selinux: UNIX domain socket fixes
RFC PATCH 1/1 selinux: UNIX domain socket fixes
Correct a problem where we weren't setting the peer label correctly on connected UNIX domain sockets and do some other general fixup while we are messing with the code.
This patch really is RFC quality; I've only boot tested it once so beware ...
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +17 -28
@@ -4002,56 +4002,45 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *ssec; -struct inode_security_struct *isec; -struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; + struct sk_security_struct *s_sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *o_sksec = other->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *n_sksec = newsk->sk_security;struct common_audit_data ad;int err; - isec =SOCK_INODE (sock)->i_security; - other_isec =SOCK_INODE (other)->i_security; -COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT (&ad,NET ); ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; - err =avc_has_perm (isec->sid, other_isec->sid, - isec->sclass, + err =avc_has_perm (s_sksec->sid, o_sksec->sid, o_sksec->sclass,UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO , &ad);if (err)return err; -/* connecting socket */ - ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; - ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid; -/* server child socket */ - ssec = newsk->sk_security; - ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid; - err =security_sid_mls_copy (other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid); + n_sksec->peer_sid = s_sksec->sid; + err =security_sid_mls_copy (o_sksec->sid, s_sksec->peer_sid, + &n_sksec->sid); +if (err) +return err; -return err; +/* connecting socket */ + s_sksec->peer_sid = n_sksec->sid; + +return 0 ; }static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send (struct socket *sock,struct socket *other) { -struct inode_security_struct *isec; -struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; +struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;struct common_audit_data ad; -int err; - - isec =SOCK_INODE (sock)->i_security; - other_isec =SOCK_INODE (other)->i_security;COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT (&ad,NET ); ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; - err =avc_has_perm (isec->sid, other_isec->sid, - isec->sclass,SOCKET__SENDTO , &ad); -if (err) -return err; - -return 0 ; +return avc_has_perm (ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass,SOCKET__SENDTO , + &ad); } static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 6 lines · Paul Moore
Correct a problem where we weren't setting the peer label correctly on connected UNIX domain sockets and do some other general fixup while we are messing with the code.
This patch really is RFC quality; I've only boot tested it once so beware ...
I'm not sure why you are changing anything here other than the assignment of the peer_sid.
The inode SID and the sock SID should be the same. The only case today where I know they can become inconsistent is upon fsetxattr() on a socket, which is not allowed by existing policy, and that can be addressed by introducing a setxattr handler for sockets that propagates the SID down to the sock.
Quoted 90 lines
Signed-off-by XXX--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)security/selinux/hooks.c +17
-29@@ -4002,56 +4002,45 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *ssec; -struct inode_security_struct *isec; -struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; + struct sk_security_struct *s_sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *o_sksec = other->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *n_sksec = newsk->sk_security;struct common_audit_data ad;int err; - isec =SOCK_INODE (sock)->i_security; - other_isec =SOCK_INODE (other)->i_security; -COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT (&ad,NET ); ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; - err =avc_has_perm (isec->sid, other_isec->sid, - isec->sclass, + err =avc_has_perm (s_sksec->sid, o_sksec->sid, o_sksec->sclass,UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO , &ad);if (err)return err; -/* connecting socket */ - ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; - ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid; -/* server child socket */ - ssec = newsk->sk_security; - ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid; - err =security_sid_mls_copy (other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid); + n_sksec->peer_sid = s_sksec->sid; + err =security_sid_mls_copy (o_sksec->sid, s_sksec->peer_sid, + &n_sksec->sid); +if (err) +return err; -return err; +/* connecting socket */ + s_sksec->peer_sid = n_sksec->sid; + +return 0 ; }static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send (struct socket *sock,struct socket *other) { -struct inode_security_struct *isec; -struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; +struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;struct common_audit_data ad; -int err; - - isec =SOCK_INODE (sock)->i_security; - other_isec =SOCK_INODE (other)->i_security;COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT (&ad,NET ); ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; - err =avc_has_perm (isec->sid, other_isec->sid, - isec->sclass,SOCKET__SENDTO , &ad); -if (err) -return err; - -return 0 ; +return avc_has_perm (ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass,SOCKET__SENDTO , + &ad); } static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family, --This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 8 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines · Paul Moore
Correct a problem where we weren't setting the peer label correctly on connected UNIX domain sockets and do some other general fixup while we are messing with the code.
This patch really is RFC quality; I've only boot tested it once so beware ...
Quoted 8 lines
I'm not sure why you are changing anything here other than the assignment of the
peer_sid.The inode SID and the sock SID should be the same. The only case today where I know they can become inconsistent is upon
fsetxattr()on a socket, which is not allowed by existing policy, and that can be addressed by introducing a setxattr handler for sockets that propagates the SID down to the sock.
Cleanliness mainly. Granted the changes in may_send() have zero effect and are largely to satisfy my own desire to shift the socket controls to using the sock SID as much as possible (instead of the inode's SID). However, in stream_connect() the changes actually make the code a bit smaller and cleaner; we need the sk_security_struct for each socket to gain access to the peer SID and it can also give us the socket's SID, fetching the inode's SID adds extra work and consumes more stack for no advantage.
Quoted 91 lines
Quoted 91 lines
Signed-off-by XXX---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 45+++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +14
-22@@ -4002,56 +4002,45 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *ssec; -struct inode_security_struct *isec; -struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; + struct sk_security_struct *s_sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *o_sksec = other->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *n_sksec = newsk->sk_security;struct common_audit_data ad;int err; - isec =SOCK_INODE (sock)->i_security; - other_isec =SOCK_INODE (other)->i_security; -COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT (&ad,NET ); ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; - err =avc_has_perm (isec->sid, other_isec->sid, - isec->sclass, + err =avc_has_perm (s_sksec->sid, o_sksec->sid, o_sksec->sclass,UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO , &ad);if (err)return err; -/* connecting socket */ - ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; - ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid; -/* server child socket */ - ssec = newsk->sk_security; - ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid; - err =security_sid_mls_copy (other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid); + n_sksec->peer_sid = s_sksec->sid; + err =security_sid_mls_copy (o_sksec->sid, s_sksec->peer_sid, + &n_sksec->sid); +if (err) +return err; -return err; +/* connecting socket */ + s_sksec->peer_sid = n_sksec->sid; + +return 0 ; }static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send (struct socket *sock,struct socket *other) { -struct inode_security_struct *isec; -struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; +struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;struct common_audit_data ad; -int err; - - isec =SOCK_INODE (sock)->i_security; - other_isec =SOCK_INODE (other)->i_security;COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT (&ad,NET ); ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +1
-6- err =avc_has_perm (isec->sid, other_isec->sid, - isec->sclass,SOCKET__SENDTO , &ad); -if (err) -return err; - -return 0 ; + return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass,
SOCKET__SENDTO,
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +1
-1+ &ad); } static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family, --This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Signature · 7 lines
paul moore linux @ hp -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.