2.6.32.36-longterm review

This is the start of the longterm review cycle for the 2.6.32.36 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let us know. If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.

Responses should be made by Sunday, March 17, 2011, 23:00:00 UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/longterm-review/patch-2.6.32.36-rc1.gz

and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

 Makefile                            |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c            |    3 --
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c             |    5 ++++
 arch/x86/mm/init.c                  |   19 --------------
 arch/x86/mm/init_64.c               |   11 ++++----
 arch/x86/xen/mmu.c                  |   13 +++++----
 drivers/firmware/dcdbas.c           |    4 ++-
 drivers/input/xen-kbdfront.c        |   45 ++++++++++++++++++----------------
 drivers/media/video/uvc/uvc_video.c |   14 +++++++----
 drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c  |    1 +
 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c             |    7 ++++-
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c         |    7 ++++-
 drivers/usb/host/ehci-q.c           |   12 ---------
 drivers/usb/misc/uss720.c           |    7 ++---
 drivers/video/console/tileblit.c    |    2 +-
 fs/aio.c                            |    4 +-
 fs/dcache.c                         |    3 ++
 fs/ext3/super.c                     |    7 +++++
 fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c                  |    4 +-
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c                   |    5 +---
 fs/proc/array.c                     |    4 +-
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                  |    4 +-
 kernel/signal.c                     |   16 +++++++++---
 mm/shmem.c                          |    1 +
 net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c               |    2 +
 25 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)

From: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>

commit e91f90bb0bb10be9cc8efd09a3cf4ecffcad0db1 upstream.

The test program below will hang because io_getevents() uses add_wait_queue_exclusive(), which means the wake_up() in io_destroy() only wakes up one of the threads. Fix this by using wake_up_all() in the aio code paths where we want to make sure no one gets stuck.

	// t.c -- compile with gcc -lpthread -laio t.c

	#include <libaio.h>
	#include <pthread.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <unistd.h>

	static const int nthr = 2;

	void *getev(void *ctx)
	{
		struct io_event ev;
		io_getevents(ctx, 1, 1, &ev, NULL);
		printf("io_getevents returned\n");
		return NULL;
	}

	int main(int argc, char *argv[])
	{
		io_context_t ctx = 0;
		pthread_t thread[nthr];
		int i;

		io_setup(1024, &ctx);

		for (i = 0; i < nthr; ++i)
			pthread_create(&thread[i], NULL, getev, ctx);

		sleep(1);

		io_destroy(ctx);

		for (i = 0; i < nthr; ++i)
			pthread_join(thread[i], NULL);

		return 0;
	}

---
 fs/aio.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static inline void really_put_req(struct
 	ctx->reqs_active--;
 
 	if (unlikely(!ctx->reqs_active && ctx->dead))
-		wake_up(&ctx->wait);
+		wake_up_all(&ctx->wait);
 }
 
 static void aio_fput_routine(struct work_struct *data)

@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ static void io_destroy(struct kioctx *io
 	 * by other CPUs at this point.  Right now, we rely on the
 	 * locking done by the above calls to ensure this consistency.
 	 */
-	wake_up(&ioctx->wait);
+	wake_up_all(&ioctx->wait);
 	put_ioctx(ioctx);	/* once for the lookup */
 }
 

From: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>

commit bee4c36a5cf5c9f63ce1d7372aa62045fbd16d47 upstream.

Up to 2.6.22, you could use remap_file_pages(2) on a tmpfs file or a shared mapping of /dev/zero or a shared anonymous mapping. In 2.6.23 we disabled it by default, but set VM_CAN_NONLINEAR to enable it on safe mappings. We made sure to set it in shmem_mmap() for tmpfs files, but missed it in shmem_zero_setup() for the others. Fix that at last.

---
 mm/shmem.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -2691,5 +2691,6 @@ int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_stru
 		fput(vma->vm_file);
 	vma->vm_file = file;
 	vma->vm_ops = &shmem_vm_ops;
+	vma->vm_flags |= VM_CAN_NONLINEAR;
 	return 0;
 }

From: Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]>

commit 47e9037ac16637cd7f12b8790ea7ce6680e42168 upstream.

If a device doesn't support power management (pm_cap == 0) but it is acpi_pci_power_manageable() because there is a _PS0 method declared for it and _EJ0 is also declared for the slot then nobody is going to set current_state = PCI_D0 for this device. This is what I think it is happening:

pci_enable_device

    |
__pci_enable_device_flags
/* here we do not set current_state because !pm_cap */
    |
do_pci_enable_device
    |
pci_set_power_state
    |
__pci_start_power_transition
    |
pci_platform_power_transition
/* platform_pci_power_manageable() calls acpi_pci_power_manageable that
 * returns true */
    |

platform_pci_set_power_state
/* acpi_pci_set_power_state gets called and does nothing because the
* acpi device has _EJ0, see the comment "If the ACPI device has _EJ0,
* ignore the device" */

at this point if we refer to the commit message that introduced the comment above (10b3dcae0f275e2546e55303d64ddbb58cec7599), it is up to the hotplug driver to set the state to D0.
However AFAICT the pci hotplug driver never does, in fact drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c:register_slot sets the slot flags to (SLOT_ENABLED | SLOT_POWEREDON) but it does not set the pci device current state to PCI_D0.

So my proposed fix is also to set current_state = PCI_D0 in register_slot.
Comments are very welcome.

---
 drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ register_slot(acpi_handle handle, u32 lv
 
 	pdev = pci_get_slot(pbus, PCI_DEVFN(device, function));
 	if (pdev) {
+		pdev->current_state = PCI_D0;
 		slot->flags |= (SLOT_ENABLED | SLOT_POWEREDON);
 		pci_dev_put(pdev);
 	}

From: Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]>

commit 14988a4d350ce3b41ecad4f63c4f44c56f5ae34d upstream.

Do not set max_pfn_mapped to the end of the initial memory mappings, that also contain pages that don't belong in pfn space (like the mfn list).

