KEYS: Improve asymmetric key and PKCS#7 handling [ver #2]
Subsystems (11)
David Howells
maintainercover KEYS: Improve asymmetric key and PKCS#7 handling [ver #2]
Here are some patches to improve the matching of asymmetric keys and to improve the handling of PKCS#7 certificates:
(1) Provide a method to preparse the data supplied for matching a key. This permits they key type to extract out the bits it needs for matching once only.
Further, the type of search (direct lookup or iterative) can be set and the function used to actually check the match can be set by preparse rather than being hard coded for the type.
(2) Improves asymmetric keys identification.
Keys derived from X.509 certs now get labelled with IDs derived from their issuer and certificate number (required to match PKCS#7) and from their SKID and subject (required to match X.509).
IDs are now binary and match criterion preparsing is provided so that criteria can be turned into binary blobs to make matching faster.
(3) Improves PKCS#7 message handling to permit PKCS#7 messages without X.509 cert lists to be matched to trusted keys, thereby allowing minimally sized PKCS#7 certs to be used.
(4) Improves PKCS#7 message handling to better handle certificate chains that are broken due to unsupported crypto that can otherwise by used to intersect a trust keyring.
They can be found here also:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-pkcs7
Changes:
(*) Documentation for the keys API changes.
(*) Doc comments and exports put on new key ID functions that are used across
modules.
(*) The four debugging 0xff bytes are removed from the middle of key IDs.
(*) Attempt to suppress the warning about not checking the redundant return
of hex2bin().
(*) pkcs->unsupported_crypto can be removed in favour of working the error
code out in pkcs7_validate_trust() from the error codes of pkcs7_validate_trust_one().
(*) bin2hex() now uses hex_byte_pack().
(*) KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE is unused and got removed.
(*) ctx.match_data.cmp will always be set in keyring_search() so the check
for NULL there can be removed.
David
---
David Howells (10):
Provide a binary to hex conversion function
KEYS: Preparse match data
KEYS: Remove key_type::def_lookup_type
KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
KEYS: Make the key matching functions return bool
KEYS: Update the keyrings documentation for match changes
KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto
PKCS#7: Handle PKCS#7 messages that contain no X.509 certs
Documentation/security/keys.txt | 65 +++++++- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h | 8 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 222 +++++++++++++++++++++-------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | 2 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 38 ++++- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 6 - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 82 +++++++---- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 102 +++++++++---- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 55 ++++--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 6 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 102 ++++++++----- fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c | 1 fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 1 fs/nfs/idmap.c | 2 include/crypto/public_key.h | 5 - include/keys/asymmetric-type.h | 38 +++++ include/keys/user-type.h | 1 include/linux/kernel.h | 1 include/linux/key-type.h | 34 ++++ lib/hexdump.c | 16 ++ net/ceph/crypto.c | 1 net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 18 ++ net/rxrpc/ar-key.c | 2 security/keys/big_key.c | 2 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 1 security/keys/internal.h | 21 +-- security/keys/key.c | 2 security/keys/keyring.c | 58 +++++--- security/keys/proc.c | 8 + security/keys/process_keys.c | 13 +- security/keys/request_key.c | 21 ++- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 6 - security/keys/trusted.c | 1 security/keys/user_defined.c | 14 -- 34 files changed, 649 insertions(+), 306 deletions(-)
David Howells
maintainerPATCH 1/10 Provide a binary to hex conversion function [ver #2]
Provide a function to convert a buffer of binary data into an unterminated ascii hex string representation of that data.
