Kernel panic at Ubuntu: IMA + Apparmor
Hello,
I discovered a kernel panic on system running Ubuntu when IMA is enabled. It happens on reboot.
----------------------
[ 106.750100] NSPROXY is NULL: error.log (/var/log/mysql/error.log) [ 106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.750241] PGD 0 [ 106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm
bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci pps_core
[ 106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15 [ 106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08 09/19/2012 [ 106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti: ffff880400fca000 [ 106.750704] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811ec7da>] [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX: ffff8800d51523e7 [ 106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI: ffff880402d20020 [ 106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8800d5152300 [ 106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15: ffff8800d51523e7 [ 106.750871] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 106.750910] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 [ 106.750962] Stack: [ 106.750981] ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18 0000000000000000 [ 106.751037] ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000 0000000000000100 [ 106.751093] 0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e ffff8803eb8df500 [ 106.751149] Call Trace: [ 106.751172] [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430 [ 106.751199] [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10 [ 106.751225] [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170 [ 106.751250] [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80 [ 106.751276] [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40 [ 106.751301] [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0 [ 106.751327] [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20 [ 106.751355] [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0 [ 106.751382] [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0 [ 106.751407] [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170 [ 106.751432] [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60 [ 106.751457] [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280 [ 106.751483] [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280 [ 106.751509] [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160 [ 106.751536] [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 106.751562] [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0 [ 106.751587] [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60 [ 106.751612] [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0 [ 106.751637] [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300 [ 106.751662] [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [ 106.751687] [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0 [ 106.751712] [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90 [ 106.751738] [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b [ 106.751763] [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0 [ 106.751788] [<ffffffff81067894>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20 [ 106.751814] [<ffffffff8174522d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f [ 106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89 e5 5d <48> 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 [ 106.752185] RIP [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.752214] RSP <ffff880400fcba60> [ 106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]--- [ 106.752282] Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!
----------------------------
It happens in "our_mnt", because current->nsproxy is NULL...
It looks like "current->nsproxy" is gone before mysqld closes error.log, or it is always NULL for mysqld???
Does anyone have any ideas?
Thanks,
Dmitry
Quoted 99 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Hello,
I discovered a kernel panic on system running Ubuntu when IMA is enabled. It happens on reboot.
----------------------
[ 106.750100] NSPROXY is NULL: error.log (/var/log/mysql/error.log) [ 106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.750241] PGD 0 [ 106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcommbluetooth
rpcsec_gss_krb5nfsdauth_rpcgssnfs_aclnfs lockd sunrpc fscachedm_cryptintel_raplx86_pkg_temp_thermalintel_powerclampkvm_intelsnd_hda_codec_hdmikvmcrct10dif_pclmulcrc32_pclmulghash_clmulni_intelaesni_intelaes_x86_64glue_helperlrw gf128mulablk_helpercryptdsnd_hda_codec_realtekdcdbassnd_hda_intelsnd_hda_codecsnd_hwdepsnd_pcmsnd_page_allocsnd_seq_midisnd_seq_midi_eventsnd_rawmidipsmousesnd_seqmicrocodeserio_rawsnd_timersnd_seq_devicesnd soundcore videolpc_ichcoretempmac_hidlp parportmei_memei nbdhid_generice1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahcipps_core[ 106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15 [ 106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08 09/19/2012 [ 106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti: ffff880400fca000 [ 106.750704] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811ec7da>] [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX: ffff8800d51523e7 [ 106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI: ffff880402d20020 [ 106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8800d5152300 [ 106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15: ffff8800d51523e7 [ 106.750871] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 106.750910] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 [ 106.750962] Stack: [ 106.750981] ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18 0000000000000000 [ 106.751037] ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000 0000000000000100 [ 106.751093] 0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e ffff8803eb8df500 [ 106.751149] Call Trace: [ 106.751172] [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430 [ 106.751199] [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10 [ 106.751225] [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170 [ 106.751250] [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80 [ 106.751276] [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40 [ 106.751301] [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0 [ 106.751327] [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20 [ 106.751355] [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0 [ 106.751382] [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0 [ 106.751407] [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170 [ 106.751432] [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60 [ 106.751457] [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280 [ 106.751483] [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280 [ 106.751509] [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160 [ 106.751536] [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 106.751562] [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0 [ 106.751587] [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60 [ 106.751612] [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0 [ 106.751637] [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300 [ 106.751662] [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [ 106.751687] [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0 [ 106.751712] [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90 [ 106.751738] [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b [ 106.751763] [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0 [ 106.751788] [<ffffffff81067894>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20 [ 106.751814] [<ffffffff8174522d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f [ 106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89 e5 5d <48> 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 [ 106.752185] RIP [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.752214] RSP <ffff880400fcba60> [ 106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]--- [ 106.752282] Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!----------------------------
It happens in "
our_mnt", becausecurrent->nsproxyis NULL...It looks like "
current->nsproxy" is gone before mysqld closes error.log, or it is always NULL for mysqld???Does anyone have any ideas?
Quoted 8 lines
Thanks,
Dmitry--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
It seems the problem is the order of functions in do_exit
do_exit()
{
...
exit_task_namespaces(tsk);
exit_task_work(tsk);
...
}First, namesspaces is cleaned up.
Second, delayed fput is done.
It seems this patch appeared in 3.10 is the reason for the panic:
8aac62706 move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify()
This patch moved exit_task_namespaces(tsk) before exit_task_work..
Oleg, Al, any thoughts?
Thanks,
- Dmitry
Quoted 12 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 10 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Hello,
I discovered a kernel panic on system running Ubuntu when IMA is enabled. It happens on reboot.
----------------------
[ 106.750100] NSPROXY is NULL: error.log (/var/log/mysql/error.log) [ 106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
...