Set max_pfn_mapped to the last real pfn mapped in the initial memory mappings that is the pfn backing _end.

LKML-Reference: <alpine.DEB.2.00.1103171739050.3382@kaball-desktop>

---
 arch/x86/xen/mmu.c |   13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -1658,9 +1658,6 @@ static __init void xen_map_identity_earl
 		for (pteidx = 0; pteidx < PTRS_PER_PTE; pteidx++, pfn++) {
 			pte_t pte;
 
-			if (pfn > max_pfn_mapped)
-				max_pfn_mapped = pfn;
-
 			if (!pte_none(pte_page[pteidx]))
 				continue;
 

@@ -1704,6 +1701,12 @@ __init pgd_t *xen_setup_kernel_pagetable
 	pud_t *l3;
 	pmd_t *l2;
 
+	/* max_pfn_mapped is the last pfn mapped in the initial memory
+	 * mappings. Considering that on Xen after the kernel mappings we
+	 * have the mappings of some pages that don't exist in pfn space, we
+	 * set max_pfn_mapped to the last real pfn mapped. */
+	max_pfn_mapped = PFN_DOWN(__pa(xen_start_info->mfn_list));
+
 	/* Zap identity mapping */
 	init_level4_pgt[0] = __pgd(0);
 

@@ -1767,9 +1770,7 @@ __init pgd_t *xen_setup_kernel_pagetable
 {
 	pmd_t *kernel_pmd;
 
-	max_pfn_mapped = PFN_DOWN(__pa(xen_start_info->pt_base) +
-				  xen_start_info->nr_pt_frames * PAGE_SIZE +
-				  512*1024);
+	max_pfn_mapped = PFN_DOWN(__pa(xen_start_info->mfn_list));
 
 	kernel_pmd = m2v(pgd[KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY].pgd);
 	memcpy(level2_kernel_pgt, kernel_pmd, sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD);

From: Yinghai Lu <[email protected]>

commit e5f15b45ddf3afa2bbbb10c7ea34fb32b6de0a0e upstream.

Now cleanup_highmap actually is in two steps: one is early in head64.c and only clears above _end; a second one is in init_memory_mapping() and tries to clean from _brk_end to _end.
It should check if those boundaries are PMD_SIZE aligned but currently does not.
Also init_memory_mapping() is called several times for numa or memory hotplug, so we really should not handle initial kernel mappings there.

This patch moves cleanup_highmap() down after _brk_end is settled so we can do everything in one step.
Also we honor max_pfn_mapped in the implementation of cleanup_highmap.

LKML-Reference: <alpine.DEB.2.00.1103171739050.3382@kaball-desktop>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c |    3 ---
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c  |    5 +++++
 arch/x86/mm/init.c       |   19 -------------------
 arch/x86/mm/init_64.c    |   11 ++++++-----
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

@@ -76,9 +76,6 @@ void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * r
 	/* Make NULL pointers segfault */
 	zap_identity_mappings();
 
-	/* Cleanup the over mapped high alias */
-	cleanup_highmap();
-
 	for (i = 0; i < NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS; i++) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK
 		set_intr_gate(i, &early_idt_handlers[i]);

@@ -294,6 +294,9 @@ static void __init init_gbpages(void)
 static inline void init_gbpages(void)
 {
 }
+static void __init cleanup_highmap(void)
+{
+}
 #endif
 
 static void __init reserve_brk(void)

@@ -921,6 +924,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 
 	reserve_brk();
 
+	cleanup_highmap();
+
 	init_gbpages();
 
 	/* max_pfn_mapped is updated here */

@@ -287,25 +287,6 @@ unsigned long __init_refok init_memory_m
 	load_cr3(swapper_pg_dir);
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	if (!after_bootmem && !start) {
-		pud_t *pud;
-		pmd_t *pmd;
-
-		mmu_cr4_features = read_cr4();
-
-		/*
-		 * _brk_end cannot change anymore, but it and _end may be
-		 * located on different 2M pages. cleanup_highmap(), however,
-		 * can only consider _end when it runs, so destroy any
-		 * mappings beyond _brk_end here.
-		 */
-		pud = pud_offset(pgd_offset_k(_brk_end), _brk_end);
-		pmd = pmd_offset(pud, _brk_end - 1);
-		while (++pmd <= pmd_offset(pud, (unsigned long)_end - 1))
-			pmd_clear(pmd);
-	}
-#endif
 	__flush_tlb_all();
 
 	if (!after_bootmem && e820_table_end > e820_table_start)

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 #include <asm/numa.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/init.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
 
 static unsigned long dma_reserve __initdata;

@@ -257,18 +258,18 @@ void __init init_extra_mapping_uc(unsign
  * to the compile time generated pmds. This results in invalid pmds up
  * to the point where we hit the physaddr 0 mapping.
  *
- * We limit the mappings to the region from _text to _end.  _end is
- * rounded up to the 2MB boundary. This catches the invalid pmds as
+ * We limit the mappings to the region from _text to _brk_end.  _brk_end
+ * is rounded up to the 2MB boundary. This catches the invalid pmds as
  * well, as they are located before _text:
  */
 void __init cleanup_highmap(void)
 {
 	unsigned long vaddr = __START_KERNEL_map;
-	unsigned long end = roundup((unsigned long)_end, PMD_SIZE) - 1;
+	unsigned long vaddr_end = __START_KERNEL_map + (max_pfn_mapped << PAGE_SHIFT);
+	unsigned long end = roundup((unsigned long)_brk_end, PMD_SIZE) - 1;
 	pmd_t *pmd = level2_kernel_pgt;
-	pmd_t *last_pmd = pmd + PTRS_PER_PMD;
 
-	for (; pmd < last_pmd; pmd++, vaddr += PMD_SIZE) {
+	for (; vaddr + PMD_SIZE - 1 < vaddr_end; pmd++, vaddr += PMD_SIZE) {
 		if (pmd_none(*pmd))
 			continue;
 		if (vaddr < (unsigned long) _text || vaddr > end)

From: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]>

commit 447c5dd7338638f526e9bcf7dcf69b4da5835c7d upstream.

