uml: check length in exitcode_proc_write()
Subsystems (9)
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
PATCH 1/1 uml: check length in exitcode_proc_write()
We don't cap the size of buffer from the user so we could write past the end of the array here. Only root can write to this file.
arch/um/kernel/exitcode.c +3 -1
@@ -40,9 +40,11 @@ static ssize_t exitcode_proc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *pos) { char *end, buf[sizeof("nnnnn\0")]; +size_t size;int tmp; -if (copy_from_user (buf, buffer, count)) + size =min (count,sizeof (buf)); +if (copy_from_user (buf, buffer, size))return -EFAULT ; tmp =simple_strtol (buf, &end,0 );
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Richard Weinberger
maintainerAm 29.10.2013 20:06, schrieb Dan Carpenter:
Quoted 6 lines
We don't cap the size of buffer from the user so we could write past the end of the array here. Only root can write to this file.
Reported-by Nico Golde <[email protected]>Reported-by Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Thanks everyone!
Patch applied and an it's way to Linus' tree.
Thanks,
//richard
Quoted 8 lines
arch/um/kernel/exitcode.c +0
-0@@ -40,9 +40,11 @@ static ssize_t exitcode_proc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *pos) {
arch/um/kernel/exitcode.c static ssize_t exitcode_proc_write(struct file *file, · line 50
Quoted 10 lines
arch/um/kernel/exitcode.c +3
-1char *end, buf[sizeof ("nnnnn\0" )]; +size_t size;int tmp; -if (copy_from_user (buf, buffer, count)) + size =min (count,sizeof (buf)); +if (copy_from_user (buf, buffer, size))return -EFAULT ; tmp =simple_strtol (buf, &end,0 );
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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PATCH 1/1 libertas: potential oops in debugfs
In reply to a message not in the archiveIf we do a zero size write then it will oops. This can only be triggered by root.
drivers/net/wireless/libertas/debugfs.c +3 -0
@@ -913,6 +913,9 @@ static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,char *p2;struct debug_data *d = f->private_data; +if (cnt ==0 ) +return 0 ; + pdata =kmalloc (cnt,GFP_KERNEL );if (pdata ==NULL )return 0 ;
Re: [patch] libertas: potential oops in debugfs
Quoted 3 lines · Dan Carpenter
If we do a zero size write then it will oops. This can only be triggered by root.
This one isn't right... Sorry for that. We do need to fix the while loop. I wasn't thinking.
I will resend.
regards,
dan carpenter
PATCH 1/1 aacraid: prevent ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference
In reply to a message not in the archiveIf "fibsize" is zero then it leads to a ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference when we dereference user_srbcmd.
Due to a missing capable() check in the compat ioctls then this error can be triggered without CAP_SYS_RAWIO. I have fixed that in a separate patch.
drivers/scsi/aacraid/commctrl.c +2 -1
@@ -511,7 +511,8 @@ static int aac_send_raw_srb(struct aac_dev* dev, void __user * arg) goto cleanup; } -if (fibsize > (dev->max_fib_size -sizeof (struct aac_fibhdr ))) { +if (fibsize ==0 || + fibsize > (dev->max_fib_size -sizeof (struct aac_fibhdr ))) { rcode = -EINVAL ; goto cleanup; }
James Bottomley
maintainerRe: [patch] [SCSI] aacraid: prevent ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference
Quoted 16 lines · Dan Carpenter
If "fibsize" is zero then it leads to a
ZERO_SIZE_PTRdereference when we dereferenceuser_srbcmd.Due to a missing
capable()check in the compat ioctls then this error can be triggered withoutCAP_SYS_RAWIO. I have fixed that in a separate patch.Reported-by Nico Golde <[email protected]>Reported-by Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>drivers/scsi/aacraid/commctrl.c +0
-0
drivers/scsi/aacraid/commctrl.c static int aac_send_raw_srb(struct aac_dev* dev, void __user * arg) · line 515
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/scsi/aacraid/commctrl.c +2
-1@@ -511,7 +511,8 @@ static int aac_send_raw_srb(struct aac_dev* dev, void __user * arg) goto cleanup; } -if (fibsize > (dev->max_fib_size -sizeof (struct aac_fibhdr ))) { +if (fibsize ==0 || + fibsize > (dev->max_fib_size -sizeof (struct aac_fibhdr ))) {
Not really if you want to catch actual undersize errors. We read out of the allocated data structure after this, so it had better be at least sizeof(*user_srbcmd) rather than just not zero to make sure we aren't reading off the end of the allocated size.
