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ICMP redirect issue

DISCUSSION Flavio Leitner 3 participants 6 messages Sep 27, 2011 – Oct 1, 2011

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#0 lore raw

Hi,

While investigating an issue on Red Hat Enterprise Linux, I found that upstream commit below removed the old_gw check.

commit f39925dbde7788cfb96419c0f092b086aa325c0f

Author: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Date:   Wed Feb 9 22:00:16 2011 -0800

ipv4: Cache learned redirect information in inetpeer.

The issue is about the gateway being a LVS, so the servers behind use the IP alias address as the default gateway. However, when the gateway sends an ICMP redirect, it comes from the primary IP address which is ignored on older kernels because of the old_gw check:

-                               if (rth->rt_dst != daddr ||
-                                   rth->rt_src != saddr ||
-                                   rth->dst.error ||
-                                   rth->rt_gateway != old_gw ||
-                                   rth->dst.dev != dev)

- break;

Well, the consequence is that the issue doesn't happen in newer kernels because it happily accepts the ICMP redirect.

The admin can still control using shared_media and secure_redirects if the host should accept only the ICMP redirects for gateways listed in default gateway list or not.

In terms of a security, if someone manages to send ICMP redirect, then I think it possible to fake the saddr to appear as coming from the correct gateway.

So, I'm not seeing a problem, but I was told to bring this up to netdev. Thoughts?

thanks,
fbl

maintainer
#1 lore raw

From: Flavio Leitner <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2011 16:21:20 -0300

Quoted 13 lines

The issue is about the gateway being a LVS, so the servers behind use the IP alias address as the default gateway. However, when the gateway sends an ICMP redirect, it comes from the primary IP address which is ignored on older kernels because of the old_gw check:

(quoted diff) +0 -6
-                               if (rth->rt_dst != daddr ||
-                                   rth->rt_src != saddr ||
-                                   rth->dst.error ||
-                                   rth->rt_gateway != old_gw ||
-                                   rth->dst.dev != dev)
-                                       break;
Quoted 6 lines

Well, the consequence is that the issue doesn't happen in newer kernels because it happily accepts the ICMP redirect.

The admin can still control using shared_media and secure_redirects if the host should accept only the ICMP redirects for gateways listed in default gateway list or not.

Unfortunately, shared_media is on by default which means the default secure_redirects setting of '1' is ignored.

This means that redirects can be spoofed in the default configuration, but with the above check they would not be spoofable.

I suspect that, because of this, we'll need to add the check back. Or do something similar.

We can't "fix" this by turning shared_media off by default because that changes behavior on input route processing wrt. how we decide whether to emit a redirect or not.

#2 lore raw
Quoted 24 lines · On Wed, 28 Sep 2011 14:06:32 -0400 (EDT) David Miller <[email protected]>…

From: Flavio Leitner <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2011 16:21:20 -0300

Quoted 14 lines

The issue is about the gateway being a LVS, so the servers behind use the IP alias address as the default gateway. However, when the gateway sends an ICMP redirect, it comes from the primary IP address which is ignored on older kernels because of the old_gw check:

(quoted diff) +0 -6
-                               if (rth->rt_dst != daddr ||
-                                   rth->rt_src != saddr ||
-                                   rth->dst.error ||
-                                   rth->rt_gateway != old_gw ||
-                                   rth->dst.dev != dev)
-                                       break;
Quoted 6 lines

Well, the consequence is that the issue doesn't happen in newer kernels because it happily accepts the ICMP redirect.

The admin can still control using shared_media and secure_redirects if the host should accept only the ICMP redirects for gateways listed in default gateway list or not.

Quoted 5 lines

Unfortunately, shared_media is on by default which means the default secure_redirects setting of '1' is ignored.

This means that redirects can be spoofed in the default configuration, but with the above check they would not be spoofable.

I fail to see what that check is preventing because if someone manages to inject a redirect packet into the network, then likely the old_gw can be tweaked to be the network gateway.

Quoted 6 lines

I suspect that, because of this, we'll need to add the check back. Or do something similar.

We can't "fix" this by turning shared_media off by default because that changes behavior on input route processing wrt. how we decide whether to emit a redirect or not.