A successful write() to the "reset" sysfs attribute should return the number of bytes written, not 0. Otherwise userspace (bash) retries the write over and over again.

---
 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -939,7 +939,12 @@ static ssize_t reset_store(struct device
 
 	if (val != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	return pci_reset_function(pdev);
+
+	result = pci_reset_function(pdev);
+	if (result < 0)
+		return result;
+
+	return count;
 }
 
 static struct device_attribute reset_attr = __ATTR(reset, 0200, NULL, reset_store);

From: Julien Tinnes <[email protected]>

commit da48524eb20662618854bb3df2db01fc65f3070c upstream.

Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.

Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.

Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.

So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out there that might depend on using other si_code values.

---
 kernel/signal.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -2351,9 +2351,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(rt_sigqueueinfo, pid_t,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
-	   Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info.  */
-	if (info.si_code >= 0)
+	 * Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info.
+	 */
+	if (info.si_code != SI_QUEUE) {
+		/* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(info.si_code < 0);
 		return -EPERM;
+	}
 	info.si_signo = sig;
 
 	/* POSIX.1b doesn't mention process groups.  */

@@ -2367,9 +2371,13 @@ long do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(pid_t tgid, pi
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
-	   Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info.  */
-	if (info->si_code >= 0)
+	 * Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info.
+	 */
+	if (info->si_code != SI_QUEUE) {
+		/* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(info->si_code < 0);
 		return -EPERM;
+	}
 	info->si_signo = sig;
 
 	return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, info);

From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>

commit ce654b37f87980d95f339080e4c3bdb2370bdf22 upstream.

Orphan cleanup is currently executed even if the file system has some number of unknown ROCOMPAT features, which deletes inodes and frees blocks, which could be very bad for some RO_COMPAT features.

This patch skips the orphan cleanup if it contains readonly compatible features not known by this ext3 implementation, which would prevent the fs from being mounted (or remounted) readwrite.

---
 fs/ext3/super.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

@@ -1404,6 +1404,13 @@ static void ext3_orphan_cleanup (struct
 		return;
 	}
 
+	/* Check if feature set allows readwrite operations */
+	if (EXT3_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~EXT3_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_SUPP)) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "EXT3-fs: %s: Skipping orphan cleanup due to "
+			 "unknown ROCOMPAT features\n", sb->s_id);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (EXT3_SB(sb)->s_mount_state & EXT3_ERROR_FS) {
 		if (es->s_last_orphan)
 			jbd_debug(1, "Errors on filesystem, "

From: Aaro Koskinen <[email protected]>

commit 0db0c01b53a1a421513f91573241aabafb87802a upstream.

The current code fails to print the "[heap]" marking if the heap is split into multiple mappings.

Fix the check so that the marking is displayed in all possible cases:
1. vma matches exactly the heap
2. the heap vma is merged e.g. with bss
3. the heap vma is splitted e.g. due to locked pages

Test cases. In all cases, the process should have mapping(s) with [heap] marking:

	(1) vma matches exactly the heap

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <sys/types.h>

	int main (void)
	{
		if (sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) {
			printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid());
			while (1)
				sleep(1);
		}
		return 0;
	}

	# ./test1
	check /proc/553/maps
	[1] + Stopped                    ./test1
	# cat /proc/553/maps | head -4
	00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3113640    /test1
	00010000-00011000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3113640    /test1
	00011000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [heap]
	4006f000-40070000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0

	(2) the heap vma is merged

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <sys/types.h>

	char foo[4096] = "foo";
	char bar[4096];

	int main (void)
	{
		if (sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) {
			printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid());
			while (1)
				sleep(1);
		}
		return 0;
	}

	# ./test2
	check /proc/556/maps
	[2] + Stopped                    ./test2
	# cat /proc/556/maps | head -4
	00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3116312    /test2
	00010000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3116312    /test2
	00012000-00014000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [heap]
	4004a000-4004b000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0

	(3) the heap vma is splitted (this fails without the patch)

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <sys/mman.h>
	#include <sys/types.h>

	int main (void)
	{
		if ((sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) && !mlockall(MCL_FUTURE) &&
		    (sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1)) {
			printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid());
			while (1)
				sleep(1);
		}
		return 0;
	}

	# ./test3
	check /proc/559/maps
	[1] + Stopped                    ./test3
	# cat /proc/559/maps|head -4
	00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3119108    /test3
	00010000-00011000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3119108    /test3
	00011000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [heap]
	00012000-00013000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [heap]

It looks like the bug has been there forever, and since it only results in some information missing from a procfile, it does not fulfil the -stable "critical issue" criteria.

---
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -244,8 +244,8 @@ static void show_map_vma(struct seq_file
 		const char *name = arch_vma_name(vma);
 		if (!name) {
 			if (mm) {
-				if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_brk &&
-						vma->vm_end >= mm->brk) {
+				if (vma->vm_start <= mm->brk &&
+						vma->vm_end >= mm->start_brk) {
 					name = "[heap]";
 				} else if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
 					   vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack) {

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 5883f57ca0008ffc93e09cbb9847a1928e50c6f3 upstream.

While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit f83ce3e6b02d5 ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes")), the start_code and end_code values were not. This would allow the text location of a PIE binary to leak, defeating ASLR.

Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value since "ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave. Thanks to Brad Spengler for pointing this out.

Addresses CVE-2011-0726

---
 fs/proc/array.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file
 		vsize,
 		mm ? get_mm_rss(mm) : 0,
 		rsslim,
-		mm ? mm->start_code : 0,
-		mm ? mm->end_code : 0,
+		mm ? (permitted ? mm->start_code : 1) : 0,
+		mm ? (permitted ? mm->end_code : 1) : 0,
 		(permitted && mm) ? mm->start_stack : 0,
 		esp,
 		eip,

From: Henry Nestler <[email protected]>

commit d6244bc0ed0c52a795e6f4dcab3886daf3e74fac upstream.

