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PolarSSL 1.3

PATCH In review [email protected]... 4 participants 12 messages Feb 27, 2014 – Apr 21, 2014

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 PolarSSL 1.3

Hi,

The attached patches add support for PolarSSL 1.3. These patches are for master only, as they drop support for PolarSSL 1.2. Supporting both versions would require a lot of #ifdef's, so I opted for dropping 1.2.

Along with PolarSSL 1.3 comes support for AES-NI and elliptic curve crypto. PolarSSL requires no specific initialization for EC crypto; everything just works out-of-the-box.

Regards,
-Steffan

#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 Upgrade to PolarSSL 1.3

From: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>

This removes support for PolarSSL 1.2. The mimimum version of PolarSSL required is now 1.3.3. The upgrade brings OpenVPN-with-PolarSSL:
* Support for EC-crypto in TLS (but not yet for external pkcs11/management keys)
* Support for AES-NI (if PolarSSL is compiled with AES-NI support)

---
 configure.ac                      |   4 +-
 src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.c     |   7 +-
 src/openvpn/pkcs11_polarssl.c     |  13 +--
 src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c        | 182 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.h        |   7 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c          |   6 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h  |   4 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c  |   4 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c | 109 +++++++----------------
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.h |   6 +-
 10 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 195 deletions(-)
configure.ac +2 -2
index 380dcdb..e3c7072 100644
@@ -826,13 +826,13 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "polarssl" ; then
 #include <polarssl/version.h>
 			]],
 			[[
-#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x01020A00 || POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x01030000
+#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x01030300 || POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x01040000
 #error invalid version
 #endif
 			]]
 		)],
 		[AC_MSG_RESULT([ok])],
-		[AC_MSG_ERROR([PolarSSL 1.2.x required and must be 1.2.10 or later])]
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([PolarSSL 1.3.x required and must be 1.3.3 or later])]
 	)
 
 	polarssl_with_pkcs11="no"
src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.c +6 -1
index 1f27d6c..7dc8aa5 100644
@@ -466,7 +466,12 @@ int cipher_ctx_mode (const cipher_context_t *ctx)
 
 int cipher_ctx_reset (cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *iv_buf)
 {
-  return 0 == cipher_reset(ctx, iv_buf);
+  int retval = cipher_reset(ctx);
+
+  if (0 == retval)
+    retval = cipher_set_iv(ctx, iv_buf, ctx->cipher_info->iv_size);
+
+  return 0 == retval;
 }
 
 int cipher_ctx_update (cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len,
src/openvpn/pkcs11_polarssl.c +7 -6
index 03b2bab..be4e973 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 #include "errlevel.h"
 #include "pkcs11_backend.h"
 #include <polarssl/pkcs11.h>
+#include <polarssl/x509.h>
 
 int
 pkcs11_init_tls_session(pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate,
@@ -78,14 +79,14 @@ pkcs11_certificate_dn (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
   char *ret = NULL;
   char dn[1024] = {0};
 
-  x509_cert polar_cert = {0};
+  x509_crt polar_cert = {0};
 
   if (pkcs11_x509_cert_init(&polar_cert, cert)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot retrieve PolarSSL certificate object");
       goto cleanup;
   }
 
-  if (-1 == x509parse_dn_gets (dn, sizeof(dn), &polar_cert.subject)) {
+  if (-1 == x509_dn_gets (dn, sizeof(dn), &polar_cert.subject)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: PolarSSL cannot parse subject");
       goto cleanup;
   }
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ pkcs11_certificate_dn (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
   ret = string_alloc(dn, gc);
 
 cleanup:
-  x509_free(&polar_cert);
+  x509_crt_free(&polar_cert);
 
   return ret;
 }
@@ -104,14 +105,14 @@ pkcs11_certificate_serial (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, char *serial,
 {
   int ret = 1;
 
-  x509_cert polar_cert = {0};
+  x509_crt polar_cert = {0};
 
   if (pkcs11_x509_cert_init(&polar_cert, cert)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot retrieve PolarSSL certificate object");
       goto cleanup;
   }
 
-  if (-1 == x509parse_serial_gets (serial, serial_len, &polar_cert.serial)) {
+  if (-1 == x509_serial_gets (serial, serial_len, &polar_cert.serial)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: PolarSSL cannot parse serial");
       goto cleanup;
   }
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ pkcs11_certificate_serial (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, char *serial,
   ret = 0;
 
 cleanup:
-  x509_free(&polar_cert);
+  x509_crt_free(&polar_cert);
 
   return ret;
 }
src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c +84 -98

333 lines not on this page · raw message

src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.h +4 -3
index fc9aa78..b80a509 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "syshead.h"
 
