Skip to contentSkip to conversation

2.6.27.55-stable review

PATCH In review Greg KH 3 participants 23 messages Oct 22, 2010

Subsystems (14)
lore
Share & tools
lore

Greg KH

author
#0 lore raw

cover 2.6.27.55-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.27.55 release. There are 17 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let us know. If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.

Responses should be made by Monday, October 25, 2010 16:00:00 UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/stable-review/patch-2.6.27.55-rc1.gz

and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

 Makefile                             |    2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S        |   18 ++++++++++++------
 block/bsg.c                          |    2 +-
 drivers/dma/mv_xor.c                 |    2 +-
 drivers/media/video/compat_ioctl32.c |   32 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 drivers/net/atlx/atl1.c              |    5 +++--
 drivers/net/b44.c                    |    4 ++--
 drivers/net/r6040.c                  |   12 +++++-------
 fs/aio.c                             |    3 +++
 fs/exec.c                            |   14 ++++++++++++++
 include/linux/mm.h                   |    8 +++++++-
 mm/memory.c                          |   15 +++++++++++----
 mm/mmap.c                            |    3 ---
 net/wireless/wext.c                  |    2 +-
 sound/core/control.c                 |    3 +++
 sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c             |    1 +
 sound/pci/rme9652/hdspm.c            |    1 +
 17 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/17 aio: check for multiplication overflow in do_io_submit

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>

commit 75e1c70fc31490ef8a373ea2a4bea2524099b478 upstream.

Tavis Ormandy pointed out that do_io_submit does not do proper bounds checking on the passed-in iocb array:

       if (unlikely(nr < 0))
               return -EINVAL;

       if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(iocbpp))))) return -EFAULT;                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The attached patch checks for overflow, and if it is detected, the number of iocbs submitted is scaled down to a number that will fit in the long.  This is an ok thing to do, as sys_io_submit is documented as returning the number of iocbs submitted, so callers should handle a return value of less than the 'nr' argument passed in.

---
 fs/aio.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/aio.c +3 -0
@@ -1677,6 +1677,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(io_submit, aio_context_t
 	if (unlikely(nr < 0))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp)))
+		nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp);
+
 	if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
author
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/17 guard page for stacks that grow upwards

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Luck, Tony <[email protected]>

commit 8ca3eb08097f6839b2206e2242db4179aee3cfb3 upstream.

pa-risc and ia64 have stacks that grow upwards. Check that they do not run into other mappings. By making VM_GROWSUP 0x0 on architectures that do not ever use it, we can avoid some unpleasant #ifdefs in check_stack_guard_page().

---
 include/linux/mm.h |    8 +++++++-
 mm/memory.c        |   15 +++++++++++----
 mm/mmap.c          |    3 ---
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/linux/mm.h +7 -1
@@ -87,7 +87,11 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void
 #define VM_MAYSHARE	0x00000080
 
 #define VM_GROWSDOWN	0x00000100	/* general info on the segment */
+#if defined(CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP) || defined(CONFIG_IA64)
 #define VM_GROWSUP	0x00000200
+#else
+#define VM_GROWSUP	0x00000000
+#endif
 #define VM_PFNMAP	0x00000400	/* Page-ranges managed without "struct page", just pure PFN */
 #define VM_DENYWRITE	0x00000800	/* ETXTBSY on write attempts.. */
 
@@ -1181,8 +1185,10 @@ unsigned long max_sane_readahead(unsigne
 
 /* Do stack extension */
 extern int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address);
-#ifdef CONFIG_IA64
+#if VM_GROWSUP
 extern int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address);
+#else
+  #define expand_upwards(vma, address) do { } while (0)
 #endif
 extern int expand_stack_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 				  unsigned long address);
mm/memory.c +11 -4
@@ -2396,11 +2396,9 @@ out_nomap:
 }
 
