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buffer overflow in isdn capi

bug report Dan Carpenter 4 participants 4 messages Apr 1, 2014 – Jun 2, 2014

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#0 lore raw

The command_2_index() function is buggy and leads to a buffer overflow. Does anyone know how to fix this?

drivers/isdn/capi/capiutil.c
403 static unsigned command_2_index(unsigned c, unsigned sc) 404 {
405 if (c & 0x80)
406 c = 0x9 + (c & 0x0f);
407 else if (c <= 0x0f);
408 else if (c == 0x41)
409 c = 0x9 + 0x1;
410 else if (c == 0xff)
411 c = 0x00;
412 return (sc & 3) * (0x9 + 0x9) + c;
413 }

Imagine that we input c = 0x7f and sc = 0x3. Then 3 * 18 + 127 = 181 and we return 181.

The other thing that stands out to me is that the last condition "(c == 0xff)" is never true because then the first condition "(c & 0x80)" would have been true already.

Here is how the function is used:

drivers/isdn/capi/capiutil.c
564 /**

   565   * capi_message2cmsg() - disassemble CAPI 2.0 message into _cmsg structure
   566   * @cmsg:       _cmsg structure
   567   * @msg:        buffer for assembled message
   568   *
   569   * Return value: 0 for success
   570   */
   571  
   572  unsigned capi_message2cmsg(_cmsg *cmsg, u8 *msg)
   573  {
   574          memset(cmsg, 0, sizeof(_cmsg));
   575          cmsg->m = msg;
   576          cmsg->l = 8;
   577          cmsg->p = 0;
   578          byteTRcpy(cmsg->m + 4, &cmsg->Command);
   579          byteTRcpy(cmsg->m + 5, &cmsg->Subcommand);
   580          cmsg->par = cpars[command_2_index(cmsg->Command, cmsg->Subcommand)];
                            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

cpars = is a 79 element array.
cmsg->Command and cmsg->Subcommand come from skb->data so we can't trust them.
181 is past the end of the 79 element array.

   581  
   582          message_2_pars(cmsg);
   583  
   584          wordTRcpy(msg + 0, &cmsg->l);
   585          wordTRcpy(cmsg->m + 2, &cmsg->ApplId);
   586          wordTRcpy(cmsg->m + 6, &cmsg->Messagenumber);
   587  
   588          return 0;
   589  }

regards,
dan carpenter

#1 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Dan Carpenter

The command_2_index() function is buggy and leads to a buffer overflow. Does anyone know how to fix this?

drivers/isdn/capi/capiutil.c
403 static unsigned command_2_index(unsigned c, unsigned sc)

These arguments should be u8 as well.

Quoted 17 lines
   404  {
   405          if (c & 0x80)
   406                  c = 0x9 + (c & 0x0f);
   407          else if (c <= 0x0f);
   408          else if (c == 0x41)
   409                  c = 0x9 + 0x1;
   410          else if (c == 0xff)
   411                  c = 0x00;
   412          return (sc & 3) * (0x9 + 0x9) + c;
   413  }

Imagine that we input c = 0x7f and sc = 0x3. Then 3 * 18 + 127 = 181 and we return 181.

The other thing that stands out to me is that the last condition "(c == 0xff)" is never true because then the first condition "(c & 0x80)" would have been true already.

#2 lore raw
In reply to Dan Carpenter

Hi Dan,

thanks for spotting this, really a bad thing.
Fortunately it is only a local issue, the messages from the ISDN bus are translated in valid command/subcommand pairs in the controller firmware, so even if you send random data on the D-channel it should not result in a buffer overflow.
But of course a local user could send wrong messages to the kernel via the /dev/capi20 device which then may let to the described out of bound access.

Am 01.04.2014 17:48, schrieb Dan Carpenter:

Quoted 3 lines

The command_2_index() function is buggy and leads to a buffer overflow. Does anyone know how to fix this?