James
Re: [patch] [SCSI] aacraid: prevent ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference
In reply to Dan CarpenterQuoted 2 lines · Dan Carpenter
If "fibsize" is zero then it leads to a
ZERO_SIZE_PTRdereference when we dereferenceuser_srbcmd.
Btw, these "ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference" issues aren't about ZERO_SIZE_PTR, they are about overrunning the allocations. The ZERO_SIZE_PTR pointer is a perfectly valid pointer and can be dereferenced just fine, as long as you stay within the allocation size.
Think about it.
So I really get the feeling that checking for a zero size is very wrong. If we can access the ZERO_SIZE_PTR, that means that we at some point don't check the size limits, and if that's true for the zero size, I don't see why that wouldn't be true for *other* sizes too..
I didn't check this particular case, and maybe zero really is special. But it's not clear at all why it should be. Can you explain why zero is special here, and why the buffer overrun cannot happen with size 1, for example?
Because quite frankly, from what I can tell, testing against zero is absolutely *WRONG*. Any size less than the size of "struct user_aac_srb" would seem to be bogus.
This has nothing to do with zero, or with ZERO_SIZE_PTR.
Tell me why I'm wrong.
Linus
Re: [patch] [SCSI] aacraid: prevent ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference
You and James are right. It should be checking against the sizeof(). I will send a v2 tomorrow. Sorry about that.
regards,
dan carpenter
Re: [patch] [SCSI] aacraid: prevent ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference
Quoted 2 lines · Dan Carpenter
You and James are right. It should be checking against the
sizeof(). I will send a v2 tomorrow. Sorry about that.
Looking some more at this, I have to say that I absolutely detest those aacraid structures. And I'm not sure that sizeof() is necessarily the right thing for the minimum size.
The "struct user_aac_srb" includes a
struct user_sgmap sg;
which has a count in it. But the actual "struct user_sgmap" structure is defined with a
struct user_sgentry sg[1];
in it, so the sizeof() of that structure basically gives the size of an entry that has _one_ sgentry.
And it's not entirely clear that you absolutely have to have a minimum of one sgentry. So I could imagine that there would be a zero-entry case that doesn't have any scatter-gather entries at all (ie just the status parts). So the "sizeof()" might actually end up giving a minimum size that is too large *if* it is possible to not have those scatter-gather entries at all?
Hmm? Somebody who knows this code, please speak up..
Linus
Re: [patch] [SCSI] aacraid: prevent ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference
In reply to Dan CarpenterQuoted 3 lines · Dan Carpenter
Due to a missing
capable()check in the compat ioctls then this error can be triggered withoutCAP_SYS_RAWIO. I have fixed that in a separate patch.
Actually, CAP_SYS_RAWIO is checked at the start of the function.
However my other patch which adds the check in the compat ioctl should probably still be applied so it matches the regular ioctl.
regards,
dan carpenter
PATCH 1/1 aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In reply to a message not in the archiveIn d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the check as well.
drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c +2 -0
@@ -771,6 +771,8 @@ static long aac_compat_do_ioctl(struct aac_dev *dev, unsigned cmd, unsigned longstatic int aac_compat_ioctl (struct scsi_device *sdev,int cmd,void __user *arg) {struct aac_dev *dev = (struct aac_dev *)sdev->host->hostdata; +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +return -EPERM ;return aac_compat_do_ioctl (dev, cmd, (unsigned long )arg); }
PATCH v2 1/1 libertas: potential oops in debugfs
In reply to a message not in the archiveIf we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a terminator.