Use mask 0x10 for "soft cursor" detection on in function tile_cursor. (Tile Blitting Operation in framebuffer console).

The old mask 0x01 for vc_cursor_type detects CUR_NONE, CUR_LOWER_THIRD and every second mode value as "software cursor". This hides the cursor for these modes (cursor.mode = 0). But, only CUR_NONE or "software cursor" should hide the cursor.
See also 0x10 in functions add_softcursor, bit_cursor and cw_cursor.

---
 drivers/video/console/tileblit.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static void tile_cursor(struct vc_data *
 			int softback_lines, int fg, int bg)
 {
 	struct fb_tilecursor cursor;
-	int use_sw = (vc->vc_cursor_type & 0x01);
+	int use_sw = (vc->vc_cursor_type & 0x10);
 
 	cursor.sx = vc->vc_x;
 	cursor.sy = vc->vc_y;

From: Mi Jinlong <[email protected]>

commit 5ece3cafbd88d4da5c734e1810c4a2e6474b57b2 upstream.

The members of nfsd4_op_flags, (ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH | ALLOWED_ON_ABSENT_FS) equals to ALLOWED_AS_FIRST_OP, maybe that's not what we want.

OP_PUTROOTFH with op_flags = ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH | ALLOWED_ON_ABSENT_FS, can't appears as the first operation with out SEQUENCE ops.

This patch modify the wrong value of ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH etc which was introduced by f9bb94c4.

---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -964,8 +964,8 @@ typedef __be32(*nfsd4op_func)(struct svc
 			      void *);
 enum nfsd4_op_flags {
 	ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH = 1 << 0,	/* No current filehandle required */
-	ALLOWED_ON_ABSENT_FS = 2 << 0,	/* ops processed on absent fs */
-	ALLOWED_AS_FIRST_OP = 3 << 0,	/* ops reqired first in compound */
+	ALLOWED_ON_ABSENT_FS = 1 << 1,	/* ops processed on absent fs */
+	ALLOWED_AS_FIRST_OP = 1 << 2,	/* ops reqired first in compound */
 };
 
 struct nfsd4_operation {

From: Mi Jinlong <[email protected]>

commit 5a02ab7c3c4580f94d13c683721039855b67cda6 upstream.

We must not use dummy for index.
After the first index, READ32(dummy) will change dummy!!!!

---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ nfsd4_decode_create_session(struct nfsd4
 
 	u32 dummy;
 	char *machine_name;
-	int i, j;
+	int i;
 	int nr_secflavs;
 
 	READ_BUF(16);

@@ -1187,8 +1187,6 @@ nfsd4_decode_create_session(struct nfsd4
 			READ_BUF(4);
 			READ32(dummy);
 			READ_BUF(dummy * 4);
-			for (j = 0; j < dummy; ++j)
-				READ32(dummy);
 			break;
 		case RPC_AUTH_GSS:
 			dprintk("RPC_AUTH_GSS callback secflavor "

@@ -1204,7 +1202,6 @@ nfsd4_decode_create_session(struct nfsd4
 			READ_BUF(4);
 			READ32(dummy);
 			READ_BUF(dummy);
-			p += XDR_QUADLEN(dummy);
 			break;
 		default:
 			dprintk("Illegal callback secflavor\n");

From: Stephan Lachowsky <[email protected]>

commit 38a66824d96de8aeeb915e6f46f0d3fe55828eb1 upstream.

The scheme used to index format in uvc_fixup_video_ctrl() is not robust:
format index is based on descriptor ordering, which does not necessarily match bFormatIndex ordering. Searching for first matching format will prevent uvc_fixup_video_ctrl() from using the wrong format/frame to make adjustments.

---
 drivers/media/video/uvc/uvc_video.c |   14 +++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -64,15 +64,19 @@ int uvc_query_ctrl(struct uvc_device *de
 static void uvc_fixup_video_ctrl(struct uvc_streaming *stream,
 	struct uvc_streaming_control *ctrl)
 {
-	struct uvc_format *format;
+	struct uvc_format *format = NULL;
 	struct uvc_frame *frame = NULL;
 	unsigned int i;
 
-	if (ctrl->bFormatIndex <= 0 ||
-	    ctrl->bFormatIndex > stream->nformats)
-		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < stream->nformats; ++i) {
+		if (stream->format[i].index == ctrl->bFormatIndex) {
+			format = &stream->format[i];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
 
-	format = &stream->format[ctrl->bFormatIndex - 1];
+	if (format == NULL)
+		return;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < format->nframes; ++i) {
 		if (format->frame[i].bFrameIndex == ctrl->bFrameIndex) {

From: Alan Stern <[email protected]>

commit b5a3b3d985493c173925907adfebf3edab236fe7 upstream.

This patch (as1453) fixes a long-standing bug in the ehci-hcd driver.

There is no need to set the Halt bit in the overlay region for an unlinked or blocked QH. Contrary to what the comment says, setting the Halt bit does not cause the QH to be patched later; that decision (made in qh_refresh()) depends only on whether the QH is currently pointing to a valid qTD. Likewise, setting the Halt bit does not prevent completions from activating the QH while it is "stopped"; they are prevented by the fact that qh_completions() temporarily changes qh->qh_state to QH_STATE_COMPLETING.

On the other hand, there are circumstances in which the QH will be reactivated _without_ being patched; this happens after an URB beyond the head of the queue is unlinked. Setting the Halt bit will then cause the hardware to see the QH with both the Active and Halt bits set, an invalid combination that will prevent the queue from advancing and may even crash some controllers.

Apparently the only reason this hasn't been reported before is that unlinking URBs from the middle of a running queue is quite uncommon. However Test 17, recently added to the usbtest driver, does exactly this, and it confirms the presence of the bug.