 #include <polarssl/ssl.h>
+#include <polarssl/x509_crt.h>
 
 #if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
 #include <polarssl/pkcs11.h>
@@ -64,9 +65,9 @@ struct tls_root_ctx {
     int endpoint; 		/**< Whether or not this is a server or a client */
 
     dhm_context *dhm_ctx;	/**< Diffie-Helmann-Merkle context */
-    x509_cert *crt_chain;	/**< Local Certificate chain */
-    x509_cert *ca_chain;	/**< CA chain for remote verification */
-    rsa_context *priv_key;	/**< Local private key */
+    x509_crt *crt_chain;	/**< Local Certificate chain */
+    x509_crt *ca_chain;		/**< CA chain for remote verification */
+    pk_context *priv_key;	/**< Local private key */
 #if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
     pkcs11_context *priv_key_pkcs11;	/**< PKCS11 private key */
 #endif
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c +3 -3
index 4dd3aa2..1aaacc7 100644
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ verify_cert_set_env(struct env_set *es, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert, int cert
   }
 
   /* export serial number as environmental variable */
-  serial = x509_get_serial(peer_cert, &gc);
+  serial = backend_x509_get_serial(peer_cert, &gc);
   openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_serial_%d", cert_depth);
   setenv_str (es, envname, serial);
 
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ verify_check_crl_dir(const char *crl_dir, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert)
   int fd = -1;
   struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
 
-  char *serial = x509_get_serial(cert, &gc);
+  char *serial = backend_x509_get_serial(cert, &gc);
 
   if (!openvpn_snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "%s%c%s", crl_dir, OS_SPECIFIC_DIRSEP, serial))
     {
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ verify_cert(struct tls_session *session, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, int cert_dep
   string_replace_leading (subject, '-', '_');
 
   /* extract the username (default is CN) */
-  if (SUCCESS != x509_get_username (common_name, TLS_USERNAME_LEN,
+  if (SUCCESS != backend_x509_get_username (common_name, TLS_USERNAME_LEN,
       opt->x509_username_field, cert))
     {
       if (!cert_depth)
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h +2 -2
index 1658cc0..1803299 100644
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ unsigned char *x509_get_sha1_hash (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *g
  *
  * @return 		\c FAILURE, \c or SUCCESS
  */
-result_t x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
+result_t backend_x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
     char * x509_username_field, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert);
 
 /*
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ result_t x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
  *
  * @return 		The certificate's serial number.
  */
-char *x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc);
+char *backend_x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc);
 
 /*
  * Save X509 fields to environment, using the naming convention:
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c +2 -2
index 658f5f3..40aaf57 100644
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ extract_x509_field_ssl (X509_NAME *x509, const char *field_name, char *out,
 }
 
 result_t
-x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
+backend_x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
     char * x509_username_field, X509 *peer_cert)
 {
 #ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
 }
 
 char *
-x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
+backend_x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
 {
   ASN1_INTEGER *asn1_i;
   BIGNUM *bignum;
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c +34 -75

213 lines not on this page · raw message

src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.h +3 -3
index b259081..b5157ed 100644
@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@
 #include "syshead.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "manage.h"
-#include <polarssl/x509.h>
+#include <polarssl/x509_crt.h>
 
 #ifndef __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED
 #define __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED
-typedef x509_cert openvpn_x509_cert_t;
+typedef x509_crt openvpn_x509_cert_t;
 #endif
 
 /** @name Function for authenticating a new connection from a remote OpenVPN peer
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ typedef x509_cert openvpn_x509_cert_t;
  *
  * @return The return value is 0 unless a fatal error occurred.
  */
-int verify_callback (void *session_obj, x509_cert *cert, int cert_depth,
+int verify_callback (void *session_obj, x509_crt *cert, int cert_depth,
     int *flags);
 
 /** @} name Function for authenticating a new connection from a remote OpenVPN peer */
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.2
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 Improve error reporting during key/cert loading with PolarSSL.

In reply to [email protected]...

