drm/i915: bounds check execbuffer relocation count
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v2 1/1 drm/i915: bounds check execbuffer relocation count
It is possible to wrap the counter used to allocate the buffer for relocation copies. This could lead to heap writing overflows.
---
v2:
- move check into validate_exec_list
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c +4 -0
@@ -732,6 +732,7 @@ validate_exec_list(struct drm_i915_gem_exec_object2 *exec, int count) {int i; +int total =0 ;for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) {char __user *ptr = (char __user *)(uintptr_t )exec[i].relocs_ptr;
@@ -744,6 +745,9 @@ validate_exec_list(struct drm_i915_gem_exec_object2 *exec,if (exec[i].relocation_count >INT_MAX /sizeof (struct drm_i915_gem_relocation_entry ))return -EINVAL ; +if (exec[i].relocation_count >INT_MAX - total) +return -ENOMEM ; + total += exec[i].relocation_count; length = exec[i].relocation_count *sizeof (struct drm_i915_gem_relocation_entry );
Signature · 6 lines
1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
Quoted 2 lines · Kees Cook
It is possible to wrap the counter used to allocate the buffer for relocation copies. This could lead to heap writing overflows.
I'd keep the return value as EINVAL so that we can continue to distinguish between the user passing garbage and hitting an oom. And total_relocs is preferrable to total, which also leads us to think more carefully about the error condition. I think the check should be against INT_MAX / sizeof(struct reloc_entry) for consistency with our other guard against overflows whilst allocating.
-Chris
Signature · 1 line
Chris Wilson, Intel Open Source Technology Centre
Quoted 10 lines · Chris Wilson
Quoted 2 lines · Kees Cook
It is possible to wrap the counter used to allocate the buffer for relocation copies. This could lead to heap writing overflows.
I'd keep the return value as EINVAL so that we can continue to distinguish between the user passing garbage and hitting an oom. And
total_relocsis preferrable to total, which also leads us to think more carefully about the error condition. I think the check should be againstINT_MAX/sizeof(struct reloc_entry)for consistency with our other guard against overflows whilst allocating.
I've ended up with this:
int max_alloc = INT_MAX / sizeof(struct drm_i915_gem_relocation_entry);
...
/* First check for malicious input causing overflow */
if (exec[i].relocation_count > max_alloc)
return -EINVAL;
if (exec[i].relocation_count > max_alloc - total_relocs)
return -EINVAL;
total_relocs += exec[i].relocation_count;And looking at that, I wonder if we should just eliminate the first if entirely?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
Quoted 23 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 10 lines · Chris Wilson
Quoted 2 lines · Kees Cook
It is possible to wrap the counter used to allocate the buffer for relocation copies. This could lead to heap writing overflows.
I'd keep the return value as EINVAL so that we can continue to distinguish between the user passing garbage and hitting an oom. And
total_relocsis preferrable to total, which also leads us to think more carefully about the error condition. I think the check should be againstINT_MAX/sizeof(struct reloc_entry)for consistency with our other guard against overflows whilst allocating.I've ended up with this:
int max_alloc = INT_MAX / sizeof(struct drm_i915_gem_relocation_entry); ... /* First check for malicious input causing overflow */ if (exec[i].relocation_count > max_alloc) return -EINVAL; if (exec[i].relocation_count > max_alloc - total_relocs) return -EINVAL; total_relocs += exec[i].relocation_count;
Quoted 1 line
And looking at that, I wonder if we should just eliminate the first if entirely?
Aye, seems reasonable. So perhaps,
/* First check for malicious input causing overflow in the worst case
* where we need to allocate the entire relocation tree as a single
* array.
*/
-Chris
Signature · 1 line
Chris Wilson, Intel Open Source Technology Centre