In short, there is no reason to set the Halt bit for an unlinked or blocked QH, and there is a very good reason not to set it. Therefore the code that sets it is removed.

---
 drivers/usb/host/ehci-q.c |   12 ------------
 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-)

@@ -315,7 +315,6 @@ qh_completions (struct ehci_hcd *ehci, s
 	int			stopped;
 	unsigned		count = 0;
 	u8			state;
-	const __le32		halt = HALT_BIT(ehci);
 	struct ehci_qh_hw	*hw = qh->hw;
 
 	if (unlikely (list_empty (&qh->qtd_list)))

@@ -422,7 +421,6 @@ qh_completions (struct ehci_hcd *ehci, s
 					&& !(qtd->hw_alt_next
 						& EHCI_LIST_END(ehci))) {
 				stopped = 1;
-				goto halt;
 			}
 
 		/* stop scanning when we reach qtds the hc is using */

@@ -456,16 +454,6 @@ qh_completions (struct ehci_hcd *ehci, s
 				 */
 				ehci_clear_tt_buffer(ehci, qh, urb, token);
 			}
-
-			/* force halt for unlinked or blocked qh, so we'll
-			 * patch the qh later and so that completions can't
-			 * activate it while we "know" it's stopped.
-			 */
-			if ((halt & hw->hw_token) == 0) {
-halt:
-				hw->hw_token |= halt;
-				wmb ();
-			}
 		}
 
 		/* unless we already know the urb's status, collect qtd status

From: Peter Holik <[email protected]>

commit adaa3c6342b249548ea830fe8e02aa5b45be8688 upstream.

My testprog do a lot of bitbang - after hours i got following warning and my machine lockups:

WARNING: at /build/buildd/linux-2.6.38/lib/kref.c:34

After debugging uss720 driver i discovered that the completion callback was called before usb_submit_urb returns. The callback frees the request structure that is krefed on return by usb_submit_urb.

---
 drivers/usb/misc/uss720.c |    7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -176,12 +176,11 @@ static struct uss720_async_request *subm
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->asynclock, flags);
 	list_add_tail(&rq->asynclist, &priv->asynclist);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->asynclock, flags);
+	kref_get(&rq->ref_count);
 	ret = usb_submit_urb(rq->urb, mem_flags);
-	if (!ret) {
-		kref_get(&rq->ref_count);
+	if (!ret)
 		return rq;
-	}
-	kref_put(&rq->ref_count, destroy_async);
+	destroy_async(&rq->ref_count);
 	err("submit_async_request submit_urb failed with %d", ret);
 	return NULL;
 }

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 23b80550e2aa61d0ba3af98b831b9195be0db9ee upstream.

Prevent read urbs from being resubmitted from tasklet after port close.

The receive tasklet was not disabled on port close, which could lead to corruption of receive lists on consecutive port open. In particular, read urbs could be re-submitted before port open, added to free list in open, and then added a second time to the free list in the completion handler.

cdc-acm.c: Entering acm_tty_open.
cdc-acm.c: acm_control_msg: rq: 0x22 val: 0x3 len: 0x0 result: 0 cdc-acm.c: Entering acm_rx_tasklet
cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50da280, rcv 0xf57fbc24, buf 0xf57fbd64 cdc-acm.c: set line: 115200 0 0 8
cdc-acm.c: acm_control_msg: rq: 0x20 val: 0x0 len: 0x7 result: 7 cdc-acm.c: acm_tty_close
cdc-acm.c: acm_port_down
cdc-acm.c: acm_control_msg: rq: 0x22 val: 0x0 len: 0x0 result: 0 cdc-acm.c: acm_ctrl_irq - urb shutting down with status: -2 cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50da300, rcv 0xf57fbc10, buf 0xf57fbd50 cdc-acm.c: Entering acm_read_bulk with status -2
cdc_acm 4-1:1.1: Aborting, acm not ready
cdc-acm.c: Entering acm_read_bulk with status -2
cdc_acm 4-1:1.1: Aborting, acm not ready
cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50da380, rcv 0xf57fbbfc, buf 0xf57fbd3c cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50da400, rcv 0xf57fbbe8, buf 0xf57fbd28 cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50da480, rcv 0xf57fbbd4, buf 0xf57fbd14 cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50da900, rcv 0xf57fbbc0, buf 0xf57fbd00 cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50da980, rcv 0xf57fbbac, buf 0xf57fbcec cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50daa00, rcv 0xf57fbb98, buf 0xf57fbcd8 cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50daa80, rcv 0xf57fbb84, buf 0xf57fbcc4 cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50dab00, rcv 0xf57fbb70, buf 0xf57fbcb0 cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50dab80, rcv 0xf57fbb5c, buf 0xf57fbc9c cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50dac00, rcv 0xf57fbb48, buf 0xf57fbc88 cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50dac80, rcv 0xf57fbb34, buf 0xf57fbc74 cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50dad00, rcv 0xf57fbb20, buf 0xf57fbc60 cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50dad80, rcv 0xf57fbb0c, buf 0xf57fbc4c cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50da880, rcv 0xf57fbaf8, buf 0xf57fbc38 cdc-acm.c: Entering acm_tty_open.
cdc-acm.c: acm_control_msg: rq: 0x22 val: 0x3 len: 0x0 result: 0 cdc-acm.c: Entering acm_rx_tasklet
cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50da280, rcv 0xf57fbc24, buf 0xf57fbd64 cdc-acm.c: Entering acm_tty_write to write 3 bytes,
cdc-acm.c: Get 3 bytes...
cdc-acm.c: acm_write_start susp_count: 0
cdc-acm.c: Entering acm_read_bulk with status 0

