3.4.62-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.4.62 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat Sep 14 17:44:08 UTC 2013. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/stable-review/patch-3.4.62-rc1.gz

and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 3.4.62-rc1

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Revert "KVM: X86 emulator: fix source operand decoding for 8bit mov[zs]x instructions"

Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
m32r: make memset() global for CONFIG_KERNEL_BZIP2=y

Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
m32r: add memcpy() for CONFIG_KERNEL_GZIP=y

Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>

    m32r: consistently use "suffix-$(...)"

Ying Xue <[email protected]>
tipc: fix lockdep warning during bearer initialization

Jason Wang <[email protected]>
macvtap: do not zerocopy if iov needs more pages than MAX_SKB_FRAGS

Jason Wang <[email protected]>
vhost: zerocopy: poll vq in zerocopy callback

Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
net: ipv6: tcp: fix potential use after free in tcp_v6_do_rcv

Jiri Bohac <[email protected]>
ICMPv6: treat dest unreachable codes 5 and 6 as EACCES, not EPROTO

Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
net: bridge: convert MLDv2 Query MRC into msecs_to_jiffies for max_delay

Thomas Graf <[email protected]>
ipv6: Don't depend on per socket memory for neighbour discovery messages

Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
ipv6: drop packets with multiple fragmentation headers

Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
ipv6: remove max_addresses check from ipv6_create_tempaddr

Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
tun: signedness bug in tun_get_user()

Dave Jones <[email protected]>
8139cp: Fix skb leak in rx_status_loop failure path.

Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
ipv6: don't stop backtracking in fib6_lookup_1 if subtree does not match

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: cubic: fix bug in bictcp_acked()

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: cubic: fix overflow error in bictcp_update()

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
fib_trie: remove potential out of bound access

Veaceslav Falico <[email protected]>
bonding: modify only neigh_parms owned by us

Veaceslav Falico <[email protected]>
neighbour: populate neigh_parms on alloc before calling ndo_neigh_setup

Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
net: check net.core.somaxconn sysctl values

stephen hemminger <[email protected]>
htb: fix sign extension bug

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                              |  4 +--
 arch/m32r/boot/compressed/Makefile    |  6 ++--
 arch/m32r/boot/compressed/misc.c      | 12 ++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c                |  4 ---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c       |  8 ++++-
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c |  1 +
 drivers/net/macvtap.c                 | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 drivers/net/tun.c                     |  6 ++--
 drivers/vhost/vhost.c                 |  1 +
 include/linux/icmpv6.h                |  2 ++
 include/linux/ipv6.h                  |  1 +
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c             |  3 +-
 net/core/neighbour.c                  | 10 +++---
 net/core/sysctl_net_core.c            |  7 +++-
 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c                   |  5 +--
 net/ipv4/tcp_cubic.c                  | 12 ++++---
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c                   | 10 +++---
 net/ipv6/icmp.c                       | 10 +++++-
 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c                    | 16 ++++++---
 net/ipv6/ndisc.c                      | 16 +++++----
 net/ipv6/reassembly.c                 |  5 +++
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c                   |  2 +-
 net/sched/sch_htb.c                   |  2 +-
 net/tipc/eth_media.c                  | 15 ++++++++-
 24 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: stephen hemminger <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cbd375567f7e4811b1c721f75ec519828ac6583f ]

When userspace passes a large priority value
the assignment of the unsigned value hopt->prio
to signed int cl->prio causes cl->prio to become negative and the comparison is with TC_HTB_NUMPRIO is always false.

The result is that HTB crashes by referencing outside the array when processing packets. With this patch the large value wraps around like other values outside the normal range.

See: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60669

---
 net/sched/sch_htb.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ struct htb_class {
 	unsigned int children;
 	struct htb_class *parent;	/* parent class */
 
-	int prio;		/* these two are used only by leaves... */
+	u32 prio;		/* these two are used only by leaves... */
 	int quantum;		/* but stored for parent-to-leaf return */
 
 	union {

Odd, the 00/23 mail for 3.4.62 doesn't show up on lkml. So this mail will most likely show up as reply to 01/23.

Anyway, here are my build results for 3.4.62:

	total: 103 pass: 89 skipped: 10 fail: 4

More configurations (added two crisv32 as well as several arm builds), one less failure (m32r:defconfig now builds).

qemu: microblaze, mips, mips64, ppc, sh, x86, x86_64 pass
qemu:arm doesn't work with the 3.4 kernel and was skipped.

sh results are new. As with other qemu results, qemu needs to be patched to work for the sh target.

Details are at http://server.roeck-us.net:8010/builders.

Guenter

That's looking better, thanks for testing and letting me know.

greg k-h

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5f671d6b4ec3e6d66c2a868738af2cdea09e7509 ]

It's possible to assign an invalid value to the net.core.somaxconn sysctl variable, because there is no checks at all.

