Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerRFC PATCH 1/4 Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace
copy_process() handles CLONE_NEWUSER before the rest of the namespaces. So in the case of clone(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWUTS) the new uts namespace will have the new user namespace as its owner. That is what we want, since we want root in that new userns to be able to have privilege over it.
--- include/linux/utsname.h | 3 +++ init/version.c | 2 ++ kernel/nsproxy.c | 3 +++ kernel/user.c | 8 ++++++-- kernel/utsname.c | 4 ++++ 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/utsname.h +3 -0
@@ -37,9 +37,12 @@ struct new_utsname {#include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/err.h> +struct user_namespace ; +struct uts_namespace {struct kref kref;struct new_utsname name; +struct user_namespace *user_ns; };extern struct uts_namespace init_uts_ns;
init/version.c +2 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ extern int version_string(LINUX_VERSION_CODE);int version_string (LINUX_VERSION_CODE );#endif +extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;struct uts_namespace init_uts_ns = { .kref = { .refcount =ATOMIC_INIT (2 ),
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ struct uts_namespace init_uts_ns = { .machine = UTS_MACHINE, .domainname = UTS_DOMAINNAME, }, + .user_ns = &init_user_ns, };EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (init_uts_ns);
kernel/nsproxy.c +3 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags, err =PTR_ERR (new_nsp->uts_ns); goto out_uts; } +put_user_ns (new_nsp->uts_ns->user_ns); + new_nsp->uts_ns->user_ns =task_cred_xxx (tsk, user)->user_ns; +get_user_ns (new_nsp->uts_ns->user_ns); new_nsp->ipc_ns =copy_ipcs (flags, tsk->nsproxy->ipc_ns);if (IS_ERR (new_nsp->ipc_ns)) {
kernel/user.c +6 -2
@@ -17,9 +17,13 @@#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +/* +* userns count is 1 for root user, 1 for init_uts_ns, +* and 1 for... ? +*/ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = { .kref = { - .refcount =ATOMIC_INIT (2 ), + .refcount =ATOMIC_INIT (3 ), }, .creator = &root_user, };
@@ -47,7 +51,7 @@ static struct kmem_cache *uid_cachep;*/ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (uidhash_lock); -/* root_user.__count is 2, 1 for init task cred, 1 for init_user_ns->creator */ +/* root_user.__count is 2, 1 for init task cred, 1 for init_user_ns->user_ns */ struct user_struct root_user = { .__count =ATOMIC_INIT (2 ), .processes =ATOMIC_INIT (1 ),
kernel/utsname.c +4 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> static struct uts_namespace *create_uts_ns (void ) {
@@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ static struct uts_namespace *clone_uts_ns(struct uts_namespace *old_ns)down_read (&uts_sem);memcpy (&ns->name, &old_ns->name,sizeof (ns->name)); + ns->user_ns = old_ns->user_ns; +get_user_ns (ns->user_ns);up_read (&uts_sem);return ns; }
@@ -71,5 +74,6 @@ void free_uts_ns(struct kref *kref)struct uts_namespace *ns; ns = container_of(kref, struct uts_namespace, kref); +put_user_ns (ns->user_ns);kfree (ns); }
Signature · 1 line
1.7.2.3
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerRFC PATCH 2/4 security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace.