 /*
- * This is like a special single-page "expand_downwards()",
- * except we must first make sure that 'address-PAGE_SIZE'
+ * This is like a special single-page "expand_{down|up}wards()",
+ * except we must first make sure that 'address{-|+}PAGE_SIZE'
  * doesn't hit another vma.
- *
- * The "find_vma()" will do the right thing even if we wrap
  */
 static inline int check_stack_guard_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
 {
@@ -2412,6 +2410,15 @@ static inline int check_stack_guard_page
 
 		expand_stack(vma, address);
 	}
+	if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP) && address + PAGE_SIZE == vma->vm_end) {
+		struct vm_area_struct *next = vma->vm_next;
+
+		/* As VM_GROWSDOWN but s/below/above/ */
+		if (next && next->vm_start == address + PAGE_SIZE)
+			return next->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+
+		expand_upwards(vma, address + PAGE_SIZE);
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
mm/mmap.c +0 -3
@@ -1589,9 +1589,6 @@ static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_a
  * PA-RISC uses this for its stack; IA64 for its Register Backing Store.
  * vma is the last one with address > vma->vm_end.  Have to extend vma.
  */
-#ifndef CONFIG_IA64
-static inline
-#endif
 int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
 {
 	int error;
author
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/17 ALSA: sound/pci/rme9652: prevent reading uninitialized stack memory

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>

commit e68d3b316ab7b02a074edc4f770e6a746390cb7d upstream.

The SNDRV_HDSP_IOCTL_GET_CONFIG_INFO and SNDRV_HDSP_IOCTL_GET_CONFIG_INFO ioctls in hdspm.c and hdsp.c allow unprivileged users to read uninitialized kernel stack memory, because several fields of the hdsp{m}_config_info structs declared on the stack are not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user. This patch takes care of it.

---
 sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c  |    1 +
 sound/pci/rme9652/hdspm.c |    1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c +1 -0
@@ -4569,6 +4569,7 @@ static int snd_hdsp_hwdep_ioctl(struct s
 			snd_printk(KERN_ERR "Hammerfall-DSP: Firmware needs to be uploaded to the card.\n");	
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
+		memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&hdsp->lock, flags);
 		info.pref_sync_ref = (unsigned char)hdsp_pref_sync_ref(hdsp);
 		info.wordclock_sync_check = (unsigned char)hdsp_wc_sync_check(hdsp);
sound/pci/rme9652/hdspm.c +1 -0
@@ -4133,6 +4133,7 @@ static int snd_hdspm_hwdep_ioctl(struct
 
 	case SNDRV_HDSPM_IOCTL_GET_CONFIG_INFO:
 
+		memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
 		spin_lock_irq(&hdspm->lock);
 		info.pref_sync_ref = hdspm_pref_sync_ref(hdspm);
 		info.wordclock_sync_check = hdspm_wc_sync_check(hdspm);
author
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/17 ALSA: prevent heap corruption in snd_ctl_new()

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>

commit 5591bf07225523600450edd9e6ad258bb877b779 upstream.

The snd_ctl_new() function in sound/core/control.c allocates space for a snd_kcontrol struct by performing arithmetic operations on a user-provided size without checking for integer overflow. If a user provides a large enough size, an overflow will occur, the allocated chunk will be too small, and a second user-influenced value will be written repeatedly past the bounds of this chunk. This code is reachable by unprivileged users who have permission to open a /dev/snd/controlC* device (on many distros, this is group "audio") via the SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD and SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_REPLACE ioctls.

---
 sound/core/control.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
sound/core/control.c +3 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 
 /* max number of user-defined controls */
 #define MAX_USER_CONTROLS	32
+#define MAX_CONTROL_COUNT	1028
 
 struct snd_kctl_ioctl {
 	struct list_head list;		/* list of all ioctls */
@@ -190,6 +191,8 @@ static struct snd_kcontrol *snd_ctl_new(
 	
 	snd_assert(control != NULL, return NULL);
 	snd_assert(control->count > 0, return NULL);
+	if (control->count > MAX_CONTROL_COUNT)
+		return NULL;
 	kctl = kzalloc(sizeof(*kctl) + sizeof(struct snd_kcontrol_volatile) * control->count, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (kctl == NULL) {
 		snd_printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot allocate control instance\n");
author
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/17 v4l1: fix 32-bit compat microcode loading translation

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

commit 3e645d6b485446c54c6745c5e2cf5c528fe4deec upstream.

