check_sclab (uint64_t comp_addr,struct IplDeviceComponentList *comps, +uint64_t comp_len,int comp_index,int *sclab_count, +uint64_t *sclab_load_psw,int *global_sclab_count, +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *)) +{ +SclabOriginLocator *sclab_locator; +SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab; + + sclab_locator = (SclabOriginLocator *)(comp_addr + comp_len -8 ); +valid_sclab_check (sclab_locator, comps, comp_index, print_func); + +if ((comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei & +S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ) ==0 ) { + *sclab_count +=1 ; + sclab = (SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *)(comp_addr + comp_len - + sclab_locator->len); + +sclab_format_check (sclab, comps, comp_index, print_func); +sclab_opsw_check (sclab, global_sclab_count, sclab_load_psw, + comps, comp_index, print_func); +sclab_ola_check (sclab, comp_addr, comps, comp_index, print_func); + } +} +static int zipl_run_secure (ComponentEntry *entry,uint8_t *tmp_sec) {bool found_signature = false;
@@ -916,6 +1156,13 @@ static int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)*/ uint64_t *cert_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +int sclab_count =0 ; +int global_sclab_count =0 ; +uint64_t sclab_load_psw =0 ; + +SecureIplCompAddrRange comp_addr_range[MAX_CERTIFICATES ]; +int addr_range_index =0 ; +void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *) =NULL ; print_func = &IPL_check;
@@ -939,8 +1186,19 @@ static int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)if (comp_len <0 ) {return -1 ; } +addr_overlap_check (comp_addr_range, &addr_range_index, + entry->compdat.load_addr, + entry->compdat.load_addr + comp_len, valid_sig, + print_func); + +if (!valid_sig) { +check_unsigned_comp (entry->compdat.load_addr, &comps, comp_index, + cert_index, comp_len, print_func); + }else { +check_sclab (entry->compdat.load_addr, &comps, comp_len, comp_index, + &sclab_count, &sclab_load_psw, &global_sclab_count, + print_func); -if (valid_sig) {perform_sig_verf (entry->compdat.load_addr, comp_len, sig_len, cert_table, &cert, &comps, &certs, comp_index, cert_index, print_func);
@@ -970,8 +1228,29 @@ static int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)return -EINVAL ; } +if (sclab_count ==0 ) { + comps.ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_NO_SCLAB ; +print_func (false,"No recognizable SCLAB" ); + } +if (!found_signature) { + comps.ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_NO_SIGED_COMP ;print_func (found_signature,"Secure boot is on, but components are not signed" ); + }else { +/* Verify PSW from the final component entry with PSW from the global SCLAB. */ +if ((comps.ipl_info_header.iiei &S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_NO_SCLAB ) ==0 ) { +if (global_sclab_count ==0 ) { + comps.ipl_info_header.iiei |=S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_NO_GLOBAL_SCLAB ; +print_func (false,"Global SCLAB does not exists" ); + }else if (global_sclab_count ==1 && sclab_load_psw) { +load_psw_check (comp_addr_range, addr_range_index, + sclab_load_psw, entry->compdat.load_psw, + &comps, comp_index, print_func); + }else { +/* Program will only reach here in audit mode */ +puts ("Multiple global SCLABs" ); + } + } }if (update_iirb (&comps, &certs)) {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +41 -2
71 lines not on this page · raw message
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +1 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ void sclp_setup(void);void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii (char *loadparm);bool sclp_is_diag320_on (void );bool sclp_is_sipl_on (void ); +bool sclp_is_sclaf_on (void );int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count);/* virtio.c */
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +8 -0
@@ -156,6 +156,14 @@ bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void)return cbl &SCCB_CBL_SIPL_BIT ; } +bool sclp_is_sclaf_on (void ) +{ +uint16_t cbl =0 ; + +sclp_get_cbl (&cbl); +return cbl &SCCB_CBL_SCLAF_BIT ; +} +int sclp_read (char *str,size_t count) {ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +1 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader {#define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader))#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4#define SCCB_CBL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 +#define SCCB_CBL_SCLAF_BIT 0x1000 typedef struct ReadInfo { SCCBHeader h;
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH 20/24 Add -secure-boot on|off option in QEMU command line
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe -secure-boot on|off command line option is implemented to enable secure IPL.
By default, -secure-boot is set to false if not specified in the command line.