I think I have an idea, I will post a proposal soon.

Quoted 13 lines

drivers/isdn/capi/capiutil.c
403 static unsigned command_2_index(unsigned c, unsigned sc)

   404  {
   405          if (c & 0x80)
   406                  c = 0x9 + (c & 0x0f);
   407          else if (c <= 0x0f);
   408          else if (c == 0x41)
   409                  c = 0x9 + 0x1;
   410          else if (c == 0xff)
   411                  c = 0x00;
   412          return (sc & 3) * (0x9 + 0x9) + c;
   413  }
Quoted 2 lines

Imagine that we input c = 0x7f and sc = 0x3. Then 3 * 18 + 127 = 181 and we return 181.

Yes need to check the array size at least, but this is not enough.

Quoted 4 lines

The other thing that stands out to me is that the last condition "(c == 0xff)" is never true because then the first condition "(c & 0x80)" would have been true already.

Yes this should be the first check or a nested if in the current first check. command FF is the MANUFACTURER command and normally not implemented at all.

Quoted 22 lines

Here is how the function is used:

drivers/isdn/capi/capiutil.c
564 /**

   565   * capi_message2cmsg() - disassemble CAPI 2.0 message into _cmsg structure
   566   * @cmsg:       _cmsg structure
   567   * @msg:        buffer for assembled message
   568   *
   569   * Return value: 0 for success
   570   */
   571  
   572  unsigned capi_message2cmsg(_cmsg *cmsg, u8 *msg)
   573  {
   574          memset(cmsg, 0, sizeof(_cmsg));
   575          cmsg->m = msg;
   576          cmsg->l = 8;
   577          cmsg->p = 0;
   578          byteTRcpy(cmsg->m + 4, &cmsg->Command);
   579          byteTRcpy(cmsg->m + 5, &cmsg->Subcommand);
   580          cmsg->par = cpars[command_2_index(cmsg->Command, cmsg->Subcommand)];
                            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Quoted 4 lines

cpars = is a 79 element array.
cmsg->Command and cmsg->Subcommand come from skb->data so we can't trust them.
181 is past the end of the 79 element array.

correct and this is not the only issue here. If you pass a value which is not a valid command, but will result in a index inside the array boundaries, it will result in cmsg->par = NULL, which is also not handled properly in the parser functions.

#3 lore raw
In reply to Dan Carpenter

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Hello all,

Quoted 2 lines · Dan Carpenter

The command_2_index() function is buggy and leads to a buffer overflow. Does anyone know how to fix this?

AFAICS this is still unfixed.
As an easy fix I propose:

- --- a/drivers/isdn/capi/capiutil.c
+++ b/drivers/isdn/capi/capiutil.c
@@ -203,14 +203,7 @@ static unsigned char *cpars[] =
/*-------------------------------------------------------*/ static unsigned command_2_index(unsigned c, unsigned sc) {
- - if (c & 0x80)
- - c = 0x9 + (c & 0x0f);
- - else if (c <= 0x0f);
- - else if (c == 0x41)
- - c = 0x9 + 0x1;
- - else if (c == 0xff)
- - c = 0x00;
- - return (sc & 3) * (0x9 + 0x9) + c;
+ return (sc & 3) * (0x9 + 0x9) + ((c & 0xf0) ? 0x9 : 0) + (c &
0x0f);
}

/*-------------------------------------------------------*/

This produces identical results to the current function for all legal values of c (0x00..0x08, 0x41, 0x80..0x88, 0xff) and guarantees that the result is <= 0x4e for all possible inputs, whether legal or not. It also makes it clearer what that function actually does.

Unless somebody points out a serious flaw with this I'll test it and submit a formal patch.

Karsten's other concern about unhandled NULL pointers in the mnames[] and cpars[] arrays should be addressed separately IMHO.

Regards,
Tilman

- --
Tilman Schmidt E-Mail: [email protected]
Bonn, Germany
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