From: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>

---
 src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c +14 -4
index 3a0d8a0..2df1b30 100644
@@ -261,8 +261,13 @@ tls_ctx_load_cert_file (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cert_file,
     }
   else
     {
-      if (0 != x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->crt_chain, cert_file))
-	msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s", cert_file);
+      int retval = x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->crt_chain, cert_file);
+      if (0 != retval)
+	{
+	  char errstr[128];
+	  polarssl_strerror(retval, errstr, sizeof(errstr));
+	  msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s (%s)", cert_file, errstr);
+	}
     }
 }
 
@@ -475,8 +480,13 @@ void tls_ctx_load_ca (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *ca_file,
   else
     {
       /* Load CA file for verifying peer supplied certificate */
-      if (0 != x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->ca_chain, ca_file))
-	msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load CA certificate file %s", ca_file);
+      int retval = x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->ca_chain, ca_file);
+      if (0 != retval)
+	{
+	  char errstr[128];
+	  polarssl_strerror(retval, errstr, sizeof(errstr));
+	  msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load CA certificate file %s (%s)", ca_file, errstr);
+	}
     }
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.2
#3 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]...
Quoted 9 lines · On 27/02/2014 12:40, [email protected]... wrote:

Hi,

The attached patches add support for PolarSSL 1.3. These patches are for master only, as they drop support for PolarSSL 1.2. Supporting both versions would require a lot of #ifdef's, so I opted for dropping 1.2.

Along with PolarSSL 1.3 comes support for AES-NI and elliptic curve crypto. PolarSSL requires no specific initialization for EC crypto; everything just works out-of-the-box.

Just tested this on server side -- works great so far.

But I scanned the patch and noticed this:

  sig_len = ctx->signature_length;
  if ( (SIZE_MAX - hashlen) > asn_len || (hashlen + asn_len) > sig_len )
    return POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;

I'm not sure I understand the (SIZE_MAX - hashlen) > asn_len part. Wouldn't this always be true for reasonable values of hashlen and asn_len?

And the *p++ lines below, I assume that the buffer's size is ctx->signature_length? Maybe add some comments about buffer-sizing assumptions?

James

#4 lore raw

Hi James,

Quoted 11 lines · James Yonan
Quoted 7 lines · On 27/02/2014 12:40, [email protected]... wrote:

The attached patches add support for PolarSSL 1.3. These patches are for master only, as they drop support for PolarSSL 1.2. Supporting both versions would require a lot of #ifdef's, so I opted for dropping 1.2.

Along with PolarSSL 1.3 comes support for AES-NI and elliptic curve crypto. PolarSSL requires no specific initialization for EC crypto; everything just works out-of-the-box.

Just tested this on server side -- works great so far.

Quoted 8 lines

But I scanned the patch and noticed this:

   sig_len = ctx->signature_length;
   if ( (SIZE_MAX - hashlen) > asn_len || (hashlen + asn_len) > sig_len )
     return POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;

I'm not sure I understand the (SIZE_MAX - hashlen) > asn_len part. Wouldn't this always be true for reasonable values of hashlen and asn_len?

This should indeed always be true for reasonable input. However, it is guarding against size_t overflow attacks. In case of a raw signature we use 'hashlen' supplied by the user. This check prevents an attacker from causing a buffer overflow using integer overflow of hashlen + asnlen (if that is larger than SIZE_MAX, the second check would possibly not catch the overflow). I don't think this can actually happen in the current codebase, but the check is cheap and 'better be safe then sorry'.

Quoted 3 lines

And the *p++ lines below, I assume that the buffer's size is ctx->signature_length? Maybe add some comments about buffer-sizing assumptions?

Correct. I agree that this was a bit too much "left as an exercise to the reader", so I added some doxygen for this function.

Attached are the updated patches, also rebased on the current master. If you're comfortable with the code, could you perhaps give it an ACK / NACK?

Regards,
-Steffan

From 10bd3bcbfbb8927ed975a573f073490919a8d4cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 13:57:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Upgrade to PolarSSL 1.3

This removes support for PolarSSL 1.2. The mimimum version of PolarSSL required is now 1.3.3. The upgrade brings OpenVPN-with-PolarSSL:
* Support for EC-crypto in TLS (but not yet for external pkcs11/management keys)
* Support for AES-NI (if PolarSSL is compiled with AES-NI support)

