toolchain-external: instrument wrapper to warn about unsafe paths
RFC PATCH 1/1 toolchain-external: instrument wrapper to warn about unsafe paths
The CodeSourcery toolchains have a very interesting feature: they warn the user when an unsafe header or library path is used, i.e a path that will lead host headers or libraries to leak into the build.
This commit adds a similar functionality into our external toolchain wrapper, so that it can be used with all external toolchains, and can also be tuned as needed. By default, the external toolchain wrapper now gives warnings such as:
WARNING: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '-I /usr/foo'
WARNING: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '-L /usr/bleh'
but the compilation continues successfully. One can then easily grep in his build log to search for occurences of this message.
Optionally, if BR_PARANOID_WRAPPER is defined in the environment, the external wrapper will instead error out and abort the compilation. We could then one day imagine setting this BR_PARANOID_WRAPPER in the autobuilders.
A similar change could be made to the internal toolchain backend either by making it use a wrapper like the external toolchain one, or by adding some patches to gcc, by borrowing the changes made by the CodeSourcery people.
--- .../toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +27 -0
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)char *progpath = argv[0 ];char *basename;char *env_debug; +char *paranoid_wrapper;int ret, i, count =0 , debug;/* Calculate the relative paths */
@@ -178,6 +179,32 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) }#endif /* ARCH || TUNE || CPU */ + paranoid_wrapper =getenv ("BR_PARANOID_WRAPPER" ); + +/* Check for unsafe library and header paths */ +for (i =1 ; i < argc; i++) { +if (!strncmp (argv[i],"-I/usr" ,strlen ("-I/usr" )) || + !strncmp (argv[i],"-L/usr" ,strlen ("-L/usr" ))) { +fprintf (stderr,"%s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s'\n" , + paranoid_wrapper ?"ERROR" :"WARNING" , argv[i]); +if (paranoid_wrapper) +exit (1 ); +continue ; + } + +if (!strcmp (argv[i],"-L" ) || !strcmp (argv[i],"-I" )) { +if (i == argc) +continue ; +if (!strncmp (argv[i+1 ],"/usr" ,strlen ("/usr" ))) { +fprintf (stderr,"%s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s %s'\n" , + paranoid_wrapper ?"ERROR" :"WARNING" , argv[i], argv[i +1 ]); +if (paranoid_wrapper) +exit (1 ); +continue ; + } + } + } +/* append forward args */ memcpy (cur, &argv[1 ],sizeof (char *) * (argc -1 )); cur += argc -1 ;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.2
RFC PATCH 1/1 toolchain-external: instrument wrapper to warn about unsafe paths
Thomas, All,
On 2014-02-11 00:28 +0100, Thomas Petazzoni spake thusly:
Quoted 12 lines
The CodeSourcery toolchains have a very interesting feature: they warn the user when an unsafe header or library path is used, i.e a path that will lead host headers or libraries to leak into the build.
This commit adds a similar functionality into our external toolchain wrapper, so that it can be used with all external toolchains, and can also be tuned as needed. By default, the external toolchain wrapper now gives warnings such as:
WARNING: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '-I
/usr/foo'
WARNING: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '-L/usr/bleh'
Quoted 7 lines
but the compilation continues successfully. One can then easily grep in his build log to search for occurences of this message.
Optionally, if
BR_PARANOID_WRAPPERis defined in the environment, the external wrapper will instead error out and abort the compilation. We could then one day imagine setting thisBR_PARANOID_WRAPPERin the autobuilders.
I think I'd prefer we do as for BR_DEBUG_WRAPPER:
BR2_PARANOID_WRAPPER undefined or empty: nothing
BR2_PARANOID_WRAPPER=WARNING : warning
BR2_PARANOID_WRAPPER=ERROR : error out
(or use numbers if you prefer)
Side-note: BR_DEBUG_WRAPPER should probably be renamed to BR2_DEBUG_WRAPPER, to follow the newly-stated naming scheme, no?
Quoted 4 lines
A similar change could be made to the internal toolchain backend either by making it use a wrapper like the external toolchain one, or by adding some patches to gcc, by borrowing the changes made by the CodeSourcery people.
