kernel: multiple flaws allowing to sniff keystrokes timings
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Hi,
Quoted 9 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 8 lines · Eugene Teo
1) https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/11/7/340
"
/proc/interruptscontains the number of emitted interrupts, which should not be world readable. The information about keyboard interrupts number may be used to learn the precise number of characters in users' passwords by simply watching the changes of number of emitted interrupts during the life of gksu-like programs."
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PoC: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/07/9
Vulnerable: all Linux versions, all distros with procfs mounted.
(The patch misses the same infoleak via
/proc/stat, which must be closed too.)The patch is also buggy, and might be reverted at any moment :(
Hm? This patch was never applied (at least I haven't received a tip for it).
You're probably talking about /proc/$PID/fd* with a weird deplock warning, which is irrelevant.
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But we really can't change this as it would break compatibility, as Alan Cox pointed out, so what can be done here?
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revoke()is still a dream (I looked into it and no other OS implements it as we have talked about it so I still fail to see how it would really work), so don't hold your breath waiting for that to happen...
Sad. I see only two solutions then:
1) show zero fields to unprivileged users (for /proc/interrupts and /proc/stat it is CAP_SYS_ADMIN, for /proc/$PID/{stat,sched,schedstat} it is ptrace_may_access(), for ttys it is uid check) and real values for privileged. The same technique is used in /proc/$PID/sched for eip/esp values.
2) completely deny the syscalls in questions for unprivileged users. Not a way to go with /proc/$PID/* as it would break top and other cpu monitors.
The solution for /proc/$PID/* could come from the applications themselves, i.e. they could create additional CPU noise while processing sensible information like passwords (like some crypto software does to protect against timing attacks), but it is crazy to expect this from all developers. Probably it would not even fix the issue as the activity can be still learned from other programs they interact with via the same /proc/$PID/* files or other implicit information sources.
Thanks,
Signature · 2 lines
Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
Quoted 19 lines · Vasiliy Kulikov
Hi,
Quoted 16 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 14 lines · Eugene Teo
1) https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/11/7/340
"
/proc/interruptscontains the number of emitted interrupts, which should not be world readable. The information about keyboard interrupts number may be used to learn the precise number of characters in users' passwords by simply watching the changes of number of emitted interrupts during the life of gksu-like programs."PoC: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/07/9
Vulnerable: all Linux versions, all distros with procfs mounted.
(The patch misses the same infoleak via
/proc/stat, which must be closed too.)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
The patch is also buggy, and might be reverted at any moment :(
Hm? This patch was never applied (at least I haven't received a tip for it).
You're probably talking about
/proc/$PID/fd*with a weird deplock warning, which is irrelevant.
Oops, sorry, you are correct.
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But we really can't change this as it would break compatibility, as Alan Cox pointed out, so what can be done here?
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[...]
Quoted 3 lines
revoke()is still a dream (I looked into it and no other OS implements it as we have talked about it so I still fail to see how it would really work), so don't hold your breath waiting for that to happen...
Quoted 7 lines
Sad. I see only two solutions then:
1) show zero fields to unprivileged users (for
/proc/interruptsand/proc/statit isCAP_SYS_ADMIN, for/proc/$PID/{stat,sched,schedstat}it isptrace_may_access(), for ttys it is uid check) and real values for privileged. The same technique is used in/proc/$PID/schedfor eip/esp values.
That makes sense to a point, users will wonder why they aren't seeing interrupts anymore, which is a valuable debug tool.
All that is leaking here is the number of keystrokes at most, right?
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2) completely deny the syscalls in questions for unprivileged users. Not a way to go with
/proc/$PID/*as it would break top and other cpu monitors.
Yes, not good.
Quoted 7 lines
The solution for
/proc/$PID/*could come from the applications themselves, i.e. they could create additional CPU noise while processing sensible information like passwords (like some crypto software does to protect against timing attacks), but it is crazy to expect this from all developers. Probably it would not even fix the issue as the activity can be still learned from other programs they interact with via the same/proc/$PID/*files or other implicit information sources.
If we provide a "good" library function for keyboard password usage, we could get other applications to use it, but yes, it is a tough issue :(
greg k-h
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Quoted 5 lines
1) show zero fields to unprivileged users (for
/proc/interruptsand/proc/statit isCAP_SYS_ADMIN, for/proc/$PID/{stat,sched,schedstat}it isptrace_may_access(), for ttys it is uid check) and real values for privileged. The same technique is used in/proc/$PID/schedfor eip/esp values.That makes sense to a point, users will wonder why they aren't seeing interrupts anymore, which is a valuable debug tool.
For the interrupts case you don't want show misleading data. It really has only one use so it's better to change the permissions in the hardening case. Something distros can already do
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All that is leaking here is the number of keystrokes at most, right?
If even that on USB.
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If we provide a "good" library function for keyboard password usage, we could get other applications to use it, but yes, it is a tough issue :(
You can also create noise by rounding off the values a bit. I don't think it would need much rounding to keep useful data and fuzz, and the rounding factor can be stuck in sysfs and default to 0.
Alan