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xfs: tmpfile fixes for inode security/acl

PATCH In review Brian Foster 4 participants 14 messages Apr 9, 2014 – Apr 30, 2014 3 messages not in the archive

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover xfs: tmpfile fixes for inode security/acl

Hi all,

Here's a v2 of the tmpfile and selinux deadlock patch. Since we also probably want to create the default acl, I created a generic helper out of xfs_vn_mknod().

Once I got that far, I noticed xfs_create_tmpfile() looked quite similar to xfs_create(). Patch 2 folds the former into the latter and eliminates the duplicate code. Patch 2 is optional with regard to addressing the selinux issue. Lightly tested... thoughts, reviews, flames appreciated.

Brian

v2:
- Added a generic create helper to inherit the security/acl init. code in the tmpfile path.
- Added patch 2 to fold xfs_create_tmpfile() into xfs_create().

Brian Foster (2):
xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl
xfs: fold xfs_create_tmpfile() into xfs_create()

 fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c | 184 ++++++++++++++---------------------------------------
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode.h |   2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c  |  43 +++++++++----
 fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h |   7 +-
 4 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 155 deletions(-)
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#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl

xfstests generic/004 reproduces an ilock deadlock using the tmpfile interface when selinux is enabled. This occurs because xfs_create_tmpfile() takes the ilock and then calls d_tmpfile(). The latter eventually calls into xfs_xattr_get() which attempts to get the lock again. E.g.:

xfs_io D ffffffff81c134c0 4096 3561 3560 0x00000080
ffff8801176a1a68 0000000000000046 ffff8800b401b540 ffff8801176a1fd8 00000000001d5800 00000000001d5800 ffff8800b401b540 ffff8800b401b540 ffff8800b73a6bd0 fffffffeffffffff ffff8800b73a6bd8 ffff8800b5ddb480

Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8177f969>] schedule+0x29/0x70
[<ffffffff81783a65>] rwsem_down_read_failed+0xc5/0x120
[<ffffffffa05aa97f>] ? xfs_ilock_attr_map_shared+0x1f/0x50 [xfs]
[<ffffffff813b3434>] call_rwsem_down_read_failed+0x14/0x30
[<ffffffff810ed179>] ? down_read_nested+0x89/0xa0
[<ffffffffa05aa7f2>] ? xfs_ilock+0x122/0x250 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa05aa7f2>] xfs_ilock+0x122/0x250 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa05aa97f>] xfs_ilock_attr_map_shared+0x1f/0x50 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa05701d0>] xfs_attr_get+0x90/0xe0 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa0565e07>] xfs_xattr_get+0x37/0x50 [xfs]
[<ffffffff8124842f>] generic_getxattr+0x4f/0x70
[<ffffffff8133fd9e>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x1ae/0x650
[<ffffffff81340e0c>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff813351bb>] security_d_instantiate+0x1b/0x30
[<ffffffff81237db0>] d_instantiate+0x50/0x70
[<ffffffff81237e85>] d_tmpfile+0xb5/0xc0
[<ffffffffa05add02>] xfs_create_tmpfile+0x362/0x410 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa0559ac8>] xfs_vn_tmpfile+0x18/0x20 [xfs]
[<ffffffff81230388>] path_openat+0x228/0x6a0
[<ffffffff810230f9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff8105a427>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x27/0x40
[<ffffffff8124054f>] ? __alloc_fd+0xaf/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8123101a>] do_filp_open+0x3a/0x90
[<ffffffff817845e7>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[<ffffffff8124054f>] ? __alloc_fd+0xaf/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8121e3ce>] do_sys_open+0x12e/0x210
[<ffffffff8121e4ce>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[<ffffffff8178eda9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

xfs_vn_tmpfile() also fails to initialize security or default acls on the newly created inode.

The functionality missing from the tmpfile() handler is mostly covered by xfs_vn_mknod() but it currently has no means to determine whether a file is unnamed. Therefore, convert xfs_vn_mknod() to xfs_generic_create() and add a parameter to trigger the tmpfile-specific file creation and dentry mapping calls.