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: at /home/johan/src/linux/linux-2.6/lib/list_debug.c:57 list_del+0x10c/0x120()
Hardware name: Vostro 1520
list_del corruption. next->prev should be f57fbc10, but was f57fbaf8
Modules linked in: cdc_acm
Pid: 3, comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 2.6.37+ #39
Call Trace:
 [<c103c7e2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x72/0xa0
 [<c11dd8ac>] ? list_del+0x10c/0x120
 [<c11dd8ac>] ? list_del+0x10c/0x120
 [<c103c8b3>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x33/0x40
 [<c11dd8ac>] list_del+0x10c/0x120
 [<f8051dbf>] acm_rx_tasklet+0xef/0x3e0 [cdc_acm]
 [<c135465d>] ? net_rps_action_and_irq_enable+0x6d/0x80
 [<c1042bb6>] tasklet_action+0xe6/0x140
 [<c104342f>] __do_softirq+0xaf/0x210
 [<c1043380>] ? __do_softirq+0x0/0x210
 <IRQ>  [<c1042c9a>] ? run_ksoftirqd+0x8a/0x1c0
 [<c1042c10>] ? run_ksoftirqd+0x0/0x1c0
 [<c105ac24>] ? kthread+0x74/0x80
 [<c105abb0>] ? kthread+0x0/0x80
 [<c100337a>] ? kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0x10
---[ end trace efd9a11434f0082e ]---
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: at /home/johan/src/linux/linux-2.6/lib/list_debug.c:57 list_del+0x10c/0x120()
Hardware name: Vostro 1520
list_del corruption. next->prev should be f57fbd50, but was f57fbdb0
Modules linked in: cdc_acm
Pid: 3, comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G        W   2.6.37+ #39
Call Trace:
 [<c103c7e2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x72/0xa0
 [<c11dd8ac>] ? list_del+0x10c/0x120
 [<c11dd8ac>] ? list_del+0x10c/0x120
 [<c103c8b3>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x33/0x40
 [<c11dd8ac>] list_del+0x10c/0x120
 [<f8051dd6>] acm_rx_tasklet+0x106/0x3e0 [cdc_acm]
 [<c135465d>] ? net_rps_action_and_irq_enable+0x6d/0x80
 [<c1042bb6>] tasklet_action+0xe6/0x140
 [<c104342f>] __do_softirq+0xaf/0x210
 [<c1043380>] ? __do_softirq+0x0/0x210
 <IRQ>  [<c1042c9a>] ? run_ksoftirqd+0x8a/0x1c0
 [<c1042c10>] ? run_ksoftirqd+0x0/0x1c0
 [<c105ac24>] ? kthread+0x74/0x80
 [<c105abb0>] ? kthread+0x0/0x80
 [<c100337a>] ? kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0x10
---[ end trace efd9a11434f0082f ]---

cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50da300, rcv 0xf57fbc10, buf 0xf57fbd50 cdc-acm.c: disconnected from network
cdc-acm.c: acm_rx_tasklet: sending urb 0xf50da380, rcv 0xf57fbbfc, buf 0xf57fbd3c cdc-acm.c: Entering acm_rx_tasklet

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: at /home/johan/src/linux/linux-2.6/lib/list_debug.c:48 list_del+0xd5/0x120()
Hardware name: Vostro 1520
list_del corruption, next is LIST_POISON1 (00100100)
Modules linked in: cdc_acm
Pid: 3, comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G        W   2.6.37+ #39
Call Trace:
 [<c103c7e2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x72/0xa0
 [<c11dd875>] ? list_del+0xd5/0x120
 [<c11dd875>] ? list_del+0xd5/0x120
 [<c103c8b3>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x33/0x40
 [<c11dd875>] list_del+0xd5/0x120
 [<f8051fac>] acm_rx_tasklet+0x2dc/0x3e0 [cdc_acm]
 [<c106dbab>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0x10
 [<c1042b30>] ? tasklet_action+0x60/0x140
 [<c1042bb6>] tasklet_action+0xe6/0x140
 [<c104342f>] __do_softirq+0xaf/0x210
 [<c1043380>] ? __do_softirq+0x0/0x210
 <IRQ>  [<c1042c9a>] ? run_ksoftirqd+0x8a/0x1c0
 [<c1042c10>] ? run_ksoftirqd+0x0/0x1c0
 [<c105ac24>] ? kthread+0x74/0x80
 [<c105abb0>] ? kthread+0x0/0x80
 [<c100337a>] ? kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0x10
---[ end trace efd9a11434f00830 ]---
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00200200
IP: [<c11dd7bd>] list_del+0x1d/0x120
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1a.1/usb4/4-1/4-1:1.0/tty/ttyACM0/uevent
Modules linked in: cdc_acm

Pid: 3, comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 2.6.37+ #39 0T816J/Vostro 1520
EIP: 0060:[<c11dd7bd>] EFLAGS: 00010046 CPU: 0
EIP is at list_del+0x1d/0x120
EAX: f57fbd3c EBX: f57fb800 ECX: ffff8000 EDX: 00200200
ESI: f57fbe90 EDI: f57fbd3c EBP: f600bf54 ESP: f600bf3c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068
Process ksoftirqd/0 (pid: 3, ti=f600a000 task=f60791c0 task.ti=f6082000)

