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net: af_packet: Validate parameter size for PACKET_HDRLEN control message

PATCH In review Guenter Roeck 3 participants 6 messages Feb 27, 2013

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 net: af_packet: Validate parameter size for PACKET_HDRLEN control message

Building af_packet may fail with

In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘packet_getsockopt’ at net/packet/af_packet.c:3215:21:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct

if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation.

---
 net/packet/af_packet.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/packet/af_packet.c +2 -0
index c7bfeff..1976b23 100644
@@ -3210,6 +3210,8 @@ static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
 		val = po->tp_version;
 		break;
 	case PACKET_HDRLEN:
+		if (len < sizeof(int))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		if (len > sizeof(int))
 			len = sizeof(int);
 		if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, len))
Signature · 1 line
1.7.9.7
maintainer
#1 lore raw

The first thing this function does is test whether len < 0, therefore your change is unnecessary.

If the user gives us something between 0 and sizeof(int), that's their problem, and they'll get a partial int copied back into userspace as a result instead of the complete integer.

Please don't blindly silence warnings like this, thanks.

#2 lore raw
In reply to Guenter Roeck
Quoted 21 lines · Guenter Roeck

Building af_packet may fail with

In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘packet_getsockopt’ at net/packet/af_packet.c:3215:21:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct

if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation.

---
  net/packet/af_packet.c |    2 ++
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/packet/af_packet.c +0 -0
index c7bfeff..1976b23 100644

net/packet/af_packet.c static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, · line 3214

Quoted 5 lines
net/packet/af_packet.c +2 -0
@@ -3210,6 +3210,8 @@ static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
  		val = po->tp_version;
  		break;
  	case PACKET_HDRLEN:
+		if (len < sizeof(int))
+			return -EINVAL;

I think this could break some user space applications here, those who e.g. only pass an uint16_t to packet_getsockopt with PACKET_HDRLEN.

Quoted 3 lines
net/packet/af_packet.c +0 -0
  		if (len > sizeof(int))
  			len = sizeof(int);
  		if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, len))
maintainer
#3 lore raw

From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 21:22:17 +0100

Quoted 18 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 17 lines

Building af_packet may fail with

In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘packet_getsockopt’ at net/packet/af_packet.c:3215:21:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error:
copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct

if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation.

---
  net/packet/af_packet.c |    2 ++
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
Quoted 15 lines

net/packet/af_packet.c static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket · line 3215

Quoted 11 lines
net/packet/af_packet.c +2 -0
index c7bfeff..1976b23 100644
@@ -3210,6 +3210,8 @@ static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket
 *sock, int level, int optname,
  		val = po->tp_version;
  		break;
  	case PACKET_HDRLEN:
+		if (len < sizeof(int))
+			return -EINVAL;

I think this could break some user space applications here, those who e.g. only pass
an uint16_t to packet_getsockopt with PACKET_HDRLEN.

Well, their shit is broken on big endian then.

#4 lore raw
Quoted 37 lines · David Miller

From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 21:22:17 +0100

Quoted 18 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 17 lines

Building af_packet may fail with

In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘packet_getsockopt’ at net/packet/af_packet.c:3215:21:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error:
copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct

if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation.

---
  net/packet/af_packet.c |    2 ++
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
Quoted 15 lines

net/packet/af_packet.c static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket · line 3215

Quoted 11 lines
net/packet/af_packet.c +2 -0
index c7bfeff..1976b23 100644
@@ -3210,6 +3210,8 @@ static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket
 *sock, int level, int optname,
  		val = po->tp_version;
  		break;
  	case PACKET_HDRLEN:
+		if (len < sizeof(int))
+			return -EINVAL;

I think this could break some user space applications here, those who e.g. only pass
an uint16_t to packet_getsockopt with PACKET_HDRLEN.

Quoted 1 line

Well, their shit is broken on big endian then.

There must be something else going on anyway ... yes, my patch fixes the warning/error, but copy_from_user should only bail out if the copy size can be larger than the provided buffer (unless I misunderstand the code in copy_from_user). And the second check should take care of that.

Anyway, point taken. I'll waste my time elsewhere :).

Thanks,
Guenter

#5 lore raw
Quoted 38 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 37 lines · David Miller

From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 21:22:17 +0100

Quoted 33 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 22 lines

Building af_packet may fail with

In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘packet_getsockopt’ at net/packet/af_packet.c:3215:21:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error:
copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct

if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation.

---
   net/packet/af_packet.c |    2 ++
   1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/packet/af_packet.c +0 -0
index c7bfeff..1976b23 100644

net/packet/af_packet.c static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket · line 3215

Quoted 6 lines
net/packet/af_packet.c +2 -0
@@ -3210,6 +3210,8 @@ static int packet_getsockopt(struct socket
 *sock, int level, int optname,
   		val = po->tp_version;
   		break;
   	case PACKET_HDRLEN:
+		if (len < sizeof(int))
+			return -EINVAL;

I think this could break some user space applications here, those who e.g. only pass
an uint16_t to packet_getsockopt with PACKET_HDRLEN.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

Well, their shit is broken on big endian then.

There must be something else going on anyway ... yes, my patch fixes the warning/error, but copy_from_user should only bail out if the copy size can be larger than the provided buffer (unless I misunderstand the code in copy_from_user). And the second check should take care of that.

Fair enough, from what I read the implementation on x86_64 uses gcc's __builtin_object_size(<X>, 0) [1]. Since the <to> (<X>) argument is known at compile time (val:int), __builtin_object_size() will return sizeof(int)-1, the number of bytes from val start to the end of the object val pointer points to. Since our length that we pass can be [0, sizeof(int)] the compiler cannot prove it, if the copy_from_user() buffer size is correct. Thus, "buffer size is not provably correct". Applications not passing int to this getsockopt(2) are screwed up then anyway.

[1] http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Object-Size-Checking.html