The sk_max_ack_backlog field of the sock structure is defined as unsigned short. Therefore, the backlog argument in inet_listen() shouldn't exceed USHRT_MAX. The backlog argument in the listen() syscall is truncated to the somaxconn value. So, the somaxconn value shouldn't exceed 65535 (USHRT_MAX).
Also, negative values of somaxconn are meaningless.

before:

$ sysctl -w net.core.somaxconn=256
net.core.somaxconn = 256
$ sysctl -w net.core.somaxconn=65536
net.core.somaxconn = 65536
$ sysctl -w net.core.somaxconn=-100
net.core.somaxconn = -100

after:

$ sysctl -w net.core.somaxconn=256
net.core.somaxconn = 256
$ sysctl -w net.core.somaxconn=65536
error: "Invalid argument" setting key "net.core.somaxconn"
$ sysctl -w net.core.somaxconn=-100
error: "Invalid argument" setting key "net.core.somaxconn"

Based on a prior patch from Changli Gao.

---
 net/core/sysctl_net_core.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/net_ratelimit.h>
 
+static int zero = 0;
+static int ushort_max = USHRT_MAX;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_RPS
 static int rps_sock_flow_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int write,
 				void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)

@@ -197,7 +200,9 @@ static struct ctl_table netns_core_table
 		.data		= &init_net.core.sysctl_somaxconn,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
 		.mode		= 0644,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &ushort_max,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax
 	},
 	{ }
 };

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Veaceslav Falico <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63134803a6369dcf7dddf7f0d5e37b9566b308d2 ]

dev->ndo_neigh_setup() might need some of the values of neigh_parms, so populate them before calling it.

---
 net/core/neighbour.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -1442,16 +1442,18 @@ struct neigh_parms *neigh_parms_alloc(st
 		atomic_set(&p->refcnt, 1);
 		p->reachable_time =
 				neigh_rand_reach_time(p->base_reachable_time);
+		dev_hold(dev);
+		p->dev = dev;
+		write_pnet(&p->net, hold_net(net));
+		p->sysctl_table = NULL;
 
 		if (ops->ndo_neigh_setup && ops->ndo_neigh_setup(dev, p)) {
+			release_net(net);
+			dev_put(dev);
 			kfree(p);
 			return NULL;
 		}
 
-		dev_hold(dev);
-		p->dev = dev;
-		write_pnet(&p->net, hold_net(net));
-		p->sysctl_table = NULL;
 		write_lock_bh(&tbl->lock);
 		p->next		= tbl->parms.next;
 		tbl->parms.next = p;

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Veaceslav Falico <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9918d5bf329d0dc5bb2d9d293bcb772bdb626e65 ]

Otherwise, on neighbour creation, bond_neigh_init() will be called with a foreign netdev.

---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -3750,11 +3750,17 @@ static int bond_neigh_init(struct neighb
  * The bonding ndo_neigh_setup is called at init time beofre any
  * slave exists. So we must declare proxy setup function which will
  * be used at run time to resolve the actual slave neigh param setup.
+ *
+ * It's also called by master devices (such as vlans) to setup their
+ * underlying devices. In that case - do nothing, we're already set up from
+ * our init.
  */
 static int bond_neigh_setup(struct net_device *dev,
 			    struct neigh_parms *parms)
 {
-	parms->neigh_setup   = bond_neigh_init;
+	/* modify only our neigh_parms */
+	if (parms->dev == dev)
+		parms->neigh_setup = bond_neigh_init;
 
 	return 0;
 }

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aab515d7c32a34300312416c50314e755ea6f765 ]

AddressSanitizer [1] dynamic checker pointed a potential out of bound access in leaf_walk_rcu()

We could allocate one more slot in tnode_new() to leave the prefetch() in-place but it looks not worth the pain.

Bug added in commit 82cfbb008572b ("[IPV4] fib_trie: iterator recode")

[1] :
https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel

---
 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/prefetch.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>

@@ -1772,10 +1771,8 @@ static struct leaf *leaf_walk_rcu(struct
 			if (!c)
 				continue;
 
-			if (IS_LEAF(c)) {
-				prefetch(rcu_dereference_rtnl(p->child[idx]));
+			if (IS_LEAF(c))
 				return (struct leaf *) c;
-			}
 
 			/* Rescan start scanning in new node */
 			p = (struct tnode *) c;

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2ed0edf9090bf4afa2c6fc4f38575a85a80d4b20 ]

commit 17a6e9f1aa9 ("tcp_cubic: fix clock dependency") added an overflow error in bictcp_update() in following code :

/* change the unit from HZ to bictcp_HZ */
t = ((tcp_time_stamp + msecs_to_jiffies(ca->delay_min>>3) -

      ca->epoch_start) << BICTCP_HZ) / HZ;

Because msecs_to_jiffies() being unsigned long, compiler does implicit type promotion.

We really want to constrain (tcp_time_stamp - ca->epoch_start) to a signed 32bit value, or else 't' has unexpected high values.

This bugs triggers an increase of retransmit rates ~24 days after boot [1], as the high order bit of tcp_time_stamp flips.