---
include/linux/kernel.h | 1 + lib/hexdump.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
include/linux/kernel.h +1 -0
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static inline char *hex_byte_pack_upper(char *buf, u8 byte)extern int hex_to_bin (char ch);extern int __must_check hex2bin (u8 *dst,const char *src,size_t count); +extern char *bin2hex (char *dst,const void *src,size_t count);bool mac_pton (const char *s,u8 *mac);
lib/hexdump.c +16 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,22 @@ int hex2bin(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t count)EXPORT_SYMBOL (hex2bin);/** +* bin2hex - convert binary data to an ascii hexadecimal string +* @dst: ascii hexadecimal result +* @src: binary data +* @count: binary data length +*/ +char *bin2hex (char *dst,const void *src,size_t count) +{ +const unsigned char *_src = src; + +while (count--) + dst =hex_byte_pack (dst, *_src++); +return dst; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (bin2hex); + +/** * hex_dump_to_buffer - convert a blob of data to "hex ASCII" in memory * @buf: data blob to dump * @len: number of bytes in the @buf
David Howells
maintainerPATCH 2/10 KEYS: Preparse match data [ver #2]
In reply to David HowellsPreparse the match data. This provides several advantages:
(1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front.
(2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs).
(3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed. This means that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type.
(4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function.
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++- include/keys/user-type.h | 4 ++ include/linux/key-type.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++-- net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 5 ++- security/keys/internal.h | 8 ++--- security/keys/keyring.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++------------ security/keys/proc.c | 8 ++--- security/keys/process_keys.c | 13 ++++---- security/keys/request_key.c | 21 ++++++++++--- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 6 ++-- security/keys/user_defined.c | 4 +- 11 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +30 -1
@@ -59,9 +59,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);* "id:<id>" - request a key matching the ID * "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype */ -static int asymmetric_key_match (const struct key *key,const void *description) +static int asymmetric_key_match (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data) {const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype =asymmetric_key_subtype (key); +const char *description = match_data->raw_data;const char *spec = description;const char *id;ptrdiff_t speclen;
@@ -94,6 +96,31 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description) }/* +* Preparse the match criterion. If we don't set lookup_type and cmp, +* the default will be an exact match on the key description. +* +* There are some specifiers for matching key IDs rather than by the key +* description: +* +* "id:<id>" - request a key by any available ID +* +* These have to be searched by iteration rather than by direct lookup because +* the key is hashed according to its description. +*/ +static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse (struct key_match_data *match_data) +{ + match_data->lookup_type =KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE ; +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Free the preparsed the match criterion. +*/ +static void asymmetric_key_match_free (struct key_match_data *match_data) +{ +} + +/* * Describe the asymmetric key */ static void asymmetric_key_describe (const struct key *key,struct seq_file *m)
@@ -196,7 +223,9 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = { .preparse = asymmetric_key_preparse, .free_preparse = asymmetric_key_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, + .match_preparse = asymmetric_key_match_preparse, .match = asymmetric_key_match, + .match_free = asymmetric_key_match_free, .destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy, .describe = asymmetric_key_describe, .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE,
include/keys/user-type.h +3 -1
@@ -36,11 +36,13 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_user;extern struct key_type key_type_logon;struct key_preparsed_payload ; +struct key_match_data ;extern int user_preparse (struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);extern void user_free_preparse (struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);extern int user_update (struct key *key,struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); -extern int user_match (const struct key *key,const void *criterion); +extern int user_match (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data);extern void user_revoke (struct key *key);extern void user_destroy (struct key *key);extern void user_describe (const struct key *user,struct seq_file *m);
include/linux/key-type.h +28 -3
@@ -53,6 +53,22 @@ typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key, const char *op, void *aux);/* +* Preparsed matching criterion. +*/ +struct key_match_data { +/* Comparison function, defaults to type->match, but can be replaced by +* type->match_preparse(). */ +int (*cmp)(const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data); + +const void *raw_data;/* Raw match data */ +void *preparsed;/* For ->match_preparse() to stash stuff */ +unsigned lookup_type;/* Type of lookup for this search. */ +#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT 0x0000/* Direct lookup by description. */ +#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE 0x0001/* Iterative search. */ +}; + +/* * kernel managed key type definition */ struct key_type {