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
[ 106.751149] Call Trace: [ 106.751172] [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430 [ 106.751199] [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10 [ 106.751225] [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170 [ 106.751250] [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80 [ 106.751276] [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40 [ 106.751301] [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0 [ 106.751327] [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20 [ 106.751355] [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0 [ 106.751382] [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0 [ 106.751407] [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170 [ 106.751432] [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
[ 106.751457] [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280 [ 106.751483] [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280 [ 106.751509] [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160 [ 106.751536] [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 106.751562] [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0 [ 106.751587] [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60 [ 106.751612] [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0 [ 106.751637] [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300
fantastic ;)
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
[ 106.751662] [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [ 106.751687] [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0 [ 106.751712] [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90 [ 106.751738] [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b [ 106.751763] [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0
...
Quoted 7 lines
It seems the problem is the order of functions in
do_exit
do_exit(){ ... exit_task_namespaces(tsk); exit_task_work(tsk);
Yes.
Eric, this makes me think again that we should do exit_task_namespaces() after exit_task_work(). We already discussed this before, but this looks like another indication this change makes sense.
The problem with fput() from free_nsproxy() was hopefully also fixed by e7b2c4069252. The main motivation for "move" was "outside of exit_notify". Even if we fix the paths above task_work_add() can have another user which wants ->nsproxy.
What do you think?
Oleg.
Quoted 51 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 12 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 10 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Hello,
I discovered a kernel panic on system running Ubuntu when IMA is enabled. It happens on reboot.
----------------------
[ 106.750100] NSPROXY is NULL: error.log (/var/log/mysql/error.log) [ 106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30...
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
[ 106.751149] Call Trace: [ 106.751172] [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430 [ 106.751199] [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10 [ 106.751225] [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170 [ 106.751250] [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80 [ 106.751276] [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40 [ 106.751301] [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0 [ 106.751327] [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20 [ 106.751355] [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0 [ 106.751382] [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0 [ 106.751407] [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170 [ 106.751432] [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
[ 106.751457] [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280 [ 106.751483] [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280 [ 106.751509] [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160 [ 106.751536] [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 106.751562] [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0 [ 106.751587] [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60 [ 106.751612] [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0 [ 106.751637] [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300fantastic ;)
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
[ 106.751662] [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [ 106.751687] [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0 [ 106.751712] [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90 [ 106.751738] [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b [ 106.751763] [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0...
Quoted 7 lines
It seems the problem is the order of functions in
do_exit
do_exit(){ ... exit_task_namespaces(tsk); exit_task_work(tsk);
Quoted 5 lines
Yes.
Eric, this makes me think again that we should do
exit_task_namespaces()afterexit_task_work(). We already discussed this before, but this looks like another indication this change makes sense.
I know you mentioned something about that. I haven't actually had much time to think about it.
Quoted 6 lines
The problem with
fput()fromfree_nsproxy()was hopefully also fixed bye7b2c4069252. The main motivation for "move" was "outside ofexit_notify". Even if we fix the paths abovetask_work_add()can have another user which wants ->nsproxy.What do you think?
I am scratching my head. Delayed work that depends on current sort of blows my mind.
As I read this it is coming from __fput. Hmm.
So I think the blinkered thing is having a security_file_permission inside of kernel_read. That is utter nonsense. At least for a kernel_read we are doing from ima.
apparmor should not be trying to limit ima.
Show me a legitimate bug caused by the ordering and we can discuss reordering.
Looking at kernel_read it is used elsewhere by the binfmt routines, and doing permissions checks there on the part of the user that is doing exec seems appropriate.
So I think the deep bug here is ima is using kernel_read which is
inappropriate for what it is trying to do. Permission checks on an
integrity mechanism?
Even if we ignore insane the security_file_permission in rw_verify_area we still have mandatory locks that could cause this to fail. Which looks like an evil user could bypass ima by simply setting a mandatory lock on a file and not letting anyone else read it. Which makes vfs_read and thus kernel_read wildly inappropriate for what ima is trying to do.
Eric
Quoted 15 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 3 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Eric, this makes me think again that we should do
exit_task_namespaces()afterexit_task_work(). We already discussed this before, but this looks like another indication this change makes sense.I know you mentioned something about that. I haven't actually had much time to think about it.
Quoted 5 lines
The problem with
fput()fromfree_nsproxy()was hopefully also fixed bye7b2c4069252. The main motivation for "move" was "outside ofexit_notify". Even if we fix the paths abovetask_work_add()can have another user which wants ->nsproxy.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
What do you think?
I am scratching my head. Delayed work that depends on current sort of blows my mind.
But task_work_add(task) was specially introduced to run a callback in the task's context.
Quoted 1 line
That is utter nonsense.
Yes I agree, _perhaps_ we can fix this particular problem without changing the exit_namespace/work ordering, and perhaps this makes sense anyway.
Well. I _think_ that __fput() and ima_file_free() in particular should not depend on current and/or current->nsproxy. If nothing else, fput() can be called by the unrelated task which looks into /proc/pid/.
But again, task_work_add() has more and more users, and it seems that even __fput() paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow to use ->nsproxy in task_work_run.
Oleg.
Quoted 29 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 15 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 3 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Eric, this makes me think again that we should do
exit_task_namespaces()afterexit_task_work(). We already discussed this before, but this looks like another indication this change makes sense.I know you mentioned something about that. I haven't actually had much time to think about it.
Quoted 5 lines
The problem with
fput()fromfree_nsproxy()was hopefully also fixed bye7b2c4069252. The main motivation for "move" was "outside ofexit_notify". Even if we fix the paths abovetask_work_add()can have another user which wants ->nsproxy.Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
What do you think?
I am scratching my head. Delayed work that depends on current sort of blows my mind.