The compat code for the VIDIOCSMICROCODE ioctl is totally buggered. It's only used by the VIDEO_STRADIS driver, and that one is scheduled to staging and eventually removed unless somebody steps up to maintain it (at which point it should use request_firmware() rather than some magic ioctl). So we'll get rid of it eventually.

But in the meantime, the compatibility ioctl code is broken, and this tries to get it to at least limp along (even if Mauro suggested just deleting it entirely, which may be the right thing to do - I don't think the compatibility translation code has ever worked unless you were very lucky).

---
 drivers/media/video/compat_ioctl32.c |   32 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/media/video/compat_ioctl32.c +21 -11
@@ -499,17 +499,24 @@ struct video_code32
 {
 	char		loadwhat[16];	/* name or tag of file being passed */
 	compat_int_t	datasize;
-	unsigned char	*data;
+	compat_uptr_t	data;
 };
 
-static inline int microcode32(struct video_code *kp, struct video_code32 __user *up)
+static struct video_code __user *get_microcode32(struct video_code32 *kp)
 {
-	if(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, up, sizeof(struct video_code32)) ||
-		copy_from_user(kp->loadwhat, up->loadwhat, sizeof (up->loadwhat)) ||
-		get_user(kp->datasize, &up->datasize) ||
-		copy_from_user(kp->data, up->data, up->datasize))
-			return -EFAULT;
-	return 0;
+	struct video_code __user *up;
+
+	up = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(*up));
+
+	/*
+	 * NOTE! We don't actually care if these fail. If the
+	 * user address is invalid, the native ioctl will do
+	 * the error handling for us
+	 */
+	(void) copy_to_user(up->loadwhat, kp->loadwhat, sizeof(up->loadwhat));
+	(void) put_user(kp->datasize, &up->datasize);
+	(void) put_user(compat_ptr(kp->data), &up->data);
+	return up;
 }
 
 #define VIDIOCGTUNER32		_IOWR('v',4, struct video_tuner32)
@@ -618,7 +625,7 @@ static int do_video_ioctl(struct file *f
 		struct video_tuner vt;
 		struct video_buffer vb;
 		struct video_window vw;
-		struct video_code vc;
+		struct video_code32 vc;
 		struct video_audio va;
 #endif
 		struct v4l2_format v2f;
@@ -745,8 +752,11 @@ static int do_video_ioctl(struct file *f
 		break;
 #ifdef CONFIG_VIDEO_V4L1_COMPAT
 	case VIDIOCSMICROCODE:
-		err = microcode32(&karg.vc, up);
-		compatible_arg = 0;
+		/* Copy the 32-bit "video_code32" to kernel space */
+		if (copy_from_user(&karg.vc, up, sizeof(karg.vc)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		/* Convert the 32-bit version to a 64-bit version in user space */
+		up = get_microcode32(&karg.vc);
 		break;
 #endif
 	};
author
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/17 dmaengine: fix interrupt clearing for mv_xor

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Simon Guinot <[email protected]>

commit cc60f8878eab892c03d06b10f389232b9b66bd83 upstream.

When using simultaneously the two DMA channels on a same engine, some transfers are never completed. For example, an endless lock can occur while writing heavily on a RAID5 array (with async-tx offload support enabled).

Note that this issue can also be reproduced by using the DMA test client.

On a same engine, the interrupt cause register is shared between two DMA channels. This patch make sure that the cause bit is only cleared for the requested channel.