The d_tmpfile() call is removed from xfs_create_tmpfile() and pulled up into the new handler to address the deadlock. E.g., xfs_create_tmpfile() has committed the create transaction and unlocked the inode prior to mapping the inode to the dentry.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c |  5 +++--
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode.h |  2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c  | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +3 -2
index 5e7a38f..768087b 100644
@@ -1334,7 +1334,8 @@ int
 xfs_create_tmpfile(
 	struct xfs_inode	*dp,
 	struct dentry		*dentry,
-	umode_t			mode)
+	umode_t			mode,
+	struct xfs_inode	**ipp)
 {
 	struct xfs_mount	*mp = dp->i_mount;
 	struct xfs_inode	*ip = NULL;
@@ -1402,7 +1403,6 @@ xfs_create_tmpfile(
 	xfs_qm_vop_create_dqattach(tp, ip, udqp, gdqp, pdqp);
 
 	ip->i_d.di_nlink--;
-	d_tmpfile(dentry, VFS_I(ip));
 	error = xfs_iunlink(tp, ip);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_trans_abort;
@@ -1415,6 +1415,7 @@ xfs_create_tmpfile(
 	xfs_qm_dqrele(gdqp);
 	xfs_qm_dqrele(pdqp);
 
+	*ipp = ip;
 	return 0;
 
  out_trans_abort:
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.h +1 -1
index 396cc1f..f2fcde5 100644
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ int		xfs_lookup(struct xfs_inode *dp, struct xfs_name *name,
 int		xfs_create(struct xfs_inode *dp, struct xfs_name *name,
 			   umode_t mode, xfs_dev_t rdev, struct xfs_inode **ipp);
 int		xfs_create_tmpfile(struct xfs_inode *dp, struct dentry *dentry,
-			   umode_t mode);
+			   umode_t mode, struct xfs_inode **ipp);
 int		xfs_remove(struct xfs_inode *dp, struct xfs_name *name,
 			   struct xfs_inode *ip);
 int		xfs_link(struct xfs_inode *tdp, struct xfs_inode *sip,
fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c +29 -12

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#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl

Quoted 2 lines · Brian Foster

xfs_vn_tmpfile() also fails to initialize security or default acls on the newly created inode.

Which it doesn't have to, as it is never available in the filesystem namespace.

Quoted 4 lines

The d_tmpfile() call is removed from xfs_create_tmpfile() and pulled up into the new handler to address the deadlock. E.g., xfs_create_tmpfile() has committed the create transaction and unlocked the inode prior to mapping the inode to the dentry.

This part of the patch looks sane, although the window where the XFS inode and VFS inode i_nlink are out of sync worries me a little.

I don't think the other refactoring belongs into the same patch.

If we decide that we want it please avoid the useless ACL inheritance for tmpfiles.

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#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl

Quoted 7 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 2 lines · Brian Foster

xfs_vn_tmpfile() also fails to initialize security or default acls on the newly created inode.

Which it doesn't have to, as it is never available in the filesystem namespace.

Are you saying it doesn't have to initialize security or the default acl, or both?

The intent here was to have the case covered where the inode happens to be linked back into the namespace since we don't do this work in the link path.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines

The d_tmpfile() call is removed from xfs_create_tmpfile() and pulled up into the new handler to address the deadlock. E.g., xfs_create_tmpfile() has committed the create transaction and unlocked the inode prior to mapping the inode to the dentry.

Quoted 7 lines

This part of the patch looks sane, although the window where the XFS inode and VFS inode i_nlink are out of sync worries me a little.

I don't think the other refactoring belongs into the same patch.

If we decide that we want it please avoid the useless ACL inheritance for tmpfiles.

The bulk of the refactoring was with the idea that the inode setup for the tmpfile case is generally equivalent for the traditional create case. The original version was posted here:

http://oss.sgi.com/archives/xfs/2014-04/msg00149.html

... and it just fixes the deadlock and adds the security initialization. I suppose I could still break that out into multiple patches, but that aside, is that behavior preferred?

Brian

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#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl

Quoted 2 lines · Brian Foster

Are you saying it doesn't have to initialize security or the default acl, or both?