---
 configure.ac                      |   4 +-
 src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.c     |   7 +-
 src/openvpn/pkcs11_polarssl.c     |  13 +--
 src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c        | 202 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.h        |   7 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c          |   6 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h  |   4 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c  |   4 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c | 109 +++++++-------------
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.h |   6 +-
 10 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 195 deletions(-)
configure.ac +2 -2
index 0c2abb9..ea35d73 100644
@@ -844,13 +844,13 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "polarssl" ; then
 #include <polarssl/version.h>
 			]],
 			[[
-#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x01020A00 || POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x01030000
+#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x01030300 || POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x01040000
 #error invalid version
 #endif
 			]]
 		)],
 		[AC_MSG_RESULT([ok])],
-		[AC_MSG_ERROR([PolarSSL 1.2.x required and must be 1.2.10 or later])]
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([PolarSSL 1.3.x required and must be 1.3.3 or later])]
 	)
 
 	polarssl_with_pkcs11="no"
src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.c +6 -1
index 1f27d6c..7dc8aa5 100644
@@ -466,7 +466,12 @@ int cipher_ctx_mode (const cipher_context_t *ctx)
 
 int cipher_ctx_reset (cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *iv_buf)
 {
-  return 0 == cipher_reset(ctx, iv_buf);
+  int retval = cipher_reset(ctx);
+
+  if (0 == retval)
+    retval = cipher_set_iv(ctx, iv_buf, ctx->cipher_info->iv_size);
+
+  return 0 == retval;
 }
 
 int cipher_ctx_update (cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len,
src/openvpn/pkcs11_polarssl.c +7 -6
index 03b2bab..be4e973 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 #include "errlevel.h"
 #include "pkcs11_backend.h"
 #include <polarssl/pkcs11.h>
+#include <polarssl/x509.h>
 
 int
 pkcs11_init_tls_session(pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate,
@@ -78,14 +79,14 @@ pkcs11_certificate_dn (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
   char *ret = NULL;
   char dn[1024] = {0};
 
-  x509_cert polar_cert = {0};
+  x509_crt polar_cert = {0};
 
   if (pkcs11_x509_cert_init(&polar_cert, cert)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot retrieve PolarSSL certificate object");
       goto cleanup;
   }
 
-  if (-1 == x509parse_dn_gets (dn, sizeof(dn), &polar_cert.subject)) {
+  if (-1 == x509_dn_gets (dn, sizeof(dn), &polar_cert.subject)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: PolarSSL cannot parse subject");
       goto cleanup;
   }
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ pkcs11_certificate_dn (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
   ret = string_alloc(dn, gc);
 
 cleanup:
-  x509_free(&polar_cert);
+  x509_crt_free(&polar_cert);
 
   return ret;
 }
@@ -104,14 +105,14 @@ pkcs11_certificate_serial (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, char *serial,
 {
   int ret = 1;
 
-  x509_cert polar_cert = {0};
+  x509_crt polar_cert = {0};
 
   if (pkcs11_x509_cert_init(&polar_cert, cert)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot retrieve PolarSSL certificate object");
       goto cleanup;
   }
 
-  if (-1 == x509parse_serial_gets (serial, serial_len, &polar_cert.serial)) {
+  if (-1 == x509_serial_gets (serial, serial_len, &polar_cert.serial)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: PolarSSL cannot parse serial");
       goto cleanup;
   }
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ pkcs11_certificate_serial (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, char *serial,
   ret = 0;
 
 cleanup:
-  x509_free(&polar_cert);
+  x509_crt_free(&polar_cert);
 
   return ret;
 }
src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c +104 -98

355 lines not on this page · raw message

src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.h +4 -3
index fc9aa78..b80a509 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "syshead.h"
 
 #include <polarssl/ssl.h>
+#include <polarssl/x509_crt.h>
 
 #if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
 #include <polarssl/pkcs11.h>
@@ -64,9 +65,9 @@ struct tls_root_ctx {
     int endpoint; 		/**< Whether or not this is a server or a client */
 
     dhm_context *dhm_ctx;	/**< Diffie-Helmann-Merkle context */
-    x509_cert *crt_chain;	/**< Local Certificate chain */
-    x509_cert *ca_chain;	/**< CA chain for remote verification */
-    rsa_context *priv_key;	/**< Local private key */
+    x509_crt *crt_chain;	/**< Local Certificate chain */
+    x509_crt *ca_chain;		/**< CA chain for remote verification */
+    pk_context *priv_key;	/**< Local private key */
 #if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
     pkcs11_context *priv_key_pkcs11;	/**< PKCS11 private key */
 #endif
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c +3 -3
index 765b886..7a9a56e 100644
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ verify_cert_set_env(struct env_set *es, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert, int cert
   }
 
   /* export serial number as environmental variable */
-  serial = x509_get_serial(peer_cert, &gc);
+  serial = backend_x509_get_serial(peer_cert, &gc);
   openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_serial_%d", cert_depth);
   setenv_str (es, envname, serial);
 
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ verify_check_crl_dir(const char *crl_dir, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert)
   int fd = -1;
   struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
 
