trimming includes from linux/security.h
Subsystems (19)
Al Viro
maintainerRFC PATCH 1/1 trimming includes from linux/security.h
linux/security.h pulls a lot of garbage; most of it can be avoided
by several more struct ....; added in there, the rest is a matter of adding explicit includes in places that (weirdly) relied on security.h to pull what they wanted. Plus taking round_hit_to_min() to the only place using it (mm/mmap.c)...
NOTE: it almost certainly won't build on some configs; it *does*
survive allmodconfig on amd64, but that's all it had been tested on. Help with review and (build-)testing would be very appreciated... Fortunately, all breakage will show up on build, which makes finding it less painful.
---
drivers/net/macvtap.c +1 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/wait.h> #include <linux/cdev.h> +#include <linux/idr.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h>
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c +1 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/completion.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/idr.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h> #include <scsi/scsi_device.h> #include <scsi/iscsi_proto.h>
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c +1 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@#include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/idr.h> #include <scsi/iscsi_proto.h> #include <target/target_core_base.h> #include <target/target_core_transport.h>
fs/nfs/client.c +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@#include <linux/inet.h> #include <linux/in6.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/idr.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/nfs_xdr.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/bc_xprt.h>
fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c +2 -0
@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@#include <linux/poll.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> #include "internal.h" static const struct dentry_operations proc_sys_dentry_operations;
fs/quota/dquot.c +1 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/kmod.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/capability.h>
fs/super.c +1 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@#include <linux/backing-dev.h> #include <linux/rculist_bl.h> #include <linux/cleancache.h> +#include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include "internal.h"
include/linux/security.h +25 -26
65 lines not on this page · raw message
ipc/msgutil.c +2 -0
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/ipc.h> +#include <linux/msg.h> #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h> +#include <linux/utsname.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include "util.h"
kernel/cred.c +1 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <linux/keyctl.h> #include <linux/init_task.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/cn_proc.h> #if 0
kernel/exit.c +1 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@#include <trace/events/sched.h> #include <linux/hw_breakpoint.h> #include <linux/oom.h> +#include <linux/shm.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/unistd.h>
kernel/sched.c +1 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@#include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/ftrace.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <asm/tlb.h> #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
kernel/sysctl.c +1 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@#include <linux/oom.h> #include <linux/kmod.h> #include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/processor.h>
mm/mmap.c +13 -0
@@ -936,6 +936,19 @@ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ /* +* If a hint addr is less than mmap_min_addr change hint to be as +* low as possible but still greater than mmap_min_addr +*/ +static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min (unsigned long hint) +{ + hint &=PAGE_MASK ; +if (((void *)hint !=NULL ) && + (hint < mmap_min_addr)) +return PAGE_ALIGN (mmap_min_addr); +return hint; +} + +/* * The caller must hold down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem). */
security/commoncap.c +1 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
security/security.c +2 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@#include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#include <linux/fsnotify.h> +#include <net/flow.h> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -0
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@#include <linux/syslog.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/msg.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h"
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@#include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/dcache.h> #include <linux/personality.h> +#include <linux/msg.h> +#include <linux/shm.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include "smack.h" #define task_security (task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
Quoted 2 lines · Al Viro
linux/security.hpulls a lot of garbage; most of it can be avoided
by several more struct ....; added in there,
Does it make sense to create a header file that contains only "struct ....;" lines? A lot of "struct ....;" lines are used for avoiding compiler warning. This results in LXR (linux cross reference) showing like
Defined as a struct type in:
* security/selinux/include/avc.h, line 35
* fs/udf/udfdecl.h, line 78
* fs/isofs/isofs.h, line 108
* fs/gfs2/bmap.h, line 15
* fs/gfs2/dir.h, line 16
* fs/xfs/xfs_acl.h, line 21
* fs/xfs/xfs_vnodeops.h, line 7
* fs/freevxfs/vxfs_extern.h, line 44
* include/linux/net.h, line 67
* include/linux/exportfs.h, line 7
* include/linux/seq_file.h, line 13
* include/linux/mm.h, line 245
* include/linux/syscalls.h, line 16
* include/linux/reiserfs_xattr.h, line 32
* include/linux/xattr.h, line 64
* include/linux/cgroup.h, line 24
* include/linux/fs.h, line 749
* include/linux/audit.h, line 375
* include/linux/cdev.h, line 9
* include/linux/cred.h, line 23
* include/linux/mtd/blktrans.h, line 31
* include/linux/generic_acl.h, line 6
* include/linux/futex.h, line 127
and makes it difficult to find the location of actual definition.