[1] for hosts with HZ=1000

Big thanks to Van Jacobson for spotting this problem.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_cubic.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ static u32 cubic_root(u64 a)
  */
 static inline void bictcp_update(struct bictcp *ca, u32 cwnd)
 {
-	u64 offs;
-	u32 delta, t, bic_target, max_cnt;
+	u32 delta, bic_target, max_cnt;
+	u64 offs, t;
 
 	ca->ack_cnt++;	/* count the number of ACKs */
 

@@ -250,9 +250,11 @@ static inline void bictcp_update(struct
 	 * if the cwnd < 1 million packets !!!
 	 */
 
+	t = (s32)(tcp_time_stamp - ca->epoch_start);
+	t += msecs_to_jiffies(ca->delay_min >> 3);
 	/* change the unit from HZ to bictcp_HZ */
-	t = ((tcp_time_stamp + msecs_to_jiffies(ca->delay_min>>3)
-	      - ca->epoch_start) << BICTCP_HZ) / HZ;
+	t <<= BICTCP_HZ;
+	do_div(t, HZ);
 
 	if (t < ca->bic_K)		/* t - K */
 		offs = ca->bic_K - t;

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cd6b423afd3c08b27e1fed52db828ade0addbc6b ]

While investigating about strange increase of retransmit rates on hosts ~24 days after boot, Van found hystart was disabled if ca->epoch_start was 0, as following condition is true when tcp_time_stamp high order bit is set.

(s32)(tcp_time_stamp - ca->epoch_start) < HZ

Quoting Van :

At initialization & after every loss ca->epoch_start is set to zero so I believe that the above line will turn off hystart as soon as the 2^31 bit is set in tcp_time_stamp & hystart will stay off for 24 days. I think we've observed that cubic's restart is too aggressive without hystart so this might account for the higher drop rate we observe.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_cubic.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static void bictcp_acked(struct sock *sk
 		return;
 
 	/* Discard delay samples right after fast recovery */
-	if ((s32)(tcp_time_stamp - ca->epoch_start) < HZ)
+	if (ca->epoch_start && (s32)(tcp_time_stamp - ca->epoch_start) < HZ)
 		return;
 
 	delay = (rtt_us << 3) / USEC_PER_MSEC;

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3e3be275851bc6fc90bfdcd732cd95563acd982b ]

In case a subtree did not match we currently stop backtracking and return NULL (root table from fib_lookup). This could yield in invalid routing table lookups when using subtrees.

Instead continue to backtrack until a valid subtree or node is found and return this match.

Also remove unneeded NULL check.

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -949,14 +949,22 @@ static struct fib6_node * fib6_lookup_1(
 
 			if (ipv6_prefix_equal(&key->addr, args->addr, key->plen)) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
-				if (fn->subtree)
-					fn = fib6_lookup_1(fn->subtree, args + 1);
+				if (fn->subtree) {
+					struct fib6_node *sfn;
+					sfn = fib6_lookup_1(fn->subtree,
+							    args + 1);
+					if (!sfn)
+						goto backtrack;
+					fn = sfn;
+				}
 #endif
-				if (!fn || fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)
+				if (fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)
 					return fn;
 			}
 		}
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
+backtrack:
+#endif
 		if (fn->fn_flags & RTN_ROOT)
 			break;
 

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Jones <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d06f5187469eee1b2932c02fd093d113cfc60d5e ]

Introduced in cf3c4c03060b688cbc389ebc5065ebcce5653e96 ("8139cp: Add dma_mapping_error checking")

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139cp.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -524,6 +524,7 @@ rx_status_loop:
 					 PCI_DMA_FROMDEVICE);
 		if (dma_mapping_error(&cp->pdev->dev, new_mapping)) {
 			dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
+			kfree_skb(new_skb);
 			goto rx_next;
 		}
 

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 15718ea0d844e4816dbd95d57a8a0e3e264ba90e ]

The recent fix d9bf5f1309 "tun: compare with 0 instead of total_len" is not totally correct. Because "len" and "sizeof()" are size_t type, that means they are never less than zero.

---
 drivers/net/tun.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -615,8 +615,9 @@ static ssize_t tun_get_user(struct tun_s
 	int offset = 0;
 
 	if (!(tun->flags & TUN_NO_PI)) {
-		if ((len -= sizeof(pi)) > count)
+		if (len < sizeof(pi))
 			return -EINVAL;
+		len -= sizeof(pi);
 
 		if (memcpy_fromiovecend((void *)&pi, iv, 0, sizeof(pi)))
 			return -EFAULT;

@@ -624,8 +625,9 @@ static ssize_t tun_get_user(struct tun_s
 	}
 
 	if (tun->flags & TUN_VNET_HDR) {
-		if ((len -= tun->vnet_hdr_sz) > count)
+		if (len < tun->vnet_hdr_sz)
 			return -EINVAL;
+		len -= tun->vnet_hdr_sz;
 
 		if (memcpy_fromiovecend((void *)&gso, iv, offset, sizeof(gso)))
 			return -EFAULT;

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4b08a8f1bd8cb4541c93ec170027b4d0782dab52 ]

Because of the max_addresses check attackers were able to disable privacy extensions on an interface by creating enough autoconfigured addresses:

<http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2012/q4/292>

But the check is not actually needed: max_addresses protects the kernel to install too many ipv6 addresses on an interface and guards addrconf_prefix_rcv to install further addresses as soon as this limit is reached. We only generate temporary addresses in direct response of a new address showing up. As soon as we filled up the maximum number of addresses of an interface, we stop installing more addresses and thus also stop generating more temp addresses.

Even if the attacker tries to generate a lot of temporary addresses by announcing a prefix and removing it again (lifetime == 0) we won't install more temp addresses, because the temporary addresses do count to the maximum number of addresses, thus we would stop installing new autoconfigured addresses when the limit is reached.