-  char *serial = x509_get_serial(cert, &gc);
+  char *serial = backend_x509_get_serial(cert, &gc);
 
   if (!openvpn_snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "%s%c%s", crl_dir, OS_SPECIFIC_DIRSEP, serial))
     {
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ verify_cert(struct tls_session *session, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, int cert_dep
   string_replace_leading (subject, '-', '_');
 
   /* extract the username (default is CN) */
-  if (SUCCESS != x509_get_username (common_name, TLS_USERNAME_LEN,
+  if (SUCCESS != backend_x509_get_username (common_name, TLS_USERNAME_LEN,
       opt->x509_username_field, cert))
     {
       if (!cert_depth)
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h +2 -2
index 7d2aae6..fa4369d 100644
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ unsigned char *x509_get_sha1_hash (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *g
  *
  * @return 		\c FAILURE, \c or SUCCESS
  */
-result_t x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
+result_t backend_x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
     char * x509_username_field, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert);
 
 /*
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ result_t x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
  *
  * @return 		The certificate's serial number.
  */
-char *x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc);
+char *backend_x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc);
 
 /*
  * Save X509 fields to environment, using the naming convention:
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c +2 -2
index cd2006f..a9205f3 100644
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ extract_x509_field_ssl (X509_NAME *x509, const char *field_name, char *out,
 }
 
 result_t
-x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
+backend_x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
     char * x509_username_field, X509 *peer_cert)
 {
 #ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
 }
 
 char *
-x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
+backend_x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
 {
   ASN1_INTEGER *asn1_i;
   BIGNUM *bignum;
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c +34 -75

213 lines not on this page · raw message

src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.h +3 -3
index b259081..b5157ed 100644
@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@
 #include "syshead.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "manage.h"
-#include <polarssl/x509.h>
+#include <polarssl/x509_crt.h>
 
 #ifndef __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED
 #define __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED
-typedef x509_cert openvpn_x509_cert_t;
+typedef x509_crt openvpn_x509_cert_t;
 #endif
 
 /** @name Function for authenticating a new connection from a remote OpenVPN peer
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ typedef x509_cert openvpn_x509_cert_t;
  *
  * @return The return value is 0 unless a fatal error occurred.
  */
-int verify_callback (void *session_obj, x509_cert *cert, int cert_depth,
+int verify_callback (void *session_obj, x509_crt *cert, int cert_depth,
     int *flags);
 
 /** @} name Function for authenticating a new connection from a remote OpenVPN peer */
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.2

From 773200816a73c0f356418fbe98d380be6559b477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 13:58:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Improve error reporting during key/cert loading with
PolarSSL.

---
 src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c +14 -4
index 91fc7c2..f26925d 100644
@@ -261,8 +261,13 @@ tls_ctx_load_cert_file (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cert_file,
     }
   else
     {
-      if (0 != x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->crt_chain, cert_file))
-	msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s", cert_file);
+      int retval = x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->crt_chain, cert_file);
+      if (0 != retval)
+	{
+	  char errstr[128];
+	  polarssl_strerror(retval, errstr, sizeof(errstr));
+	  msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s (%s)", cert_file, errstr);
+	}
     }
 }
 
@@ -495,8 +500,13 @@ void tls_ctx_load_ca (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *ca_file,
   else
     {
       /* Load CA file for verifying peer supplied certificate */
-      if (0 != x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->ca_chain, ca_file))
-	msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load CA certificate file %s", ca_file);
+      int retval = x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->ca_chain, ca_file);
+      if (0 != retval)
+	{
+	  char errstr[128];
+	  polarssl_strerror(retval, errstr, sizeof(errstr));
+	  msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load CA certificate file %s (%s)", ca_file, errstr);
+	}
     }
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.2
#5 lore raw

Hi,

Quoted 5 lines · Steffan Karger
Quoted 2 lines · James Yonan

I'm not sure I understand the (SIZE_MAX - hashlen) > asn_len part. Wouldn't this always be true for reasonable values of hashlen and asn_len?

This should indeed always be true for reasonable input.

Ouch, James was totally right. This would always be true, but should always be *false* for reasonable input; the check has to be the other way around. Attached the same two patches, except for that single character...

On the positive side: I've added my management-external-key test to my vanilla-openvpn tests too, so I should catch regressions more easily now.