This code can only be triggered by root.
drivers/net/wireless/libertas/debugfs.c +5 -1
@@ -913,7 +913,10 @@ static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,char *p2;struct debug_data *d = f->private_data; - pdata =kmalloc (cnt,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (cnt =0 ) +return 0 ; + + pdata =kmalloc (cnt +1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (pdata =NULL )return 0 ;
@@ -922,6 +925,7 @@ static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,kfree (pdata);return 0 ; } + pdata[cnt] ='\0' ; p0 = pdata;for (i =0 ; i < num_of_items; i++) {
Re: [patch v2] libertas: potential oops in debugfs
Quoted 9 lines · Dan Carpenter
If we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a terminator.
This code can only be triggered by root.
Reported-by Nico Golde <[email protected]>Reported-by Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Quoted 29 lines
drivers/net/wireless/libertas/debugfs.c +5
-2@@ -913,7 +913,10 @@ static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,char *p2;struct debug_data *d = f->private_data; - pdata =kmalloc (cnt,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (cnt =0 ) +return 0 ; + + pdata =kmalloc (cnt +1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (pdata =NULL )return 0 ;@@ -922,6 +925,7 @@ static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,kfree (pdata);return 0 ; } + pdata[cnt] ='\0' ; p0 = pdata;for (i =0 ; i < num_of_items; i++) { --To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-wireless" in the body of a message to [email protected]
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PATCH 1/1 megaraid: missing bounds check in mimd_to_kioc()
In reply to a message not in the archivepthru32->dataxferlen comes from the user so we need to check that it's not too large so we don't overflow the buffer.
---
Please review this carefully because I have not tested it.
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mm.c +2 -0
@@ -486,6 +486,8 @@ mimd_to_kioc(mimd_t __user *umimd, mraid_mmadp_t *adp, uioc_t *kioc) pthru32->dataxferaddr = kioc->buf_paddr;if (kioc->data_dir &UIOC_WR ) { +if (pthru32->dataxferlen > kioc->xferlen) +return -EINVAL ;if (copy_from_user (kioc->buf_vaddr, kioc->user_data, pthru32->dataxferlen)) {return (-EFAULT );
Re: [patch] [SCSI] megaraid: missing bounds check in mimd_to_kioc()
Hi,
Quoted 6 lines · Dan Carpenter
pthru32->dataxferlencomes from the user so we need to check that it's not too large so we don't overflow the buffer.Reported-by Nico Golde <[email protected]>Reported-by Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
I don't see this in Linus's tree nor linux-next yet. Can someone pick this up?
Thanks!
-Kees
Quoted 17 lines
---
Please review this carefully because I have not tested it.drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mm.c +2
-0@@ -486,6 +486,8 @@ mimd_to_kioc(mimd_t __user *umimd, mraid_mmadp_t *adp, uioc_t *kioc) pthru32->dataxferaddr = kioc->buf_paddr;if (kioc->data_dir &UIOC_WR ) { +if (pthru32->dataxferlen > kioc->xferlen) +return -EINVAL ;if (copy_from_user (kioc->buf_vaddr, kioc->user_data, pthru32->dataxferlen)) {return (-EFAULT );
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
RE: [patch] [SCSI] megaraid: missing bounds check in mimd_to_kioc()
In reply to Dan CarpenterQuoted 33 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 30, 2013 10:44 PM
To: DL-MegaRAID Linux
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley; [email protected]; [email protected]; Nico Golde; Fabian Yamaguchi
Subject: [patch] [SCSI] megaraid: missing bounds check inmimd_to_kioc()
pthru32->dataxferlencomes from the user so we need to check that it's not too large so we don't overflow the buffer.Reported-by Nico Golde <[email protected]>Reported-by Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>---
Please review this carefully because I have not tested it.drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mm.c +2
-0@@ -486,6 +486,8 @@ mimd_to_kioc(mimd_t __user *umimd, mraid_mmadp_t *adp, uioc_t *kioc) pthru32->dataxferaddr = kioc->buf_paddr;if (kioc->data_dir &UIOC_WR ) { +if (pthru32->dataxferlen > kioc->xferlen) +return -EINVAL ;if (copy_from_user (kioc->buf_vaddr, kioc->user_data, pthru32->dataxferlen)) {
Quoted 1 line
return (-EFAULT);
Sumit
Re: [patch] [SCSI] megaraid: missing bounds check in mimd_to_kioc()
Quoted 37 lines · Sumit
Quoted 33 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 30, 2013 10:44 PM
To: DL-MegaRAID Linux
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley; [email protected]; [email protected]; Nico Golde; Fabian Yamaguchi
Subject: [patch] [SCSI] megaraid: missing bounds check inmimd_to_kioc()
pthru32->dataxferlencomes from the user so we need to check that it's not too large so we don't overflow the buffer.Reported-by Nico Golde <[email protected]>Reported-by Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>---
Please review this carefully because I have not tested it.drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mm.c +2
-0@@ -486,6 +486,8 @@ mimd_to_kioc(mimd_t __user *umimd, mraid_mmadp_t *adp, uioc_t *kioc) pthru32->dataxferaddr = kioc->buf_paddr;if (kioc->data_dir &UIOC_WR ) { +if (pthru32->dataxferlen > kioc->xferlen) +return -EINVAL ;if (copy_from_user (kioc->buf_vaddr, kioc->user_data, pthru32->dataxferlen)) {Quoted 1 line
return (-EFAULT);Acked-by Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Quoted 2 lines
Sumit
Thanks for the Ack. Who normally picks patches for this area?