The ACLs for sure. LSM do run-time access decisions, so they will probably rely on the security data being initialized. Given that O_TMPFILE files aren't publicly available I'm not sure there's a point in them doing that, though.

LSMs are also affected by the lack of a proper parent I'll discuss for ACLs below.

Quoted 3 lines

The intent here was to have the case covered where the inode happens to be linked back into the namespace since we don't do this work in the link path.

That's an interesting one. O_TMFILE files don't have a real parent to inherit ACLs from, the pathname passed in just needs to point to a directory to find the filesystem to create the tmpfile in. On the other hand it seem like the extN implementations do inherity the ACL in this case.

The link into the namespace is irrelavant here as ACL inheritance only happens on initial create, not at link time.

I also think we'll absolutely need a test case for ACLs+tmpfile to make sure all filesystems handle it the same way.

Quoted 9 lines

The bulk of the refactoring was with the idea that the inode setup for the tmpfile case is generally equivalent for the traditional create case. The original version was posted here:

http://oss.sgi.com/archives/xfs/2014-04/msg00149.html

... and it just fixes the deadlock and adds the security initialization. I suppose I could still break that out into multiple patches, but that aside, is that behavior preferred?

I think just fixing the deadlock and initializing the security is enough for the first pass. If you want to do the refactoring on top send it as a second series on top of the actual fixes.

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#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl

So any opinions from other fs / security people on how O_TMPFILE files should behave for ACL inheritance / labeling?

Quoted 38 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 2 lines · Brian Foster

Are you saying it doesn't have to initialize security or the default acl, or both?

The ACLs for sure. LSM do run-time access decisions, so they will probably rely on the security data being initialized. Given that O_TMPFILE files aren't publicly available I'm not sure there's a point in them doing that, though.

LSMs are also affected by the lack of a proper parent I'll discuss for ACLs below.

Quoted 3 lines

The intent here was to have the case covered where the inode happens to be linked back into the namespace since we don't do this work in the link path.

That's an interesting one. O_TMFILE files don't have a real parent to inherit ACLs from, the pathname passed in just needs to point to a directory to find the filesystem to create the tmpfile in. On the other hand it seem like the extN implementations do inherity the ACL in this case.

The link into the namespace is irrelavant here as ACL inheritance only happens on initial create, not at link time.

I also think we'll absolutely need a test case for ACLs+tmpfile to make sure all filesystems handle it the same way.

Quoted 9 lines

The bulk of the refactoring was with the idea that the inode setup for the tmpfile case is generally equivalent for the traditional create case. The original version was posted here:

http://oss.sgi.com/archives/xfs/2014-04/msg00149.html

... and it just fixes the deadlock and adds the security initialization. I suppose I could still break that out into multiple patches, but that aside, is that behavior preferred?

Quoted 8 lines

I think just fixing the deadlock and initializing the security is enough for the first pass. If you want to do the refactoring on top send it as a second series on top of the actual fixes.

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#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl

Christoph,

Quoted 2 lines · Christoph Hellwig

So any opinions from other fs / security people on how O_TMPFILE files should behave for ACL inheritance / labeling?

from how O_TMPFILE is documented right now [*], creating such a file and then linking it into the namespace is one of the obvious use cases. The intent seems to be to make it seem like the file was created and populated atomically, possibly with inherited permissions and all. I think this behavior require that the O_TMPFILE file inherits from the directory it was "created" in.

Adding code to achieve the effect of create-time inheritance at link time, only for O_TMPFILE files or files without any links, doesn't seem reasonable to me: it would duplicate create code in the link code path, and it would make it harder to override inherited permissions or labels.

(Trying to fake inheritance by reimplementing it in user space seems like a much worse idea still.)

[*] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open.2.html

Thanks,
Andreas

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#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl

Quoted 2 lines · Andreas Gruenbacher

from how O_TMPFILE is documented right now [*], creating such a file and then linking it into the namespace is one of the obvious use cases.

Btw, I think the man page is wrong - given that the tmpfile is not visible in the namespace it is obviously not created in the directory. The directory passed in is just a handle for the filesystem it should be created in.