This patch fixes CVE-2013-0343 (but other layer-2 attacks are still possible).

Thanks to Ding Tianhong to bring this topic up again.

---
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c |   10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -910,12 +910,10 @@ retry:
 	if (ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)
 		addr_flags |= IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC;
 
-	ift = !max_addresses ||
-	      ipv6_count_addresses(idev) < max_addresses ?
-		ipv6_add_addr(idev, &addr, tmp_plen,
-			      ipv6_addr_type(&addr)&IPV6_ADDR_SCOPE_MASK,
-			      addr_flags) : NULL;
-	if (!ift || IS_ERR(ift)) {
+	ift = ipv6_add_addr(idev, &addr, tmp_plen,
+			    ipv6_addr_type(&addr)&IPV6_ADDR_SCOPE_MASK,
+			    addr_flags);
+	if (IS_ERR(ift)) {
 		in6_ifa_put(ifp);
 		in6_dev_put(idev);
 		printk(KERN_INFO

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f46078cfcd77fa5165bf849f5e568a7ac5fa569c ]

It is not allowed for an ipv6 packet to contain multiple fragmentation headers. So discard packets which were already reassembled by fragmentation logic and send back a parameter problem icmp.

The updates for RFC 6980 will come in later, I have to do a bit more research here.

---
 include/linux/ipv6.h  |    1 +
 net/ipv6/reassembly.c |    5 +++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)

@@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ struct inet6_skb_parm {
 #define IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED	1
 #define IP6SKB_FORWARDED	2
 #define IP6SKB_REROUTED		4
+#define IP6SKB_FRAGMENTED      16
 };
 
 #define IP6CB(skb)	((struct inet6_skb_parm*)((skb)->cb))

@@ -516,6 +516,7 @@ static int ip6_frag_reasm(struct frag_qu
 	head->tstamp = fq->q.stamp;
 	ipv6_hdr(head)->payload_len = htons(payload_len);
 	IP6CB(head)->nhoff = nhoff;
+	IP6CB(head)->flags |= IP6SKB_FRAGMENTED;
 
 	/* Yes, and fold redundant checksum back. 8) */
 	if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)

@@ -551,6 +552,9 @@ static int ipv6_frag_rcv(struct sk_buff
 	const struct ipv6hdr *hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 	struct net *net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
 
+	if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FRAGMENTED)
+		goto fail_hdr;
+
 	IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)), IPSTATS_MIB_REASMREQDS);
 
 	/* Jumbo payload inhibits frag. header */

@@ -571,6 +575,7 @@ static int ipv6_frag_rcv(struct sk_buff
 				 ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)), IPSTATS_MIB_REASMOKS);
 
 		IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = (u8 *)fhdr - skb_network_header(skb);
+		IP6CB(skb)->flags |= IP6SKB_FRAGMENTED;
 		return 1;
 	}
 

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Graf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 25a6e6b84fba601eff7c28d30da8ad7cfbef0d43 ]

Allocating skbs when sending out neighbour discovery messages currently uses sock_alloc_send_skb() based on a per net namespace socket and thus share a socket wmem buffer space.

If a netdevice is temporarily unable to transmit due to carrier loss or for other reasons, the queued up ndisc messages will cosnume all of the wmem space and will thus prevent from any more skbs to be allocated even for netdevices that are able to transmit packets.

The number of neighbour discovery messages sent is very limited, use of alloc_skb() bypasses the socket wmem buffer size enforcement while the manual call to skb_set_owner_w() maintains the socket reference needed for the IPv6 output path.

This patch has orginally been posted by Eric Dumazet in a modified form.

---
 net/ipv6/ndisc.c |   16 +++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -441,7 +441,6 @@ struct sk_buff *ndisc_build_skb(struct n
 	int hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
 	int tlen = dev->needed_tailroom;
 	int len;
-	int err;
 	u8 *opt;
 
 	if (!dev->addr_len)

@@ -451,14 +450,12 @@ struct sk_buff *ndisc_build_skb(struct n
 	if (llinfo)
 		len += ndisc_opt_addr_space(dev);
 
-	skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
-				  (MAX_HEADER + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) +
-				   len + hlen + tlen),
-				  1, &err);
+	skb = alloc_skb((MAX_HEADER + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) +
+			 len + hlen + tlen), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!skb) {
 		ND_PRINTK0(KERN_ERR
-			   "ICMPv6 ND: %s() failed to allocate an skb, err=%d.\n",
-			   __func__, err);
+			   "ICMPv6 ND: %s() failed to allocate an skb.\n",
+			   __func__);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 

@@ -486,6 +483,11 @@ struct sk_buff *ndisc_build_skb(struct n
 					   csum_partial(hdr,
 							len, 0));
 
+	/* Manually assign socket ownership as we avoid calling
+	 * sock_alloc_send_pskb() to bypass wmem buffer limits
+	 */
+	skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
+
 	return skb;
 }
 

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2d98c29b6fb3de44d9eaa73c09f9cf7209346383 ]

While looking into MLDv1/v2 code, I noticed that bridging code does not convert it's max delay into jiffies for MLDv2 messages as we do in core IPv6' multicast code.