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
--- include/linux/capability.h | 7 +++++-- include/linux/security.h | 12 +++++++----- kernel/capability.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 +++-- security/commoncap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- security/security.c | 12 ++++++------ security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 +++++++++----- 7 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +5 -2
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;* * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ -#define has_capability (t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (cap)) == 0) +#define has_capability (t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0)/** * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
@@ -555,9 +555,12 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ #define has_capability_noaudit (t, cap) \ - (security_real_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0) + (security_real_capable_noaudit((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0) +struct user_namespace ; +extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;extern int capable (int cap); +extern int ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ struct dentry ;
include/linux/security.h +7 -5
@@ -46,13 +46,14 @@struct ctl_table ;struct audit_krule ; +struct user_namespace ;/* * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used * as the default capabilities functions */ extern int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred, -int cap,int audit); +struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,int audit);extern int cap_settime (struct timespec *ts,struct timezone *tz);extern int cap_ptrace_access_check (struct task_struct *child,unsigned int mode);extern int cap_ptrace_traceme (struct task_struct *parent);
@@ -1258,6 +1259,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)* credentials. * @tsk contains the task_struct for the process. * @cred contains the credentials to use. +* @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
@@ -1386,7 +1388,7 @@ struct security_operations {const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted);int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred, -int cap,int audit); +struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,int audit);int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table,int op);int (*quotactl) (int cmds,int type,int id,struct super_block *sb);int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -1668,9 +1670,9 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); -int security_capable (int cap); -int security_real_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap); -int security_real_capable_noaudit (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap); +int security_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap); +int security_real_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap); +int security_real_capable_noaudit (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);int security_sysctl (struct ctl_table *table,int op);int security_quotactl (int cmds,int type,int id,struct super_block *sb);int security_quota_on (struct dentry *dentry);
kernel/capability.c +20 -2
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> /*
@@ -301,15 +302,32 @@ error:*/ int capable (int cap) { +return ns_capable (&init_user_ns, cap); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable); + +/** +* ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect +* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in +* @cap: The capability to be tested for +* +* Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently +* available for use, false if not. +* +* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the +* assumption that it's about to be used. +*/ +int ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) +{if (unlikely (!cap_valid (cap))) {printk (KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n" , cap);BUG (); } -if (security_capable (cap) ==0 ) { +if (security_capable (ns, cap) ==0 ) { current->flags |=PF_SUPERPRIV ;return 1 ; }return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (ns_capable);
security/apparmor/lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include "include/apparmor.h"
@@ -137,11 +138,11 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, }static int apparmor_capable (struct task_struct *task,const struct cred *cred, -int cap,int audit) +struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,int audit) {struct aa_profile *profile;/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */ -int error =cap_capable (task, cred, cap, audit); +int error =cap_capable (task, cred, ns, cap, audit);if (!error) { profile =aa_cred_profile (cred);if (!unconfined (profile))
security/commoncap.c +33 -7
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability * @tsk: The task to query * @cred: The credentials to use +* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability * @cap: The capability to check for * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not *
@@ -79,10 +81,32 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. */ -int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred,int cap, -int audit) +int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred, +struct user_namespace *targ_ns,int cap,int audit) { -return cap_raised (cred->cap_effective, cap) ?0 : -EPERM ; +for (;;) { +/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ +if (targ_ns == cred->user->user_ns) +return cap_raised (cred->cap_effective, cap) ?0 : -EPERM ; + +/* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */ +if (targ_ns->creator == cred->user) +return 0 ; + +/* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */ +if (targ_ns == &init_user_ns) +return -EPERM ; + +/* If you have the capability in a parent user ns you have it +* in the over all children user namespaces as well, so see +* if this process has the capability in the parent user +* namespace. +*/ + targ_ns = targ_ns->creator->user_ns; + } + +/* We never get here */ +return -EPERM ; }/**
@@ -177,7 +201,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP * capability */ -if (cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SETPCAP , +if (cap_capable (current,current_cred (), +current_cred ()->user->user_ns,CAP_SETPCAP ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT ) ==0 )return 0 ;return 1 ;
@@ -829,7 +854,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, & (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ || ((new->securebits &SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))/*[2]*/ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS |SECURE_ALL_BITS ))/*[3]*/ - || (cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SETPCAP , + || (cap_capable (current,current_cred (), +current_cred ()->user->user_ns,CAP_SETPCAP ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT ) !=0 )/*[4]*/ /* * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