@@ -67,8 +83,6 @@ struct key_type {/* Default key search algorithm. */ unsigned def_lookup_type; -#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT 0x0000/* Direct lookup by description. */ -#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE 0x0001/* Iterative search. */ /* vet a description */ int (*vet_description)(const char *description);
@@ -96,8 +110,19 @@ struct key_type {*/ int (*update)(struct key *key,struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); +/* Preparse the data supplied to ->match() (optional). The +* data to be preparsed can be found in match_data->raw_data. +* The lookup type can also be set by this function. +*/ +int (*match_preparse)(struct key_match_data *match_data); +/* match a key against a description */ -int (*match)(const struct key *key,const void *desc); +int (*match)(const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data); + +/* Free preparsed match data (optional). This should be supplied it +* ->match_preparse() is supplied. */ +void (*match_free)(struct key_match_data *match_data);/* clear some of the data from a key on revokation (optional) * - the key's semaphore will be write-locked by the caller
net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +3 -2
@@ -177,10 +177,11 @@ static void dns_resolver_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)* should end with a period). The domain name is case-independent. */ static int -dns_resolver_match (const struct key *key,const void *description) +dns_resolver_match (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data) {int slen, dlen, ret =0 ; -const char *src = key->description, *dsp = description; +const char *src = key->description, *dsp = match_data->raw_data;kenter ("%s,%s" , src, dsp);
security/keys/internal.h +3 -5
@@ -107,13 +107,10 @@ extern int iterate_over_keyring(const struct key *keyring,int (*func)(const struct key *key,void *data), void *data); -typedef int (*key_match_func_t )(const struct key *,const void *); -struct keyring_search_context {struct keyring_index_key index_key;const struct cred *cred; -key_match_func_t match; -const void *match_data; +struct key_match_data match_data;unsigned flags;#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE 0x0001/* [as type->def_lookup_type] */ #define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK 0x0002/* Skip state checks */
@@ -152,7 +149,8 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,struct key *dest_keyring, unsigned long flags); -extern int lookup_user_key_possessed (const struct key *key,const void *target); +extern int lookup_user_key_possessed (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data);extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key (key_serial_t id,unsigned long flags,key_perm_t perm);#define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE 0x01
security/keys/keyring.c +30 -19
89 lines not on this page · raw message
security/keys/proc.c +4 -4
@@ -194,10 +194,10 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) .index_key.type = key->type, .index_key.description = key->description, .cred = current_cred(), - .match = lookup_user_key_possessed, - .match_data = key, - .flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK | - KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT), + .match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed, + .match_data.raw_data = key, + .match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, + .flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK, }; key_ref =make_key_ref (key,0 );
security/keys/process_keys.c +7 -6
@@ -489,9 +489,10 @@ found:/* * See if the key we're looking at is the target key. */ -int lookup_user_key_possessed (const struct key *key,const void *target) +int lookup_user_key_possessed (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data) { -return key == target; +return key == match_data->raw_data; }/*
@@ -516,9 +517,9 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, key_perm_t perm) {struct keyring_search_context ctx = { - .match = lookup_user_key_possessed, - .flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK | -KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT ), + .match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed, + .match_data.lookup_type =KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT , + .flags =KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK , };struct request_key_auth *rka;struct key *key;
@@ -673,7 +674,7 @@ try_again: ctx.index_key.type = key->type; ctx.index_key.description = key->description; ctx.index_key.desc_len =strlen (key->description); - ctx.match_data = key; + ctx.match_data.raw_data = key;kdebug ("check possessed" ); skey_ref =search_process_keyrings (&ctx);kdebug ("possessed=%p" , skey_ref);
security/keys/request_key.c +16 -5
@@ -513,9 +513,9 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, .index_key.type = type, .index_key.description = description, .cred = current_cred(), - .match = type->match, - .match_data = description, - .flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, + .match_data.cmp = type->match, + .match_data.raw_data = description, + .match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, };struct key *key;key_ref_t key_ref;
@@ -525,6 +525,14 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description, callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags); +if (type->match_preparse) { + ret = type->match_preparse (&ctx.match_data); +if (ret <0 ) { + key =ERR_PTR (ret); + goto error; + } + } +/* search all the process keyrings for a key */ key_ref =search_process_keyrings (&ctx);
