trivial: make mmap_min_addr perms 600
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 trivial: make mmap_min_addr perms 600
Chuck points out that mmap_min_addr is 644...
CAP_SYS_RAWIO will deny users read/write to the file, let's let them see that this is intended.
---
kernel/sysctl.c +1 -1
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .procname = "mmap_min_addr", .data = &dac_mmap_min_addr, .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long), - .mode = 0644, + .mode = 0600, .proc_handler = mmap_min_addr_handler, },#endif
Quoted 6 lines · Kyle McMartin
Chuck points out that
mmap_min_addris 644...
CAP_SYS_RAWIOwill deny users read/write to the file, let's let them see that this is intended.Signed-off-by Kyle McMartin <[email protected]>
I'm fine with it. RAWIO was only really added to block writes as I recall, but I don't see a good reason normal users need to see this and blocking them with rwx perms first is a good idea.
James, do you want to pick up and push towards linus?
-Eric
Quoted 14 lines
---
kernel/sysctl.c +1
-1@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .procname = "mmap_min_addr", .data = &dac_mmap_min_addr, .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long), - .mode = 0644, + .mode = 0600, .proc_handler = mmap_min_addr_handler, },#endif
Quoted 3 lines · Kyle McMartin
Chuck points out that
mmap_min_addris 644...CAP_SYS_RAWIOwill deny users read/write to the file, let's let them see that this is intended.
Hmm. Denying read is actually an unintended side-effect of the CAP_SYS_RAWIO check.
The value is useful information for an admin to see without being root ("is my system vulnerable to kernel NULL pointer attacks?") and its setting is trivially easy for an attacker to determine by calling mmap() in PAGE_SIZE increments starting at 0.
I would opt for greater transparency for the admin, and leave it 644 and instead more carefully check CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
--- security/min_addr.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
security/min_addr.c +1 -1
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, {int ret; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (write && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ))return -EPERM ; ret =proc_doulongvec_minmax (table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
Signature · 6 lines
1.7.0.4 -- Kees Cook Ubuntu Security Team
Quoted 4 lines · Kees Cook
I would opt for greater transparency for the admin, and leave it 644 and instead more carefully check
CAP_SYS_RAWIO.Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
fine with me.