Maybe it would be best to not duplicate this, and always use the wrapper, even for the internal backend?
Quoted 18 lines
Signed-off-by Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>--- .../toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +1
-0@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)char *progpath = argv[0 ];char *basename;char *env_debug; +char *paranoid_wrapper;int ret, i, count =0 , debug;/* Calculate the relative paths */
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 187
Quoted 9 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +6
-0@@ -178,6 +179,32 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) }#endif /* ARCH || TUNE || CPU */ + paranoid_wrapper =getenv ("BR_PARANOID_WRAPPER" ); + +/* Check for unsafe library and header paths */ +for (i =1 ; i < argc; i++) { +if (!strncmp (argv[i],"-I/usr" ,strlen ("-I/usr" )) || + !strncmp (argv[i],"-L/usr" ,strlen ("-L/usr" ))) {
No need for strncmp: you're comparing to a constant, so it will not overflow.
Also, using strlen on an argument of strncmp is flawed to begin with. For strncmp(a, b, strlen(b)) :
- if 'b' is a constant, there's no need for strncmp to begin with
- if 'b' is a user-supplied value, strlen will happily go west, and will not protect strncmp anyway.
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 195
Quoted 8 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +8
-0+fprintf (stderr,"%s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s'\n" , + paranoid_wrapper ?"ERROR" :"WARNING" , argv[i]); +if (paranoid_wrapper) +exit (1 ); +continue ; + } + +if (!strcmp (argv[i],"-L" ) || !strcmp (argv[i],"-I" )) {
And here you're using strcmp.
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 198
Quoted 3 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +3
-0+if (i == argc) +continue ; +if (!strncmp (argv[i+1 ],"/usr" ,strlen ("/usr" ))) {
Ditto strncmp.
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 210
Quoted 12 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +9
-0+fprintf (stderr,"%s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s %s'\n" , + paranoid_wrapper ?"ERROR" :"WARNING" , argv[i], argv[i +1 ]); +if (paranoid_wrapper) +exit (1 ); +continue ; + } + } + } +/* append forward args */ memcpy (cur, &argv[1 ],sizeof (char *) * (argc -1 )); cur += argc -1 ;
Otherwise, I like the idea pretty much! :-)
Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.
Signature · 6 lines
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------. | Yann E. MORIN | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: | | +33 662 376 056 | Software Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN | ___ | | +33 223 225 172 `------------.-------: X AGAINST | \e/ There is no | | http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL | v conspiracy. | '------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
RFC PATCH 1/1 toolchain-external: instrument wrapper to warn about unsafe paths
Dear Yann E. MORIN,
Quoted 9 lines · Yann E. MORIN
Quoted 4 lines
Optionally, if
BR_PARANOID_WRAPPERis defined in the environment, the external wrapper will instead error out and abort the compilation. We could then one day imagine setting thisBR_PARANOID_WRAPPERin the autobuilders.I think I'd prefer we do as for
BR_DEBUG_WRAPPER:
BR2_PARANOID_WRAPPERundefined or empty: nothing
BR2_PARANOID_WRAPPER=WARNING : warning
BR2_PARANOID_WRAPPER=ERROR : error out
Sure, I don't have any particular feeling about this. However, I would maybe like to have this feature enabled as the warning level by default.
Quoted 2 lines
Side-note:
BR_DEBUG_WRAPPERshould probably be renamed toBR2_DEBUG_WRAPPER, to follow the newly-stated naming scheme, no?
If I understood the newly-stated naming scheme, yes, I believe you're right, it should be renamed BR2_DEBUG_WRAPPER.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
A similar change could be made to the internal toolchain backend either by making it use a wrapper like the external toolchain one, or by adding some patches to gcc, by borrowing the changes made by the CodeSourcery people.
Maybe it would be best to not duplicate this, and always use the wrapper, even for the internal backend?
