vfs: re-introduce MAY_CHDIR
Subsystems (6)
PATCH 1/3 vfs: re-introduce MAY_CHDIR
Currently MAY_ACCESS means that filesystems must check the permissions right then and not rely on cached results or the results of future operations on the object. This can be because of a call to sys_access() or because of a call to chdir() which needs to check search without relying on any future operations inside that dir. I plan to use MAY_ACCESS for other purposes in the security system, so I split the MAY_ACCESS and the MAY_CHDIR cases.
---
fs/fuse/dir.c | 2 +- fs/nfs/dir.c | 2 +- fs/open.c | 6 +++--- include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/fuse/dir.c +1 -1
@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)exist. So if permissions are revoked this won't be noticed immediately, only after the attribute timeout has expired */ - }else if (mask &MAY_ACCESS ) { + }else if (mask & (MAY_ACCESS |MAY_CHDIR )) { err =fuse_access (inode, mask); }else if ((mask &MAY_EXEC ) &&S_ISREG (inode->i_mode)) {if (!(inode->i_mode &S_IXUGO )) {
fs/nfs/dir.c +1 -1
@@ -1927,7 +1927,7 @@ int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)if ((mask & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC )) ==0 ) goto out;/* Is this sys_access() ? */ -if (mask &MAY_ACCESS ) +if (mask & (MAY_ACCESS |MAY_CHDIR )) goto force_lookup;switch (inode->i_mode &S_IFMT ) {
fs/open.c +3 -3
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chdir, const char __user *, filename)if (error) goto out; - error =inode_permission (path.dentry->d_inode,MAY_EXEC |MAY_ACCESS ); + error =inode_permission (path.dentry->d_inode,MAY_EXEC |MAY_CHDIR );if (error) goto dput_and_out;
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)if (!S_ISDIR (inode->i_mode)) goto out_putf; - error =inode_permission (inode,MAY_EXEC |MAY_ACCESS ); + error =inode_permission (inode,MAY_EXEC |MAY_CHDIR );if (!error)set_fs_pwd (current->fs, &file->f_path); out_putf:
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)if (error) goto out; - error =inode_permission (path.dentry->d_inode,MAY_EXEC |MAY_ACCESS ); + error =inode_permission (path.dentry->d_inode,MAY_EXEC |MAY_CHDIR );if (error) goto dput_and_out;
include/linux/fs.h +1 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct inodes_stat_t {#define MAY_APPEND 8#define MAY_ACCESS 16#define MAY_OPEN 32 +#define MAY_CHDIR 64/* * flags in file.f_mode. Note that FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE must correspond
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): 20100409221352.2612.11909.stgit-E+B5uJFuEZf0UfVguI6niVaTQe2KTcn/@public.gmane.org
PATCH 2/3 security: make LSMs explicitly mask off permissions
SELinux needs to pass the MAY_ACCESS flag so it can handle auditting correctly. Presently the masking of MAY_* flags is done in the VFS. In order to allow LSMs to decide what flags they care about and what flags they don't just pass them all and the each LSM mask off what they don't need. This patch should contain no functional changes to either the VFS or any LSM.
---
fs/namei.c | 3 +-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +1 -2
@@ -282,8 +282,7 @@ int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)if (retval)return retval; -return security_inode_permission (inode, - mask & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND )); +return security_inode_permission (inode, mask); }/**
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -0
@@ -2700,6 +2700,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) {const struct cred *cred =current_cred (); + mask &= (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND ); +if (!mask) {/* No permission to check. Existence test. */ return 0 ;
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2 -0
@@ -599,6 +599,8 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,static int smack_inode_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask) {struct smk_audit_info ad; + + mask &= (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND );/* * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there. */
PATCH 3/3 SELinux: special dontaudit for access checks
In reply to a message not in the archiveCurrently there are a number of applications (nautilus being the main one) which calls access() on files in order to determine how they should be displayed. It is normal and expected that nautilus will want to see if files are executable or if they are really read/write-able. access() should return the real permission. SELinux policy checks are done in access() and can result in lots of AVC denials as policy denies RWX on files which DAC allows. Currently SELinux must dontaudit actual attempts to read/write/execute a file in order to silence these messages (and not flood the logs.) But dontaudit rules like that can hide real attacks. This patch addes a new common file permission audit_access. This permission is special in that it is meaningless and should never show up in an allow rule. Instead the only place this permission has meaning is in a dontaudit rule like so:
dontaudit nautilus_t sbin_t:file audit_access
With such a rule if nautilus just checks access() we will still get denied and thus userspace will still get the correct answer but we will not log the denial. If nautilus attempted to actually perform one of the forbidden actions (rather than just querying access(2) about it) we would still log a denial. This type of dontaudit rule should be used sparingly, as it could be a method for an attacker to probe the system permissions without detection.
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +39 -7
@@ -2696,19 +2696,51 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nareturn dentry_has_perm (cred,NULL , dentry,FILE__READ ); } -static int selinux_inode_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask) +static int selinux_inode_permission (struct inode *inode,int in_mask) {const struct cred *cred =current_cred (); +struct inode_security_struct *isec; +struct common_audit_data ad; +struct av_decision avd; +u32 sid, perms; +int rc, mask; - mask &= (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND ); + mask = in_mask & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND ); -if (!mask) { -/* No permission to check. Existence test. */ +/* No permission to check. Existence test. */ +if (!mask) +return 0 ; + +validate_creds (cred); + +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))return 0 ; - } -return inode_has_perm (cred, inode, -file_mask_to_av (inode->i_mode, mask),NULL ); + sid =cred_sid (cred); + isec = inode->i_security; + +COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT (&ad,FS ); + ad.u.fs.inode = inode; + + perms =file_mask_to_av (inode->i_mode, mask); + + rc =avc_has_perm_noaudit (sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,0 , &avd); +/* +* We want to audit if this call was not from access(2). +* We also want to audit if the call was from access(2) +* but the magic FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS permission was in the auditdeny +* vector. +* +* aka there is a not dontaudit rule for file__audit_access. This +* might make more sense as a test inside avc_audit, but then we would +* have to push the MAY_ACCESS flag down to avc_audit and I think we +* already have enough stuff down there. +*/ +if (!(in_mask &MAY_ACCESS ) || + (avd.auditdeny &FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS )) +avc_audit (sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &avd, rc, &ad); + +return rc; }static int selinux_inode_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *iattr)
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1 -1
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append"#define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \ - "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton" + "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access"#define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \ "listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom", \