Trusted kernel patchset
(Posting as core rather than tech because I suspect this is more political than technical at this point)
Most major distributions ship these. There is strong demand from Google, who want to use them in a use-case that has nothing to do with UEFI Secure Boot. Making a distinction between root and kernel security is a necessary part of securing a boot chain[1].
Yet, after apparently gaining at least a rough consensus at LPC last year, we're now at the point where there's yet another suggestion for how to rewrite them but absolutely nobody showing any signs of being willing to do that work or any agreement from anyone in the security community that entirely reworking capabilities is either practical or desirable.
It'd be nice to have this done before August, but given that all previous attempts to actually get it unblocked on mailing lists have failed maybe we should talk about it in person. Again.
[1] See: the large number of people running modified kernels on their Android devices by using the signed vendor kernel to kexec them. Great for freedom, bad for the guarantees you were attempting to provide regarding trusted code
Signature · 1 line
Matthew Garrett | [email protected]
Quoted 15 lines · Matthew Garrett
(Posting as core rather than tech because I suspect this is more political than technical at this point)
Most major distributions ship these. There is strong demand from Google, who want to use them in a use-case that has nothing to do with UEFI Secure Boot. Making a distinction between root and kernel security is a necessary part of securing a boot chain[1].
Yet, after apparently gaining at least a rough consensus at LPC last year, we're now at the point where there's yet another suggestion for how to rewrite them but absolutely nobody showing any signs of being willing to do that work or any agreement from anyone in the security community that entirely reworking capabilities is either practical or desirable.
Quoted 3 lines
It'd be nice to have this done before August, but given that all previous attempts to actually get it unblocked on mailing lists have failed maybe we should talk about it in person. Again.
I think it's fairly obvious I'd like to attend this. Other suggested people would be:
James Bottomley
James Morris
Kees Cook
Joey Li
Gary Lin
Vojtech Pavlik
josh
Quoted 8 lines · Matthew Garrett
(Posting as core rather than tech because I suspect this is more political than technical at this point)
Most major distributions ship these. There is strong demand from Google, who want to use them in a use-case that has nothing to do with UEFI Secure Boot. Making a distinction between root and kernel security is a necessary part of securing a boot chain[1].
Quoted 6 lines
Yet, after apparently gaining at least a rough consensus at LPC last year, we're now at the point where there's yet another suggestion for how to rewrite them but absolutely nobody showing any signs of being willing to do that work or any agreement from anyone in the security community that entirely reworking capabilities is either practical or desirable.
I am very interested in this, both from the POV of how capabilities do and/or should work, and of what trusted boot should do.
There is a lot of very vocal opposition to any change in the way that capabilities work, and I think that, at some point, it might be helpful if enough people who think that capabilities can change reached some kind of consensus so that something can be done.
That being said, capabilities are a giant mess, and it might be really hard to fix them.
--Andy