Cryptographic issues with SSD-technology and wide-block encryption modes
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Dear Arno, dear Milan,
I have seen that you are well aware of the SSD-technology drawbacks from a cryptographic viewpoint, e.g.
http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/2012-August/002665.html
http://asalor.blogspot.de/2011/08/trim-dm-crypt-problems.html
One essential issue that concerns full disk encryption on SSDs, that I have not seen in a mail discussion here so far (might be there and I simply missed it), is the distribution of an uncontrollable amount of copies of SSD-page contents (~4096 Bytes) where only a limited number of blocks (~16 Bytes) have changed. This is initiated by local changes in userspace data and technically due to the complex nature of the flash translation layer (mainly wear leveling techniques), the narrow-block encryption modes (here: XTS) and sector-wise constant IVs. In Cipher-block chaining mode the position where a bit-flip happened is visible in principle.
A countermeasure to those history-building SSD-mechanisms is to blur what is written to the flash device by forcing a multi-sector-wide change when a bit changes (preferrably: multi-sector = size of file system blocks). There are two concrete realizations of that strategy that I know of:
1) Use random IVs. Leaves you with data expansion, since you have to store the IVs, and a pain in the *** effort to implement this reliably.
2) Add a (claimed patent free) wide-block mode like TET or HEHfp (see articles below) from the Hash-Encrypt-Hash family to the Crypto-API and change the dmcrypt crypto engine to handle variable block sizes instead of always operating on 512 Bytes of data (compare the discussion: http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/2011-April/001667.html)
Another (great) advantage of those wide-block modes is their inherent 1/2*MAC functionality due to the intended collision avoidance in the encryption layer that is built in by the universal hash pre- and post-processing („1/2“ for: not a MAC but more than no MAC at all).
Since you maintain the code I would like to know your opinion on this and if there is a chance to pursue such a project.
Best
Stavros
P.S.: You can search the web for the above mentioned articles:
TET: Shai Halevi, „Invertible universal hashing and the TET encryption mode“
HEHfp: Palash Sarkar, „Improving upon the TET mode of operation“
Those are instances of the hash-encrypt-hash family introduced by Naor and Reingold in „A pseudo-random encryption mode“. Halevi discusses the intellectual-property issues et the end of his article.
Quoted 6 lines · Stavros Kousidis
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Ah, thanks. I was just about to complain.
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Dear Arno, dear Milan,
I have seen that you are well aware of the SSD-technology drawbacks from a cryptographic viewpoint, e.g.
http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/2012-August/002665.html
http://asalor.blogspot.de/2011/08/trim-dm-crypt-problems.html
Quoted 10 lines
One essential issue that concerns full disk encryption on SSDs, that I have not seen in a mail discussion here so far (might be there and I simply missed it), is the distribution of an uncontrollable amount of copies of SSD-page contents (~4096 Bytes) where only a limited number of blocks (~16 Bytes) have changed. This is initiated by local changes in userspace data and technically due to the complex nature of the flash translation layer (mainly wear leveling techniques), the narrow-block encryption modes (here: XTS) and sector-wise constant IVs. In Cipher-block chaining mode the position where a bit-flip happened is visible in principle.
I am aware of that issue. However, XTS mode should lead to a full sector (512 Bytes) chage even if only one bit is changed. That is the whole point of modes like XTS, EME, etc.
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A countermeasure to those history-building SSD-mechanisms is to blur what is written to the flash device by forcing a multi-sector-wide change when a bit changes (preferrably: multi-sector = size of file system blocks). There are two concrete realizations of that strategy that I know of:
I think you just have to live with it at this time. It is not a severe vulnerability in most situations. And it will not build up to badly, at some time the blocks get re-used. The amounth of spares/write pool in SSDs seems to be shrinking as well.
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1) Use random IVs. Leaves you with data expansion, since you have to store the IVs, and a pain in the *** effort to implement this reliably.
It is. It also breaks the dm-model as additional accesses are required. Not an option, I think.