Stack:
 c1527e84 00000030 c1527e54 00100100 f57fb800 f57fbd3c f600bf98 f8051fac
 f8053104 f8052b94 f600bf6c c106dbab f600bf80 00000286 f60791c0 c1042b30
 f57fbda8 f57f5800 f57fbdb0 f57fbd80 f57fbe7c c1656b04 00000000 f600bfb0
Call Trace:
 [<f8051fac>] ? acm_rx_tasklet+0x2dc/0x3e0 [cdc_acm]
 [<c106dbab>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0x10
 [<c1042b30>] ? tasklet_action+0x60/0x140
 [<c1042bb6>] ? tasklet_action+0xe6/0x140
 [<c104342f>] ? __do_softirq+0xaf/0x210
 [<c1043380>] ? __do_softirq+0x0/0x210
 <IRQ>
 [<c1042c9a>] ? run_ksoftirqd+0x8a/0x1c0
 [<c1042c10>] ? run_ksoftirqd+0x0/0x1c0
 [<c105ac24>] ? kthread+0x74/0x80
 [<c105abb0>] ? kthread+0x0/0x80
 [<c100337a>] ? kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0x10
Code: ff 48 14 e9 57 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 89 e5 83 ec 18 81 38 00 01 10 00 0f 84 9c 00 00 00 8b 50 04 81 fa 00 02 20 00 74 33 <8b> 12 39 d0 75 5c 8b 10 8b 4a 04 39 c8 0f 85 b5 00 00 00 8b 48
EIP: [<c11dd7bd>] list_del+0x1d/0x120 SS:ESP 0068:f600bf3c
CR2: 0000000000200200
---[ end trace efd9a11434f00831 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Pid: 3, comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G      D W   2.6.37+ #39
Call Trace:
 [<c13fede1>] ? printk+0x1d/0x24
 [<c13fecce>] panic+0x66/0x15c
 [<c10067df>] oops_end+0x8f/0x90
 [<c1025476>] no_context+0xc6/0x160
 [<c10255a8>] __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x98/0x140
 [<c103cf68>] ? release_console_sem+0x1d8/0x210
 [<c1025667>] bad_area_nosemaphore+0x17/0x20
 [<c1025a49>] do_page_fault+0x279/0x420
 [<c1006a8f>] ? show_trace+0x1f/0x30
 [<c13fede1>] ? printk+0x1d/0x24
 [<c10257d0>] ? do_page_fault+0x0/0x420
 [<c140333b>] error_code+0x5f/0x64
 [<c103007b>] ? select_task_rq_fair+0x37b/0x6a0
 [<c10257d0>] ? do_page_fault+0x0/0x420
 [<c11dd7bd>] ? list_del+0x1d/0x120
 [<f8051fac>] acm_rx_tasklet+0x2dc/0x3e0 [cdc_acm]
 [<c106dbab>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0x10
 [<c1042b30>] ? tasklet_action+0x60/0x140
 [<c1042bb6>] tasklet_action+0xe6/0x140
 [<c104342f>] __do_softirq+0xaf/0x210
 [<c1043380>] ? __do_softirq+0x0/0x210
 <IRQ>  [<c1042c9a>] ? run_ksoftirqd+0x8a/0x1c0
 [<c1042c10>] ? run_ksoftirqd+0x0/0x1c0
 [<c105ac24>] ? kthread+0x74/0x80
 [<c105abb0>] ? kthread+0x0/0x80
 [<c100337a>] ? kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0x10
panic occurred, switching back to text console
------------[ cut here ]------------

---
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -652,8 +652,10 @@ static void acm_port_down(struct acm *ac
 		usb_kill_urb(acm->ctrlurb);
 		for (i = 0; i < ACM_NW; i++)
 			usb_kill_urb(acm->wb[i].urb);
+		tasklet_disable(&acm->urb_task);
 		for (i = 0; i < nr; i++)
 			usb_kill_urb(acm->ru[i].urb);
+		tasklet_enable(&acm->urb_task);
 		acm->control->needs_remote_wakeup = 0;
 		usb_autopm_put_interface(acm->control);
 	}

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 15e5bee33ffc11d0e5c6f819a65e7881c5c407be upstream.

Must check return value of tty_port_tty_get.

---
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -534,6 +534,8 @@ static void acm_softint(struct work_stru
 	if (!ACM_READY(acm))
 		return;
 	tty = tty_port_tty_get(&acm->port);
+	if (!tty)
+		return;
 	tty_wakeup(tty);
 	tty_kref_put(tty);
 }

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 7e7797e7f6f7bfab73fca02c65e40eaa5bb9000c upstream.

Fix potential null-pointer exception on disconnect introduced by commit 11ea859d64b69a747d6b060b9ed1520eab1161fe (USB: additional power savings for cdc-acm devices that support remote wakeup).

Only access acm->dev after making sure it is non-null in control urb completion handler.

---
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ static void acm_ctrl_irq(struct urb *urb
 	if (!ACM_READY(acm))
 		goto exit;
 
+	usb_mark_last_busy(acm->dev);
+
 	data = (unsigned char *)(dr + 1);
 	switch (dr->bNotificationType) {
 	case USB_CDC_NOTIFY_NETWORK_CONNECTION:

@@ -336,7 +338,6 @@ static void acm_ctrl_irq(struct urb *urb
 		break;
 	}
 exit:
-	usb_mark_last_busy(acm->dev);
 	retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (retval)
 		dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - usb_submit_urb failed with "

From: Olaf Hering <[email protected]>

commit 8c3c283e6bf463ab498d6e7823aff6c4762314b6 upstream.

A virtualized display device is usually viewed with the vncviewer application, either by 'xm vnc domU' or with vncviewer localhost:port. vncviewer and the RFB protocol provides absolute coordinates to the virtual display. These coordinates are either passed through to a PV guest or converted to relative coordinates for a HVM guest.

A PV guest receives these coordinates and passes them to the kernels evdev driver. There it can be picked up by applications such as the xorg-input drivers. Using absolute coordinates avoids issues such as guest mouse pointer not tracking host mouse pointer due to wrong mouse acceleration settings in the guests X display.

Advertise either absolute or relative coordinates to the input system and the evdev driver, depending on what dom0 provides. The xorg-input driver prefers relative coordinates even if a devices provides both.