-Steffan

From 4fa6fbfd1e1d2937b7aae689bccb24e59279416b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 13:57:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Upgrade to PolarSSL 1.3

This removes support for PolarSSL 1.2. The mimimum version of PolarSSL required is now 1.3.3. The upgrade brings OpenVPN-with-PolarSSL:
* Support for EC-crypto in TLS (but not yet for external pkcs11/management keys)
* Support for AES-NI (if PolarSSL is compiled with AES-NI support)

---
 configure.ac                      |   4 +-
 src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.c     |   7 +-
 src/openvpn/pkcs11_polarssl.c     |  13 +--
 src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c        | 202 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.h        |   7 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c          |   6 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h  |   4 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c  |   4 +-
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c | 109 +++++++-------------
 src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.h |   6 +-
 10 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 195 deletions(-)
configure.ac +2 -2
index 0c2abb9..ea35d73 100644
@@ -844,13 +844,13 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "polarssl" ; then
 #include <polarssl/version.h>
 			]],
 			[[
-#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x01020A00 || POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x01030000
+#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x01030300 || POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x01040000
 #error invalid version
 #endif
 			]]
 		)],
 		[AC_MSG_RESULT([ok])],
-		[AC_MSG_ERROR([PolarSSL 1.2.x required and must be 1.2.10 or later])]
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([PolarSSL 1.3.x required and must be 1.3.3 or later])]
 	)
 
 	polarssl_with_pkcs11="no"
src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.c +6 -1
index 1f27d6c..7dc8aa5 100644
@@ -466,7 +466,12 @@ int cipher_ctx_mode (const cipher_context_t *ctx)
 
 int cipher_ctx_reset (cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *iv_buf)
 {
-  return 0 == cipher_reset(ctx, iv_buf);
+  int retval = cipher_reset(ctx);
+
+  if (0 == retval)
+    retval = cipher_set_iv(ctx, iv_buf, ctx->cipher_info->iv_size);
+
+  return 0 == retval;
 }
 
 int cipher_ctx_update (cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len,
src/openvpn/pkcs11_polarssl.c +7 -6
index 03b2bab..be4e973 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 #include "errlevel.h"
 #include "pkcs11_backend.h"
 #include <polarssl/pkcs11.h>
+#include <polarssl/x509.h>
 
 int
 pkcs11_init_tls_session(pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate,
@@ -78,14 +79,14 @@ pkcs11_certificate_dn (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
   char *ret = NULL;
   char dn[1024] = {0};
 
-  x509_cert polar_cert = {0};
+  x509_crt polar_cert = {0};
 
   if (pkcs11_x509_cert_init(&polar_cert, cert)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot retrieve PolarSSL certificate object");
       goto cleanup;
   }
 
-  if (-1 == x509parse_dn_gets (dn, sizeof(dn), &polar_cert.subject)) {
+  if (-1 == x509_dn_gets (dn, sizeof(dn), &polar_cert.subject)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: PolarSSL cannot parse subject");
       goto cleanup;
   }
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ pkcs11_certificate_dn (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
   ret = string_alloc(dn, gc);
 
 cleanup:
-  x509_free(&polar_cert);
+  x509_crt_free(&polar_cert);
 
   return ret;
 }
@@ -104,14 +105,14 @@ pkcs11_certificate_serial (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, char *serial,
 {
   int ret = 1;
 
-  x509_cert polar_cert = {0};
+  x509_crt polar_cert = {0};
 
   if (pkcs11_x509_cert_init(&polar_cert, cert)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot retrieve PolarSSL certificate object");
       goto cleanup;
   }
 
-  if (-1 == x509parse_serial_gets (serial, serial_len, &polar_cert.serial)) {
+  if (-1 == x509_serial_gets (serial, serial_len, &polar_cert.serial)) {
       msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: PolarSSL cannot parse serial");
       goto cleanup;
   }
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ pkcs11_certificate_serial (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, char *serial,
   ret = 0;
 
 cleanup:
-  x509_free(&polar_cert);
+  x509_crt_free(&polar_cert);
 
   return ret;
 }
src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c +104 -98

355 lines not on this page · raw message

src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.h +4 -3
index fc9aa78..b80a509 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "syshead.h"
 