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2) Add a (claimed patent free) wide-block mode like TET or HEHfp (see articles below) from the Hash-Encrypt-Hash family to the Crypto-API and change the dmcrypt crypto engine to handle variable block sizes instead of always operating on 512 Bytes of data (compare the discussion:
http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/2011-April/001667.html)
I will have a look at the articles, but I think this is not really an option either, agen because of mismatch with the dm-layer.
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Another (great) advantage of those wide-block modes is their inherent 1/2*MAC functionality due to the intended collision avoidance in the encryption layer that is built in by the universal hash pre- and post-processing („1/2“ for: not a MAC but more than no MAC at all).
Since you maintain the code I would like to know your opinion on this and if there is a chance to pursue such a project.
That would be Milan. I am just the volunteer that does the documentation. Milan actually gets paid for real work on cryotsetup.
Arno
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Best
Stavros
P.S.: You can search the web for the above mentioned articles:TET: Shai Halevi, „Invertible universal hashing and the TET encryption mode“
HEHfp: Palash Sarkar, „Improving upon the TET mode of operation“Those are instances of the hash-encrypt-hash family introduced by Naor and Reingold in „A pseudo-random encryption mode“. Halevi discusses the intellectual-property issues et the end of his article.
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Signature · 6 lines
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: [email protected] GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718 ---- One of the painful things about our time is that those who feel certainty are stupid, and those with any imagination and understanding are filled with doubt and indecision. -- Bertrand Russell
Quoted 12 lines · Arno Wagner
Quoted 10 lines · Stavros Kousidis
One essential issue that concerns full disk encryption on SSDs, that I have not seen in a mail discussion here so far (might be there and I simply missed it), is the distribution of an uncontrollable amount of copies of SSD-page contents (~4096 Bytes) where only a limited number of blocks (~16 Bytes) have changed. This is initiated by local changes in userspace data and technically due to the complex nature of the flash translation layer (mainly wear leveling techniques), the narrow-block encryption modes (here: XTS) and sector-wise constant IVs. In Cipher-block chaining mode the position where a bit-flip happened is visible in principle.
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I am aware of that issue. However, XTS mode should lead to a full sector (512 Bytes) chage even if only one bit is changed. That is the whole point of modes like XTS, EME, etc.
I am afraid this is not true for XTS. blocks inside XTS can be processed in parallel (so they cannot depend on each other) so the effect can be exactly opposite - first bit change in (the same) sector using e.g. CBC will change the whole ciphertext sector, while with XTS only first encryption block (16 bytes) is changed.
I tried to show it here http://mbroz.fedorapeople.org/talks/DevConf2012/img6.jpg
But despite that, XTS is usually better. But it would be nice to have some not patent encumbered wide mode (no code changes needed, just someone have to invent it and add to crypto API :-)
Milan
Quoted 14 lines · Milan Broz
Quoted 12 lines · Arno Wagner
Quoted 10 lines · Stavros Kousidis
One essential issue that concerns full disk encryption on SSDs, that I have not seen in a mail discussion here so far (might be there and I simply missed it), is the distribution of an uncontrollable amount of copies of SSD-page contents (~4096 Bytes) where only a limited number of blocks (~16 Bytes) have changed. This is initiated by local changes in userspace data and technically due to the complex nature of the flash translation layer (mainly wear leveling techniques), the narrow-block encryption modes (here: XTS) and sector-wise constant IVs. In Cipher-block chaining mode the position where a bit-flip happened is visible in principle.
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I am aware of that issue. However, XTS mode should lead to a full sector (512 Bytes) chage even if only one bit is changed. That is the whole point of modes like XTS, EME, etc.
I am afraid this is not true for XTS. blocks inside XTS can be processed in parallel (so they cannot depend on each other) so the effect can be
Hmm. You are right, my mistake. I sort-of assumed XTS was not weaker than CBC for this particular attack without really checking. One look at the definition makes it very obvious though.