---
 drivers/dma/mv_xor.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma/mv_xor.c +1 -1
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int mv_is_err_intr(u32 intr_cause
 
 static void mv_xor_device_clear_eoc_cause(struct mv_xor_chan *chan)
 {
-	u32 val = (1 << (1 + (chan->idx * 16)));
+	u32 val = ~(1 << (chan->idx * 16));
 	dev_dbg(chan->device->common.dev, "%s, val 0x%08x\n", __func__, val);
 	__raw_writel(val, XOR_INTR_CAUSE(chan));
 }
author
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/17 wext: fix potential private ioctl memory content leak

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>

commit df6d02300f7c2fbd0fbe626d819c8e5237d72c62 upstream.

When a driver doesn't fill the entire buffer, old heap contents may remain, and if it also doesn't update the length properly, this old heap content will be copied back to userspace.

It is very unlikely that this happens in any of the drivers using private ioctls since it would show up as junk being reported by iwpriv, but it seems better to be safe here, so use kzalloc.

---
 net/wireless/wext.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/wireless/wext.c +1 -1
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static int ioctl_private_iw_point(struct
 	} else if (!iwp->pointer)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	extra = kmalloc(extra_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	extra = kzalloc(extra_size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!extra)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
author
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/17 atl1: fix resume

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Luca Tettamanti <[email protected]>

commit ec5a32f67c603b11d68eb283d94eb89a4f6cfce1 upstream.

adapter->cmb.cmb is initialized when the device is opened and freed when it's closed. Accessing it unconditionally during resume results either in a crash (NULL pointer dereference, when the interface has not been opened yet) or data corruption (when the interface has been used and brought down adapter->cmb.cmb points to a deallocated memory area).

---
 drivers/net/atlx/atl1.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/atlx/atl1.c +3 -2
@@ -2881,10 +2881,11 @@ static int atl1_resume(struct pci_dev *p
 	pci_enable_wake(pdev, PCI_D3cold, 0);
 
 	atl1_reset_hw(&adapter->hw);
-	adapter->cmb.cmb->int_stats = 0;
 
-	if (netif_running(netdev))
+	if (netif_running(netdev)) {
+		adapter->cmb.cmb->int_stats = 0;
 		atl1_up(adapter);
+	}
 	netif_device_attach(netdev);
 
 	return 0;
author
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/17 bsg: fix incorrect device_status value

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: FUJITA Tomonori <[email protected]>

commit 478971600e47cb83ff2d3c63c5c24f2b04b0d6a1 upstream.

bsg incorrectly returns sg's masked_status value for device_status.

---
 block/bsg.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
block/bsg.c +1 -1
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static int blk_complete_sgv4_hdr_rq(stru
 	/*
 	 * fill in all the output members
 	 */
-	hdr->device_status = status_byte(rq->errors);
+	hdr->device_status = rq->errors & 0xff;
 	hdr->transport_status = host_byte(rq->errors);
 	hdr->driver_status = driver_byte(rq->errors);
 	hdr->info = 0;
author
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/17 r6040: fix r6040_multicast_list

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>

commit 3bcf8229a8c49769e48d3e0bd1e20d8e003f8106 upstream.

As reported in <https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15355>, r6040_ multicast_list currently crashes. This is due a wrong maximum of multicast entries. This patch fixes the following issues with multicast:

- number of maximum entries if off-by-one (4 instead of 3)

- the writing of the hash table index is not necessary and leads to invalid values being written into the MCR1 register, so the MAC is simply put in a non coherent state

- when we exceed the maximum number of mutlticast address, writing the broadcast address should be done in registers MID_1{L,M,H} instead of MID_O{L,M,H}, otherwise we would loose the adapter's MAC address

[bwh: Adjust for 2.6.32; should also apply to 2.6.27]

---
 drivers/net/r6040.c |   11 ++++-------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/net/r6040.c +4 -7
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
 #define RX_DESC_SIZE	(RX_DCNT * sizeof(struct r6040_descriptor))
 #define TX_DESC_SIZE	(TX_DCNT * sizeof(struct r6040_descriptor))
 #define MBCR_DEFAULT	0x012A	/* MAC Bus Control Register */
-#define MCAST_MAX	4	/* Max number multicast addresses to filter */
+#define MCAST_MAX	3	/* Max number multicast addresses to filter */
 