 #include <polarssl/ssl.h>
+#include <polarssl/x509_crt.h>
 
 #if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
 #include <polarssl/pkcs11.h>
@@ -64,9 +65,9 @@ struct tls_root_ctx {
     int endpoint; 		/**< Whether or not this is a server or a client */
 
     dhm_context *dhm_ctx;	/**< Diffie-Helmann-Merkle context */
-    x509_cert *crt_chain;	/**< Local Certificate chain */
-    x509_cert *ca_chain;	/**< CA chain for remote verification */
-    rsa_context *priv_key;	/**< Local private key */
+    x509_crt *crt_chain;	/**< Local Certificate chain */
+    x509_crt *ca_chain;		/**< CA chain for remote verification */
+    pk_context *priv_key;	/**< Local private key */
 #if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
     pkcs11_context *priv_key_pkcs11;	/**< PKCS11 private key */
 #endif
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c +3 -3
index 765b886..7a9a56e 100644
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ verify_cert_set_env(struct env_set *es, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert, int cert
   }
 
   /* export serial number as environmental variable */
-  serial = x509_get_serial(peer_cert, &gc);
+  serial = backend_x509_get_serial(peer_cert, &gc);
   openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_serial_%d", cert_depth);
   setenv_str (es, envname, serial);
 
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ verify_check_crl_dir(const char *crl_dir, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert)
   int fd = -1;
   struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
 
-  char *serial = x509_get_serial(cert, &gc);
+  char *serial = backend_x509_get_serial(cert, &gc);
 
   if (!openvpn_snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "%s%c%s", crl_dir, OS_SPECIFIC_DIRSEP, serial))
     {
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ verify_cert(struct tls_session *session, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, int cert_dep
   string_replace_leading (subject, '-', '_');
 
   /* extract the username (default is CN) */
-  if (SUCCESS != x509_get_username (common_name, TLS_USERNAME_LEN,
+  if (SUCCESS != backend_x509_get_username (common_name, TLS_USERNAME_LEN,
       opt->x509_username_field, cert))
     {
       if (!cert_depth)
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h +2 -2
index 7d2aae6..fa4369d 100644
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ unsigned char *x509_get_sha1_hash (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *g
  *
  * @return 		\c FAILURE, \c or SUCCESS
  */
-result_t x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
+result_t backend_x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
     char * x509_username_field, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert);
 
 /*
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ result_t x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
  *
  * @return 		The certificate's serial number.
  */
-char *x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc);
+char *backend_x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc);
 
 /*
  * Save X509 fields to environment, using the naming convention:
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c +2 -2
index cd2006f..a9205f3 100644
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ extract_x509_field_ssl (X509_NAME *x509, const char *field_name, char *out,
 }
 
 result_t
-x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
+backend_x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
     char * x509_username_field, X509 *peer_cert)
 {
 #ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
 }
 
 char *
-x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
+backend_x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
 {
   ASN1_INTEGER *asn1_i;
   BIGNUM *bignum;
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c +34 -75

213 lines not on this page · raw message

src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.h +3 -3
index b259081..b5157ed 100644
@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@
 #include "syshead.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "manage.h"
-#include <polarssl/x509.h>
+#include <polarssl/x509_crt.h>
 
 #ifndef __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED
 #define __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED
-typedef x509_cert openvpn_x509_cert_t;
+typedef x509_crt openvpn_x509_cert_t;
 #endif
 
 /** @name Function for authenticating a new connection from a remote OpenVPN peer
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ typedef x509_cert openvpn_x509_cert_t;
  *
  * @return The return value is 0 unless a fatal error occurred.
  */
-int verify_callback (void *session_obj, x509_cert *cert, int cert_depth,
+int verify_callback (void *session_obj, x509_crt *cert, int cert_depth,
     int *flags);
 
 /** @} name Function for authenticating a new connection from a remote OpenVPN peer */
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.2

From 6a09fd63d84e867e9dae7b9af9133c9b07e9e0f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 13:58:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Improve error reporting during key/cert loading with
PolarSSL.

---
 src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c +14 -4
index 55a60a3..de52fa5 100644
@@ -261,8 +261,13 @@ tls_ctx_load_cert_file (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cert_file,
     }
   else
     {
-      if (0 != x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->crt_chain, cert_file))
-	msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s", cert_file);
+      int retval = x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->crt_chain, cert_file);
+      if (0 != retval)
+	{
+	  char errstr[128];
+	  polarssl_strerror(retval, errstr, sizeof(errstr));
+	  msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s (%s)", cert_file, errstr);
+	}
     }
 }
 
@@ -495,8 +500,13 @@ void tls_ctx_load_ca (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *ca_file,
   else
     {
       /* Load CA file for verifying peer supplied certificate */
-      if (0 != x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->ca_chain, ca_file))
-	msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load CA certificate file %s", ca_file);
+      int retval = x509_crt_parse_file(ctx->ca_chain, ca_file);
+      if (0 != retval)
+	{
+	  char errstr[128];
+	  polarssl_strerror(retval, errstr, sizeof(errstr));
+	  msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load CA certificate file %s (%s)", ca_file, errstr);
+	}
     }
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.2
#6 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Steffan Karger

Hi,

Quoted 5 lines · Steffan Karger
Quoted 2 lines · James Yonan

I'm not sure I understand the (SIZE_MAX - hashlen) > asn_len part. Wouldn't this always be true for reasonable values of hashlen and asn_len?