What about something like below? It will change a bit the secure_redirects documentation.

shared_media  secure_redirect  behavior:
      0             0          all pass.
      0             1          only from gateways and for gateways.
      1             0          all pass.
      1             1          default, old behavior, only from

gateways.

If you agree with the approach, I'll run tests here and post the patch with a proper changelog, documentation and signed-off.

thanks,
fbl

net/ipv4/route.c +3 -0
index 075212e..fa00fcd 100644
@@ -1332,6 +1332,9 @@ void ip_rt_redirect(__be32 old_gw, __be32 daddr, __be32 new_gw,
 			goto reject_redirect;
 	}
 
+	if (IN_DEV_SEC_REDIRECTS(in_dev) && ip_fib_check_default(old_gw, dev))
+		goto reject_redirect;
+
 	peer = inet_getpeer_v4(daddr, 1);
 	if (peer) {
 		peer->redirect_learned.a4 = new_gw;
maintainer
#3 lore raw

From: Flavio Leitner <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2011 17:19:52 -0300

Quoted 2 lines

What about something like below? It will change a bit the secure_redirects documentation.

The previous check was stronger, and served other purposes.

Firstly, it required that the spoofer know the exact gateway IP address we used previously, whereas your test requires only knowing the subnet which is easier to figure out.

But more importantly, the old test allowed us to ignore outdated or erroneous redirects.

We really have to restore the original behavior before my inetpeer changes (enforce that the old gateway matches), and find another way to accomodate IPVS.

maintainer
#4 lore raw

From: David Miller <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2011 18:56:54 -0400 (EDT)

Quoted 12 lines

From: Flavio Leitner <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2011 17:19:52 -0300

Quoted 2 lines

What about something like below? It will change a bit the secure_redirects documentation.

The previous check was stronger, and served other purposes.

Firstly, it required that the spoofer know the exact gateway IP address we used previously, whereas your test requires only knowing the subnet which is easier to figure out.

Quoted 6 lines

But more importantly, the old test allowed us to ignore outdated or erroneous redirects.

We really have to restore the original behavior before my inetpeer changes (enforce that the old gateway matches), and find another way to accomodate IPVS.

BTW, I just double-checked RFC1122 and it explicitly specifies the old_gw check:

[ RFC1122, section 3.2.2.2 ]

...

A Redirect message SHOULD be silently discarded if the new gateway address it specifies is not on the same connected (sub-) net through which the Redirect arrived [INTRO:2, Appendix A], or if the source of the Redirect is not the current first-hop gateway for the specified destination (see Section 3.3.1).

In fact, it's saying that we should also validate that saddr == old_gw too.

So really, we need to put the check back and find a way to accomodate IPVS.

#5 lore raw
Quoted 36 lines · David Miller

From: David Miller <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2011 18:56:54 -0400 (EDT)

Quoted 12 lines

From: Flavio Leitner <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2011 17:19:52 -0300

Quoted 2 lines

What about something like below? It will change a bit the secure_redirects documentation.

The previous check was stronger, and served other purposes.

Firstly, it required that the spoofer know the exact gateway IP address we used previously, whereas your test requires only knowing the subnet which is easier to figure out.

Quoted 6 lines

But more importantly, the old test allowed us to ignore outdated or erroneous redirects.

We really have to restore the original behavior before my inetpeer changes (enforce that the old gateway matches), and find another way to accomodate IPVS.

BTW, I just double-checked RFC1122 and it explicitly specifies the old_gw check:

[ RFC1122, section 3.2.2.2 ]

...

A Redirect message SHOULD be silently discarded if the new gateway address it specifies is not on the same connected (sub-) net through which the Redirect arrived [INTRO:2, Appendix A], or if the source of the Redirect is not the current first-hop gateway for the specified destination (see Section 3.3.1).

Quoted 4 lines

In fact, it's saying that we should also validate that saddr == old_gw too.

So really, we need to put the check back and find a way to accomodate IPVS.

Hi Dave,

I'm have to admit that this issues is new to me. But doesn't it affect any setup where a secondary address is being used as the gateway and the gateway send an ICMP redirect?

Perhaps an option to weaken the check for these cases would provide a work-around for those who need it. Or does that break your inetpeer changes horribly?