@@ -894,7 +920,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) {int cap_sys_admin =0 ; -if (cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_ADMIN , +if (cap_capable (current,current_cred (), &init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ,SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT ) ==0 ) cap_sys_admin =1 ;return __vm_enough_memory (mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -921,7 +947,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,int ret =0 ;if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { - ret =cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_RAWIO , + ret =cap_capable (current,current_cred (), &init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT );/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ if (ret ==0 )
security/security.c +6 -6
@@ -172,30 +172,30 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, effective, inheritable, permitted); } -int security_capable (int cap) +int security_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) { -return security_ops->capable (current,current_cred (), cap, +return security_ops->capable (current,current_cred (), ns, cap,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT ); } -int security_real_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) +int security_real_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) {const struct cred *cred;int ret; cred =get_task_cred (tsk); - ret = security_ops->capable (tsk, cred, cap,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT ); + ret = security_ops->capable (tsk, cred, ns, cap,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT );put_cred (cred);return ret; } -int security_real_capable_noaudit (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) +int security_real_capable_noaudit (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) {const struct cred *cred;int ret; cred =get_task_cred (tsk); - ret = security_ops->capable (tsk, cred, cap,SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT ); + ret = security_ops->capable (tsk, cred, ns, cap,SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT );put_cred (cred);return ret; }
security/selinux/hooks.c +9 -5
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@#include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/posix-timers.h> #include <linux/syslog.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h"
@@ -1423,6 +1424,7 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ static int task_has_capability (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred, +struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,int audit) {struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1851,15 +1853,15 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,*/ static int selinux_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred, -int cap,int audit) +struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,int audit) {int rc; - rc =cap_capable (tsk, cred, cap, audit); + rc =cap_capable (tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);if (rc)return rc; -return task_has_capability (tsk, cred, cap, audit); +return task_has_capability (tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit); }static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid (ctl_table *table,u16 tclass,u32 *sid)
@@ -2012,7 +2014,8 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) {int rc, cap_sys_admin =0 ; - rc =selinux_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_ADMIN , + rc =selinux_capable (current,current_cred (), + &init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ,SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT );if (rc ==0 ) cap_sys_admin =1 ;
@@ -2826,7 +2829,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ - error =selinux_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_MAC_ADMIN , + error =selinux_capable (current,current_cred (), + &init_user_ns,CAP_MAC_ADMIN ,SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT );if (!error) error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
Signature · 1 line
1.7.2.3
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerRFC PATCH 3/4 allow sethostname in a container
To test this, you can:
1. clone a new user namespace without a new uts namespace. You can NOT set hostname.
2. clone both a new user and uts namespace. You can set hostname.
--- kernel/sys.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
kernel/sys.c +1 -1
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)int errno;char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!ns_capable (current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (len <0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
1.7.2.3
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerRFC PATCH 4/4 allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Changelog:
Dec 8: Fixed bug in my check_kill_permission pointed out by
Eric Biederman.
To test:
1. Test killing tasks as usual. No change.
2. Clone a new user namespace without a new pidns. a. You CAN kill -CONT tasks in your thread group but outside your user ns.
b. You can NOT otherwise kill tasks outside your user_ns. c. Inside your new userns, signal semantics are as normal
with respect to userids, CAP_KILL, and thread groups.
--- kernel/signal.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/signal.c +22 -5
@@ -635,6 +635,27 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info) (!is_si_special (info) &&SI_FROMUSER (info)); } +static inline int kill_ok_by_cred (struct cred *cred,struct cred *tcred) +{ +if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) { +/* userids are not equivalent - either you have the +capability to the target user ns or you don't */ +if (ns_capable (tcred->user->user_ns,CAP_KILL )) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; + } + +/* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */ +if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) && + !ns_capable (tcred->user->user_ns,CAP_KILL )) +return 0 ; + +return 1 ; +} +/* * Bad permissions for sending the signal * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
@@ -659,11 +680,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info, cred =current_cred (); tcred =__task_cred (t);if (!same_thread_group (current, t) && - (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && - (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && - (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && - (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) && - !capable (CAP_KILL )) { + !kill_ok_by_cred (cred, tcred)) {switch (sig) {case SIGCONT : sid =task_session (t);
Signature · 1 line
1.7.2.3
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Quoted 23 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Changelog:
Dec 8: Fixed bug in mycheck_kill_permissionpointed out by
Eric Biederman.To test:
1. Test killing tasks as usual. No change.
2. Clone a new user namespace without a new pidns. a. You CAN kill -CONT tasks in your thread group but outside your user ns.