Michael, should I send you an update for this, or do you want to do it yourself as you can probably come up with better language anyway?

Quoted 11 lines

The
intent seems to be to make it seem like the file was created and populated atomically, possibly with inherited permissions and all.
I think this
behavior require that the O_TMPFILE file inherits from the directory it was "created" in.

Adding code to achieve the effect of create-time inheritance at link time, only for O_TMPFILE files or files without any links, doesn't seem reasonable to me: it would duplicate create code in the link code path, and it would make it harder to override inherited permissions or labels.

Inheriting any ACL on creating an anonymous file seems utterly wrong. Inheriting on link seems somewhat more sensible and not too bad in terms of code, but very confusing in terms of semantics. I think the best method is to make sure it simply does not inherit any ACL and document that clearly.

Quoted 2 lines

(Trying to fake inheritance by reimplementing it in user space seems like a much worse idea still.)

We don't fake inheritance when linking any other file either. And creating a file in a /tmp without any ACL and then linking it into the filesystem already is very common today.

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#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl

Quoted 8 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 2 lines · Andreas Gruenbacher

from how O_TMPFILE is documented right now [*], creating such a file and then linking it into the namespace is one of the obvious use cases.

Btw, I think the man page is wrong - given that the tmpfile is not visible in the namespace it is obviously not created in the directory. The directory passed in is just a handle for the filesystem it should be created in.

I don't agree. If the file is created with O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL, it is clear that the file will never be linked into the namespace. Even then, there are operations which are affected by the inode permissions and label of the anonymous file, and those should still behave reasonably. In this context, I would expect them to behave as if the file was actually created in the specified directory, not in the file system root or "nowhere" with no clearly defined permissions and security label.

If the file is created without O_EXCL, then it is clear that the file can later become part of the namespace. In that case, I would also expect the file to be initialized in the context of the specified directory. The file can then be filled with data, permissions and other attributes can be changed if desired, and then the anonymous file can be linked into that directory.

Quoted 10 lines

Michael, should I send you an update for this, or do you want to do it yourself as you can probably come up with better language anyway?

Quoted 7 lines

The
intent seems to be to make it seem like the file was created and populated atomically, possibly with inherited permissions and all.
I think this
behavior require that the O_TMPFILE file inherits from the directory it was "created" in.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Adding code to achieve the effect of create-time inheritance at link time, only for O_TMPFILE files or files without any links, doesn't seem reasonable to me: it would duplicate create code in the link code path, and it would make it harder to override inherited permissions or labels.

Inheriting any ACL on creating an anonymous file seems utterly wrong.

Why?

Quoted 4 lines

Inheriting on link seems somewhat more sensible and not too bad in terms of code, but very confusing in terms of semantics. I think the best method is to make sure it simply does not inherit any ACL and document that clearly.

Again, this approach would make it almost impossible to use O_TMPFILE as a way to atomically create and initialize a file with permission and security label inheritance. This would severely limit the usefulness of O_TMPFILE.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

(Trying to fake inheritance by reimplementing it in user space seems like a much worse idea still.)

We don't fake inheritance when linking any other file either. And creating a file in a /tmp without any ACL and then linking it into the filesystem already is very common today.

Well, creating a file in /tmp and moving it somewhere else often doesn't even work because of file system boundaries, and sometimes it simply is the wrong thing to do:

When the intent is to "create a new file in a directory", such as when saving to a new file in an editor, the result should be as if the file was actually created in that directory. Creating the file in /tmp and then moving it to where it should end up is simply wrong.

When the intent is to "move a file from here to there", the file should keep all its attributes, including permissions and security label. It should make no difference in result whether the file could actually be moved or if it had to be copied across file system boundaries.

Thanks,
Andreas

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#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl

Quoted 5 lines · Andreas Gruenbacher
Quoted 4 lines

Btw, I think the man page is wrong - given that the tmpfile is not visible in the namespace it is obviously not created in the directory. The directory passed in is just a handle for the filesystem it should be created in.