--- qemu-options.hx | 8 ++++++++ system/vl.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
qemu-options.hx +8 -0
@@ -1262,6 +1262,14 @@ SRST A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths. ERST +DEF("secure-boot", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_secure_boot, + "-secure-boot on|off\n" + " enable/disable secure boot\n", QEMU_ARCH_S390X) +SRST +``-secure-boot on|off`` + Enable/disable secure boot. Default is off. +ERST + DEFHEADING() DEFHEADING(Block device options:)
system/vl.c +21 -0
@@ -524,6 +524,19 @@ static QemuOptsList qemu_boot_certificates_opts = { }, }; +static QemuOptsList qemu_secure_boot_opts = { + .name ="secure-boot" , + .implied_opt_name ="secure-boot" , + .head =QTAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER (qemu_secure_boot_opts.head), + .desc = { + { + .name ="secure-boot" , + .type =QEMU_OPT_BOOL , + }, + {/* end of list */ } + }, +}; +const char *qemu_get_vm_name (void ) {return qemu_name;
@@ -2894,6 +2907,7 @@ void qemu_init(int argc, char **argv)qemu_add_opts (&qemu_fw_cfg_opts);qemu_add_opts (&qemu_action_opts);qemu_add_opts (&qemu_boot_certificates_opts); +qemu_add_opts (&qemu_secure_boot_opts);qemu_add_run_with_opts ();module_call_init (MODULE_INIT_OPTS );
@@ -3046,6 +3060,13 @@ void qemu_init(int argc, char **argv)exit (1 ); }break ; +case QEMU_OPTION_secure_boot: + opts =qemu_opts_parse_noisily (qemu_find_opts ("secure-boot" ), + optarg, true); +if (!opts) { +exit (1 ); + } +break ;case QEMU_OPTION_fda:case QEMU_OPTION_fdb: drive_add(IF_FLOPPY, popt->index - QEMU_OPTION_fda,
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 20/24] Add -secure-boot on|off option in QEMU command line
Quoted 17 lines · Zhuoying Cai
The
-secure-boot on|offcommand line option is implemented to enable secure IPL.By default, -secure-boot is set to false if not specified in the command line.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- qemu-options.hx | 8 ++++++++ system/vl.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)qemu-options.hx +0
-0
qemu-options.hx SRST · line 1271
Quoted 10 lines
qemu-options.hx +7
-0@@ -1262,6 +1262,14 @@ SRST A colon may be used to delineate multiple paths. ERST +DEF("secure-boot", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_secure_boot, + "-secure-boot on|off\n" + " enable/disable secure boot\n", QEMU_ARCH_S390X) +SRST +``-secure-boot on|off`` + Enable/disable secure boot. Default is off. +ERST
As with patch 1, please try to turn this into a machine option instead.
Thanks,
Thomas
PATCH 21/24 hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIf -secure-boot on is specified on the command line option, indicating true secure IPL enabled, set Secure-IPL bit and IPL-Information-Report bit on in IPIB Flags field, and trigger true secure IPL in the S390 BIOS.
Any error that occurs during true secure IPL will cause the IPL to terminate.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +21 -1
@@ -438,6 +438,15 @@ static bool s390_has_certificate(void)return ipl->cert_store.count >0 ; } +static bool s390_secure_boot_enabled (void ) +{ +QemuOpts *opts; + + opts =qemu_find_opts_singleton ("secure-boot" ); + +return qemu_opt_get_bool (opts,"secure-boot" , false); +} +static bool s390_build_iplb (DeviceState *dev_st,IplParameterBlock *iplb) {CcwDevice *ccw_dev =NULL ;
@@ -495,6 +504,17 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)s390_ipl_convert_loadparm ((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm); iplb->flags |=DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID ; +/* +* If -secure-boot on, then toggle the secure IPL flags to trigger +* secure boot in the s390 BIOS. +* +* Boot process will terminate if any error occurs during secure boot. +* +* If SIPL is on, IPLIR must also be on. +*/ +if (s390_secure_boot_enabled ()) { + iplb->hdr_flags |= (DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL |DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ); + }/* * Secure boot in audit mode will perform * if certificate(s) exist in the key store.
@@ -504,7 +524,7 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)* * Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB. */ -if (s390_has_certificate ()) { + else if (s390_has_certificate()) { iplb->hdr_flags |=DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH 22/24 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode
In reply to Zhuoying CaiWhen secure boot is enabled (-secure-boot on) and certificate(s) are provided, the boot operates in True Secure IPL mode.
Any verification error during True Secure IPL mode will cause the entire boot process to terminate.
Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities. If secure boot is enabled but no certificate is provided, the boot process will also terminate, as this is not a valid secure boot configuration.