b. You can NOT otherwise kill tasks outside youruser_ns. c. Inside your new userns, signal semantics are as normal
with respect to userids,CAP_KILL, and thread groups.Signed-off-by Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>--- kernel/signal.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)kernel/signal.c +0
-0
kernel/signal.c static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info) · line 639
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/signal.c +2
-0@@ -635,6 +635,27 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info) (!is_si_special (info) &&SI_FROMUSER (info)); } +static inline int kill_ok_by_cred (struct cred *cred,struct cred *tcred) +{
Nit: You should just pass in the target task here. Making it abundantly clear where current and tcred come from. ns_capable implicitly uses current which is a little surprising when everything else is being passed in, but makes perfect sense in this context.
Quoted 35 lines
kernel/signal.c +20
-5+if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) { +/* userids are not equivalent - either you have the +capability to the target user ns or you don't */ +if (ns_capable (tcred->user->user_ns,CAP_KILL )) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; + } + +/* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */ +if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) && + !ns_capable (tcred->user->user_ns,CAP_KILL )) +return 0 ; + +return 1 ; +} +/* * Bad permissions for sending the signal * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock @@ -659,11 +680,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info, cred =current_cred (); tcred =__task_cred (t);if (!same_thread_group (current, t) && - (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && - (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && - (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && - (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) && - !capable (CAP_KILL )) { + !kill_ok_by_cred (cred, tcred)) {switch (sig) {case SIGCONT : sid =task_session (t);
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
In reply to Serge E. HallynQuoted 23 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Changelog:
Dec 8: Fixed bug in mycheck_kill_permissionpointed out by
Eric Biederman.To test:
1. Test killing tasks as usual. No change.
2. Clone a new user namespace without a new pidns. a. You CAN kill -CONT tasks in your thread group but outside your user ns.
b. You can NOT otherwise kill tasks outside youruser_ns. c. Inside your new userns, signal semantics are as normal
with respect to userids,CAP_KILL, and thread groups.Signed-off-by Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>--- kernel/signal.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)kernel/signal.c +0
-0
kernel/signal.c static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info) · line 639
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/signal.c +2
-0@@ -635,6 +635,27 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info) (!is_si_special (info) &&SI_FROMUSER (info)); } +static inline int kill_ok_by_cred (struct cred *cred,struct cred *tcred) +{
Nit: You should just pass in the target task here. Making it abundantly clear where current and tcred come from. ns_capable implicitly uses current which is a little surprising when everything else is being passed in, but makes perfect sense in this context.
Quoted 35 lines
kernel/signal.c +20
-5+if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) { +/* userids are not equivalent - either you have the +capability to the target user ns or you don't */ +if (ns_capable (tcred->user->user_ns,CAP_KILL )) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; + } + +/* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */ +if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) && + !ns_capable (tcred->user->user_ns,CAP_KILL )) +return 0 ; + +return 1 ; +} +/* * Bad permissions for sending the signal * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock @@ -659,11 +680,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info, cred =current_cred (); tcred =__task_cred (t);if (!same_thread_group (current, t) && - (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && - (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && - (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && - (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) && - !capable (CAP_KILL )) { + !kill_ok_by_cred (cred, tcred)) {switch (sig) {case SIGCONT : sid =task_session (t);
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH 4/4] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Quoted 8 lines · Eric W. Biederman
kernel/signal.c static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info) · line 639
Quoted 2 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
kernel/signal.c +2
-0+static inline int kill_ok_by_cred (struct cred *cred,struct cred *tcred) +{Nit: You should just pass in the target task here. Making it abundantly clear where current and tcred come from.
ns_capableimplicitly uses current which is a little surprising when everything else is being passed in, but makes perfect sense in this context.