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exactly opposite - first bit change in (the same) sector using e.g. CBC will change the whole ciphertext sector, while with XTS only first encryption block (16 bytes) is changed.
I tried to show it here http://mbroz.fedorapeople.org/talks/DevConf2012/img6.jpgBut despite that, XTS is usually better.
I agree. And attacks were attackers have repeated access to the ciphertext, but not the plaintext are quite rare anyways. And even then, usually nothing aignificant is gained.
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But it would be nice to have
some not patent encumbered wide mode (no code changes needed, just someone have to invent it and add to crypto API :-)
Indeed.
Arno
Signature · 6 lines
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: [email protected] GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718 ---- One of the painful things about our time is that those who feel certainty are stupid, and those with any imagination and understanding are filled with doubt and indecision. -- Bertrand Russell
Quoted 11 lines · Stavros Kousidis
One essential issue that concerns full disk encryption on SSDs, that I have not seen in a mail discussion here so far (might be there and I simply missed it), is the distribution of an uncontrollable amount of copies of SSD-page contents (~4096 Bytes) where only a limited number of blocks (~16 Bytes) have changed. This is initiated by local changes in userspace data and technically due to the complex nature of the flash translation layer (mainly wear leveling techniques), the narrow-block encryption modes (here: XTS) and sector-wise constant IVs. In Cipher-block chaining mode the position where a bit-flip happened is visible in principle.
Let me paraphrase, you are worried about someone physically ripping the SSD out of your computer, desoldering the chips and reverse engeneering the wear-leveling. In the off-change that there actually are several generations of a somehow vulnerable block (or several) and the changes would tell the attacker "something".
With the slight variatians:
a) Somone with root-priviles making full-copies of the device at different points in time
b) Somone with root-priviledes and the SSD containing some vendor specific commands to read the RAW contents of the flash and/or possibility to get older versions of blocks (at different points in time)
c) Taking the SSD out and making full copies at different points in time.
d) c in variant b
e) Things that don't come to my mind
In short:
I would worry about these things, before i worry about POTENTIAL information leakage of several generations of a specific block. In all cases you already need a vulnerability to even get to the information.
I don't say the theoretical vulnerability doesn't exist, but there are things much more serious before worrying about such theoretical things. Among the first i would worry about: The so called "cold-boot attack". At least for cases were you worry about someone with physical access.
I would call this is a typical case for the: "Law Of Diminishing Returns"
There is a gain, but the amount of work is disproportional.
Signature · 1 line
Matthias
Quoted 19 lines · Matthias Schniedermeyer
Quoted 11 lines · Stavros Kousidis
One essential issue that concerns full disk encryption on SSDs, that I have not seen in a mail discussion here so far (might be there and I simply missed it), is the distribution of an uncontrollable amount of copies of SSD-page contents (~4096 Bytes) where only a limited number of blocks (~16 Bytes) have changed. This is initiated by local changes in userspace data and technically due to the complex nature of the flash translation layer (mainly wear leveling techniques), the narrow-block encryption modes (here: XTS) and sector-wise constant IVs. In Cipher-block chaining mode the position where a bit-flip happened is visible in principle.
Let me paraphrase, you are worried about someone physically ripping the SSD out of your computer, desoldering the chips and reverse engeneering the wear-leveling. In the off-change that there actually are several generations of a somehow vulnerable block (or several) and the changes would tell the attacker "something".
Quoted 11 lines
With the slight variatians:
a) Somone with root-priviles making full-copies of the device at different points in time
b) Somone with root-priviledes and the SSD containing some vendor specific commands to read the RAW contents of the flash and/or possibility to get older versions of blocks (at different points in time)
c) Taking the SSD out and making full copies at different points in time.
d) c in variant b
e) Things that don't come to my mind
Nice list! ;-)
Here is one more:
f) Chain-reallocation of a sector in a HDD because of some externel issue like vibration. With the difference that the old copies live forever.