Quoted 7 lines

I don't agree. If the file is created with O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL, it is clear that the file will never be linked into the namespace. Even then, there are operations which are affected by the inode permissions and label of the anonymous file, and those should still behave reasonably. In this context, I would expect them to behave as if the file was actually created in the specified directory, not in the file system root or "nowhere" with no clearly defined permissions and security label.

So you want to define the files as being in a directory, but not actually visible? That's defintively a new and strange state to be in.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

Inheriting any ACL on creating an anonymous file seems utterly wrong.

Why?

Because it has no parent to inherit it from.

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#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xfs: fix tmpfile/selinux deadlock and initialize security/acl

In reply to Brian Foster

Looks like I have lost the the argument on the ACLs. Do you want to resend a version of this rebased to the current tree, or should I do it?

We probably should get this into 3.15 so that our tmpfile doesn't behave different from everyone else in the release where we introduce it.

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#14 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 xfs: fold xfs_create_tmpfile() into xfs_create()

In reply to Brian Foster

xfs_create_tmpfile() duplicates most of xfs_create() with the exception of a couple minor differences. We use a unique transaction reservation and place the allocated inode on the unlinked list rather than create a directory entry for it.

Fold xfs_create_tmpfile() into xfs_create() to reduce some of this duplication. The name parameter that represents the name of the directory entry to create is now conditional and its existence dictates whether a directory entry is created for the inode or not.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c | 185 +++++++++++++----------------------------------------
 fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c  |   8 +--
 fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h |   7 +-
 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 146 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +46 -139
index 768087b..b895526 100644
@@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ xfs_create(
 	struct xfs_dquot	*udqp = NULL;
 	struct xfs_dquot	*gdqp = NULL;
 	struct xfs_dquot	*pdqp = NULL;
-	struct xfs_trans_res	tres;
+	struct xfs_trans_res	*tres;
 	uint			resblks;
 
 	trace_xfs_create(dp, name);
@@ -1181,14 +1181,21 @@ xfs_create(
 	if (is_dir) {
 		rdev = 0;
 		resblks = XFS_MKDIR_SPACE_RES(mp, name->len);
-		tres.tr_logres = M_RES(mp)->tr_mkdir.tr_logres;
-		tres.tr_logcount = XFS_MKDIR_LOG_COUNT;
+		tres = &M_RES(mp)->tr_mkdir;
 		tp = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, XFS_TRANS_MKDIR);
-	} else {
+	} else if (name) {
 		resblks = XFS_CREATE_SPACE_RES(mp, name->len);
-		tres.tr_logres = M_RES(mp)->tr_create.tr_logres;
-		tres.tr_logcount = XFS_CREATE_LOG_COUNT;
+		tres = &M_RES(mp)->tr_create;
 		tp = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, XFS_TRANS_CREATE);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * If we don't have a name, we're in the ->tmpfile() path. We
+		 * have a unique transaction here since we modify the unlinked
+		 * list rather than create a directory entry.
+		 */
+		resblks = XFS_IALLOC_SPACE_RES(mp);
+		tres = &M_RES(mp)->tr_create_tmpfile;
+		tp = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, XFS_TRANS_CREATE_TMPFILE);
 	}
 
 	cancel_flags = XFS_TRANS_RELEASE_LOG_RES;
@@ -1199,26 +1206,22 @@ xfs_create(
 	 * the case we'll drop the one we have and get a more
 	 * appropriate transaction later.
 	 */
-	tres.tr_logflags = XFS_TRANS_PERM_LOG_RES;
-	error = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, &tres, resblks, 0);
+	error = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, tres, resblks, 0);
 	if (error == ENOSPC) {
 		/* flush outstanding delalloc blocks and retry */
 		xfs_flush_inodes(mp);
-		error = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, &tres, resblks, 0);
+		error = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, tres, resblks, 0);
 	}
 	if (error == ENOSPC) {
 		/* No space at all so try a "no-allocation" reservation */
 		resblks = 0;
-		error = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, &tres, 0, 0);
+		error = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, tres, 0, 0);
 	}
 	if (error) {
 		cancel_flags = 0;
 		goto out_trans_cancel;
 	}
 