But
task_work_add(task)was specially introduced to run a callback in the task's context.Quoted 1 line
That is utter nonsense.
Yes I agree, _perhaps_ we can fix this particular problem without changing the exit_namespace/work ordering, and perhaps this makes sense anyway.
Quoted 7 lines
Well. I _think_ that
__fput()andima_file_free()in particular should not depend on current and/orcurrent->nsproxy. If nothing else,fput()can be called by the unrelated task which looks into/proc/pid/.But again,
task_work_add()has more and more users, and it seems that even__fput()paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow to use ->nsproxy intask_work_run.
Like I said, give me a clear motivating case. Right now not allowing nsproxy is turning up bugs in __fput. Which seems like a good thing.
Eric
Quoted 7 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 4 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Well. I _think_ that
__fput()andima_file_free()in particular should not depend on current and/orcurrent->nsproxy. If nothing else,fput()can be called by the unrelated task which looks into/proc/pid/.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
But again,
task_work_add()has more and more users, and it seems that even__fput()paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow to use ->nsproxy intask_work_run.Like I said, give me a clear motivating case.
I agree, we need a reason. Currently I do not see one.
Quoted 2 lines
Right now not allowing
nsproxy is turning up bugs in__fput. Which seems like a good thing.
This is what I certainly agree with ;)
Oleg.
Quoted 12 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 11 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Well. I _think_ that
__fput()andima_file_free()in particular should not depend on current and/orcurrent->nsproxy. If nothing else,fput()can be called by the unrelated task which looks into/proc/pid/.But again,
task_work_add()has more and more users, and it seems that even__fput()paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow to use ->nsproxy intask_work_run.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Like I said, give me a clear motivating case.
I agree, we need a reason. Currently I do not see one.
Quoted 2 lines
Right now not allowing
nsproxy is turning up bugs in__fput. Which seems like a good thing.This is what I certainly agree with ;)
Hi,
IMA uses kernel_read API which does not know anything about caller. And of course security frameworks are at guard as usual.
Exactly after reading first Eric's respons, I thought why to scratch the head when task work queues are indeed designed for tasks...
And if you to dig for the history, IMA-appraisal was stuck due to lockdep reporting even though it was on non-everlaping cases. IIRC files vs. directories...
After that IIRC Al Viro discussed about delayed fput and IIRC Oleg (sorry if I am wrong) introduced task work queues.
So IMA-appraisal was able to be upstreamed... That was ~3.4 time frame, IIRC
Name space also dated around ~3.4??
Apparmor namespace change was also around that time.
3.10 introduces this name space order change and broke IMA-appraisal.
Isn't it a clear motivating case???
- Dmitry
Quoted 6 lines
Oleg.
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Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Dmitry
Quoted 23 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 12 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 11 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Well. I _think_ that
__fput()andima_file_free()in particular should not depend on current and/orcurrent->nsproxy. If nothing else,fput()can be called by the unrelated task which looks into/proc/pid/.But again,
task_work_add()has more and more users, and it seems that even__fput()paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow to use ->nsproxy intask_work_run.Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Like I said, give me a clear motivating case.
I agree, we need a reason. Currently I do not see one.
Quoted 2 lines
Right now not allowing
nsproxy is turning up bugs in__fput. Which seems like a good thing.This is what I certainly agree with ;)
Quoted 7 lines
Hi,
IMA uses
kernel_readAPI which does not know anything about caller. And of course security frameworks are at guard as usual.Exactly after reading first Eric's respons, I thought why to scratch the head when task work queues are indeed designed for tasks...
__fput has no guarantee of running in the task that close the file descriptor. If your code depends on that your code is broken.
Quoted 7 lines
And if you to dig for the history, IMA-appraisal was stuck due to lockdep reporting even though it was on non-everlaping cases. IIRC files vs. directories...
After that IIRC Al Viro discussed about delayed fput and IIRC Oleg (sorry if I am wrong) introduced task work queues.
Quoted 6 lines
So IMA-appraisal was able to be upstreamed... That was ~3.4 time frame, IIRC
Name space also dated around ~3.4??
Apparmor namespace change was also around that time.3.10 introduces this name space order change and broke IMA-appraisal.
IMA-appraisal is fundamentally broken because I can take a mandatory file lock and prevent IMA-apprasial.
Using kernel_read is what allows this.
Quoted 1 line
Isn't it a clear motivating case???
kernel_read is not appropriate for IMA use. The rest of this is just the messenger.
IMA needs to use a cousin of kernel_read that operates at a lower level than vfs_read. A function that all of the permission checks and the fsnotify work.
I am sorry to be the bearer of bad news. But kernel_read is totally inappropriate for IMA.
Eric
Quoted 45 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 23 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 12 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 11 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Well. I _think_ that
__fput()andima_file_free()in particular should not depend on current and/orcurrent->nsproxy. If nothing else,fput()can be called by the unrelated task which looks into/proc/pid/.But again,
task_work_add()has more and more users, and it seems that even__fput()paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow to use ->nsproxy intask_work_run.Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Like I said, give me a clear motivating case.
I agree, we need a reason. Currently I do not see one.
Quoted 2 lines
Right now not allowing
nsproxy is turning up bugs in__fput. Which seems like a good thing.This is what I certainly agree with ;)
Quoted 7 lines
Hi,
IMA uses
kernel_readAPI which does not know anything about caller. And of course security frameworks are at guard as usual.Exactly after reading first Eric's respons, I thought why to scratch the head when task work queues are indeed designed for tasks...
__fputhas no guarantee of running in the task that close the file descriptor. If your code depends on that your code is broken.Quoted 9 lines
And if you to dig for the history, IMA-appraisal was stuck due to lockdep reporting even though it was on non-everlaping cases. IIRC files vs. directories...