 /* Descriptor status */
 #define DSC_OWNER_MAC	0x8000	/* MAC is the owner of this descriptor */
@@ -969,9 +969,6 @@ static void r6040_multicast_list(struct
 			crc >>= 26;
 			hash_table[crc >> 4] |= 1 << (15 - (crc & 0xf));
 		}
-		/* Write the index of the hash table */
-		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-			iowrite16(hash_table[i] << 14, ioaddr + MCR1);
 		/* Fill the MAC hash tables with their values */
 		iowrite16(hash_table[0], ioaddr + MAR0);
 		iowrite16(hash_table[1], ioaddr + MAR1);
@@ -987,9 +984,9 @@ static void r6040_multicast_list(struct
 		dmi = dmi->next;
 	}
 	for (i = dev->mc_count; i < MCAST_MAX; i++) {
-		iowrite16(0xffff, ioaddr + MID_0L + 8*i);
-		iowrite16(0xffff, ioaddr + MID_0M + 8*i);
-		iowrite16(0xffff, ioaddr + MID_0H + 8*i);
+		iowrite16(0xffff, ioaddr + MID_1L + 8*i);
+		iowrite16(0xffff, ioaddr + MID_1M + 8*i);
+		iowrite16(0xffff, ioaddr + MID_1H + 8*i);
 	}
 }
 
author
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/17 r6040: Fix multicast list iteration when hash filter is used

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>

This was fixed in mainline by the interface change made in commit f9dcbcc9e338d08c0f7de7eba4eaafbbb7f81249.

After walking the multicast list to set up the hash filter, this function will walk off the end of the list when filling the exact-match entries. This was fixed in mainline by the interface change made in commit f9dcbcc9e338d08c0f7de7eba4eaafbbb7f81249.

Reported-by [email protected]

Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15355

Reference: http://bugs.debian.org/600155

---
 drivers/net/r6040.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/r6040.c +1 -0
@@ -976,6 +976,7 @@ static void r6040_multicast_list(struct
 		iowrite16(hash_table[3], ioaddr + MAR3);
 	}
 	/* Multicast Address 1~4 case */
+	dmi = dev->mc_list;
 	for (i = 0, dmi; (i < dev->mc_count) && (i < MCAST_MAX); i++) {
 		adrp = (u16 *)dmi->dmi_addr;
 		iowrite16(adrp[0], ioaddr + MID_1L + 8*i);
#12 lore raw

Re: [11/17] r6040: Fix multicast list iteration when hash filter is used

drivers/net/r6040.c static void r6040_multicast_list(struct · line 980

Quoted 11 lines · Greg KH
 drivers/net/r6040.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/r6040.c +1 -0
@@ -976,6 +976,7 @@ static void r6040_multicast_list(struct
 		iowrite16(hash_table[3], ioaddr + MAR3);
 	}
 	/* Multicast Address 1~4 case */
+	dmi = dev->mc_list;
 	for (i = 0, dmi; (i < dev->mc_count) && (i < MCAST_MAX); i++) {

Any reason for the dmi in the above line? As far as I can see it is a nop.

Quoted 3 lines
drivers/net/r6040.c +0 -0
 		adrp = (u16 *)dmi->dmi_addr;
 		iowrite16(adrp[0], ioaddr + MID_1L + 8*i);
author
#13 lore raw

Re: [11/17] r6040: Fix multicast list iteration when hash filter is used

Quoted 4 lines · Jack Stone
Quoted 3 lines · Greg KH
 drivers/net/r6040.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
Quoted 10 lines

drivers/net/r6040.c static void r6040_multicast_list(struct · line 980

Quoted 8 lines
drivers/net/r6040.c +1 -0
@@ -976,6 +976,7 @@ static void r6040_multicast_list(struct
 		iowrite16(hash_table[3], ioaddr + MAR3);
 	}
 	/* Multicast Address 1~4 case */
+	dmi = dev->mc_list;
 	for (i = 0, dmi; (i < dev->mc_count) && (i < MCAST_MAX); i++) {

Any reason for the dmi in the above line? As far as I can see it is a nop.