-	xfs_ilock(dp, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL | XFS_ILOCK_PARENT);
-	unlock_dp_on_error = true;
-
 	xfs_bmap_init(&free_list, &first_block);
 
 	/*
@@ -1229,9 +1232,14 @@ xfs_create(
 	if (error)
 		goto out_trans_cancel;
 
-	error = xfs_dir_canenter(tp, dp, name, resblks);
-	if (error)
-		goto out_trans_cancel;
+	if (name) {
+		xfs_ilock(dp, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL | XFS_ILOCK_PARENT);
+		unlock_dp_on_error = true;
+
+		error = xfs_dir_canenter(tp, dp, name, resblks);
+		if (error)
+			goto out_trans_cancel;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * A newly created regular or special file just has one directory
@@ -1253,27 +1261,34 @@ xfs_create(
 	 * the transaction cancel unlocking dp so don't do it explicitly in the
 	 * error path.
 	 */
-	xfs_trans_ijoin(tp, dp, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
-	unlock_dp_on_error = false;
+	if (name) {
+		xfs_trans_ijoin(tp, dp, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
+		unlock_dp_on_error = false;
 
-	error = xfs_dir_createname(tp, dp, name, ip->i_ino,
+		error = xfs_dir_createname(tp, dp, name, ip->i_ino,
 					&first_block, &free_list, resblks ?
 					resblks - XFS_IALLOC_SPACE_RES(mp) : 0);
-	if (error) {
-		ASSERT(error != ENOSPC);
-		goto out_trans_abort;
-	}
-	xfs_trans_ichgtime(tp, dp, XFS_ICHGTIME_MOD | XFS_ICHGTIME_CHG);
-	xfs_trans_log_inode(tp, dp, XFS_ILOG_CORE);
+		if (error) {
+			ASSERT(error != ENOSPC);
+			goto out_trans_abort;
+		}
+		xfs_trans_ichgtime(tp, dp, XFS_ICHGTIME_MOD | XFS_ICHGTIME_CHG);
+		xfs_trans_log_inode(tp, dp, XFS_ILOG_CORE);
 
-	if (is_dir) {
-		error = xfs_dir_init(tp, ip, dp);
-		if (error)
-			goto out_bmap_cancel;
+		if (is_dir) {
+			error = xfs_dir_init(tp, ip, dp);
+			if (error)
+				goto out_bmap_cancel;
 
-		error = xfs_bumplink(tp, dp);
+			error = xfs_bumplink(tp, dp);
+			if (error)
+				goto out_bmap_cancel;
+		}
+	} else {
+		ip->i_d.di_nlink--;
+		error = xfs_iunlink(tp, ip);
 		if (error)
-			goto out_bmap_cancel;
+			goto out_trans_abort;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -1331,114 +1346,6 @@ xfs_create(
 }
 