RFC3810, 5.1.3. Maximum Response Code says:

The Maximum Response Code field specifies the maximum time allowed before sending a responding Report. The actual time allowed, called the Maximum Response Delay, is represented in units of milliseconds, and is derived from the Maximum Response Code as follows: [...]

As we update timers that work with jiffies, we need to convert it.

---
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1155,7 +1155,8 @@ static int br_ip6_multicast_query(struct
 		mld2q = (struct mld2_query *)icmp6_hdr(skb);
 		if (!mld2q->mld2q_nsrcs)
 			group = &mld2q->mld2q_mca;
-		max_delay = mld2q->mld2q_mrc ? MLDV2_MRC(mld2q->mld2q_mrc) : 1;
+
+		max_delay = max(msecs_to_jiffies(MLDV2_MRC(ntohs(mld2q->mld2q_mrc))), 1UL);
 	}
 
 	if (!group)

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Bohac <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 61e76b178dbe7145e8d6afa84bb4ccea71918994 ]

RFC 4443 has defined two additional codes for ICMPv6 type 1 (destination unreachable) messages:
5 - Source address failed ingress/egress policy
6 - Reject route to destination

Now they are treated as protocol error and icmpv6_err_convert() converts them to EPROTO.

RFC 4443 says:
"Codes 5 and 6 are more informative subsets of code 1."

Treat codes 5 and 6 as code 1 (EACCES)

Btw, connect() returning -EPROTO confuses firefox, so that fallback to other/IPv4 addresses does not work:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=910773

---
 include/linux/icmpv6.h |    2 ++
 net/ipv6/icmp.c        |   10 +++++++++-
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ static inline struct icmp6hdr *icmp6_hdr
 #define ICMPV6_NOT_NEIGHBOUR		2
 #define ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH		3
 #define ICMPV6_PORT_UNREACH		4
+#define ICMPV6_POLICY_FAIL		5
+#define ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE		6
 
 /*
  *	Codes for Time Exceeded

@@ -917,6 +917,14 @@ static const struct icmp6_err {
 		.err	= ECONNREFUSED,
 		.fatal	= 1,
 	},
+	{	/* POLICY_FAIL */
+		.err	= EACCES,
+		.fatal	= 1,
+	},
+	{	/* REJECT_ROUTE	*/
+		.err	= EACCES,
+		.fatal	= 1,
+	},
 };
 
 int icmpv6_err_convert(u8 type, u8 code, int *err)

@@ -928,7 +936,7 @@ int icmpv6_err_convert(u8 type, u8 code,
 	switch (type) {
 	case ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH:
 		fatal = 1;
-		if (code <= ICMPV6_PORT_UNREACH) {
+		if (code < ARRAY_SIZE(tab_unreach)) {
 			*err  = tab_unreach[code].err;
 			fatal = tab_unreach[code].fatal;
 		}

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3a1c756590633c0e86df606e5c618c190926a0df ]

In tcp_v6_do_rcv() code, when processing pkt options, we soley work on our skb clone opt_skb that we've created earlier before entering tcp_rcv_established() on our way. However, only in condition ...

  if (np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass)
    np->rcv_tclass = ipv6_get_dsfield(ipv6_hdr(skb));

... we work on skb itself. As we extract every other information out of opt_skb in ipv6_pktoptions path, this seems wrong, since skb can already be released by tcp_rcv_established() earlier on. When we try to access it in ipv6_hdr(), we will dereference freed skb.

[ Bug added by commit 4c507d2897bd9b ("net: implement IP_RECVTOS for
IP_PKTOPTIONS") ]

---
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1571,7 +1571,7 @@ ipv6_pktoptions:
 		if (np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim || np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim)
 			np->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(opt_skb)->hop_limit;
 		if (np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass)
-			np->rcv_tclass = ipv6_tclass(ipv6_hdr(skb));
+			np->rcv_tclass = ipv6_tclass(ipv6_hdr(opt_skb));
 		if (ipv6_opt_accepted(sk, opt_skb)) {
 			skb_set_owner_r(opt_skb, sk);
 			opt_skb = xchg(&np->pktoptions, opt_skb);

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>

commit c70aa540c7a9f67add11ad3161096fb95233aa2e upstream.

We add used and signal guest in worker thread but did not poll the virtqueue during the zero copy callback. This may lead the missing of adding and signalling during zerocopy. Solve this by polling the virtqueue and let it wakeup the worker during callback.

---
 drivers/vhost/vhost.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -1603,6 +1603,7 @@ void vhost_zerocopy_callback(struct ubuf
 	struct vhost_ubuf_ref *ubufs = ubuf->ctx;
 	struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = ubufs->vq;
 
+	vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
 	/* set len = 1 to mark this desc buffers done DMA */
 	vq->heads[ubuf->desc].len = VHOST_DMA_DONE_LEN;
 	kref_put(&ubufs->kref, vhost_zerocopy_done_signal);

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>

commit ece793fcfc417b3925844be88a6a6dc82ae8f7c6 upstream.

We try to linearize part of the skb when the number of iov is greater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS. This is not enough since each single vector may occupy more than one pages, so zerocopy_sg_fromiovec() may still fail and may break the guest network.