@@ -537,7 +545,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,if (ret <0 ) {key_put (key); key =ERR_PTR (ret); - goto error; + goto error_free; } } }else if (PTR_ERR (key_ref) != -EAGAIN ) {
@@ -547,12 +555,15 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,* should consult userspace if we can */ key =ERR_PTR (-ENOKEY );if (!callout_info) - goto error; + goto error_free; key =construct_key_and_link (&ctx, callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags); } +error_free: +if (type->match_free) + type->match_free (&ctx.match_data); error:kleave (" = %p" , key);return key;
security/keys/request_key_auth.c +3 -3
@@ -246,9 +246,9 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id) .index_key.type = &key_type_request_key_auth, .index_key.description = description, .cred = current_cred(), - .match = user_match, - .match_data = description, - .flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, + .match_data.cmp = user_match, + .match_data.raw_data = description, + .match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, };struct key *authkey;key_ref_t authkey_ref;
security/keys/user_defined.c +2 -2
@@ -141,9 +141,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_update);/* * match users on their name */ -int user_match (const struct key *key,const void *description) +int user_match (const struct key *key,const struct key_match_data *match_data) { -return strcmp (key->description, description) ==0 ; +return strcmp (key->description, match_data->raw_data) ==0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (user_match);
David Howells
maintainerPATCH 3/10 KEYS: Remove key_type::def_lookup_type [ver #2]
In reply to David HowellsRemove key_type::def_lookup_type as it's no longer used. The information now defaults to KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT but may be overridden by type->match_preparse().
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | 1 - include/linux/key-type.h | 3 --- security/keys/big_key.c | 1 - security/keys/internal.h | 11 +++++------ security/keys/user_defined.c | 2 -- 6 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +0 -1
@@ -228,7 +228,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = { .match_free = asymmetric_key_match_free, .destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy, .describe = asymmetric_key_describe, - .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE, };EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (key_type_asymmetric);
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c +0 -1
@@ -72,7 +72,6 @@ error:*/ static struct key_type key_type_pkcs7 = { .name ="pkcs7_test" , - .def_lookup_type =KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT , .preparse = pkcs7_preparse, .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
include/linux/key-type.h +0 -3
@@ -81,9 +81,6 @@ struct key_type {*/ size_t def_datalen; -/* Default key search algorithm. */ -unsigned def_lookup_type; -/* vet a description */ int (*vet_description)(const char *description);
security/keys/big_key.c +0 -1
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");*/ struct key_type key_type_big_key = { .name ="big_key" , - .def_lookup_type =KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT , .preparse = big_key_preparse, .free_preparse = big_key_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
security/keys/internal.h +5 -6
@@ -112,12 +112,11 @@ struct keyring_search_context {const struct cred *cred;struct key_match_data match_data;unsigned flags; -#define KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_TYPE 0x0001/* [as type->def_lookup_type] */ -#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK 0x0002/* Skip state checks */ -#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK 0x0004/* Override NO_STATE_CHECK */ -#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME 0x0008/* Don't update times */ -#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM 0x0010/* Don't check permissions */ -#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP 0x0020/* Give an error on excessive depth */ +#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK 0x0001/* Skip state checks */ +#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK 0x0002/* Override NO_STATE_CHECK */ +#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME 0x0004/* Don't update times */ +#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM 0x0008/* Don't check permissions */ +#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP 0x0010/* Give an error on excessive depth */ int (*iterator)(const void *object,void *iterator_data);
security/keys/user_defined.c +0 -2
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc);*/ struct key_type key_type_user = { .name ="user" , - .def_lookup_type =KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT , .preparse = user_preparse, .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
@@ -48,7 +47,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);*/ struct key_type key_type_logon = { .name ="logon" , - .def_lookup_type =KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT , .preparse = user_preparse, .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
David Howells
maintainerPATCH 4/10 KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse [ver #2]
In reply to David HowellsA previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm. Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the user_match() function.