After that IIRC Al Viro discussed about delayed fput and IIRC Oleg (sorry if I am wrong) introduced task work queues.
So IMA-appraisal was able to be upstreamed... That was ~3.4 time frame, IIRC
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Name space also dated around ~3.4??
Apparmor namespace change was also around that time.3.10 introduces this name space order change and broke IMA-appraisal.
IMA-appraisal is fundamentally broken because I can take a mandatory file lock and prevent IMA-apprasial.
What file lock are you talking about?
IMA-appraisal does not depends on file locks...
Quoted 7 lines
Using
kernel_readis what allows this.Quoted 1 line
Isn't it a clear motivating case???
kernel_readis not appropriate for IMA use. The rest of this is just the messenger.
Quoted 7 lines
IMA needs to use a cousin of
kernel_readthat operates at a lower level thanvfs_read. A function that all of the permission checks and the fsnotify work.I am sorry to be the bearer of bad news. But
kernel_readis totally inappropriate for IMA.
So you break IMA-appraisal and declare that it cannot be used now?
Quoted 2 lines
Eric
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Dmitry
Quoted 49 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 48 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 23 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 12 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 11 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Well. I _think_ that
__fput()andima_file_free()in particular should not depend on current and/orcurrent->nsproxy. If nothing else,fput()can be called by the unrelated task which looks into/proc/pid/.But again,
task_work_add()has more and more users, and it seems that even__fput()paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow to use ->nsproxy intask_work_run.Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Like I said, give me a clear motivating case.
I agree, we need a reason. Currently I do not see one.
Quoted 2 lines
Right now not allowing
nsproxy is turning up bugs in__fput. Which seems like a good thing.This is what I certainly agree with ;)
Quoted 7 lines
Hi,
IMA uses
kernel_readAPI which does not know anything about caller. And of course security frameworks are at guard as usual.Exactly after reading first Eric's respons, I thought why to scratch the head when task work queues are indeed designed for tasks...
__fputhas no guarantee of running in the task that close the file descriptor. If your code depends on that your code is broken.Quoted 12 lines
And if you to dig for the history, IMA-appraisal was stuck due to lockdep reporting even though it was on non-everlaping cases. IIRC files vs. directories...
After that IIRC Al Viro discussed about delayed fput and IIRC Oleg (sorry if I am wrong) introduced task work queues.
So IMA-appraisal was able to be upstreamed... That was ~3.4 time frame, IIRC
Name space also dated around ~3.4??
Apparmor namespace change was also around that time.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
3.10 introduces this name space order change and broke IMA-appraisal.
IMA-appraisal is fundamentally broken because I can take a mandatory file lock and prevent IMA-apprasial.
What file lock are you talking about?
IMA-appraisal does not depends on file locks...
It honors them. Look at rw_verify_area, in vfs_read, in kernel_read.
It sure looks like locks_mandatory_area can cause your kernel_read to fail.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Using
kernel_readis what allows this.Quoted 1 line
Isn't it a clear motivating case???
kernel_readis not appropriate for IMA use. The rest of this is just the messenger.IMA needs to use a cousin of
kernel_readthat operates at a lower level thanvfs_read. A function that all of the permission checks and the fsnotify work.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I am sorry to be the bearer of bad news. But
kernel_readis totally inappropriate for IMA.So you break IMA-appraisal and declare that it cannot be used now?
I didn't break it. I read the code, and I read the back trace to see where the bug was.
I see IMA-appraisal trying to read file data as if it were a user space application in such a way that it can get permission denied for a whole host of reasons.
My understanding of IMA-appraisal is that using a code path that can give use permission denined when performing appraisal is a way for clever people to attack and avoid IMA-appraisal without violating any security policy.
Am I wrong. Is it ok for IMA-appraisal to get permission denied when it wants to appraise a file?
Eric
Quoted 85 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 49 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 48 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 23 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 12 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 11 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Well. I _think_ that
__fput()andima_file_free()in particular should not depend on current and/orcurrent->nsproxy. If nothing else,fput()can be called by the unrelated task which looks into/proc/pid/.But again,
task_work_add()has more and more users, and it seems that even__fput()paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow to use ->nsproxy intask_work_run.Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Like I said, give me a clear motivating case.
I agree, we need a reason. Currently I do not see one.
Quoted 2 lines
Right now not allowing
nsproxy is turning up bugs in__fput. Which seems like a good thing.This is what I certainly agree with ;)
Quoted 7 lines
Hi,
IMA uses
kernel_readAPI which does not know anything about caller. And of course security frameworks are at guard as usual.Exactly after reading first Eric's respons, I thought why to scratch the head when task work queues are indeed designed for tasks...
__fputhas no guarantee of running in the task that close the file descriptor. If your code depends on that your code is broken.Quoted 12 lines
And if you to dig for the history, IMA-appraisal was stuck due to lockdep reporting even though it was on non-everlaping cases. IIRC files vs. directories...
After that IIRC Al Viro discussed about delayed fput and IIRC Oleg (sorry if I am wrong) introduced task work queues.
So IMA-appraisal was able to be upstreamed... That was ~3.4 time frame, IIRC
Name space also dated around ~3.4??
Apparmor namespace change was also around that time.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
3.10 introduces this name space order change and broke IMA-appraisal.
IMA-appraisal is fundamentally broken because I can take a mandatory file lock and prevent IMA-apprasial.
What file lock are you talking about?
IMA-appraisal does not depends on file locks...It honors them. Look at
rw_verify_area, invfs_read, inkernel_read.It sure looks like
locks_mandatory_areacan cause yourkernel_readto fail.Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Using
kernel_readis what allows this.Quoted 1 line
Isn't it a clear motivating case???
kernel_readis not appropriate for IMA use. The rest of this is just the messenger.IMA needs to use a cousin of
kernel_readthat operates at a lower level thanvfs_read. A function that all of the permission checks and the fsnotify work.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I am sorry to be the bearer of bad news. But
kernel_readis totally inappropriate for IMA.So you break IMA-appraisal and declare that it cannot be used now?