Solve this problem by calculate the pages needed for iov before trying to do zerocopy and switch to use copy instead of zerocopy if it needs more than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.

This is done through introducing a new helper to count the pages for iov, and call uarg->callback() manually when switching from zerocopy to copy to notify vhost.

We can do further optimization on top.

This bug were introduced from b92946e2919134ebe2a4083e4302236295ea2a73 (macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb).

---
 drivers/net/macvtap.c |   62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

@@ -642,6 +642,28 @@ static int macvtap_skb_to_vnet_hdr(const
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static unsigned long iov_pages(const struct iovec *iv, int offset,
+			       unsigned long nr_segs)
+{
+	unsigned long seg, base;
+	int pages = 0, len, size;
+
+	while (nr_segs && (offset >= iv->iov_len)) {
+		offset -= iv->iov_len;
+		++iv;
+		--nr_segs;
+	}
+
+	for (seg = 0; seg < nr_segs; seg++) {
+		base = (unsigned long)iv[seg].iov_base + offset;
+		len = iv[seg].iov_len - offset;
+		size = ((base & ~PAGE_MASK) + len + ~PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		pages += size;
+		offset = 0;
+	}
+
+	return pages;
+}
 
 /* Get packet from user space buffer */
 static ssize_t macvtap_get_user(struct macvtap_queue *q, struct msghdr *m,

@@ -688,31 +710,15 @@ static ssize_t macvtap_get_user(struct m
 	if (unlikely(count > UIO_MAXIOV))
 		goto err;
 
-	if (m && m->msg_control && sock_flag(&q->sk, SOCK_ZEROCOPY))
-		zerocopy = true;
-
-	if (zerocopy) {
-		/* Userspace may produce vectors with count greater than
-		 * MAX_SKB_FRAGS, so we need to linearize parts of the skb
-		 * to let the rest of data to be fit in the frags.
-		 */
-		if (count > MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
-			copylen = iov_length(iv, count - MAX_SKB_FRAGS);
-			if (copylen < vnet_hdr_len)
-				copylen = 0;
-			else
-				copylen -= vnet_hdr_len;
-		}
-		/* There are 256 bytes to be copied in skb, so there is enough
-		 * room for skb expand head in case it is used.
-		 * The rest buffer is mapped from userspace.
-		 */
-		if (copylen < vnet_hdr.hdr_len)
-			copylen = vnet_hdr.hdr_len;
-		if (!copylen)
-			copylen = GOODCOPY_LEN;
+	if (m && m->msg_control && sock_flag(&q->sk, SOCK_ZEROCOPY)) {
+		copylen = vnet_hdr.hdr_len ? vnet_hdr.hdr_len : GOODCOPY_LEN;
 		linear = copylen;
-	} else {
+		if (iov_pages(iv, vnet_hdr_len + copylen, count)
+		    <= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
+			zerocopy = true;
+	}
+
+	if (!zerocopy) {
 		copylen = len;
 		linear = vnet_hdr.hdr_len;
 	}

@@ -724,9 +730,15 @@ static ssize_t macvtap_get_user(struct m
 
 	if (zerocopy)
 		err = zerocopy_sg_from_iovec(skb, iv, vnet_hdr_len, count);
-	else
+	else {
 		err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iovec(skb, 0, iv, vnet_hdr_len,
 						   len);
+		if (!err && m && m->msg_control) {
+			struct ubuf_info *uarg = m->msg_control;
+			uarg->callback(uarg);
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (err)
 		goto err_kfree;
 

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ying Xue <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4225a398c1352a7a5c14dc07277cb5cc4473983b ]

When the lockdep validator is enabled, it will report the below warning when we enable a TIPC bearer:

[ INFO: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected ]
---------------------------------------------------------
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(ptype_lock);
                                local_irq_disable();
                                lock(tipc_net_lock);
                                lock(ptype_lock);

<Interrupt>
lock(tipc_net_lock);

*** DEADLOCK ***

the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock:
-> (ptype_lock){+.+...} ops: 10 {
[...]
SOFTIRQ-ON-W at:

                      [<c1089418>] __lock_acquire+0x528/0x13e0
                      [<c108a360>] lock_acquire+0x90/0x100
                      [<c1553c38>] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
                      [<c14651ca>] dev_add_pack+0x3a/0x60
                      [<c182da75>] arp_init+0x1a/0x48
                      [<c182dce5>] inet_init+0x181/0x27e
                      [<c1001114>] do_one_initcall+0x34/0x170
                      [<c17f7329>] kernel_init+0x110/0x1b2
                      [<c155b6a2>] kernel_thread_helper+0x6/0x10
[...]
   ... key      at: [<c17e4b10>] ptype_lock+0x10/0x20
   ... acquired at:
    [<c108a360>] lock_acquire+0x90/0x100
    [<c1553c38>] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
    [<c14651ca>] dev_add_pack+0x3a/0x60
    [<c8bc18d2>] enable_bearer+0xf2/0x140 [tipc]
    [<c8bb283a>] tipc_enable_bearer+0x1ba/0x450 [tipc]
    [<c8bb3a04>] tipc_cfg_do_cmd+0x5c4/0x830 [tipc]
    [<c8bbc032>] handle_cmd+0x42/0xd0 [tipc]
    [<c148e802>] genl_rcv_msg+0x232/0x280
    [<c148d3f6>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x86/0xb0
    [<c148e5bc>] genl_rcv+0x1c/0x30
    [<c148d144>] netlink_unicast+0x174/0x1f0
    [<c148ddab>] netlink_sendmsg+0x1eb/0x2d0
    [<c1456bc1>] sock_aio_write+0x161/0x170
    [<c1135a7c>] do_sync_write+0xac/0xf0
    [<c11360f6>] vfs_write+0x156/0x170
    [<c11361e2>] sys_write+0x42/0x70
    [<c155b0df>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x38

[...]
}
-> (tipc_net_lock){+..-..} ops: 4 {
[...]