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 6 +++--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | 1 - fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c | 1 - fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 1 - fs/nfs/idmap.c | 2 -- include/keys/user-type.h | 3 --- include/linux/key-type.h | 4 ---- net/ceph/crypto.c | 1 - net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- net/rxrpc/ar-key.c | 2 -- security/keys/big_key.c | 1 - security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 1 - security/keys/internal.h | 2 ++ security/keys/key.c | 2 +- security/keys/keyring.c | 15 ++++++++++----- security/keys/request_key.c | 2 +- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 2 +- security/keys/trusted.c | 1 - security/keys/user_defined.c | 12 ------------ 19 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +3 -3
@@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);* "id:<id>" - request a key matching the ID * "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype */ -static int asymmetric_key_match (const struct key *key, -const struct key_match_data *match_data) +static int asymmetric_key_cmp (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data) {const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype =asymmetric_key_subtype (key);const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key,static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse (struct key_match_data *match_data) { match_data->lookup_type =KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE ; + match_data->cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp;return 0 ; }
@@ -224,7 +225,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = { .free_preparse = asymmetric_key_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .match_preparse = asymmetric_key_match_preparse, - .match = asymmetric_key_match, .match_free = asymmetric_key_match_free, .destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy, .describe = asymmetric_key_describe,
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c +0 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ static struct key_type key_type_pkcs7 = { .preparse = pkcs7_preparse, .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, - .match = user_match, .revoke = user_revoke, .destroy = user_destroy, .describe = user_describe,
fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c +0 -1
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ cifs_spnego_key_destroy(struct key *key)struct key_type cifs_spnego_key_type = { .name ="cifs.spnego" , .instantiate = cifs_spnego_key_instantiate, - .match = user_match, .destroy = cifs_spnego_key_destroy, .describe = user_describe, };
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c +0 -1
@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ static struct key_type cifs_idmap_key_type = { .instantiate = cifs_idmap_key_instantiate, .destroy = cifs_idmap_key_destroy, .describe = user_describe, - .match = user_match, }; static char *
fs/nfs/idmap.c +0 -2
@@ -177,7 +177,6 @@ static struct key_type key_type_id_resolver = { .preparse = user_preparse, .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, - .match = user_match, .revoke = user_revoke, .destroy = user_destroy, .describe = user_describe,
@@ -401,7 +400,6 @@ static struct key_type key_type_id_resolver_legacy = { .preparse = user_preparse, .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, - .match = user_match, .revoke = user_revoke, .destroy = user_destroy, .describe = user_describe,
include/keys/user-type.h +0 -3
@@ -36,13 +36,10 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_user;extern struct key_type key_type_logon;struct key_preparsed_payload ; -struct key_match_data ;extern int user_preparse (struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);extern void user_free_preparse (struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);extern int user_update (struct key *key,struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); -extern int user_match (const struct key *key, -const struct key_match_data *match_data);extern void user_revoke (struct key *key);extern void user_destroy (struct key *key);extern void user_describe (const struct key *user,struct seq_file *m);
include/linux/key-type.h +0 -4
@@ -113,10 +113,6 @@ struct key_type {*/ int (*match_preparse)(struct key_match_data *match_data); -/* match a key against a description */ -int (*match)(const struct key *key, -const struct key_match_data *match_data); -/* Free preparsed match data (optional). This should be supplied it * ->match_preparse() is supplied. */ void (*match_free)(struct key_match_data *match_data);
net/ceph/crypto.c +0 -1
@@ -476,7 +476,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_ceph = { .preparse = ceph_key_preparse, .free_preparse = ceph_key_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, - .match = user_match, .destroy = ceph_key_destroy, };
net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +13 -4
