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Define CAP_SYSLOG

PATCH In review Serge E. Hallyn 3 participants 4 messages Nov 25, 2010 – Nov 28, 2010

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Serge E. Hallyn

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Define CAP_SYSLOG

Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Split this off into a new CAP_SYSLOG privilege which we can sanely take away from a container through the capability bounding set.

With this patch, an lxc container can be prevented from messing with the host's syslog (i.e. dmesg -c).

Changelog: mar 12 2010: add selinux capability2:cap_syslog perm
Changelog: nov 22 2010:
. port to new kernel
. add a WARN_ONCE if userspace isn't using CAP_SYSLOG

Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc "Christopher J. PeBenito" <[email protected]>
Cc Eric Paris <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/capability.h          |    7 +++++--
 kernel/printk.c                     |    8 +++++++-
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +5 -2
index 90012b9..fb16a36 100644
@@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 /* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
 /* Allow administration of the random device */
 /* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
-/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
 /* Allow setting the domainname */
 /* Allow setting the hostname */
 /* Allow calling bdflush() */
@@ -352,7 +351,11 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 
 #define CAP_MAC_ADMIN        33
 
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
+
+#define CAP_SYSLOG           34
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_SYSLOG
 
 #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
 
kernel/printk.c +7 -1
index 9a2264f..111cdc2 100644
@@ -283,8 +283,14 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
 			return -EPERM;
 		if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
 		     type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) &&
-		    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		    !capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) {
+			/* remove after 2.6.28 */
+			if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+				WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with "
+				  "CAP_SYS_ADMIN but no CAP_SYSLOG "
+				  "(deprecated and denied).\n");
 			return -EPERM;
+		}
 	}
 
 	error = security_syslog(type);
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1 -1
index 8858d2b..7ed3663 100644
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	    "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
 	{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
 	{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
-	{ "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", NULL } },
+	{ "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", NULL } },
 	{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
 	{ "tun_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
#1 lore raw
Quoted 56 lines · On Thu, 25 Nov 2010 17:11:32 +0000 Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Split this off into a new CAP_SYSLOG privilege which we can sanely take away from a container through the capability bounding set.

With this patch, an lxc container can be prevented from messing with the host's syslog (i.e. dmesg -c).

Changelog: mar 12 2010: add selinux capability2:cap_syslog perm
Changelog: nov 22 2010:
. port to new kernel
. add a WARN_ONCE if userspace isn't using CAP_SYSLOG

Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc "Christopher J. PeBenito" <[email protected]>
Cc Eric Paris <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/capability.h          |    7 +++++--
 kernel/printk.c                     |    8 +++++++-
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +5 -2
index 90012b9..fb16a36 100644
@@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 /* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
 /* Allow administration of the random device */
 /* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
-/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
 /* Allow setting the domainname */
 /* Allow setting the hostname */
 /* Allow calling bdflush() */
@@ -352,7 +351,11 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 
 #define CAP_MAC_ADMIN        33
 
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
+
+#define CAP_SYSLOG           34
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_SYSLOG
 
 #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
 
kernel/printk.c +0 -0
index 9a2264f..111cdc2 100644

kernel/printk.c int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file) · line 287

Quoted 6 lines
kernel/printk.c +2 -1
@@ -283,8 +283,14 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
 			return -EPERM;
 		if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
 		     type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) &&
-		    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		    !capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) {
+			/* remove after 2.6.28 */

Is this supposed to say: after 2.6.38 ??

Quoted 15 lines
kernel/printk.c +5 -0
+			if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+				WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with "
+				  "CAP_SYS_ADMIN but no CAP_SYSLOG "
+				  "(deprecated and denied).\n");
 			return -EPERM;
+		}
 	}
 
 	error = security_syslog(type);
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +0 -0
index 8858d2b..7ed3663 100644

security/selinux/include/classmap.h struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { · line 148

Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1 -1
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	    "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
 	{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
 	{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
-	{ "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", NULL } },
+	{ "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", NULL } },
 	{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
 	{ "tun_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },

---
~Randy
*** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***

author maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Randy Dunlap

kernel/printk.c int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file) · line 287

Quoted 1 line · On Thu, 25 Nov 2010 17:11:32 +0000 Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
kernel/printk.c +1 -0
+			/* remove after 2.6.28 */

Is this supposed to say: after 2.6.38 ??

:) yup - i only noticed this after sending it, looking at lkml.org, but didn't have a way of getting to my mail server to reply to myself.

thanks,
-serge

#3 lore raw
In reply to Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 11 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Split this off into a new CAP_SYSLOG privilege which we can sanely take away from a container through the capability bounding set.

With this patch, an lxc container can be prevented from messing with the host's syslog (i.e. dmesg -c).

Changelog: mar 12 2010: add selinux capability2:cap_syslog perm
Changelog: nov 22 2010:
. port to new kernel
. add a WARN_ONCE if userspace isn't using CAP_SYSLOG

Applied with kernel version fix to:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next

Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>