Thanks, that makes sense, will do.
If the set seems fine overall, then I'll also look at adding ptrace controls, and hopefully send the result out next week.
thanks,
-serge
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): m14oal3mjx.fsf-+imSwln9KH6u2/kzUuoCbdi2O/[email protected]
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Quoted 8 lines · Eric W. Biederman
kernel/signal.c static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info) · line 639
Quoted 2 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
kernel/signal.c +2
-0+static inline int kill_ok_by_cred (struct cred *cred,struct cred *tcred) +{Nit: You should just pass in the target task here. Making it abundantly clear where current and tcred come from.
ns_capableimplicitly uses current which is a little surprising when everything else is being passed in, but makes perfect sense in this context.
Thanks, that makes sense, will do.
If the set seems fine overall, then I'll also look at adding ptrace controls, and hopefully send the result out next week.
thanks,
-serge
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
RFC PATCH 4/4 allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Changelog:
Dec 8: Fixed bug in my check_kill_permission pointed out by
Eric Biederman.
To test:
1. Test killing tasks as usual. No change.
2. Clone a new user namespace without a new pidns. a. You CAN kill -CONT tasks in your thread group but outside your user ns.
b. You can NOT otherwise kill tasks outside your user_ns. c. Inside your new userns, signal semantics are as normal
with respect to userids, CAP_KILL, and thread groups.
--- kernel/signal.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/signal.c +22 -5
@@ -635,6 +635,27 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info) (!is_si_special (info) &&SI_FROMUSER (info)); } +static inline int kill_ok_by_cred (struct cred *cred,struct cred *tcred) +{ +if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) { +/* userids are not equivalent - either you have the +capability to the target user ns or you don't */ +if (ns_capable (tcred->user->user_ns,CAP_KILL )) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; + } + +/* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */ +if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && + (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) && + !ns_capable (tcred->user->user_ns,CAP_KILL )) +return 0 ; + +return 1 ; +} +/* * Bad permissions for sending the signal * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
@@ -659,11 +680,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info, cred =current_cred (); tcred =__task_cred (t);if (!same_thread_group (current, t) && - (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) && - (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) && - (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) && - (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) && - !capable (CAP_KILL )) { + !kill_ok_by_cred (cred, tcred)) {switch (sig) {case SIGCONT : sid =task_session (t);
Signature · 1 line
1.7.2.3
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
RFC PATCH 3/4 allow sethostname in a container
To test this, you can:
1. clone a new user namespace without a new uts namespace. You can NOT set hostname.
2. clone both a new user and uts namespace. You can set hostname.
--- kernel/sys.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
kernel/sys.c +1 -1
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)int errno;char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!ns_capable (current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (len <0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
1.7.2.3
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
RFC PATCH 2/4 security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace.