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
RE: [patch] [SCSI] megaraid: missing bounds check in mimd_to_kioc()
Quoted 49 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Kees Cook [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Friday, January 10, 2014 12:05 AM
To: Saxena, Sumit
Cc: Dan Carpenter; DL-MegaRAID Linux; James E.J. Bottomley; linux- [email protected]; [email protected]; Nico Golde; Fabian Yamaguchi
Subject: Re: [patch] [SCSI] megaraid: missing bounds check inmimd_to_kioc()Quoted 20 lines · Sumit
Quoted 20 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 30, 2013 10:44 PM
To: DL-MegaRAID Linux
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley; [email protected]; [email protected]; Nico Golde; Fabian Yamaguchi
Subject: [patch] [SCSI] megaraid: missing bounds check inmimd_to_kioc()
pthru32->dataxferlencomes from the user so we need to check that it's not too large so we don't overflow the buffer.Reported-by Nico Golde <[email protected]>Reported-by Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>---
Please review this carefully because I have not tested it.Quoted 6 lines
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mm.c mimd_to_kioc(mimd_t __user *umimd,
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mm.c +0
-0@@ -486,6 +486,8 @@ mimd_to_kioc(mimd_t __user *umimd,
mraid_mmadp_tQuoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mm.c +2
-0*adp, uioc_t *kioc) pthru32->dataxferaddr = kioc->buf_paddr;if (kioc->data_dir &UIOC_WR ) { +if (pthru32->dataxferlen > kioc->xferlen) +return -EINVAL ;if (copy_from_user (kioc->buf_vaddr, kioc->user_data, pthru32->dataxferlen)) {return (-EFAULT);
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Acked-by Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>Sumit
Thanks for the Ack. Who normally picks patches for this area?
-Kees
James Bottomley(Linux SCSI subsystem maintainer) should pick this patch.
Sumit
Quoted 3 lines
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
Re: [patch] [SCSI] megaraid: missing bounds check in mimd_to_kioc()
Quoted 51 lines · Sumit
Quoted 51 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Kees Cook [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Friday, January 10, 2014 12:05 AM
To: Saxena, Sumit
Cc: Dan Carpenter; DL-MegaRAID Linux; James E.J. Bottomley; linux- [email protected]; [email protected]; Nico Golde; Fabian Yamaguchi
Subject: Re: [patch] [SCSI] megaraid: missing bounds check inmimd_to_kioc()Quoted 20 lines · Sumit
Quoted 20 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Dan Carpenter [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 30, 2013 10:44 PM
To: DL-MegaRAID Linux
Cc: James E.J. Bottomley; [email protected]; [email protected]; Nico Golde; Fabian Yamaguchi
Subject: [patch] [SCSI] megaraid: missing bounds check inmimd_to_kioc()
pthru32->dataxferlencomes from the user so we need to check that it's not too large so we don't overflow the buffer.Reported-by Nico Golde <[email protected]>Reported-by Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>---
Please review this carefully because I have not tested it.Quoted 6 lines
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mm.c mimd_to_kioc(mimd_t __user *umimd,
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mm.c +0
-0@@ -486,6 +486,8 @@ mimd_to_kioc(mimd_t __user *umimd,
mraid_mmadp_tQuoted 12 lines
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mm.c +2
-0*adp, uioc_t *kioc) pthru32->dataxferaddr = kioc->buf_paddr;if (kioc->data_dir &UIOC_WR ) { +if (pthru32->dataxferlen > kioc->xferlen) +return -EINVAL ;if (copy_from_user (kioc->buf_vaddr, kioc->user_data, pthru32->dataxferlen)) {return (-EFAULT);Acked-by Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Sumit
Thanks for the Ack. Who normally picks patches for this area?