    IN-SOFTIRQ-R at:
                     [<c108953a>] __lock_acquire+0x64a/0x13e0
                     [<c108a360>] lock_acquire+0x90/0x100
                     [<c15541cd>] _raw_read_lock_bh+0x3d/0x50
                     [<c8bb874d>] tipc_recv_msg+0x1d/0x830 [tipc]
                     [<c8bc195f>] recv_msg+0x3f/0x50 [tipc]
                     [<c146a5fa>] __netif_receive_skb+0x22a/0x590
                     [<c146ab0b>] netif_receive_skb+0x2b/0xf0
                     [<c13c43d2>] pcnet32_poll+0x292/0x780
                     [<c146b00a>] net_rx_action+0xfa/0x1e0
                     [<c103a4be>] __do_softirq+0xae/0x1e0

[...]
}

CPU0 and CPU1:

Time 0 on CPU0:

kernel_init()->inet_init()->dev_add_pack()

At time 0, the ptype_lock is held by CPU0 in dev_add_pack();

Time 1 on CPU1:

tipc_enable_bearer()->enable_bearer()->dev_add_pack()

At time 1, tipc_enable_bearer() first holds tipc_net_lock, and then wants to take ptype_lock to register TIPC protocol handler into the networking stack. But the ptype_lock has been taken by dev_add_pack() on CPU0, so at this time the dev_add_pack() running on CPU1 has to be busy looping.

Time 2 on CPU0:

netif_receive_skb()->recv_msg()->tipc_recv_msg()

At time 2, an incoming TIPC packet arrives at CPU0, hence tipc_recv_msg() will be invoked. In tipc_recv_msg(), it first wants to hold tipc_net_lock. At the moment, below scenario happens:

On CPU0, below is our sequence of taking locks:

lock(ptype_lock)->lock(tipc_net_lock)

On CPU1, our sequence of taking locks looks like:

lock(tipc_net_lock)->lock(ptype_lock)

Obviously deadlock may happen in this case.

But please note the deadlock possibly doesn't occur at all when the first TIPC bearer is enabled. Before enable_bearer() -- running on CPU1 does not hold ptype_lock, so the TIPC receive handler (i.e. recv_msg()) is not registered successfully via dev_add_pack(), so the tipc_recv_msg() cannot be called by recv_msg() even if a TIPC message comes to CPU0. But when the second TIPC bearer is registered, the deadlock can perhaps really happen.

To fix it, we will push the work of registering TIPC protocol handler into workqueue context. After the change, both paths taking ptype_lock are always in process contexts, thus, the deadlock should never occur.

---
 net/tipc/eth_media.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct eth_bearer {
 	struct tipc_bearer *bearer;
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	struct packet_type tipc_packet_type;
+	struct work_struct setup;
 	struct work_struct cleanup;
 };
 

@@ -138,6 +139,17 @@ static int recv_msg(struct sk_buff *buf,
 }
 
 /**
+ * setup_bearer - setup association between Ethernet bearer and interface
+ */
+static void setup_bearer(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct eth_bearer *eb_ptr =
+		container_of(work, struct eth_bearer, setup);
+
+	dev_add_pack(&eb_ptr->tipc_packet_type);
+}
+
+/**
  * enable_bearer - attach TIPC bearer to an Ethernet interface
  */
 

@@ -181,7 +193,8 @@ static int enable_bearer(struct tipc_bea
 	eb_ptr->tipc_packet_type.func = recv_msg;
 	eb_ptr->tipc_packet_type.af_packet_priv = eb_ptr;
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(eb_ptr->tipc_packet_type.list));
-	dev_add_pack(&eb_ptr->tipc_packet_type);
+	INIT_WORK(&eb_ptr->setup, setup_bearer);
+	schedule_work(&eb_ptr->setup);
 
 	/* Associate TIPC bearer with Ethernet bearer */
 

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>

commit df12aef6a19bb2d69859a94936bda0e6ccaf3327 upstream.

Commit a556bec9955c ("m32r: fix arch/m32r/boot/compressed/Makefile") changed "$(suffix_y)" to "$(suffix-y)", but didn't update any location where "suffix_y" is set, causing:

make[5]: *** No rule to make target arch/m32r/boot/compressed/vmlinux.bin.', needed by arch/m32r/boot/compressed/piggy.o'. Stop. make[4]: *** [arch/m32r/boot/compressed/vmlinux] Error 2
make[3]: *** [zImage] Error 2

Correct the other locations to fix this.