 int
-xfs_create_tmpfile(
-	struct xfs_inode	*dp,
-	struct dentry		*dentry,
-	umode_t			mode,
-	struct xfs_inode	**ipp)
-{
-	struct xfs_mount	*mp = dp->i_mount;
-	struct xfs_inode	*ip = NULL;
-	struct xfs_trans	*tp = NULL;
-	int			error;
-	uint			cancel_flags = XFS_TRANS_RELEASE_LOG_RES;
-	prid_t                  prid;
-	struct xfs_dquot	*udqp = NULL;
-	struct xfs_dquot	*gdqp = NULL;
-	struct xfs_dquot	*pdqp = NULL;
-	struct xfs_trans_res	*tres;
-	uint			resblks;
-
-	if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(mp))
-		return XFS_ERROR(EIO);
-
-	prid = xfs_get_initial_prid(dp);
-
-	/*
-	 * Make sure that we have allocated dquot(s) on disk.
-	 */
-	error = xfs_qm_vop_dqalloc(dp, xfs_kuid_to_uid(current_fsuid()),
-				xfs_kgid_to_gid(current_fsgid()), prid,
-				XFS_QMOPT_QUOTALL | XFS_QMOPT_INHERIT,
-				&udqp, &gdqp, &pdqp);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
-	resblks = XFS_IALLOC_SPACE_RES(mp);
-	tp = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, XFS_TRANS_CREATE_TMPFILE);
-
-	tres = &M_RES(mp)->tr_create_tmpfile;
-	error = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, tres, resblks, 0);
-	if (error == ENOSPC) {
-		/* No space at all so try a "no-allocation" reservation */
-		resblks = 0;
-		error = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, tres, 0, 0);
-	}
-	if (error) {
-		cancel_flags = 0;
-		goto out_trans_cancel;
-	}
-
-	error = xfs_trans_reserve_quota(tp, mp, udqp, gdqp,
-						pdqp, resblks, 1, 0);
-	if (error)
-		goto out_trans_cancel;
-
-	error = xfs_dir_ialloc(&tp, dp, mode, 1, 0,
-				prid, resblks > 0, &ip, NULL);
-	if (error) {
-		if (error == ENOSPC)
-			goto out_trans_cancel;
-		goto out_trans_abort;
-	}
-
-	if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_WSYNC)
-		xfs_trans_set_sync(tp);
-
-	/*
-	 * Attach the dquot(s) to the inodes and modify them incore.
-	 * These ids of the inode couldn't have changed since the new
-	 * inode has been locked ever since it was created.
-	 */
-	xfs_qm_vop_create_dqattach(tp, ip, udqp, gdqp, pdqp);
-
-	ip->i_d.di_nlink--;
-	error = xfs_iunlink(tp, ip);
-	if (error)
-		goto out_trans_abort;
-
-	error = xfs_trans_commit(tp, XFS_TRANS_RELEASE_LOG_RES);
-	if (error)
-		goto out_release_inode;
-
-	xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
-	xfs_qm_dqrele(gdqp);
-	xfs_qm_dqrele(pdqp);
-
-	*ipp = ip;
-	return 0;
-
- out_trans_abort:
-	cancel_flags |= XFS_TRANS_ABORT;
- out_trans_cancel:
-	xfs_trans_cancel(tp, cancel_flags);
- out_release_inode:
-	/*
-	 * Wait until after the current transaction is aborted to
-	 * release the inode.  This prevents recursive transactions
-	 * and deadlocks from xfs_inactive.
-	 */
-	if (ip)
-		IRELE(ip);
-
-	xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
-	xfs_qm_dqrele(gdqp);
-	xfs_qm_dqrele(pdqp);
-
-	return error;
-}
-
-int
 xfs_link(
 	xfs_inode_t		*tdp,
 	xfs_inode_t		*sip,
fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c +4 -4
index 301ecbf..b430eb7 100644
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ xfs_generic_create(
 	struct inode	*inode;
 	struct xfs_inode *ip = NULL;
 	struct posix_acl *default_acl, *acl;
-	struct xfs_name	name;
+	struct xfs_name	name, *namep = NULL;
 	int		error;
 
 	/*
@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ xfs_generic_create(
 
 	if (!tmpfile) {
 		xfs_dentry_to_name(&name, dentry, mode);
-		error = xfs_create(XFS_I(dir), &name, mode, rdev, &ip);
-	} else {
-		error = xfs_create_tmpfile(XFS_I(dir), dentry, mode, &ip);
+		namep = &name;
 	}
+
+	error = xfs_create(XFS_I(dir), namep, mode, rdev, &ip);
 	if (unlikely(error))
 		goto out_free_acl;
 
fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h +4 -3
index a4ae41c..da46c94 100644
@@ -691,13 +691,14 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(xfs_namespace_class,
 		__field(dev_t, dev)
 		__field(xfs_ino_t, dp_ino)
 		__field(int, namelen)
-		__dynamic_array(char, name, name->len)
+		__dynamic_array(char, name, name ? name->len : 0)
 	),
 	TP_fast_assign(
 		__entry->dev = VFS_I(dp)->i_sb->s_dev;
 		__entry->dp_ino = dp->i_ino;
-		__entry->namelen = name->len;
-		memcpy(__get_str(name), name->name, name->len);
+		__entry->namelen = name ? name->len : 0;
+		if (name)
+			memcpy(__get_str(name), name->name, name->len);
 	),
 	TP_printk("dev %d:%d dp ino 0x%llx name %.*s",
 		  MAJOR(__entry->dev), MINOR(__entry->dev),
Signature · 6 lines
1.8.3.1