I didn't break it. I read the code, and I read the back trace to see where the bug was.
Quoted 9 lines
I see IMA-appraisal trying to read file data as if it were a user space application in such a way that it can get permission denied for a whole host of reasons.
My understanding of IMA-appraisal is that using a code path that can give use permission denined when performing appraisal is a way for clever people to attack and avoid IMA-appraisal without violating any security policy.
Interesting thing is that file was already open before and LSM gave OK for this. Then re-reading the file on close in fact does not need any LSM permission checks.
But as kernel_read API is still the same, it goes via the same checks...
But on close with delayed fput nsproxy is missing ....
Quoted 3 lines
Am I wrong. Is it ok for IMA-appraisal to get permission denied when it wants to appraise a file?
IMA is called after may_open...
Quoted 1 line
Eric
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Dmitry
Quoted 101 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 85 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 49 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 48 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 23 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 12 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 11 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Well. I _think_ that
__fput()andima_file_free()in particular should not depend on current and/orcurrent->nsproxy. If nothing else,fput()can be called by the unrelated task which looks into/proc/pid/.But again,
task_work_add()has more and more users, and it seems that even__fput()paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow to use ->nsproxy intask_work_run.Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Like I said, give me a clear motivating case.
I agree, we need a reason. Currently I do not see one.
Quoted 2 lines
Right now not allowing
nsproxy is turning up bugs in__fput. Which seems like a good thing.This is what I certainly agree with ;)
Quoted 7 lines
Hi,
IMA uses
kernel_readAPI which does not know anything about caller. And of course security frameworks are at guard as usual.Exactly after reading first Eric's respons, I thought why to scratch the head when task work queues are indeed designed for tasks...
__fputhas no guarantee of running in the task that close the file descriptor. If your code depends on that your code is broken.Quoted 12 lines
And if you to dig for the history, IMA-appraisal was stuck due to lockdep reporting even though it was on non-everlaping cases. IIRC files vs. directories...
After that IIRC Al Viro discussed about delayed fput and IIRC Oleg (sorry if I am wrong) introduced task work queues.
So IMA-appraisal was able to be upstreamed... That was ~3.4 time frame, IIRC
Name space also dated around ~3.4??
Apparmor namespace change was also around that time.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
3.10 introduces this name space order change and broke IMA-appraisal.
IMA-appraisal is fundamentally broken because I can take a mandatory file lock and prevent IMA-apprasial.
What file lock are you talking about?
IMA-appraisal does not depends on file locks...It honors them. Look at
rw_verify_area, invfs_read, inkernel_read.It sure looks like
locks_mandatory_areacan cause yourkernel_readto fail.Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Using
kernel_readis what allows this.Quoted 1 line
Isn't it a clear motivating case???
kernel_readis not appropriate for IMA use. The rest of this is just the messenger.IMA needs to use a cousin of
kernel_readthat operates at a lower level thanvfs_read. A function that all of the permission checks and the fsnotify work.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I am sorry to be the bearer of bad news. But
kernel_readis totally inappropriate for IMA.So you break IMA-appraisal and declare that it cannot be used now?
I didn't break it. I read the code, and I read the back trace to see where the bug was.
Quoted 9 lines
I see IMA-appraisal trying to read file data as if it were a user space application in such a way that it can get permission denied for a whole host of reasons.
My understanding of IMA-appraisal is that using a code path that can give use permission denined when performing appraisal is a way for clever people to attack and avoid IMA-appraisal without violating any security policy.
Interesting thing is that file was already open before and LSM gave OK for this. Then re-reading the file on close in fact does not need any LSM permission checks.
But askernel_readAPI is still the same, it goes via the same checks...
Quoted 12 lines
But on close with delayed fput nsproxy is missing ....
Quoted 3 lines
Am I wrong. Is it ok for IMA-appraisal to get permission denied when it wants to appraise a file?
IMA is called after
may_open...Quoted 1 line
Eric
Is it really a show stopper to switch order of 2 functions as quick fix? It was like that before 3.10 and seemed ok...
Quoted 4 lines
--
Thanks,
Dmitry
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Dmitry
Quoted 2 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Is it really a show stopper to switch order of 2 functions as quick fix? It was like that before 3.10 and seemed ok...
When that is the question. The answer is yes it is a show stopper.
A quick fix to bury a fundamental design flaw because the code previously seemed ok. That seems fundamentally wrong.
Having IMA conflict with Apparmor in Kconfig would be a sensible quick fix.
Eric
Quoted 7 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 2 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Is it really a show stopper to switch order of 2 functions as quick fix? It was like that before 3.10 and seemed ok...
When that is the question. The answer is yes it is a show stopper.
Quoted 7 lines
A quick fix to bury a fundamental design flaw because the code previously seemed ok. That seems fundamentally wrong.
Having IMA conflict with Apparmor in
Kconfigwould be a sensible quick fix.Eric
Conflict with Apparmor means with Ubuntu.
But answering to your early question..
IMA does not want permission denied when measuring and re-measuring files. may_open() is doing that job before.
We need quickly introduce kernel_read without LSM checks...
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Dmitry
Quoted 7 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Conflict with Apparmor means with Ubuntu.
But answering to your early question..
IMA does not want permission denied when measuring and re-measuring files.may_open()is doing that job before.We need quickly introduce
kernel_readwithout LSM checks...
*snarl*
What we need quickly is to introduce you to a textbook or two. As the matter of fact, in this case even wikipedia might suffice...