Which is exactly one of the two solutions I proposed in the paragraph you're quoting :-)
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 22 lines
Signed-off-by Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>--- .../toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +1
-0@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)char *progpath = argv[0 ];char *basename;char *env_debug; +char *paranoid_wrapper;int ret, i, count =0 , debug;/* Calculate the relative paths */ @@ -178,6 +179,32 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) }#endif /* ARCH || TUNE || CPU */
Quoted 9 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 187
Quoted 6 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +6
-0+ paranoid_wrapper =getenv ("BR_PARANOID_WRAPPER" ); + +/* Check for unsafe library and header paths */ +for (i =1 ; i < argc; i++) { +if (!strncmp (argv[i],"-I/usr" ,strlen ("-I/usr" )) || + !strncmp (argv[i],"-L/usr" ,strlen ("-L/usr" ))) {No need for strncmp: you're comparing to a constant, so it will not overflow.
I need strncmp here: I want to match only the first characters of argv[i]. I.e, the above condition should match:
-I/usr/bar -L/usr/local/foo -I/usr/include/mysql
etc. If I use strcmp(), it is going to compare the entire string, and -I/usr/include/mysql is not the same as -I/usr.
Quoted 1 line
Also, using strlen on an argument of strncmp is flawed to begin with.
Weird, a certain Yann E. Morin did exactly this in
http://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c?id=2c1dc32647eb308126b0ae80a91988059d39aa7b :-)
Quoted 4 lines
For
strncmp(a, b, strlen(b)):
- if 'b' is a constant, there's no need for strncmp to begin with
- if 'b' is a user-supplied value, strlen will happily go west, and will not protect strncmp anyway.
You miss the case where you use strncmp() to only match the first N characters of the string. Which is both what I'm doing here, and what your patch for -march, -mtune and -mcpu is doing.
Quoted 10 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 195
Quoted 8 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +8
-0+fprintf (stderr,"%s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s'\n" , + paranoid_wrapper ?"ERROR" :"WARNING" , argv[i]); +if (paranoid_wrapper) +exit (1 ); +continue ; + } + +if (!strcmp (argv[i],"-L" ) || !strcmp (argv[i],"-I" )) {And here you're using strcmp.
Yes, because I'm matching the entire string.
Quoted 6 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 198
Quoted 4 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +3
-0+if (i == argc) +continue ; +if (!strncmp (argv[i+1 ],"/usr" ,strlen ("/usr" ))) {Ditto strncmp.
Yes because I want to match only the beginning of the string, so that this condition together with the above matches:
-I /usr/include/mysql -L /usr/foo
Quoted 1 line
Otherwise, I like the idea pretty much! :-)
Me too :)
Best regards,
Thomas
Signature · 3 lines
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Free Electrons Embedded Linux, Kernel and Android engineering http://free-electrons.com
RFC PATCH 1/1 toolchain-external: instrument wrapper to warn about unsafe paths
Thomas, All,
On 2014-02-11 09:18 +0100, Thomas Petazzoni spake thusly:
Quoted 7 lines · Yann E. MORIN
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Optionally, if
BR_PARANOID_WRAPPERis defined in the environment, the external wrapper will instead error out and abort the compilation. We could then one day imagine setting thisBR_PARANOID_WRAPPERin the autobuilders.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I think I'd prefer we do as for
BR_DEBUG_WRAPPER:
BR2_PARANOID_WRAPPERundefined or empty: nothing
BR2_PARANOID_WRAPPER=WARNING : warning
BR2_PARANOID_WRAPPER=ERROR : error outSure, I don't have any particular feeling about this. However, I would maybe like to have this feature enabled as the warning level by default.
Probably sane, indeed.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Side-note:
BR_DEBUG_WRAPPERshould probably be renamed toBR2_DEBUG_WRAPPER, to follow the newly-stated naming scheme, no?If I understood the newly-stated naming scheme, yes, I believe you're right, it should be renamed
BR2_DEBUG_WRAPPER.
Ok, will cook a patch.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
A similar change could be made to the internal toolchain backend either by making it use a wrapper like the external toolchain one, or by adding some patches to gcc, by borrowing the changes made by the CodeSourcery people.
Maybe it would be best to not duplicate this, and always use the wrapper, even for the internal backend?