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#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] xfs: fold xfs_create_tmpfile() into xfs_create()

fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c xfs_create( · line 1184

Quoted 12 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +2 -3
-	struct xfs_trans_res	tres;
+	struct xfs_trans_res	*tres;
 	uint			resblks;
 
 	trace_xfs_create(dp, name);
@@ -1181,14 +1181,21 @@ xfs_create(
 	if (is_dir) {
 		rdev = 0;
 		resblks = XFS_MKDIR_SPACE_RES(mp, name->len);
-		tres.tr_logres = M_RES(mp)->tr_mkdir.tr_logres;
-		tres.tr_logcount = XFS_MKDIR_LOG_COUNT;
+		tres = &M_RES(mp)->tr_mkdir;

The (nice) reservation cleanup should be a patch of it's own.

fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c xfs_create( · line 1195

Quoted 6 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +6 -0
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * If we don't have a name, we're in the ->tmpfile() path. We
+		 * have a unique transaction here since we modify the unlinked
+		 * list rather than create a directory entry.
+		 */

How is that transaction more "uniqueue" than the others? Seems like this comment generally doesn't add a whole lot of value.

fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c xfs_create( · line 1242

Quoted 8 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +8 -0
+	if (name) {
+		xfs_ilock(dp, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL | XFS_ILOCK_PARENT);
+		unlock_dp_on_error = true;
+
+		error = xfs_dir_canenter(tp, dp, name, resblks);
+		if (error)
+			goto out_trans_cancel;
+	}

So we get another special case in this function. Can't say I like that too much, on the other hand I don't really like the duplicate code either. So I'm not excited about this, but also not strongly against it.

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#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] xfs: fold xfs_create_tmpfile() into xfs_create()

Quoted 4 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 4 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +1 -1
-	struct xfs_trans_res	tres;
+	struct xfs_trans_res	*tres;
 	uint			resblks;
Quoted 11 lines

fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c xfs_create( · line 1184

Quoted 8 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +1 -2
 	trace_xfs_create(dp, name);
@@ -1181,14 +1181,21 @@ xfs_create(
 	if (is_dir) {
 		rdev = 0;
 		resblks = XFS_MKDIR_SPACE_RES(mp, name->len);
-		tres.tr_logres = M_RES(mp)->tr_mkdir.tr_logres;
-		tres.tr_logcount = XFS_MKDIR_LOG_COUNT;
+		tres = &M_RES(mp)->tr_mkdir;

The (nice) reservation cleanup should be a patch of it's own.

Ok.

Quoted 10 lines

fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c xfs_create( · line 1195

Quoted 6 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +6 -0
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * If we don't have a name, we're in the ->tmpfile() path. We
+		 * have a unique transaction here since we modify the unlinked
+		 * list rather than create a directory entry.
+		 */

How is that transaction more "uniqueue" than the others? Seems like this comment generally doesn't add a whole lot of value.

It's just as unique as the others. ;) I wasn't intending to call out this transaction as special in any way. Rather, I was just trying to document why there is a separate transaction depending on the existence of the name. I can drop the comment.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +4 -0
+	if (name) {
+		xfs_ilock(dp, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL | XFS_ILOCK_PARENT);
+		unlock_dp_on_error = true;
+
Quoted 9 lines

fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c xfs_create( · line 1242

Quoted 4 lines
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +4 -0
+		error = xfs_dir_canenter(tp, dp, name, resblks);
+		if (error)
+			goto out_trans_cancel;
+	}

So we get another special case in this function. Can't say I like that too much, on the other hand I don't really like the duplicate code either. So I'm not excited about this, but also not strongly against it.

Indeed. I debated whether it would be reasonable to make this function slightly longer and more complex on its own. When I realized xfs_create_tmpfile() was 90% duplicate, it seemed worth the tradeoff for a 100+ line function.

Brian

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