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In short:
I would worry about these things, before i worry about POTENTIAL information leakage of several generations of a specific block. In all cases you already need a vulnerability to even get to the information.I don't say the theoretical vulnerability doesn't exist, but there are things much more serious before worrying about such theoretical things.
Actually, I think it is a bit different: These vulnerabilities are practical, but do not apply in almost all situations. That means the right way to deal with them is to document them but tell the very few people that would have a problem to just not use this system. It certainly does not justify massive changes to a system that works well.
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Among the first i would worry about: The so called "cold-boot attack". At least for cases were you worry about someone with physical access.
I would call this is a typical case for the: "Law Of Diminishing Returns"
There is a gain, but the amount of work is disproportional.
Indeed.
Arno
Signature · 6 lines
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: [email protected] GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718 ---- One of the painful things about our time is that those who feel certainty are stupid, and those with any imagination and understanding are filled with doubt and indecision. -- Bertrand Russell
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I would call this is a typical case for the: "Law Of Diminishing Returns"
There is a gain, but the amount of work is disproportional.
You are probably right.
Hi,
Quoted 10 lines · Stavros Kousidis
One essential issue that concerns full disk encryption on SSDs, that I have not seen in a mail discussion here so far (might be there and I simply missed it), is the distribution of an uncontrollable amount of copies of SSD-page contents (~4096 Bytes) where only a limited number of blocks (~16 Bytes) have changed. This is initiated by local changes in userspace data and technically due to the complex nature of the flash translation layer (mainly wear leveling techniques), the narrow-block encryption modes (here: XTS) and sector-wise constant IVs. In Cipher-block chaining mode the position where a bit-flip happened is visible in principle.
The main problem (I see) with these analysis is that it usually take just part of the system (either SSD architecture or block encryption).
But it is more complex system with several layer interfering, this interference can make the problem with ciphertext block copies worse but also decrease impact.
An example (illustrative but I hope not completely wrong:)
Imagine you have write pattern changing several consecutive 512 bytes sectors with some delay between writes.
In theory, that's exactly case you are describing, you will get several copies inside SSD (on flash chips) because of wear leveling and similar techniques (do not forget internal garbage collection as well).
In reality, it depends
- Filesystem above uses large blocks as well (most common is page size 4k I think). The filesystem (and page cache) will send IO request only of this block (page) size, not 512 bytes sector. Depending on timing, you will see either several IOs or only just one (write-cache effect).
- The transparent dmcrypt is using 512 bytes for encryption but it always encrypts the whole submitted IO before resending. (Let's ignore
corner case with IO split because of lack or memory or storage restriction for now.) (Note dmcrypt has no own IO scheduler but it has internal queues for
requests - so there is some delay in processing.)
- The encrypted IO request is submitted to underlying device, where IO scheduler is responsible for real submission to device. And here it can be (and will be with exception of noop scheduler) merged into one big IO.
- internal SSD architecture, and storage in general, have write-cache internally and will optimize writes as well.
- storage (specifically SSD) uses hints for IO size, and every user in kernel should (or must) produce IOs restricted by these hints
So, in this example you changed e.g. whole 4k page in several writes, but you cold see just one final IO! All it depends how the stack is configured and how filesystem is using Flush/FUA requests to sync IO in-flight.
There is always some corner cases but I am trying to say that I am not sure if this problem is really so important in usual use cases.
(As someone already mentioned, there are other attack vectors where the risk is probably higher.)
But that said, yes I'm very well aware of this problem and I would like to have at least some analysis what's really going on in todays flash storage devices and how it is related to disk encryption security. So let's try to gather some data first.
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A countermeasure to those history-building SSD-mechanisms is to blur what is written to the flash device by forcing a multi-sector-wide change when a bit changes (preferrably: multi-sector = size of file system blocks). There are two concrete realizations of that strategy that I know of:
1) Use random IVs. Leaves you with data expansion, since you have to store the IVs, and a pain in the *** effort to implement this reliably.