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
--- include/linux/capability.h | 7 +++++-- include/linux/security.h | 12 +++++++----- kernel/capability.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 +++-- security/commoncap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- security/security.c | 12 ++++++------ security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 +++++++++----- 7 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +5 -2
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;* * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ -#define has_capability (t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (cap)) == 0) +#define has_capability (t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0)/** * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
@@ -555,9 +555,12 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ #define has_capability_noaudit (t, cap) \ - (security_real_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0) + (security_real_capable_noaudit((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0) +struct user_namespace ; +extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;extern int capable (int cap); +extern int ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ struct dentry ;
include/linux/security.h +7 -5
@@ -46,13 +46,14 @@struct ctl_table ;struct audit_krule ; +struct user_namespace ;/* * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used * as the default capabilities functions */ extern int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred, -int cap,int audit); +struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,int audit);extern int cap_settime (struct timespec *ts,struct timezone *tz);extern int cap_ptrace_access_check (struct task_struct *child,unsigned int mode);extern int cap_ptrace_traceme (struct task_struct *parent);
@@ -1258,6 +1259,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)* credentials. * @tsk contains the task_struct for the process. * @cred contains the credentials to use. +* @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
@@ -1386,7 +1388,7 @@ struct security_operations {const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted);int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred, -int cap,int audit); +struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,int audit);int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table,int op);int (*quotactl) (int cmds,int type,int id,struct super_block *sb);int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -1668,9 +1670,9 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); -int security_capable (int cap); -int security_real_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap); -int security_real_capable_noaudit (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap); +int security_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap); +int security_real_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap); +int security_real_capable_noaudit (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);int security_sysctl (struct ctl_table *table,int op);int security_quotactl (int cmds,int type,int id,struct super_block *sb);int security_quota_on (struct dentry *dentry);
kernel/capability.c +20 -2
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> /*
@@ -301,15 +302,32 @@ error:*/ int capable (int cap) { +return ns_capable (&init_user_ns, cap); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable); + +/** +* ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect +* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in +* @cap: The capability to be tested for +* +* Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently +* available for use, false if not. +* +* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the +* assumption that it's about to be used. +*/ +int ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) +{if (unlikely (!cap_valid (cap))) {printk (KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n" , cap);BUG (); } -if (security_capable (cap) ==0 ) { +if (security_capable (ns, cap) ==0 ) { current->flags |=PF_SUPERPRIV ;return 1 ; }return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (ns_capable);
security/apparmor/lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include "include/apparmor.h"
@@ -137,11 +138,11 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, }static int apparmor_capable (struct task_struct *task,const struct cred *cred, -int cap,int audit) +struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,int audit) {struct aa_profile *profile;/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */ -int error =cap_capable (task, cred, cap, audit); +int error =cap_capable (task, cred, ns, cap, audit);if (!error) { profile =aa_cred_profile (cred);if (!unconfined (profile))
security/commoncap.c +33 -7
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability * @tsk: The task to query * @cred: The credentials to use +* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability * @cap: The capability to check for * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not *
@@ -79,10 +81,32 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. */ -int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred,int cap, -int audit) +int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred, +struct user_namespace *targ_ns,int cap,int audit) { -return cap_raised (cred->cap_effective, cap) ?0 : -EPERM ; +for (;;) { +/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ +if (targ_ns == cred->user->user_ns) +return cap_raised (cred->cap_effective, cap) ?0 : -EPERM ; + +/* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */ +if (targ_ns->creator == cred->user) +return 0 ; + +/* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */ +if (targ_ns == &init_user_ns) +return -EPERM ; + +/* If you have the capability in a parent user ns you have it +* in the over all children user namespaces as well, so see +* if this process has the capability in the parent user +* namespace. +*/ + targ_ns = targ_ns->creator->user_ns; + } + +/* We never get here */ +return -EPERM ; }/**
@@ -177,7 +201,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP * capability */ -if (cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SETPCAP , +if (cap_capable (current,current_cred (), +current_cred ()->user->user_ns,CAP_SETPCAP ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT ) ==0 )return 0 ;return 1 ;
@@ -829,7 +854,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, & (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ || ((new->securebits &SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))/*[2]*/ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS |SECURE_ALL_BITS ))/*[3]*/ - || (cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SETPCAP , + || (cap_capable (current,current_cred (), +current_cred ()->user->user_ns,CAP_SETPCAP ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT ) !=0 )/*[4]*/ /* * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