---
 arch/m32r/boot/compressed/Makefile |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ endif
 
 OBJCOPYFLAGS += -R .empty_zero_page
 
-suffix_$(CONFIG_KERNEL_GZIP)	= gz
-suffix_$(CONFIG_KERNEL_BZIP2)	= bz2
-suffix_$(CONFIG_KERNEL_LZMA)	= lzma
+suffix-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_GZIP)	= gz
+suffix-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_BZIP2)	= bz2
+suffix-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_LZMA)	= lzma
 
 $(obj)/piggy.o: $(obj)/vmlinux.scr $(obj)/vmlinux.bin.$(suffix-y) FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,ld)

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>

commit a8abbca6617e1caa2344d2d38d0a35f3e5928b79 upstream.

Fix the m32r link error:

LD arch/m32r/boot/compressed/vmlinux
arch/m32r/boot/compressed/misc.o: In function `zlib_updatewindow':
misc.c:(.text+0x190): undefined reference to `memcpy'
misc.c:(.text+0x190): relocation truncated to fit: R_M32R_26_PLTREL against undefined symbol `memcpy' make[5]: *** [arch/m32r/boot/compressed/vmlinux] Error 1

by adding our own implementation of memcpy().

---
 arch/m32r/boot/compressed/misc.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

@@ -39,6 +39,16 @@ static void *memset(void *s, int c, size
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KERNEL_GZIP
+void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n)
+{
+	char *d = dest;
+	const char *s = src;
+	while (n--)
+		*d++ = *s++;
+
+	return dest;
+}
+
 #define BOOT_HEAP_SIZE             0x10000
 #include "../../../../lib/decompress_inflate.c"
 #endif

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>

commit 9a75c6e5240f7edc5955e8da5b94bde6f96070b3 upstream.

Fix the m32r compile error:

arch/m32r/boot/compressed/misc.c:31:14: error: static declaration of 'memset' follows non-static declaration make[5]: *** [arch/m32r/boot/compressed/misc.o] Error 1
make[4]: *** [arch/m32r/boot/compressed/vmlinux] Error 2

by removing the static keyword.

---
 arch/m32r/boot/compressed/misc.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static unsigned long free_mem_ptr;
 static unsigned long free_mem_end_ptr;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KERNEL_BZIP2
-static void *memset(void *s, int c, size_t n)
+void *memset(void *s, int c, size_t n)
 {
 	char *ss = s;
 

3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

This reverts commit 5b5b30580218eae22609989546bac6e44d0eda6e, which was commit 660696d1d16a71e15549ce1bf74953be1592bcd3 upstream.

Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]> writes:

[this patch] introduces the following:

arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c: In function ‘decode_operand’:
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:3974:4: warning: passing argument 1 of ‘decode_register’ makes integer from pointer +without a cast [enabled by default]
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:789:14: note: expected ‘u8’ but argument is of type ‘struct x86_emulate_ctxt *’ arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:3974:4: warning: passing argument 2 of ‘decode_register’ makes pointer from integer +without a cast [enabled by default]
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:789:14: note: expected ‘long unsigned int *’ but argument is of type ‘u8’

Based on the severity of the warnings above, I'm reasonably sure there will be some kind of runtime regressions due to this, but I stopped to investigate the warnings as soon as I saw them, before any run time testing.

It happens because mainline v3.7-rc1~113^2~40 (dd856efafe60) does this:

-static void *decode_register(u8 modrm_reg, unsigned long *regs, +static void *decode_register(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u8 modrm_reg,

Since 660696d1d16a71e1 was only applied to stable 3.4, 3.8, and 3.9 -- and the prerequisite above is in 3.7+, the issue should be limited to 3.4.44+

---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c |    4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)

@@ -3737,10 +3737,6 @@ static int decode_operand(struct x86_emu
 		break;
 	case OpMem8:
 		ctxt->memop.bytes = 1;
-		if (ctxt->memop.type == OP_REG) {
-			ctxt->memop.addr.reg = decode_register(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_rm, 1);
-			fetch_register_operand(&ctxt->memop);
-		}
 		goto mem_common;
 	case OpMem16:
 		ctxt->memop.bytes = 2;

3.4.62-rc1 applied cleanly to 3.4.61

Compiled and booted on the following systems:

Samsung Series 9 900X4C Intel Corei5
HP ProBook 6475b AMD A10-4600M APU with Radeon(tm) HD Graphics

dmesgs look good. No regressions compared to the previous dmesgs for this release. dmesg emerg, crit, alert, err are clean. No regressions in warn.

Cross-compile testing: HP Compaq dc7700 SFF desktop: x86-64 Intel Core-i2:

Cross-compile tests results:

alpha: defconfig passed
arm: defconfig passed
arm64: not applicable
blackfin: defconfig passed
c6x: dsk6455_defconfig passed - defconfig isn't supported
mips: defconfig passed
mipsel: defconfig passed
powerpc: wii_defconfig passed
sh: defconfig passed
sparc: defconfig passed
tile: tilegx_defconfig passed

-- Shuah

Shuah Khan
Senior Linux Kernel Developer - Open Source Group
Samsung Research America(Silicon Valley)
[email protected] | (970) 672-0658