Al Viro
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Tetsuo Handa
Quoted 2 lines · Al Viro
linux/security.hpulls a lot of garbage; most of it can be avoided
by several more struct ....; added in there,Does it make sense to create a header file that contains only "struct ....;" lines? A lot of "struct ....;" lines are used for avoiding compiler warning. This results in LXR (linux cross reference) showing like
Defined as a struct type in:
*
security/selinux/include/avc.h, line 35
Er... Then LXR sucks. It's trivial to distinguish those from actual definition; talks to LXR folks and let them fix their code...
struct <tag> ;
vs
struct <tag> {
is not that hard to handle, even if you bother with __attribute__ in weird places like that. They need to distinguish those from
struct <tag> <ident>
etc., after all, so they do some amount of lookahead...
Quoted 6 lines · Al Viro
linux/security.h pulls a lot of garbage; most of it can be avoided by several more struct ....; added in there, the rest is a matter of adding explicit includes in places that (weirdly) relied on
security.hto pull what they wanted. Plus takinground_hit_to_min()to the only place using it (mm/mmap.c)...
Quoted 6 lines
NOTE: it almost certainly won't build on some configs; it *does* survive allmodconfig on amd64, but that's all it had been tested on. Help with review and (build-)testing would be very appreciated... Fortunately, all breakage will show up on build, which makes finding it less painful.
Signed-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>
Hi Al,
I did some testing on this for powerpc and arm. The one snag I came across was that security.h uses things like current->mm and fields in task_struct, so you get fallout like I've pasted below. But to put sched.h (and all its 300 sub-includes) back into security.h kind of defeats the purpose of what you were trying to do, I think.
A proper fix would be to somehow really make security.h a real standalone header, via using defines instead of inlines or similar?
For now, I just added sched.h to the files that were breaking, but it seems wrong to penalize random C files for the breakage in the security.h header file.
This tree seems to survive most powerpc and arm defconfigs:
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/paulg/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/al-security-Nov30
but as I said above, I'm not really liking the last commit on it that adds sched.h to 20-odd files.
Paul.
---
In file included from /home/paul/git/linux-head/fs/super.c:28:/home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_real_capable':/home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1890: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1890: warning: type defaults to 'int' in declaration of '_________p1' /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1890: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1890: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1890: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1890: warning: type defaults to 'int' in declaration of 'type name' /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1890: warning: type defaults to 'int' in declaration of 'type name' /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1890: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1890: warning: type defaults to 'int' in declaration of 'type name' /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1890: warning:
passing argument 2 of 'cap_capable' from incompatible pointer type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:71: note: expected 'const struct cred *' but argument is of type 'int *' /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_real_capable_noaudit':/home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1901: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1901: warning: type defaults to 'int' in declaration of '_________p1' /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1901: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1901: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1901: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1901: warning: type defaults to 'int' in declaration of 'type name' /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1901: warning: type defaults to 'int' in declaration of 'type name' /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1901: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1901: warning: type defaults to 'int' in declaration of 'type name' /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1902: warning:
passing argument 2 of 'cap_capable' from incompatible pointer type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:71: note: expected 'const struct cred *' but argument is of type 'int *' /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_vm_enough_memory':/home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1931: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1932: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type /home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h: In function 'security_vm_enough_memory_kern':/home/paul/git/linux-head/include/linux/security.h:1945: error:
dereferencing pointer to incomplete type
make[3]: *** [fs/super.o] Error 1
Al Viro
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Paul Gortmaker
A proper fix would be to somehow really make
security.ha real standalone header, via using defines instead of inlines or similar?