-Kees
James Bottomley(Linux SCSI subsystem maintainer) should pick this patch.
Okay, thanks. James, can you pick up this patch as well?
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/12/18/477
Thanks,
-Kees
Quoted 6 lines
Sumit
Quoted 3 lines
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
PATCH 1/1 xfs: underflow bug in xfs_attrlist_by_handle()
In reply to a message not in the archiveIf we allocate less than sizeof(struct attrlist) then we end up corrupting memory or doing a ZERO_PTR_SIZE dereference.
This can only be triggered with CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c +2 -1
@@ -442,7 +442,8 @@ xfs_attrlist_by_handle(return -XFS_ERROR (EPERM );if (copy_from_user (&al_hreq, arg,sizeof (xfs_fsop_attrlist_handlereq_t)))return -XFS_ERROR (EFAULT ); -if (al_hreq.buflen >XATTR_LIST_MAX ) +if (al_hreq.buflen <sizeof (struct attrlist ) || + al_hreq.buflen >XATTR_LIST_MAX )return -XFS_ERROR (EINVAL );/*
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl32.c +2 -1
@@ -356,7 +356,8 @@ xfs_compat_attrlist_by_handle(if (copy_from_user (&al_hreq, arg,sizeof (compat_xfs_fsop_attrlist_handlereq_t)))return -XFS_ERROR (EFAULT ); -if (al_hreq.buflen >XATTR_LIST_MAX ) +if (al_hreq.buflen <sizeof (struct attrlist ) || + al_hreq.buflen >XATTR_LIST_MAX )return -XFS_ERROR (EINVAL );/*
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Re: [patch] xfs: underflow bug in xfs_attrlist_by_handle()
Quoted 14 lines · Dan Carpenter
If we allocate less than sizeof(struct attrlist) then we end up corrupting memory or doing a
ZERO_PTR_SIZEdereference.This can only be triggered with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.Reported-by Nico Golde <[email protected]>Reported-by Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c +0
-0
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c xfs_attrlist_by_handle( · line 447
Quoted 7 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c +2
-1@@ -442,7 +442,8 @@ xfs_attrlist_by_handle(return -XFS_ERROR (EPERM );if (copy_from_user (&al_hreq, arg,sizeof (xfs_fsop_attrlist_handlereq_t)))return -XFS_ERROR (EFAULT ); -if (al_hreq.buflen >XATTR_LIST_MAX ) +if (al_hreq.buflen <sizeof (struct attrlist ) || + al_hreq.buflen >XATTR_LIST_MAX )return -XFS_ERROR (EINVAL );
Yup, that's not checked in xfs_attr_list(). Looks like these are the only direct callers of xfs_attr_list(), and the other callers of xfs_attr_list_int() don't appear to have the same issue. Good find!
Cheers,
Dave.
Signature · 7 lines
Dave Chinner [email protected] _______________________________________________ xfs mailing list [email protected] http://oss.sgi.com/mailman/listinfo/xfs
Ben Myers
AppliedRe: [patch] xfs: underflow bug in xfs_attrlist_by_handle()
In reply to Dan CarpenterQuoted 8 lines · Dan Carpenter
If we allocate less than sizeof(struct attrlist) then we end up corrupting memory or doing a
ZERO_PTR_SIZEdereference.This can only be triggered with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.Reported-by Nico Golde <[email protected]>Reported-by Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Applied. Thanks Dan.
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