Look closer at the for loop please.

thanks,

greg k-h

#14 lore raw

Re: [11/17] r6040: Fix multicast list iteration when hash filter is used

Quoted 16 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 4 lines · Jack Stone
Quoted 3 lines · Greg KH
 drivers/net/r6040.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
Quoted 10 lines

drivers/net/r6040.c static void r6040_multicast_list(struct · line 980

Quoted 8 lines
drivers/net/r6040.c +1 -0
@@ -976,6 +976,7 @@ static void r6040_multicast_list(struct
 		iowrite16(hash_table[3], ioaddr + MAR3);
 	}
 	/* Multicast Address 1~4 case */
+	dmi = dev->mc_list;
 	for (i = 0, dmi; (i < dev->mc_count) && (i < MCAST_MAX); i++) {

Any reason for the dmi in the above line? As far as I can see it is a nop.

Quoted 1 line

Look closer at the for loop please.

Maybe I'm missing something but:
for (i = 0, ---->dmi <----; (i < ...

The dmi here still doesn't seem to do anything?

Thanks,

Jack

#15 lore raw

Re: [11/17] r6040: Fix multicast list iteration when hash filter is used

Quoted 17 lines · Jack Stone
Quoted 16 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 14 lines · Jack Stone

drivers/net/r6040.c static void r6040_multicast_list(struct · line 980

Quoted 11 lines · Greg KH
 drivers/net/r6040.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/r6040.c +1 -0
@@ -976,6 +976,7 @@ static void r6040_multicast_list(struct
 		iowrite16(hash_table[3], ioaddr + MAR3);
 	}
 	/* Multicast Address 1~4 case */
+	dmi = dev->mc_list;
 	for (i = 0, dmi; (i < dev->mc_count) && (i < MCAST_MAX); i++) {

Any reason for the dmi in the above line? As far as I can see it is a nop.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

Look closer at the for loop please.

Maybe I'm missing something but:
for (i = 0, ---->dmi <----; (i < ...

The dmi here still doesn't seem to do anything?

It doesn't, but it doesn't do any harm either. The loop has been rewritten in mainline.

Ben.

Signature · 2 lines
Ben Hutchings
Once a job is fouled up, anything done to improve it makes it worse.
#16 lore raw

Re: [11/17] r6040: Fix multicast list iteration when hash filter is used

Quoted 20 lines · Ben Hutchings
Quoted 19 lines · Jack Stone
Quoted 17 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 4 lines · Jack Stone
Quoted 3 lines · Greg KH
 drivers/net/r6040.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
Quoted 10 lines

drivers/net/r6040.c static void r6040_multicast_list(struct · line 980

Quoted 8 lines
drivers/net/r6040.c +1 -0
@@ -976,6 +976,7 @@ static void r6040_multicast_list(struct
 		iowrite16(hash_table[3], ioaddr + MAR3);
 	}
 	/* Multicast Address 1~4 case */
+	dmi = dev->mc_list;
 	for (i = 0, dmi; (i < dev->mc_count) && (i < MCAST_MAX); i++) {

Any reason for the dmi in the above line? As far as I can see it is a nop.

Look closer at the for loop please.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Maybe I'm missing something but:
for (i = 0, ---->dmi <----; (i < ...

The dmi here still doesn't seem to do anything?

It doesn't, but it doesn't do any harm either. The loop has been rewritten in mainline.

Agreed, it causes no problems, but it seems like it was intended to be the dmi init, i.e.

for (i = 0, dmi = dev->mc_list; ...

I suppose it doesn't really matter but either removing the dmi in the for loop or moving the dmi init in there would make more sense to me.

I really should learn to explain myself fully. Sorry for taking up your time.

Thanks,

Jack

author
#17 lore raw

PATCH 12/17 powerpc: Initialise paca->kstack before early_setup_secondary

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Matt Evans <[email protected]>

commit f761622e59433130bc33ad086ce219feee9eb961 upstream.