Whee... that says something about the amount of places pulling sched.h, doesn't it? FWIW, looking at that stuff makes me really wonder why the hell do we have 3 functions there... Look: on LSM-infested builds we get
int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
{
WARN_ON(current->mm == NULL);
return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
}
int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
WARN_ON(mm == NULL);
return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
}
int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages)
{
/* If current->mm is a kernel thread then we will pass NULL,
for this specific case that is fine */
return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
}
and on LSM-free ones
static inline int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
{
WARN_ON(current->mm == NULL);
return cap_vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
}
static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
WARN_ON(mm == NULL);
return cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
}
static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages)
{
/* If current->mm is a kernel thread then we will pass NULL,
for this specific case that is fine */
return cap_vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
}and looking at the callers, we get this:
* mmap_region() calls ..._enough_memory(); current->mm has been
already read to local variable and we'd've oopsed already if it had been NULL. If anything, that's BUG_ON(!mm) in the beginning of function...
* do_brk() - ditto. Just before that call we have
if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)
return -ENOMEM;which renders that WARN_ON() rather pointless.
* mprotect_fixup() - probably a bug, unless it's always called withvma->vm_mm == current->mm. Should it call ..._enough_memory_mm() instead? Looking through the callers shows:
+ mprotect(2) - we are guaranteed that, all right (and
incidentally we oops if current->mm is NULL; down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem) is done first).
+ setup_arg_pages() - we rely on bprm->vma->mm ==current->mm here. And we oops first if it happens to be NULL. bprm->vma is set in __bprm_mm_init() and its ->mm is set to bprm->mm we used to have at that point. Which couldn't have been NULL *and* is what current->mm is set to by flush_old_exec(). So we are OK as long as all setup_arg_pages() follow a successful flush_old_exec() on the same bprm. Which is true for all callers (all are ->load_binary() instances).
So we are actually OK, except that I'd still used ..._enough_memory_mm()
in mprotect_fixup() - will be much easier to verify that what we are doing is correct, without detours through weird places.
* vma_to_resize() - current->mm in local variable and we bugger
off to Efault first if it happens to be NULL.
* acct_stack_growth() - calls ..._enough_memory_mm(), and if mm
happens to be NULL, well, we'd already accessed mm->total_vm, so that WARN_ON() is too late for anything.
* insert_vm_struct() - calls ..._enough_memory_mm(), oopses before
that point if mm is NULL (read from mm->mm_rb.rb_node in find_vma_prepare())
* sys_swapoff() - root-only syscall and we'd better not have it
called with current->mm == NULL.
* dup_mmap() - ..._enough_memory() is called; shouldn't that
be ..._enough_memory_mm() instead? I really wonder about that one - here we end up passing old ->mm to __vm_enough_memory(). Is that the right thing to do?
Frankly, I would very much prefer to reduce these 3 functions to one (..._mm() variant, sans the WARN_ON()) and had callers pass current->mm explicitly. I.e. something like this (preserving the current behaviour):
collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants together
---
include/linux/security.h +0 -16
@@ -1683,9 +1683,7 @@ int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);int security_quota_on (struct dentry *dentry);int security_syslog (int type);int security_settime (const struct timespec *ts,const struct timezone *tz); -int security_vm_enough_memory (long pages);int security_vm_enough_memory_mm (struct mm_struct *mm,long pages); -int security_vm_enough_memory_kern (long pages);int security_bprm_set_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm);int security_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm);void security_bprm_committing_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -1923,25 +1921,11 @@ static inline int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts,return cap_settime (ts, tz); } -static inline int security_vm_enough_memory (long pages) -{ -WARN_ON (current->mm ==NULL ); -return cap_vm_enough_memory (current->mm, pages); -} -static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_mm (struct mm_struct *mm,long pages) { -WARN_ON (mm ==NULL );return cap_vm_enough_memory (mm, pages); } -static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_kern (long pages) -{ -/* If current->mm is a kernel thread then we will pass NULL, -for this specific case that is fine */ -return cap_vm_enough_memory (current->mm, pages); -} -static inline int security_bprm_set_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {return cap_bprm_set_creds (bprm);