This should indeed always be true for reasonable input.

Quoted 7 lines

Ouch, James was totally right. This would always be true, but should always be *false* for reasonable input; the check has to be the other way around. Attached the same two patches, except for that single character...

On the positive side: I've added my management-external-key test to my vanilla-openvpn tests too, so I should catch regressions more easily now.

ACK for the revised patches (0001-Upgrade-to-PolarSSL-1.3.patch and 0002-Improve-error-reporting-during-key-cert-loading-with.patch).

James

#7 lore raw
In reply to Steffan Karger

Hi,

Quoted 4 lines · Steffan Karger

Ouch, James was totally right. This would always be true, but should always be *false* for reasonable input; the check has to be the other way around. Attached the same two patches, except for that single character...

Merged both, will push soon.

When test-building, it seems that there is a patch missing to the plugin API bits...

libtool: compile: gcc -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -I../../../../openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam -I../../.. -I../../../../openvpn/include -g -O2 -MT auth-pam.lo -MD -MP -MF .deps/auth-pam.Tpo -c ../../../../openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.c -fPIC -DPIC -o .libs/auth-pam.o In file included from ../../../../openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.c:51:0:
../../../../openvpn/include/openvpn-plugin.h:35:1: error: unknown type name 'x509_cert'
make[4]: *** [auth-pam.lo] Fehler 1

(basic "./configure --with-crypto-library=polarssl && make" on Linux)

Could you...?

gert

Signature · 4 lines
USENET is *not* the non-clickable part of WWW!
                                                           //www.muc.de/~gert/
Gert Doering - Munich, Germany                             [email protected]...
fax: +49-89-35655025                        [email protected]...
#8 lore raw

Hi,

Quoted 2 lines · Gert Doering

When test-building, it seems that there is a patch missing to the plugin API bits...

Ah, right, I usually compile polar builds without the plugin api. Attached a patch that should fix this. It compiles and passes client_t tests, but I don't have plugin tests to really verify everything works...

-Steffan

From 491fd5e253a62940caafd973377019be1e3164f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
Date: Mon, 21 Apr 2014 11:52:51 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Update openvpn-plugin.h for PolarSSL 1.3.

---
 include/openvpn-plugin.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/openvpn-plugin.h +2 -2
index 03da92a..5f2d407 100644
@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@
 
 #ifdef ENABLE_SSL
 #ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL
-#include <polarssl/x509.h>
+#include <polarssl/x509_crt.h>
 #ifndef __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED
 #define __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED
-typedef x509_cert openvpn_x509_cert_t;
+typedef x509_crt openvpn_x509_cert_t;
 #endif
 #else
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.2
#9 lore raw

[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Update openvpn-plugin.h for PolarSSL 1.3.

ACK (as in "fixes the build for me". None of the default plugins will actually *use* this, and any plugin using x509 stuff would have to be adapted to the 1.3 API - yes, this is the way it is)

Your patch has been applied to the master branch.

commit cc1cee74c683ce92e56bb6a6170988fb6520b803

Author: Steffan Karger
Date:   Mon Apr 21 11:52:51 2014 +0200
     Update openvpn-plugin.h for PolarSSL 1.3.

     Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/8567
     Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>

--
kind regards,

Gert Doering

#10 lore raw

[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Upgrade to PolarSSL 1.3

In reply to Steffan Karger

Your patch has been applied to the master branch.

commit 03df3a990f71b3d02653eba364ac89f8400611c3

Author: Steffan Karger
Date:   Tue Feb 4 13:57:15 2014 +0100
     Upgrade to PolarSSL 1.3

     Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: James Yonan <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/8555
     Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>

--
kind regards,

Gert Doering

#11 lore raw

[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Improve error reporting during key/cert loading with PolarSSL.

In reply to Steffan Karger

Your patch has been applied to the master branch.

commit 5e0112d9c60c488d3951491052d1aec8ef793023

Author: Steffan Karger
Date:   Tue Feb 4 13:58:05 2014 +0100
     Improve error reporting during key/cert loading with PolarSSL.

     Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: James Yonan <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/8555
     Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>

--
kind regards,

Gert Doering