Please, figure out what "mandatory locking" is about, what kind of exclusion does it provide and how much is it (un)related to LSM.
It has nothing to do with permission being denied; the normal behaviour is to *block* until the lock has been removed. Or failure with -EAGAIN if the file had been opened with O_NDELAY.
The effects apply only to read/write and their ilk; they have nothing to do with e.g. O_RDWR open(). And having a file already opened r/w by somebody does not prevent another process from opening it and acquiring an exclusive lock on some range.
Quoted 8 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 6 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Conflict with Apparmor means with Ubuntu.
But answering to your early question..
IMA does not want permission denied when measuring and re-measuring files.may_open()is doing that job before.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
We need quickly introduce
kernel_readwithout LSM checks...*snarl*
What we need quickly is to introduce you to a textbook or two. As the matter of fact, in this case even wikipedia might suffice...
Hopefully we have you who were introduced to a textbook or two about relevant subject and able kindly help us with the solution instead of telling me this crap...
Quoted 3 lines
Please, figure out what "mandatory locking" is about, what kind of exclusion does it provide and how much is it (un)related to LSM.
I admit, I missed this issue, but see above, we have you :)
Quoted 8 lines
It has nothing to do with permission being denied; the normal behaviour is to *block* until the lock has been removed. Or failure with
-EAGAINif the file had been opened withO_NDELAY.The effects apply only to read/write and their ilk; they have nothing to do with e.g.
O_RDWRopen(). And having a file already opened r/w by somebody does not prevent another process from opening it and acquiring an exclusive lock on some range.
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Dmitry
Quoted 13 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 12 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 7 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Conflict with Apparmor means with Ubuntu.
But answering to your early question..
IMA does not want permission denied when measuring and re-measuring files.may_open()is doing that job before.We need quickly introduce
kernel_readwithout LSM checks...*snarl*
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
What we need quickly is to introduce you to a textbook or two. As the matter of fact, in this case even wikipedia might suffice...
Hopefully we have you who were introduced to a textbook or two about relevant subject and able kindly help us with the solution instead of telling me this crap...
See the discussion of that very topic (required modifications of vfs_read()) upthread. And Eric has a very good point about the usefulness of understanding the basics of IO-related system calls in Unix for anybody who does any kind of development related to keeping track of file contents modifications, etc. It's *not* about some arcane knowledge of VFS internals (which also might come handy when sticking hooks into said internals); it's about being familiar with the semantics of read(2) and related concepts.
Quoted 22 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 13 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 12 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 7 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Conflict with Apparmor means with Ubuntu.
But answering to your early question..
IMA does not want permission denied when measuring and re-measuring files.may_open()is doing that job before.We need quickly introduce
kernel_readwithout LSM checks...*snarl*
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
What we need quickly is to introduce you to a textbook or two. As the matter of fact, in this case even wikipedia might suffice...
Hopefully we have you who were introduced to a textbook or two about relevant subject and able kindly help us with the solution instead of telling me this crap...
Quoted 7 lines
See the discussion of that very topic (required modifications of
vfs_read()) upthread. And Eric has a very good point about the usefulness of understanding the basics of IO-related system calls in Unix for anybody who does any kind of development related to keeping track of file contents modifications, etc. It's *not* about some arcane knowledge of VFS internals (which also might come handy when sticking hooks into said internals); it's about being familiar with the semantics of read(2) and related concepts.
Great. Teaching discussions are over?
So how we will solve the problem reported in this thread?
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Dmitry
Quoted 96 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 85 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 49 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 48 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 23 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 12 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 11 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Well. I _think_ that
__fput()andima_file_free()in particular should not depend on current and/orcurrent->nsproxy. If nothing else,fput()can be called by the unrelated task which looks into/proc/pid/.But again,
task_work_add()has more and more users, and it seems that even__fput()paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow to use ->nsproxy intask_work_run.Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Like I said, give me a clear motivating case.
I agree, we need a reason. Currently I do not see one.
Quoted 2 lines
Right now not allowing
nsproxy is turning up bugs in__fput. Which seems like a good thing.This is what I certainly agree with ;)
Quoted 7 lines
Hi,
IMA uses
kernel_readAPI which does not know anything about caller. And of course security frameworks are at guard as usual.Exactly after reading first Eric's respons, I thought why to scratch the head when task work queues are indeed designed for tasks...
__fputhas no guarantee of running in the task that close the file descriptor. If your code depends on that your code is broken.Quoted 12 lines
And if you to dig for the history, IMA-appraisal was stuck due to lockdep reporting even though it was on non-everlaping cases. IIRC files vs. directories...
After that IIRC Al Viro discussed about delayed fput and IIRC Oleg (sorry if I am wrong) introduced task work queues.
So IMA-appraisal was able to be upstreamed... That was ~3.4 time frame, IIRC
Name space also dated around ~3.4??
Apparmor namespace change was also around that time.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
3.10 introduces this name space order change and broke IMA-appraisal.
IMA-appraisal is fundamentally broken because I can take a mandatory file lock and prevent IMA-apprasial.
What file lock are you talking about?
IMA-appraisal does not depends on file locks...It honors them. Look at
rw_verify_area, invfs_read, inkernel_read.It sure looks like
locks_mandatory_areacan cause yourkernel_readto fail.Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Using
kernel_readis what allows this.Quoted 1 line
Isn't it a clear motivating case???
kernel_readis not appropriate for IMA use. The rest of this is just the messenger.IMA needs to use a cousin of
kernel_readthat operates at a lower level thanvfs_read. A function that all of the permission checks and the fsnotify work.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I am sorry to be the bearer of bad news. But
kernel_readis totally inappropriate for IMA.So you break IMA-appraisal and declare that it cannot be used now?
I didn't break it. I read the code, and I read the back trace to see where the bug was.