Note: True Secure IPL mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++----- pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h | 7 +++++++ pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 6 +++++- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +20 -5
@@ -757,6 +757,10 @@ static void valid_sclab_check(SclabOriginLocator *sclab_locator, comps->device_entries[comp_index].cei |=S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB ;/* a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode */ +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) { +print_func (is_magic_match,"Magic is not matched. SCLAB does not exist" ); + } +return ; }
@@ -1164,7 +1168,11 @@ static int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry *entry, uint8_t *tmp_sec)int addr_range_index =0 ;void (*print_func)(bool ,const char *) =NULL ; - print_func = &IPL_check; +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) { + print_func = &IPL_assert; + }else if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { + print_func = &IPL_check; + }if (!secure_ipl_supported ()) {return -1 ;
@@ -1321,6 +1329,7 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte) entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1 ]);switch (boot_mode) { +case ZIPL_SECURE_MODE :case ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE :if (zipl_run_secure (entry, tmp_sec)) {return -1 ;
@@ -1692,10 +1701,16 @@ static int zipl_load_vscsi(void)int zipl_mode (void ) {uint32_t cert_len; +bool secure; cert_len =request_certificate ((uint64_t *)certs_sec,0 ); + secure =is_secure_boot_on (iplb->hdr_flags); -return (cert_len >0 ) ?ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE :ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE ; +if (secure) { +return (cert_len >0 ) ?ZIPL_SECURE_MODE :ZIPL_SECURE_INVALID_MODE ; + }else { +return (cert_len >0 ) ?ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE :ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE ; + } }void zipl_load (void )
@@ -1703,7 +1718,7 @@ void zipl_load(void)VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) {panic ("Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" ); }ipl_iso_el_torito ();
@@ -1712,7 +1727,7 @@ void zipl_load(void) }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) {panic ("Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" ); }netmain ();
@@ -1725,7 +1740,7 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) {panic ("ECKD boot device does not support secure boot!" ); }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +7 -0
@@ -185,6 +185,13 @@ static inline bool load_next_iplb(void)return true; } +static inline bool is_secure_boot_on (uint8_t hdr_flags) +{ +/* If secure boot is on, SIPL bit and IPLIR bit must be on. */ +return (hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL ) && + (hdr_flags &DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR ); +} +static inline uint64_t diag320 (void *data,unsigned long subcode) { register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +5 -1
@@ -277,10 +277,14 @@ static void ipl_boot_device(void) boot_mode =zipl_mode (); } +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_INVALID_MODE ) { +panic ("Need at least one certificate for secure boot!" ); + } +switch (cutype) {case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990 :case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107 : -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE ) { +if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) {panic ("Passthrough (vfio) device does not support secure boot!" ); }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +2 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ void zipl_load(void);#define ZIPL_NORMAL_MODE 1#define ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE 2 +#define ZIPL_SECURE_MODE 3 +#define ZIPL_SECURE_INVALID_MODE -1int zipl_mode (void );
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH 23/24 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices
In reply to Zhuoying CaiThe current approach to enabling secure boot relies on providing -secure-boot and -boot-certificates options, which apply to all boot devices.
With the possibility of multiple boot devices, secure boot expects all provided devices to be supported and eligible (e.g., virtio-blk/virtio-scsi using the SCSI scheme).
If multiple boot devices are provided and include an unsupported (e.g., ECKD, VFIO) or a non-eligible (e.g., Net) device, the boot process will terminate with an error logged to the console.
--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 28 +++++++++----- pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +18 -10
@@ -1713,23 +1713,35 @@ int zipl_mode(void) } } +int zipl_check_scsi_mbr_magic (void ) +{ +ScsiMbr *mbr = (void *)sec; + +/* Grab the MBR */ +memset (sec,FREE_SPACE_FILLER ,sizeof (sec)); +if (virtio_read (0 , mbr)) { +puts ("Cannot read block 0" ); +return -EIO ; + } + +if (!magic_match (mbr->magic,ZIPL_MAGIC )) { +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} +void zipl_load (void ) {VDev *vdev =virtio_get_device ();if (vdev->is_cdrom) { -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) { -panic ("Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!" ); - }ipl_iso_el_torito ();puts ("Failed to IPL this ISO image!" );return ; }if (virtio_get_device_type () ==VIRTIO_ID_NET ) { -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) { -panic ("Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!" ); - }netmain ();puts ("Failed to IPL from this network!" );return ;
@@ -1740,10 +1752,6 @@ void zipl_load(void)return ; } -if (boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_AUDIT_MODE || boot_mode ==ZIPL_SECURE_MODE ) { -panic ("ECKD boot device does not support secure boot!" ); - } -switch (virtio_get_device_type ()) {case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK :zipl_load_vblk ();
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +69 -5
96 lines not on this page · raw message
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +1 -0
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ void zipl_load(void);#define ZIPL_SECURE_INVALID_MODE -1int zipl_mode (void ); +int zipl_check_scsi_mbr_magic (void );/* jump2ipl.c */ void write_reset_psw (uint64_t psw);
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
PATCH 24/24 hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without specifying a boot device
In reply to Zhuoying CaiIf secure boot in audit mode or True Secure IPL mode is enabled without specifying a boot device, the boot process will terminate with an error.