@@ -894,7 +920,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) {int cap_sys_admin =0 ; -if (cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_ADMIN , +if (cap_capable (current,current_cred (), &init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ,SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT ) ==0 ) cap_sys_admin =1 ;return __vm_enough_memory (mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -921,7 +947,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,int ret =0 ;if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { - ret =cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_RAWIO , + ret =cap_capable (current,current_cred (), &init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT );/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ if (ret ==0 )
security/security.c +6 -6
@@ -172,30 +172,30 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, effective, inheritable, permitted); } -int security_capable (int cap) +int security_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) { -return security_ops->capable (current,current_cred (), cap, +return security_ops->capable (current,current_cred (), ns, cap,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT ); } -int security_real_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) +int security_real_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) {const struct cred *cred;int ret; cred =get_task_cred (tsk); - ret = security_ops->capable (tsk, cred, cap,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT ); + ret = security_ops->capable (tsk, cred, ns, cap,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT );put_cred (cred);return ret; } -int security_real_capable_noaudit (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) +int security_real_capable_noaudit (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) {const struct cred *cred;int ret; cred =get_task_cred (tsk); - ret = security_ops->capable (tsk, cred, cap,SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT ); + ret = security_ops->capable (tsk, cred, ns, cap,SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT );put_cred (cred);return ret; }
security/selinux/hooks.c +9 -5
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@#include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/posix-timers.h> #include <linux/syslog.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h"
@@ -1423,6 +1424,7 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ static int task_has_capability (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred, +struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,int audit) {struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1851,15 +1853,15 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,*/ static int selinux_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred, -int cap,int audit) +struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,int audit) {int rc; - rc =cap_capable (tsk, cred, cap, audit); + rc =cap_capable (tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);if (rc)return rc; -return task_has_capability (tsk, cred, cap, audit); +return task_has_capability (tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit); }static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid (ctl_table *table,u16 tclass,u32 *sid)
@@ -2012,7 +2014,8 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) {int rc, cap_sys_admin =0 ; - rc =selinux_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_ADMIN , + rc =selinux_capable (current,current_cred (), + &init_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ,SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT );if (rc ==0 ) cap_sys_admin =1 ;
@@ -2826,7 +2829,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ - error =selinux_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_MAC_ADMIN , + error =selinux_capable (current,current_cred (), + &init_user_ns,CAP_MAC_ADMIN ,SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT );if (!error) error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
Signature · 1 line
1.7.2.3
include/linux/utsname.h struct new_utsname { · line 45
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
struct
uts_namespace{include/linux/utsname.h +1
-0struct kref kref;struct new_utsname name; +struct user_namespace *user_ns;
You're going to add these to the rest?
include/linux/utsname.h struct new_utsname { · line 45
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
struct
uts_namespace{include/linux/utsname.h +1
-0struct kref kref;struct new_utsname name; +struct user_namespace *user_ns;
You're going to add these to the rest?
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Quoted 7 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
include/linux/utsname.h struct new_utsname { · line 45
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
struct
uts_namespace{include/linux/utsname.h +1
-0struct kref kref;struct new_utsname name; +struct user_namespace *user_ns;You're going to add these to the rest?
That is the idea.
namespaces and other objects of interest will keep a user_ns pointer referencing the context in which they were created.
I took a quick look and all of the namespaces seem to have capability checks that we want to allow if you are in the proper context.
What is particularly interesting is that this makes a root user in something other than the init_user_ns with all capabilities essentially a normal user because capable(CAP_XXX) becomes capable(&init_user_ns, CAP_XXX). And as such will always fail except where we have updated the capability checks.
Eric
Quoted 7 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
include/linux/utsname.h struct new_utsname { · line 45
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
struct
uts_namespace{include/linux/utsname.h +1
-0struct kref kref;struct new_utsname name; +struct user_namespace *user_ns;You're going to add these to the rest?
That is the idea.
namespaces and other objects of interest will keep a user_ns pointer referencing the context in which they were created.
I took a quick look and all of the namespaces seem to have capability checks that we want to allow if you are in the proper context.
What is particularly interesting is that this makes a root user in something other than the init_user_ns with all capabilities essentially a normal user because capable(CAP_XXX) becomes capable(&init_user_ns, CAP_XXX). And as such will always fail except where we have updated the capability checks.
Eric