Quoted 9 lines
I see IMA-appraisal trying to read file data as if it were a user space application in such a way that it can get permission denied for a whole host of reasons.
My understanding of IMA-appraisal is that using a code path that can give use permission denined when performing appraisal is a way for clever people to attack and avoid IMA-appraisal without violating any security policy.
Quoted 3 lines
Interesting thing is that file was already open before and LSM gave OK for this. Then re-reading the file on close in fact does not need any LSM permission checks.
And LSM are typically an implementation of mandatory access control. Which means they do the crazy thing of checking every file operation. Which means from one operation to the next they can give you -EPERM.
Quoted 3 lines
But as
kernel_readAPI is still the same, it goes via the same checks...But on close with delayed fput nsproxy is missing ....
And you might right in the same processor or you might be called in a completely different process with completely different credentials and security labels and the the lsm instead of crashing would silently tell you no, and you have even stranger bugs to track down.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Am I wrong. Is it ok for IMA-appraisal to get permission denied when it wants to appraise a file?
IMA is called after
may_open...
Which in the case of mandatory file locking, or lsms means little.
I am afraid your mental model of where linux does permission checks is about 20 years out of date. Which is interesting to say to an lsm maintainer...
Eric
Quoted 106 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 96 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 85 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 49 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 48 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 23 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 12 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 11 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Well. I _think_ that
__fput()andima_file_free()in particular should not depend on current and/orcurrent->nsproxy. If nothing else,fput()can be called by the unrelated task which looks into/proc/pid/.But again,
task_work_add()has more and more users, and it seems that even__fput()paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow to use ->nsproxy intask_work_run.Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Like I said, give me a clear motivating case.
I agree, we need a reason. Currently I do not see one.
Quoted 2 lines
Right now not allowing
nsproxy is turning up bugs in__fput. Which seems like a good thing.This is what I certainly agree with ;)
Quoted 7 lines
Hi,
IMA uses
kernel_readAPI which does not know anything about caller. And of course security frameworks are at guard as usual.Exactly after reading first Eric's respons, I thought why to scratch the head when task work queues are indeed designed for tasks...
__fputhas no guarantee of running in the task that close the file descriptor. If your code depends on that your code is broken.Quoted 12 lines
And if you to dig for the history, IMA-appraisal was stuck due to lockdep reporting even though it was on non-everlaping cases. IIRC files vs. directories...
After that IIRC Al Viro discussed about delayed fput and IIRC Oleg (sorry if I am wrong) introduced task work queues.
So IMA-appraisal was able to be upstreamed... That was ~3.4 time frame, IIRC
Name space also dated around ~3.4??
Apparmor namespace change was also around that time.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
3.10 introduces this name space order change and broke IMA-appraisal.
IMA-appraisal is fundamentally broken because I can take a mandatory file lock and prevent IMA-apprasial.
What file lock are you talking about?
IMA-appraisal does not depends on file locks...It honors them. Look at
rw_verify_area, invfs_read, inkernel_read.It sure looks like
locks_mandatory_areacan cause yourkernel_readto fail.Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Using
kernel_readis what allows this.Quoted 1 line
Isn't it a clear motivating case???
kernel_readis not appropriate for IMA use. The rest of this is just the messenger.IMA needs to use a cousin of
kernel_readthat operates at a lower level thanvfs_read. A function that all of the permission checks and the fsnotify work.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I am sorry to be the bearer of bad news. But
kernel_readis totally inappropriate for IMA.So you break IMA-appraisal and declare that it cannot be used now?
I didn't break it. I read the code, and I read the back trace to see where the bug was.
Quoted 9 lines
I see IMA-appraisal trying to read file data as if it were a user space application in such a way that it can get permission denied for a whole host of reasons.
My understanding of IMA-appraisal is that using a code path that can give use permission denined when performing appraisal is a way for clever people to attack and avoid IMA-appraisal without violating any security policy.
Quoted 3 lines
Interesting thing is that file was already open before and LSM gave OK for this. Then re-reading the file on close in fact does not need any LSM permission checks.
And LSM are typically an implementation of mandatory access control. Which means they do the crazy thing of checking every file operation. Which means from one operation to the next they can give you
-EPERM.
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But as
kernel_readAPI is still the same, it goes via the same checks...But on close with delayed fput nsproxy is missing ....
And you might right in the same processor or you might be called in a completely different process with completely different credentials and security labels and the the lsm instead of crashing would silently tell you no, and you have even stranger bugs to track down.
task works are supposed to be called from process context and credentials should stay the same on any CPU.
Isn't it?
And not taking into account to IMA, reverse order of exit_taskwork and exit_namespaces
looks reasonable as it was before.
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Am I wrong. Is it ok for IMA-appraisal to get permission denied when it wants to appraise a file?
IMA is called after
may_open...Which in the case of mandatory file locking, or lsms means little.
No, it does not mean little.
LSMs, which are AC models, can only impose additional restrictions, not to relax them.
IMA is not AC LSM, it is integrity verification module.
But follows the same principal.
It may further to restrict the access by performing integrity checks... It makes sure that that "OK" decision granted by LSM, was actually based on trustworthy
file credentials...
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I am afraid your mental model of where linux does permission checks is about 20 years out of date. Which is interesting to say to an lsm maintainer...
Be sure it's not. I am quite aware where linux does permission checks.
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Eric
IMA does kernel_read at file open.
At that point, security_file_permission might have certain sense as process will be reading file after that.
Though, it will also happen during real file access..
In the case of IMA-appraisal, on file close, indeed file_permission check is useless.
It may be "utter nonsense" as you say.
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Thanks, Dmitry
Quoted 5 lines · Eric W. Biederman
IMA-appraisal is fundamentally broken because I can take a mandatory file lock and prevent IMA-apprasial.
