ARM: SECCOMP support
PATCH 1/1 ARM: SECCOMP support
arch/arm/Kconfig +14 -0
@@ -1438,6 +1438,20 @@ config UACCESS_WITH_MEMCPY However, if the CPU data cache is using a write-allocate mode, this option is unlikely to provide any performance gain. +config SECCOMP + bool + prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" + ---help--- + This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications + that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their + execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to + the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write + syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in + their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is + enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled + and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls + defined by each seccomp mode. + config CC_STACKPROTECTOR bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)" help
arch/arm/include/asm/seccomp.h new file +11 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +#ifndef _ASM_ARM_SECCOMP_H +#define _ASM_ARM_SECCOMP_H + +#include <linux/unistd.h> + +#define __NR_seccomp_read __NR_read +#define __NR_seccomp_write __NR_write +#define __NR_seccomp_exit __NR_exit +#define __NR_seccomp_sigreturn __NR_rt_sigreturn + +#endif /* _ASM_ARM_SECCOMP_H */
arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h +2 -0
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ extern void vfp_flush_hwstate(struct thread_info *);#define TIF_MEMDIE 18/* is terminating due to OOM killer */ #define TIF_FREEZE 19#define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK 20 +#define TIF_SECCOMP 21#define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)#define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
@@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ extern void vfp_flush_hwstate(struct thread_info *);#define _TIF_USING_IWMMXT (1 << TIF_USING_IWMMXT)#define _TIF_FREEZE (1 << TIF_FREEZE)#define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK (1 << TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK) +#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)/* * Change these and you break ASM code in entry-common.S
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +18 -1
@@ -314,6 +314,16 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi) tst ip, #_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE @ are we tracing syscalls? bne __sys_trace +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP + tst ip, #_TIF_SECCOMP + beq 1f + mov r0, scno + bl __secure_computing + add r0, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF @ pointer to regs + ldmia r0, {r0 - r3} @ have to reload r0 - r3 +1: +#endif + cmp scno, #NR_syscalls @ check upper syscall limit adr lr, BSYM(ret_fast_syscall) @ return address ldrcc pc, [tbl, scno, lsl #2] @ call sys_* routine
@@ -336,8 +346,15 @@ __sys_trace: mov r0, #0 @ trace entry [IP = 0] bl syscall_trace - adr lr, BSYM(__sys_trace_return) @ return address mov scno, r0 @ syscall number (possibly new) + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP + ldr ip, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS] @ check for syscall tracing + tst ip, #_TIF_SECCOMP + blne __secure_computing +#endif + + adr lr, BSYM(__sys_trace_return) @ return address add r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF @ pointer to regs cmp scno, #NR_syscalls @ check upper syscall limit ldmccia r1, {r0 - r3} @ have to reload r0 - r3
PATCH 1/1 ARM: SECCOMP support
Quoted 7 lines · Nicolas Pitre
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +0
-0@@ -314,6 +314,16 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi) tst ip, #_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE @ are we tracing syscalls? bne __sys_trace
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S ENTRY(vector_swi) · line 325
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +9
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP + tst ip, #_TIF_SECCOMP + beq 1f + mov r0, scno + bl __secure_computing + add r0, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF @ pointer to regs + ldmia r0, {r0 - r3} @ have to reload r0 - r3 +1: +#endif
Why not do this before the test for TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE? You're doing the same check in both paths, and x86 checks for secure computing before any syscall tracing stuff.
PATCH 1/1 ARM: SECCOMP support
Quoted 9 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux
Quoted 8 lines · Nicolas Pitre
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +0
-0@@ -314,6 +314,16 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi) tst ip, #_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE @ are we tracing syscalls? bne __sys_trace
Quoted 13 lines
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S ENTRY(vector_swi) · line 325
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +9
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP + tst ip, #_TIF_SECCOMP + beq 1f + mov r0, scno + bl __secure_computing + add r0, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF @ pointer to regs + ldmia r0, {r0 - r3} @ have to reload r0 - r3 +1: +#endifWhy not do this before the test for
TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE? You're doing the same check in both paths, and x86 checks for secure computing before any syscall tracing stuff.
Well, for one thing, the syscall tracing has the ability to change the actual syscall number. So this looked like a possible hole that could somehow be exploited to escape the seccomp control. So I went with the safest way.
Nicolas
PATCH 1/1 ARM: SECCOMP support
Quoted 4 lines · Nicolas Pitre
Well, for one thing, the syscall tracing has the ability to change the actual syscall number. So this looked like a possible hole that could somehow be exploited to escape the seccomp control. So I went with the safest way.
That is also true for x86 - the seccomp test on x86 is done first, before the syscall entry trap.
PATCH 1/1 ARM: SECCOMP support
Quoted 8 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux
Quoted 4 lines · Nicolas Pitre
Well, for one thing, the syscall tracing has the ability to change the actual syscall number. So this looked like a possible hole that could somehow be exploited to escape the seccomp control. So I went with the safest way.
That is also true for x86 - the seccomp test on x86 is done first, before the syscall entry trap.
OK, what about this then:
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +13 -2
@@ -293,7 +293,6 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi) get_thread_info tsk adr tbl, sys_call_table @ load syscall table pointer - ldr ip, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS] @ check for syscall tracing #if defined(CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT) /*
@@ -310,8 +309,20 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi) eor scno, scno, #__NR_SYSCALL_BASE @ check OS number #endif + ldr r10, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS] @ check for syscall tracing stmdb sp!, {r4, r5} @ push fifth and sixth args - tst ip, #_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE @ are we tracing syscalls? + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP + tst r10, #_TIF_SECCOMP + beq 1f + mov r0, scno + bl __secure_computing + add r0, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF @ pointer to regs + ldmia r0, {r0 - r3} @ have to reload r0 - r3 +1: +#endif + + tst r10, #_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE @ are we tracing syscalls? bne __sys_trace cmp scno, #NR_syscalls @ check upper syscall limit
Nicolas