Anything what need more space is problem (that includes data integrity, auth tags, whatever). And IMHO (pseudo-)random IV will cause more problems than it solves.
Quoted 6 lines
2) Add a (claimed patent free) wide-block mode like TET or HEHfp (see articles below) from the Hash-Encrypt-Hash family to the Crypto-API and change the dmcrypt crypto engine to handle variable block sizes instead of always operating on 512 Bytes of data (compare the discussion:
http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/2011-April/001667.html)
Yes, the work on deploying new cipher or encryption mode (either narrow or wide) for Linux block encryption starts in Linux kernel API.
Send a patch to crypto kernel API list, get it in official kernel and dmcrypt/cryptsetup can start to use it.
(But if there is any patent problem, no chance...)
But do not forget one thing - while cryptsetup is always open to support wide range of algorithms, a huge user base is bound by standards which do not allow them to use anything else. That's why XTS is so widely used.
BTW anyone know what had happened with EME2 wide mode?
http://siswg.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36&Itemid=1
Milan
Quoted 49 lines
The main problem (I see) with these analysis is that it usually take just part of the system (either SSD architecture or block encryption).
But it is more complex system with several layer interfering, this interference can make the problem with ciphertext block copies worse but also decrease impact.
An example (illustrative but I hope not completely wrong:)
Imagine you have write pattern changing several consecutive 512 bytes sectors with some delay between writes.
In theory, that's exactly case you are describing, you will get several copies inside SSD (on flash chips) because of wear leveling and similar techniques (do not forget internal garbage collection as well).
In reality, it depends
- Filesystem above uses large blocks as well (most common is page size 4k I think). The filesystem (and page cache) will send IO request only of this block (page) size, not 512 bytes sector. Depending on timing, you will see either several IOs or only just one (write-cache effect).
- The transparent dmcrypt is using 512 bytes for encryption but it always encrypts the whole submitted IO before resending. (Let's ignore
corner case with IO split because of lack or memory or storage restriction for now.) (Note dmcrypt has no own IO scheduler but it has internal queues for requests - so there is some delay in processing.)- The encrypted IO request is submitted to underlying device, where IO scheduler is responsible for real submission to device. And here it can be (and will be with exception of noop scheduler) merged into one big IO.
- internal SSD architecture, and storage in general, have write-cache internally and will optimize writes as well.
- storage (specifically SSD) uses hints for IO size, and every user in kernel should (or must) produce IOs restricted by these hints
So, in this example you changed e.g. whole 4k page in several writes, but you cold see just one final IO! All it depends how the stack is configured and how filesystem is using Flush/FUA requests to sync IO in-flight.
There is always some corner cases but I am trying to say that I am not sure if this problem is really so important in usual use cases.
Quoted 7 lines
(As someone already mentioned, there are other attack vectors where the risk is probably higher.)
But that said, yes I'm very well aware of this problem and I would like to have at least some analysis what's really going on in todays flash storage devices and how it is related to disk encryption security. So let's try to gather some data first.
That clarifies some things to me, and yes, I would also like to know what's happening inside those things. Especially since I have seen:
http://static.usenix.org/events/fast11/tech/full_papers/Wei.pdf
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A countermeasure to those history-building SSD-mechanisms is to blur what is written to the flash device by forcing a multi-sector-wide change when a bit changes (preferrably: multi-sector = size of file system blocks). There are two concrete realizations of that strategy that I know of:
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1) Use random IVs. Leaves you with data expansion, since you have to store the IVs, and a pain in the *** effort to implement this reliably.
Anything what need more space is problem (that includes data integrity, auth tags, whatever). And IMHO (pseudo-)random IV will cause more problems than it solves.
That's true. I just included it to mention a no-go.
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2) Add a (claimed patent free) wide-block mode like TET or HEHfp (see articles below) from the Hash-Encrypt-Hash family to the Crypto-API and change the dmcrypt crypto engine to handle variable block sizes instead of always operating on 512 Bytes of data (compare the discussion:
http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/2011-April/001667.html)Yes, the work on deploying new cipher or encryption mode (either narrow or wide) for Linux block encryption starts in Linux kernel API.
