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ARM: SECCOMP support

PATCH New Nicolas Pitre 2 participants 5 messages Sep 23, 2010 – Sep 25, 2010 Arm (32-bit)

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ARM: SECCOMP support

arch/arm/Kconfig +14 -0
index 553b7cf..09b890e 100644
@@ -1438,6 +1438,20 @@ config UACCESS_WITH_MEMCPY
 	  However, if the CPU data cache is using a write-allocate mode,
 	  this option is unlikely to provide any performance gain.
 
+config SECCOMP
+	bool
+	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
+	---help---
+	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
+	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
+	  execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
+	  the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
+	  syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
+	  their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
+	  enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
+	  and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
+	  defined by each seccomp mode.
+
 config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
 	help
arch/arm/include/asm/seccomp.h new file +11 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..52b156b
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#ifndef _ASM_ARM_SECCOMP_H
+#define _ASM_ARM_SECCOMP_H
+
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+
+#define __NR_seccomp_read __NR_read
+#define __NR_seccomp_write __NR_write
+#define __NR_seccomp_exit __NR_exit
+#define __NR_seccomp_sigreturn __NR_rt_sigreturn
+
+#endif /* _ASM_ARM_SECCOMP_H */
arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h +2 -0
index 763e29f..7b5cc8d 100644
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ extern void vfp_flush_hwstate(struct thread_info *);
 #define TIF_MEMDIE		18	/* is terminating due to OOM killer */
 #define TIF_FREEZE		19
 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	20
+#define TIF_SECCOMP		21
 
 #define _TIF_SIGPENDING		(1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
@@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ extern void vfp_flush_hwstate(struct thread_info *);
 #define _TIF_USING_IWMMXT	(1 << TIF_USING_IWMMXT)
 #define _TIF_FREEZE		(1 << TIF_FREEZE)
 #define _TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK	(1 << TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
+#define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
 
 /*
  * Change these and you break ASM code in entry-common.S
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +18 -1
index f05a35a..cdd0a88 100644
@@ -314,6 +314,16 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi)
 	tst	ip, #_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE		@ are we tracing syscalls?
 	bne	__sys_trace
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	tst	ip, #_TIF_SECCOMP
+	beq	1f
+	mov	r0, scno
+	bl	__secure_computing	
+	add	r0, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmia	r0, {r0 - r3}			@ have to reload r0 - r3
+1:
+#endif
+
 	cmp	scno, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
 	adr	lr, BSYM(ret_fast_syscall)	@ return address
 	ldrcc	pc, [tbl, scno, lsl #2]		@ call sys_* routine
@@ -336,8 +346,15 @@ __sys_trace:
 	mov	r0, #0				@ trace entry [IP = 0]
 	bl	syscall_trace
 
-	adr	lr, BSYM(__sys_trace_return)	@ return address
 	mov	scno, r0			@ syscall number (possibly new)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	ldr	ip, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]		@ check for syscall tracing
+	tst	ip, #_TIF_SECCOMP
+	blne	__secure_computing	
+#endif
+
+	adr	lr, BSYM(__sys_trace_return)	@ return address
 	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
 	cmp	scno, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
 	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r3}			@ have to reload r0 - r3
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ARM: SECCOMP support

Quoted 7 lines · Nicolas Pitre
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +0 -0
index f05a35a..cdd0a88 100644
@@ -314,6 +314,16 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi)
 	tst	ip, #_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE		@ are we tracing syscalls?
 	bne	__sys_trace

arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S ENTRY(vector_swi) · line 325

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +9 -0
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	tst	ip, #_TIF_SECCOMP
+	beq	1f
+	mov	r0, scno
+	bl	__secure_computing	
+	add	r0, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmia	r0, {r0 - r3}			@ have to reload r0 - r3
+1:
+#endif

Why not do this before the test for TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE? You're doing the same check in both paths, and x86 checks for secure computing before any syscall tracing stuff.

#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ARM: SECCOMP support

Quoted 9 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux
Quoted 8 lines · Nicolas Pitre
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +0 -0
index f05a35a..cdd0a88 100644
@@ -314,6 +314,16 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi)
 	tst	ip, #_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE		@ are we tracing syscalls?
 	bne	__sys_trace
 
Quoted 13 lines

arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S ENTRY(vector_swi) · line 325

Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +9 -0
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	tst	ip, #_TIF_SECCOMP
+	beq	1f
+	mov	r0, scno
+	bl	__secure_computing	
+	add	r0, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmia	r0, {r0 - r3}			@ have to reload r0 - r3
+1:
+#endif

Why not do this before the test for TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE? You're doing the same check in both paths, and x86 checks for secure computing before any syscall tracing stuff.

Well, for one thing, the syscall tracing has the ability to change the actual syscall number. So this looked like a possible hole that could somehow be exploited to escape the seccomp control. So I went with the safest way.

Nicolas

#3 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ARM: SECCOMP support

Quoted 4 lines · Nicolas Pitre

Well, for one thing, the syscall tracing has the ability to change the actual syscall number. So this looked like a possible hole that could somehow be exploited to escape the seccomp control. So I went with the safest way.

That is also true for x86 - the seccomp test on x86 is done first, before the syscall entry trap.

#4 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ARM: SECCOMP support

Quoted 8 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux
Quoted 4 lines · Nicolas Pitre

Well, for one thing, the syscall tracing has the ability to change the actual syscall number. So this looked like a possible hole that could somehow be exploited to escape the seccomp control. So I went with the safest way.

That is also true for x86 - the seccomp test on x86 is done first, before the syscall entry trap.

OK, what about this then:

arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +13 -2
index f05a35a..5f3c4bf 100644
@@ -293,7 +293,6 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi)
 
 	get_thread_info tsk
 	adr	tbl, sys_call_table		@ load syscall table pointer
-	ldr	ip, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]		@ check for syscall tracing
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT)
 	/*
@@ -310,8 +309,20 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi)
 	eor	scno, scno, #__NR_SYSCALL_BASE	@ check OS number
 #endif
 
+	ldr	r10, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]		@ check for syscall tracing
 	stmdb	sp!, {r4, r5}			@ push fifth and sixth args
-	tst	ip, #_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE		@ are we tracing syscalls?
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	tst	r10, #_TIF_SECCOMP
+	beq	1f
+	mov	r0, scno
+	bl	__secure_computing	
+	add	r0, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmia	r0, {r0 - r3}			@ have to reload r0 - r3
+1:
+#endif
+
+	tst	r10, #_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE		@ are we tracing syscalls?
 	bne	__sys_trace
 
 	cmp	scno, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit

Nicolas