Using
kernel_readis what allows this.
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Isn't it a clear motivating case???
kernel_readis not appropriate for IMA use. The rest of this is just the messenger.IMA needs to use a cousin of
kernel_readthat operates at a lower level thanvfs_read. A function that all of the permission checks and the fsnotify work.
It's worse than that, actually ;-/ IMA hooks in __fput() have interesting interplay with revoke-related stuff as well. Another very messy thing in the same area is that it actually does ->read() from under ->i_mutex, leading to all kinds of interesting locking issues...
I doubt that your "let's open-code vfs_read() guts" would be a good idea; if nothing else, it might make more sense to make rw_verify_area() skip the mandlock and security theatre when called in such situation.
What a mess... ;-/
Quoted 21 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 5 lines · Eric W. Biederman
IMA-appraisal is fundamentally broken because I can take a mandatory file lock and prevent IMA-apprasial.
Using
kernel_readis what allows this.Quoted 8 lines
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Isn't it a clear motivating case???
kernel_readis not appropriate for IMA use. The rest of this is just the messenger.IMA needs to use a cousin of
kernel_readthat operates at a lower level thanvfs_read. A function that all of the permission checks and the fsnotify work.It's worse than that, actually ;-/ IMA hooks in
__fput()have interesting interplay with revoke-related stuff as well. Another very messy thing in the same area is that it actually does ->read() from under ->i_mutex, leading to all kinds of interesting locking issues...
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I doubt that your "let's open-code
vfs_read()guts" would be a good idea; if nothing else, it might make more sense to makerw_verify_area()skip the mandlock and security theatre when called in such situation.What a mess... ;-/
Agreed.
All I really meant is that vfs_read does too much, so it probably needs to be refactored for this case. But fsnotify_read, add_rchar, and inc_syscr all seem inappropriate.
So I think we might be able to get away with something like this:
ssize_t __vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
ssize_t ret;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
return -EBADF;
if (!file->f_op->read && !file->f_op->aio_read)
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, count)))
return -EFAULT;
if (ret >= 0) {
count = ret;
if (file->f_op->read)
ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos);
else
ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
}
return ret;
}How much of the rest we do really would seem to depend on how valuable the sanity checks are.
This area of code keeps evolving enough that I don't see how we could possibly avoid going through helper functions to figure out which file ops we want to use this week.
Eric
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ssize_t__vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos){ ssize_t ret; if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) return -EBADF; if (!file->f_op->read && !file->f_op->aio_read) return -EINVAL; if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, count))) return -EFAULT; if (ret >= 0) { count = ret;
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if (file->f_op->read) ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos); else ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos); } return ret; }
... which lacks the f_pos wraparound, etc. checks done by rw_verify_area(). IOW, it's one more place to grep through while verifying that ->read() et.al. do not get called with such arguments.
fanotify probably could be skipped - ask the security circus crowd about that one, it's their bast^Wbaby. add_rchar() and inc_syscr()... depends on whether you want those reads hidden from accounting.
Quoted 21 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 19 lines · Eric W. Biederman
ssize_t__vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos){ ssize_t ret; if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) return -EBADF; if (!file->f_op->read && !file->f_op->aio_read) return -EINVAL; if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, count))) return -EFAULT; if (ret >= 0) { count = ret; if (file->f_op->read) ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos); else ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos); }
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return ret; }... which lacks the
f_poswraparound, etc. checks done byrw_verify_area(). IOW, it's one more place to grep through while verifying that ->read() et.al. do not get called with such arguments.
Agreed it must be done more delicately than my sketch. I am not familiar with how much value such sanity checks add. Especially when the read is not coming from a potentially hostile userspace.
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fanotify probably could be skipped - ask the security circus crowd about that one, it's their bast^Wbaby.
When the point is having a factor of read that skips the security circus I think it makes sense to skip this too. At least as a starting position.
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add_rchar()andinc_syscr()... depends on whether you want those reads hidden from accounting.
I doubt it matters in practice, the code is cheap.
Still it feels wrong to account reads to a task that did not ask for them. It feels more correct to account that kind of read into a different bucket. Say the reads performed by the kernel for mysterious kernel activities.
Eric
My apologies for those receiving this post a 2nd time. The original post never made it the mailing lists ...
Quoted 26 lines · Eric W. Biederman
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Quoted 21 lines · Eric W. Biederman
ssize_t__vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos){ ssize_t ret; if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) return -EBADF; if (!file->f_op->read && !file->f_op->aio_read) return -EINVAL; if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, count))) return -EFAULT; if (ret >= 0) { count = ret; if (file->f_op->read) ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos); else ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos); } return ret; }
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... which lacks the
f_poswraparound, etc. checks done byrw_verify_area(). IOW, it's one more place to grep through while verifying that ->read() et.al. do not get called with such arguments.Agreed it must be done more delicately than my sketch. I am not familiar with how much value such sanity checks add. Especially when the read is not coming from a potentially hostile userspace.
Sorry for the delay in commenting, imap problems. This sounds like a plausible solution, similar to __vfs_setxattr_noperm() vs. __vfs_setxattr().
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fanotify probably could be skipped - ask the security circus crowd about that one, it's their bast^Wbaby.
When the point is having a factor of read that skips the security circus I think it makes sense to skip this too. At least as a starting position.
Right, fsnotify*() is meant for userspace access, not kernel access. CC'ing Eric Paris for comment.
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add_rchar()andinc_syscr()... depends on whether you want those reads hidden from accounting.I doubt it matters in practice, the code is cheap.
Still it feels wrong to account reads to a task that did not ask for them. It feels more correct to account that kind of read into a different bucket. Say the reads performed by the kernel for mysterious kernel activities.
Ok. So who are the interested parties that need to be included in this discussion?
thanks,
Mimi