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Send a patch to crypto kernel API list, get it in official kernel and dmcrypt/cryptsetup can start to use it.
(But if there is any patent problem, no chance...)But do not forget one thing - while cryptsetup is always open to support wide range of algorithms, a huge user base is bound by standards which do not allow them to use anything else. That's why XTS is so widely used.
Ok that sounds reasonable (doable???). What exactly do you mean by a huge user base being bound by standards and to XTS?
Stavros
Quoted 7 lines · Stavros Kousidis
Quoted 4 lines
But that said, yes I'm very well aware of this problem and I would like to have at least some analysis what's really going on in todays flash storage devices and how it is related to disk encryption security. So let's try to gather some data first.
That clarifies some things to me, and yes, I would also like to know what's happening inside those things. Especially since I have seen:
http://static.usenix.org/events/fast11/tech/full_papers/Wei.pdf
yes, this is nice paper!
Please if anyone here have more such pointers, please post it here!
I am quite interested in research here and there are several interesting interactions which surely need more coverage.
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But do not forget one thing - while cryptsetup is always open to support wide range of algorithms, a huge user base is bound by standards which do not allow them to use anything else. That's why XTS is so widely used.
Ok that sounds reasonable (doable???). What exactly do you mean by a huge user base being bound by standards and to XTS?
I mean users which are required to comply (at least to some extent) to FIPS standards for example. (Usually government & public sector etc.)
Here, AFAIK, you can use AES and CBC or XTS modes only.
And I am trying to keep default cryptsetup/LUKS modes compatible with these,
but really, that was just note that many people will (or will have to) prefer standard modes (which get more analysis as well).
Milan
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BTW anyone know what had happened with EME2 wide mode?
http://siswg.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36&Itemid=1[http://siswg.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36&Itemid=1]
As far as I know there are intellectual-property issues:
P. Rogaway, Block cipher mode of operation for constructing a wide-blocksize block cipher from a conventional block cipher, US Patent Application 20040131182 A1
Quoted 10 lines · Stavros Kousidis
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BTW anyone know what had happened with EME2 wide mode? [snip long link]
As far as I know there are intellectual-property issues:
P. Rogaway, Block cipher mode of operation for constructing a wide-blocksize block cipher from a conventional block cipher, US Patent Application 20040131182 A1 _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list [email protected]
http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
Hey, this caught my attention so I contacted Dr. Rogaway. Included below is the email conversation (my apologies for the format, he replied at the top so I followed suit):
=======
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Cool, thank you. It seems there was some misinformation in that thread
then,
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so would you mind if I quoted your response?
Go right ahead.
Best wishes,
Phil Rogaway
Quoted 11 lines · you
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Hi Alex,
There is no Rogaway or UC patent related to EME2.
The University of California did do a patent application, but abandoned it (that is, decided not to pursue a utility patent). I had to look up some old correspondence to remind myself of this, but it seems that we informed Matt Ball and Jim Hughes back in Nov 2007 that there'd be no patent, filling out some IEEE patent-disclosure form saying this, too.
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Best wishes,
phil rogawayQuoted 4 lines · Alex Elsayed
Hi, I was wondering if you had any plans to (explicitly) offer similar terms regarding open-source software for EME2 as you recently have for OCB. There was a recent discussion on the dm-crypt mailing list with the title "Cryptographic issues with SSD-technology and wide-block
encryption
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modes." In the course of the discussion Milan Broz, the maintainer of dm-crypt, stated the following:
"[It] would be nice to have some not patent encumbered wide mode (no
code
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changes needed, just someone have to invent it and add to crypto API)"
I'm just someone who reads the list, but I thought I'd write to point
out
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that there's interest.
(Frankly, I'm also very interested in OCB, but the other AE patents have an
exceedingly unfortunate chilling effect independent of your license.)