--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +10 -0
@@ -767,6 +767,16 @@ void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu)s390_ipl_create_cert_store (&ipl->cert_store);if (!ipl->iplb_valid) { ipl->iplb_valid =s390_init_all_iplbs (ipl); + +/* +* Secure IPL without specifying a boot device. +* IPLB is not generated if no boot device is defined. +*/ +if ((s390_has_certificate () ||s390_secure_boot_enabled ()) && + !ipl->iplb_valid) { +error_report ("No boot devicie defined for Secure IPL" ); +exit (1 ); + } }else { ipl->qipl.chain_len =0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Re: [PATCH v1 24/24] hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without specifying a boot device
Quoted 16 lines · Zhuoying Cai
If secure boot in audit mode or True Secure IPL mode is enabled without specifying a boot device, the boot process will terminate with an error.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)hw/s390x/ipl.c +0
-0@@ -767,6 +767,16 @@ void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu)s390_ipl_create_cert_store (&ipl->cert_store);if (!ipl->iplb_valid) { ipl->iplb_valid =s390_init_all_iplbs (ipl);
hw/s390x/ipl.c void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu) · line 779
Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/ipl.c +10
-0+ +/* +* Secure IPL without specifying a boot device. +* IPLB is not generated if no boot device is defined. +*/ +if ((s390_has_certificate () ||s390_secure_boot_enabled ()) && + !ipl->iplb_valid) { +error_report ("No boot devicie defined for Secure IPL" ); +exit (1 ); + }
I'm confused why this check is needed. If there is no valid iplb, won't boot just fail outright anyway?
Quoted 3 lines
hw/s390x/ipl.c +0
-0}else { ipl->qipl.chain_len =0 ; }
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Collin
Re: [PATCH v1 24/24] hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without specifying a boot device
Quoted 21 lines · Collin Walling
Quoted 20 lines · Zhuoying Cai
If secure boot in audit mode or True Secure IPL mode is enabled without specifying a boot device, the boot process will terminate with an error.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)hw/s390x/ipl.c +4
-0@@ -767,6 +767,16 @@ void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu)s390_ipl_create_cert_store (&ipl->cert_store);if (!ipl->iplb_valid) { ipl->iplb_valid =s390_init_all_iplbs (ipl); + +/* +* Secure IPL without specifying a boot device. +* IPLB is not generated if no boot device is defined.
Quoted 8 lines
hw/s390x/ipl.c void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu) · line 779
Quoted 6 lines
hw/s390x/ipl.c +6
-0+*/ +if ((s390_has_certificate () ||s390_secure_boot_enabled ()) && + !ipl->iplb_valid) { +error_report ("No boot devicie defined for Secure IPL" ); +exit (1 ); + }I'm confused why this check is needed. If there is no valid iplb, won't boot just fail outright anyway?
No. If there is no IPLB (e.g. no device has been assigned a boot index), we have a rudimentary probing routine that will examine if a device is potentially bootable, and, if so, try to boot from it. This check is basically stating that boot device probing is not supported when using secure IPL, so at least one device must be defined with a boot index.
Quoted 5 lines
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hw/s390x/ipl.c +0
-0}else { ipl->qipl.chain_len =0 ; }
Re: [PATCH v1 24/24] hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without specifying a boot device
In reply to Collin WallingQuoted 22 lines · Collin Walling
Quoted 21 lines · Zhuoying Cai
If secure boot in audit mode or True Secure IPL mode is enabled without specifying a boot device, the boot process will terminate with an error.
Signed-off-by Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>--- hw/s390x/ipl.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)hw/s390x/ipl.c +5
-0@@ -767,6 +767,16 @@ void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu)s390_ipl_create_cert_store (&ipl->cert_store);if (!ipl->iplb_valid) { ipl->iplb_valid =s390_init_all_iplbs (ipl); + +/* +* Secure IPL without specifying a boot device. +* IPLB is not generated if no boot device is defined. +*/
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hw/s390x/ipl.c void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu) · line 779
Quoted 5 lines
hw/s390x/ipl.c +5
-0+if ((s390_has_certificate () ||s390_secure_boot_enabled ()) && + !ipl->iplb_valid) { +error_report ("No boot devicie defined for Secure IPL" ); +exit (1 ); + }I'm confused why this check is needed. If there is no valid iplb, won't boot just fail outright anyway?
If no boot device is specified, the BIOS will still scan all channels to find a bootable device (as defined in probe_boot_device() within pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c).
Boot will proceed if a bootable device is found, but the IPLB will not be generated on the host side in this case. We cannot determine whether secure boot is enabled, since it's indicated by the IPLB flags.
Therefore, specifying secure IPL without a boot device cause the process to terminate early.
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hw/s390x/ipl.c +0
-0}else { ipl->qipl.chain_len =0 ; }