kernel/fork.c +1 -1
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm) charge =0 ;if (mpnt->vm_flags &VM_ACCOUNT ) {unsigned int len = (mpnt->vm_end - mpnt->vm_start) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; -if (security_vm_enough_memory (len)) +if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm (oldmm, len))/* sic */ goto fail_nomem; charge = len; }
mm/mmap.c +2 -2
@@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ munmap_back:*/ if (accountable_mapping (file, vm_flags)) { charged = len >>PAGE_SHIFT ; -if (security_vm_enough_memory (charged)) +if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm (mm, charged))return -ENOMEM ; vm_flags |=VM_ACCOUNT ; }
@@ -2202,7 +2202,7 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)return -ENOMEM ; -if (security_vm_enough_memory (len >>PAGE_SHIFT )) +if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm (mm, len >>PAGE_SHIFT ))return -ENOMEM ;/* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */
mm/mprotect.c +1 -1
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,if (!(oldflags & (VM_ACCOUNT |VM_WRITE |VM_HUGETLB |VM_SHARED |VM_NORESERVE ))) { charged = nrpages; -if (security_vm_enough_memory (charged)) +if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm (mm, charged))return -ENOMEM ; newflags |=VM_ACCOUNT ; }
mm/mremap.c +1 -1
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *vma_to_resize(unsigned long addr,if (vma->vm_flags &VM_ACCOUNT ) {unsigned long charged = (new_len - old_len) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; -if (security_vm_enough_memory (charged)) +if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm (mm, charged)) goto Efault; *p = charged; }
mm/shmem.c +2 -2
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static inline struct shmem_sb_info *SHMEM_SB(struct super_block *sb)static inline int shmem_acct_size (unsigned long flags,loff_t size) {return (flags &VM_NORESERVE ) ? -0 :security_vm_enough_memory_kern (VM_ACCT (size)); +0 :security_vm_enough_memory_mm (current->mm,VM_ACCT (size)); }static inline void shmem_unacct_size (unsigned long flags,loff_t size)
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static inline void shmem_unacct_size(unsigned long flags, loff_t size)static inline int shmem_acct_block (unsigned long flags) {return (flags &VM_NORESERVE ) ? -security_vm_enough_memory_kern (VM_ACCT (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE )) :0 ; +security_vm_enough_memory_mm (current->mm,VM_ACCT (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE )) :0 ; }static inline void shmem_unacct_blocks (unsigned long flags,long pages)
mm/swapfile.c +3 -1
@@ -1562,6 +1562,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(swapoff, const char __user *, specialfile)if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; +BUG_ON (!current->mm); + pathname =getname (specialfile); err =PTR_ERR (pathname);if (IS_ERR (pathname))
@@ -1589,7 +1591,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(swapoff, const char __user *, specialfile)spin_unlock (&swap_lock); goto out_dput; } -if (!security_vm_enough_memory (p->pages)) +if (!security_vm_enough_memory_mm (current->mm, p->pages))vm_unacct_memory (p->pages);else { err = -ENOMEM ;
security/security.c +0 -14
@@ -208,25 +208,11 @@ int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz)return security_ops->settime (ts, tz); } -int security_vm_enough_memory (long pages) -{ -WARN_ON (current->mm ==NULL ); -return security_ops->vm_enough_memory (current->mm, pages); -} -int security_vm_enough_memory_mm (struct mm_struct *mm,long pages) { -WARN_ON (mm ==NULL );return security_ops->vm_enough_memory (mm, pages); } -int security_vm_enough_memory_kern (long pages) -{ -/* If current->mm is a kernel thread then we will pass NULL, -for this specific case that is fine */ -return security_ops->vm_enough_memory (current->mm, pages); -} -int security_bprm_set_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {return security_ops->bprm_set_creds (bprm);
On 11-11-30 05:29 PM, Al Viro wrote:
[...]
Quoted 5 lines
Frankly, I would very much prefer to reduce these 3 functions to one (..._mm() variant, sans the
WARN_ON()) and had callers passcurrent->mmexplicitly. I.e. something like this (preserving the current behaviour):
I dropped my scattered sched.h additions, and added this in to fix the current->mm users.
I also had to macro-ize two static inlines in security.h to avoid needing sched.h for incomplete types on task->real_cred, but that meant I could drop the add of linux/cred.h to linux/security.h
Found one more trivial build error in selinux/hooks.c needing shm.h but that was it. I've got more builds running, but I've already built a bunch of arm, mips, powerpc, and sparc without seeing any more fallout.
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/paulg/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/al-security-Nov30
If you want to squash the security.h commits all into one, change commit logs, or anything like that, by all means, go ahead.
Paul.