Which is exactly one of the two solutions I proposed in the paragraph you're quoting :-)
And I was just expressing my preference. ;-)
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines
Signed-off-by Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>--- .../toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +1
-0@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)char *progpath = argv[0 ];char *basename;char *env_debug; +char *paranoid_wrapper;int ret, i, count =0 , debug;/* Calculate the relative paths */ @@ -178,6 +179,32 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) }#endif /* ARCH || TUNE || CPU */
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c int main(int argc, char **argv) · line 187
Quoted 6 lines
toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c +6
-0+ paranoid_wrapper =getenv ("BR_PARANOID_WRAPPER" ); + +/* Check for unsafe library and header paths */ +for (i =1 ; i < argc; i++) { +if (!strncmp (argv[i],"-I/usr" ,strlen ("-I/usr" )) || + !strncmp (argv[i],"-L/usr" ,strlen ("-L/usr" ))) {
Don't we also want to check -L/lib as well?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
No need for strncmp: you're comparing to a constant, so it will not overflow.
I need strncmp here: I want to match only the first characters of argv[i]. I.e, the above condition should match:
Quoted 6 lines
-I/usr/bar -L/usr/local/foo -I/usr/include/mysqletc. If I use
strcmp(), it is going to compare the entire string, and -I/usr/include/mysql is not the same as -I/usr.
Doh, righto-right. I should not review patches so late in the night...
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Also, using strlen on an argument of strncmp is flawed to begin with.
Weird, a certain Yann E. Morin did exactly this in
http://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c?id=2c1dc32647eb308126b0ae80a91988059d39aa7b :-)
Hehe! ;-)
Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.
Signature · 6 lines
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------. | Yann E. MORIN | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: | | +33 662 376 056 | Software Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN | ___ | | +33 223 225 172 `------------.-------: X AGAINST | \e/ There is no | | http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL | v conspiracy. | '------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
RFC PATCH 1/1 toolchain-external: instrument wrapper to warn about unsafe paths
In reply to Thomas PetazzoniHi Thomas,
Quoted 11 lines · Thomas Petazzoni
The CodeSourcery toolchains have a very interesting feature: they warn the user when an unsafe header or library path is used, i.e a path that will lead host headers or libraries to leak into the build.
This commit adds a similar functionality into our external toolchain wrapper, so that it can be used with all external toolchains, and can also be tuned as needed. By default, the external toolchain wrapper now gives warnings such as:
WARNING: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '-I
/usr/foo'
WARNING: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '-L/usr/bleh'
I'd mention that this makes Buildroot builds under /usr even more problematic. I thought this limitation appears in the documentation, but I can't find it there now.
baruch
Signature · 3 lines
http://baruch.siach.name/blog/ ~. .~ Tk Open Systems
=}------------------------------------------------ooO--U--Ooo------------{=
- baruch at tkos.co.il - tel: +972.2.679.5364, http://www.tkos.co.il -RFC PATCH 1/1 toolchain-external: instrument wrapper to warn about unsafe paths
Dear Baruch Siach,
Quoted 10 lines · Baruch Siach
Quoted 9 lines · Thomas Petazzoni
The CodeSourcery toolchains have a very interesting feature: they warn the user when an unsafe header or library path is used, i.e a path that will lead host headers or libraries to leak into the build.
This commit adds a similar functionality into our external toolchain wrapper, so that it can be used with all external toolchains, and can also be tuned as needed. By default, the external toolchain wrapper now gives warnings such as:
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
WARNING: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '-I
/usr/foo'
WARNING: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '-L/usr/bleh'I'd mention that this makes Buildroot builds under /usr even more problematic.
Yes, this is true. Technically speaking, testing for -I/usr or -L/usr is not the ideal way to achieve this. The ideal way would be to look if only headers/libraries from the toolchain sysroot, and from the package source tree are used. But this is fairly hard to achieve, unfortunately. I am open to suggestions on how to achieve this.
But in any case, this mechanism will have to have a mechanism to be entirely disabled.
Quoted 2 lines
I thought this limitation appears in the documentation, but I can't find it there now.
I don't think it's written in the documentation, but we have a bug report for it, at https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=5750.
Best regards,
Thomas
Signature · 3 lines
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Free Electrons Embedded Linux, Kernel and Android engineering http://free-electrons.com