As early setup calls down to slb_initialize(), we must have kstack initialised before checking "should we add a bolted SLB entry for our kstack?"

Failing to do so means stack access requires an SLB miss exception to refill an entry dynamically, if the stack isn't accessible via SLB(0) (kernel text & static data). It's not always allowable to take such a miss, and intermittent crashes will result.

Primary CPUs don't have this issue; an SLB entry is not bolted for their stack anyway (as that lives within SLB(0)). This patch therefore only affects the init of secondaries.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S +3 -3
@@ -1479,9 +1479,6 @@ __secondary_start:
 	/* Load TOC */
 	ld	r2,PACATOC(r13)
 
-	/* Do early setup for that CPU (stab, slb, hash table pointer) */
-	bl	.early_setup_secondary
-
 	/* Initialize the kernel stack.  Just a repeat for iSeries.	 */
 	LOAD_REG_ADDR(r3, current_set)
 	sldi	r28,r24,3		/* get current_set[cpu#]	 */
@@ -1489,6 +1486,9 @@ __secondary_start:
 	addi	r1,r1,THREAD_SIZE-STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
 	std	r1,PACAKSAVE(r13)
 
+	/* Do early setup for that CPU (stab, slb, hash table pointer) */
+	bl	.early_setup_secondary
+
 	/* Clear backchain so we get nice backtraces */
 	li	r7,0
 	mtlr	r7
author
#18 lore raw

PATCH 13/17 powerpc: Dont use kernel stack with translation off

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Michael Neuling <[email protected]>

commit 54a834043314c257210db2a9d59f8cc605571639 upstream.

In f761622e59433130bc33ad086ce219feee9eb961 we changed early_setup_secondary so it's called using the proper kernel stack rather than the emergency one.

Unfortunately, this stack pointer can't be used when translation is off on PHYP as this stack pointer might be outside the RMO. This results in the following on all non zero cpus:
cpu 0x1: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c00000001639fd10]

      pc: 000000000001c50c
      lr: 000000000000821c
      sp: c00000001639ff90
     msr: 8000000000001000
     dar: c00000001639ffa0
   dsisr: 42000000
    current = 0xc000000016393540
    paca    = 0xc000000006e00200
      pid   = 0, comm = swapper

The original patch was only tested on bare metal system, so it never caught this problem.

This changes __secondary_start so that we calculate the new stack pointer but only start using it after we've called early_setup_secondary.

With this patch, the above problem goes away.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S |   12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S +9 -3
@@ -1482,13 +1482,19 @@ __secondary_start:
 	/* Initialize the kernel stack.  Just a repeat for iSeries.	 */
 	LOAD_REG_ADDR(r3, current_set)
 	sldi	r28,r24,3		/* get current_set[cpu#]	 */
-	ldx	r1,r3,r28
-	addi	r1,r1,THREAD_SIZE-STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
-	std	r1,PACAKSAVE(r13)
+	ldx	r14,r3,r28
+	addi	r14,r14,THREAD_SIZE-STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
+	std	r14,PACAKSAVE(r13)
 
 	/* Do early setup for that CPU (stab, slb, hash table pointer) */
 	bl	.early_setup_secondary
 
+	/*
+	 * setup the new stack pointer, but *don't* use this until
+	 * translation is on.
+	 */
+	mr	r1, r14
+
 	/* Clear backchain so we get nice backtraces */
 	li	r7,0
 	mtlr	r7
author
#19 lore raw

PATCH 14/17 b44: fix carrier detection on bind

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Paul Fertser <[email protected]>

commit bcf64aa379fcadd074449cbf0c049da70071b06f upstream.

For carrier detection to work properly when binding the driver with a cable unplugged, netif_carrier_off() should be called after register_netdev(), not before.

