unread variables in sunrpc kerberos code
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Adding the linux-nfs list on the cc in case somebody else has looked at this more recently than me....
Quoted 5 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 2 lines
I think it's probably harmless, though it wouldn't be a bad idea to review it if somebody had the time.
Can you explain why it is harmless? Is the sequence number checked elsewhere? If yes, where?
I really don't remember.
OK, I give in, I'll go look:
RFC 1964 section 1.2.1.2 says
The sequence number provides a basis for detection of replayed tokens. Replay detection *can* be performed using state information retained on received sequence numbers...
(emphasis mine), and
Provision of per-message replay and out-of-sequence detection services is optional for implementation of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism.
For some reason RFC 4121, which appears to be the one describing the v2 tokens, doesn't have similar text that I can find. I can't tell what they think you're supposed to do with sequence numbers, if anything.
RPC's (hence gss tokens) can be processed out of order, so it's a little unclear how the sequence numbers would be checked. You'd have to choose a window of sequence numbers to track, I guess, and just reject anything older. Absence any guidance about how to do this in the RFC's this sounds like a potential source of interoperability problems.
RPCSEC_GSS also has its own sequence number that's included in all the data we encrypt or checksum, so should provide sufficient replay protection on its own. And the RPCSEC_GSS RPC's do tell you how to determine the window and handle old tokens.
So I may be missing something--more review always welcomed--but I think it's all OK.
Unless someone else has more to add I'll cook up a patch that attempts to make the situation clearer to future unfortunate readers of this code.
--b.
RPCSEC_GSS requires that the GSS-API level sequencing is turned off - e.g. the sequence_req_flag is set to false.
rfc2203:
When GSS_Init_sec_context() is called, the parameters replay_det_req_flag and sequence_req_flag must be turned off. The reasons for this are:
* ONC RPC can be used over unreliable transports and provides no
layer to reliably re-assemble messages. Thus it is possible for gaps in message sequencing to occur, as well as out of order messages.
* RPC servers can be multi-threaded, and thus the order in which
GSS-API messages are signed or wrapped can be different from the order in which the messages are verified or unwrapped, even if the requests are sent on reliable transports.
* To maximize convenience of implementation, the order in which an
ONC RPC entity will verify the header and verify/unwrap the body of an RPC call or reply is left unspecified.
The RPCSEC_GSS protocol provides for protection from replay attack, yet tolerates out-of-order delivery or processing of messages and tolerates dropped requests.
So the RPCSEC_GSS layer does the sequencing, not the GSS layer.
-->Andy
Quoted 53 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Adding the linux-nfs list on the cc in case somebody else has looked at this more recently than me....
Quoted 5 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 2 lines
I think it's probably harmless, though it wouldn't be a bad idea to review it if somebody had the time.
Can you explain why it is harmless? Is the sequence number checked elsewhere? If yes, where?
I really don't remember.
OK, I give in, I'll go look:
RFC 1964 section 1.2.1.2 says
The sequence number provides a basis for detection of replayed tokens. Replay detection *can* be performed using state information retained on received sequence numbers...
(emphasis mine), and
Provision of per-message replay and out-of-sequence detection services is optional for implementation of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism.
For some reason RFC 4121, which appears to be the one describing the v2 tokens, doesn't have similar text that I can find. I can't tell what they think you're supposed to do with sequence numbers, if anything.
RPC's (hence gss tokens) can be processed out of order, so it's a little unclear how the sequence numbers would be checked. You'd have to choose a window of sequence numbers to track, I guess, and just reject anything older. Absence any guidance about how to do this in the RFC's this sounds like a potential source of interoperability problems.
RPCSEC_GSSalso has its own sequence number that's included in all the data we encrypt or checksum, so should provide sufficient replay protection on its own. And theRPCSEC_GSSRPC's do tell you how to determine the window and handle old tokens.So I may be missing something--more review always welcomed--but I think it's all OK.
Unless someone else has more to add I'll cook up a patch that attempts to make the situation clearer to future unfortunate readers of this code.
--b.
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Quoted 23 lines · Andy Adamson
RPCSEC_GSSrequires that the GSS-API level sequencing is turned off - e.g. thesequence_req_flagis set to false.rfc2203:
When
GSS_Init_sec_context()is called, the parametersreplay_det_req_flagandsequence_req_flagmust be turned off. The reasons for this are:* ONC RPC can be used over unreliable transports and provides no
layer to reliably re-assemble messages. Thus it is possible for gaps in message sequencing to occur, as well as out of order messages.* RPC servers can be multi-threaded, and thus the order in which
GSS-API messages are signed or wrapped can be different from the order in which the messages are verified or unwrapped, even if the requests are sent on reliable transports.* To maximize convenience of implementation, the order in which an
ONC RPC entity will verify the header and verify/unwrap the body of an RPC call or reply is left unspecified.
Quoted 6 lines
The
RPCSEC_GSSprotocol provides for protection from replay attack, yet tolerates out-of-order delivery or processing of messages and tolerates dropped requests.So the
RPCSEC_GSSlayer does the sequencing, not the GSS layer.
Thanks Andy, that RFC text is a good explanation; I'll add a comment referencing that.
--b.
Thanks for following up. Looks good.
-Andi
Signature · 1 line
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