---
 drivers/input/xen-kbdfront.c |   45 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static irqreturn_t input_handler(int rq,
 static int __devinit xenkbd_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 				  const struct xenbus_device_id *id)
 {
-	int ret, i;
+	int ret, i, abs;
 	struct xenkbd_info *info;
 	struct input_dev *kbd, *ptr;
 

@@ -123,6 +123,11 @@ static int __devinit xenkbd_probe(struct
 	if (!info->page)
 		goto error_nomem;
 
+	if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-abs-pointer", "%d", &abs) < 0)
+		abs = 0;
+	if (abs)
+		xenbus_printf(XBT_NIL, dev->nodename, "request-abs-pointer", "1");
+
 	/* keyboard */
 	kbd = input_allocate_device();
 	if (!kbd)

@@ -132,11 +137,12 @@ static int __devinit xenkbd_probe(struct
 	kbd->id.bustype = BUS_PCI;
 	kbd->id.vendor = 0x5853;
 	kbd->id.product = 0xffff;
-	kbd->evbit[0] = BIT(EV_KEY);
+
+	__set_bit(EV_KEY, kbd->evbit);
 	for (i = KEY_ESC; i < KEY_UNKNOWN; i++)
-		set_bit(i, kbd->keybit);
+		__set_bit(i, kbd->keybit);
 	for (i = KEY_OK; i < KEY_MAX; i++)
-		set_bit(i, kbd->keybit);
+		__set_bit(i, kbd->keybit);
 
 	ret = input_register_device(kbd);
 	if (ret) {

@@ -155,12 +161,20 @@ static int __devinit xenkbd_probe(struct
 	ptr->id.bustype = BUS_PCI;
 	ptr->id.vendor = 0x5853;
 	ptr->id.product = 0xfffe;
-	ptr->evbit[0] = BIT(EV_KEY) | BIT(EV_REL) | BIT(EV_ABS);
+
+	if (abs) {
+		__set_bit(EV_ABS, ptr->evbit);
+		input_set_abs_params(ptr, ABS_X, 0, XENFB_WIDTH, 0, 0);
+		input_set_abs_params(ptr, ABS_Y, 0, XENFB_HEIGHT, 0, 0);
+	} else {
+		input_set_capability(ptr, EV_REL, REL_X);
+		input_set_capability(ptr, EV_REL, REL_Y);
+	}
+	input_set_capability(ptr, EV_REL, REL_WHEEL);
+
+	__set_bit(EV_KEY, ptr->evbit);
 	for (i = BTN_LEFT; i <= BTN_TASK; i++)
-		set_bit(i, ptr->keybit);
-	ptr->relbit[0] = BIT(REL_X) | BIT(REL_Y) | BIT(REL_WHEEL);
-	input_set_abs_params(ptr, ABS_X, 0, XENFB_WIDTH, 0, 0);
-	input_set_abs_params(ptr, ABS_Y, 0, XENFB_HEIGHT, 0, 0);
+		__set_bit(i, ptr->keybit);
 
 	ret = input_register_device(ptr);
 	if (ret) {

@@ -267,7 +281,7 @@ static void xenkbd_backend_changed(struc
 				   enum xenbus_state backend_state)
 {
 	struct xenkbd_info *info = dev_get_drvdata(&dev->dev);
-	int ret, val;
+	int val;
 
 	switch (backend_state) {
 	case XenbusStateInitialising:

@@ -278,17 +292,6 @@ static void xenkbd_backend_changed(struc
 
 	case XenbusStateInitWait:
 InitWait:
-		ret = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, info->xbdev->otherend,
-				   "feature-abs-pointer", "%d", &val);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			val = 0;
-		if (val) {
-			ret = xenbus_printf(XBT_NIL, info->xbdev->nodename,
-					    "request-abs-pointer", "1");
-			if (ret)
-				printk(KERN_WARNING
-				       "xenkbd: can't request abs-pointer");
-		}
 		xenbus_switch_state(dev, XenbusStateConnected);
 		break;
 

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

commit 246408dcd5dfeef2df437ccb0ef4d6ee87805f58 upstream.

If we call xs_close(), we're in one of two situations:
- Autoclose, which means we don't expect to resend a request
- bind+connect failed, which probably means the port is in use

---
 net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -743,6 +743,8 @@ static void xs_reset_transport(struct so
 	if (sk == NULL)
 		return;
 
+	transport->srcport = 0;
+
 	write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
 	transport->inet = NULL;
 	transport->sock = NULL;

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit 24ff6663ccfdaf088dfa7acae489cb11ed4f43c4 upstream.

While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denial

type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file

Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the security_d_instantiate.

Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run security_d_instantiate() by the parent's i_mutex, but obviously this isn't an option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in and finds our new dentry before we get to run security_d_instantiate(), we go ahead and call it if we find a dentry already. Eric assures me that this is ok as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so calling security_d_instantiate() against the same dentry multiple times is ok. With this patch I'm no longer getting errant -EACCESS values.

---
 fs/dcache.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -1175,9 +1175,12 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct ino
 	spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock);
 
 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+	security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode);
 	return tmp;
 
  out_iput:
+	if (res && !IS_ERR(res))
+		security_d_instantiate(res, inode);
 	iput(inode);
 	return res;
 }

From: Stuart Hayes <[email protected]>

commit dd65c736d1b5312c80c88a64bf521db4959eded5 upstream.

The dcdbas driver can do an I/O write to cause a SMI to occur. The SMI handler looks at certain registers and memory locations, so the SMI needs to happen immediately. On some systems I/O writes are posted, though, causing the SMI to happen well after the "outb" occurred, which causes random failures. Following the "outb" with an "inb" forces the write to go through even if it is posted.

---
 drivers/firmware/dcdbas.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -267,8 +267,10 @@ int dcdbas_smi_request(struct smi_cmd *s
 	}
 
 	/* generate SMI */
+	/* inb to force posted write through and make SMI happen now */
 	asm volatile (
-		"outb %b0,%w1"
+		"outb %b0,%w1\n"
+		"inb %w1"
 		: /* no output args */
 		: "a" (smi_cmd->command_code),
 		  "d" (smi_cmd->command_address),

I think you mean March 27 instead of March 17? :p

Thanks.

Kindest regards,
Giam Teck Choon

Ick yes, thanks, good catch.

greg k-h