---
 drivers/net/b44.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/b44.c +2 -2
@@ -2164,8 +2164,6 @@ static int __devinit b44_init_one(struct
 	dev->irq = sdev->irq;
 	SET_ETHTOOL_OPS(dev, &b44_ethtool_ops);
 
-	netif_carrier_off(dev);
-
 	err = ssb_bus_powerup(sdev->bus, 0);
 	if (err) {
 		dev_err(sdev->dev,
@@ -2205,6 +2203,8 @@ static int __devinit b44_init_one(struct
 		goto err_out_powerdown;
 	}
 
+	netif_carrier_off(dev);
+
 	ssb_set_drvdata(sdev, dev);
 
 	/* Chip reset provides power to the b44 MAC & PCI cores, which
author
#20 lore raw

PATCH 15/17 setup_arg_pages: diagnose excessive argument size

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>

commit 1b528181b2ffa14721fb28ad1bd539fe1732c583 upstream.

The CONFIG_STACK_GROWSDOWN variant of setup_arg_pages() does not check the size of the argument/environment area on the stack. When it is unworkably large, shift_arg_pages() hits its BUG_ON. This is exploitable with a very large RLIMIT_STACK limit, to create a crash pretty easily.

Check that the initial stack is not too large to make it possible to map in any executable. We're not checking that the actual executable (or intepreter, for binfmt_elf) will fit. So those mappings might clobber part of the initial stack mapping. But that is just userland lossage that userland made happen, not a kernel problem.

---
 fs/exec.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/exec.c +5 -0
@@ -608,6 +608,11 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
 #else
 	stack_top = arch_align_stack(stack_top);
 	stack_top = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top);
+
+	if (unlikely(stack_top < mmap_min_addr) ||
+	    unlikely(vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start >= stack_top - mmap_min_addr))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	stack_shift = vma->vm_end - stack_top;
 
 	bprm->p -= stack_shift;
author
#21 lore raw

PATCH 16/17 execve: improve interactivity with large arguments

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>

commit 7993bc1f4663c0db67bb8f0d98e6678145b387cd upstream.

This adds a preemption point during the copying of the argument and environment strings for execve, in copy_strings(). There is already a preemption point in the count() loop, so this doesn't add any new points in the abstract sense.

When the total argument+environment strings are very large, the time spent copying them can be much more than a normal user time slice. So this change improves the interactivity of the rest of the system when one process is doing an execve with very large arguments.

---
 fs/exec.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/exec.c +2 -0
@@ -436,6 +436,8 @@ static int copy_strings(int argc, char _
 		while (len > 0) {
 			int offset, bytes_to_copy;
 
+			cond_resched();
+
 			offset = pos % PAGE_SIZE;
 			if (offset == 0)
 				offset = PAGE_SIZE;
author
#22 lore raw

PATCH 17/17 execve: make responsive to SIGKILL with large arguments

In reply to Greg KH

2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>

commit 9aea5a65aa7a1af9a4236dfaeb0088f1624f9919 upstream.

An execve with a very large total of argument/environment strings can take a really long time in the execve system call. It runs uninterruptibly to count and copy all the strings. This change makes it abort the exec quickly if sent a SIGKILL.

Note that this is the conservative change, to interrupt only for SIGKILL, by using fatal_signal_pending(). It would be perfectly correct semantics to let any signal interrupt the string-copying in execve, i.e. use signal_pending() instead of fatal_signal_pending(). We'll save that change for later, since it could have user-visible consequences, such as having a timer set too quickly make it so that an execve can never complete, though it always happened to work before.

---
 fs/exec.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/exec.c +7 -0
@@ -393,6 +393,9 @@ static int count(char __user * __user *
 			argv++;
 			if(++i > max)
 				return -E2BIG;
+
+			if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
+				return -ERESTARTNOHAND;
 			cond_resched();
 		}
 	}
@@ -436,6 +439,10 @@ static int copy_strings(int argc, char _
 		while (len > 0) {
 			int offset, bytes_to_copy;
 
+			if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
+				ret = -ERESTARTNOHAND;
+				goto out;
+			}
 			cond_resched();
 
 			offset = pos % PAGE_SIZE;