@@ -176,9 +176,8 @@ static void dns_resolver_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)* The domain name may be a simple name or an absolute domain name (which * should end with a period). The domain name is case-independent. */ -static int -dns_resolver_match (const struct key *key, -const struct key_match_data *match_data) +static int dns_resolver_cmp (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data) {int slen, dlen, ret =0 ;const char *src = key->description, *dsp = match_data->raw_data;
@@ -210,6 +209,16 @@ no_match: }/* +* Preparse the match criterion. +*/ +static int dns_resolver_match_preparse (struct key_match_data *match_data) +{ + match_data->lookup_type =KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE ; + match_data->cmp = dns_resolver_cmp; +return 0 ; +} + +/* * Describe a DNS key */ static void dns_resolver_describe (const struct key *key,struct seq_file *m)
@@ -243,7 +252,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_dns_resolver = { .preparse = dns_resolver_preparse, .free_preparse = dns_resolver_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, - .match = dns_resolver_match, + .match_preparse = dns_resolver_match_preparse, .revoke = user_revoke, .destroy = user_destroy, .describe = dns_resolver_describe,
net/rxrpc/ar-key.c +0 -2
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_rxrpc = { .preparse = rxrpc_preparse, .free_preparse = rxrpc_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, - .match = user_match, .destroy = rxrpc_destroy, .describe = rxrpc_describe, .read = rxrpc_read,
@@ -61,7 +60,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_rxrpc_s = { .preparse = rxrpc_preparse_s, .free_preparse = rxrpc_free_preparse_s, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, - .match = user_match, .destroy = rxrpc_destroy_s, .describe = rxrpc_describe, };
security/keys/big_key.c +0 -1
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = { .preparse = big_key_preparse, .free_preparse = big_key_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, - .match = user_match, .revoke = big_key_revoke, .destroy = big_key_destroy, .describe = big_key_describe,
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +0 -1
@@ -970,7 +970,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_encrypted = { .name = "encrypted", .instantiate = encrypted_instantiate, .update = encrypted_update, - .match = user_match, .destroy = encrypted_destroy, .describe = user_describe, .read = encrypted_read,
security/keys/internal.h +2 -0
@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ struct keyring_search_context {struct timespec now; }; +extern int key_default_cmp (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data);extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux (key_ref_t keyring_ref,struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
security/keys/key.c +1 -1
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, } key_ref =ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); -if (!index_key.type->match || !index_key.type->instantiate || +if (!index_key.type->instantiate || (!index_key.description && !index_key.type->preparse)) goto error_put_type;
security/keys/keyring.c +10 -5
@@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_keyring = { .preparse = keyring_preparse, .free_preparse = keyring_free_preparse, .instantiate = keyring_instantiate, - .match = user_match, .revoke = keyring_revoke, .destroy = keyring_destroy, .describe = keyring_describe,
@@ -512,6 +511,15 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,EXPORT_SYMBOL (keyring_alloc);/* +* By default, we keys found by getting an exact match on their descriptions. +*/ +int key_default_cmp (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data) +{ +return strcmp (key->description, match_data->raw_data) ==0 ; +} + +/* * Iteration function to consider each key found. */ static int keyring_search_iterator (const void *object,void *iterator_data)
@@ -884,7 +892,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring, .index_key.type = type, .index_key.description = description, .cred = current_cred(), - .match_data.cmp = type->match, + .match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp, .match_data.raw_data = description, .match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, .flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,
@@ -892,9 +900,6 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,key_ref_t key;int ret; -if (!ctx.match_data.cmp) -return ERR_PTR (-ENOKEY ); -if (type->match_preparse) { ret = type->match_preparse (&ctx.match_data);if (ret <0 )
security/keys/request_key.c +1 -1
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, .index_key.type = type, .index_key.description = description, .cred = current_cred(), - .match_data.cmp = type->match, + .match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp, .match_data.raw_data = description, .match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, };
security/keys/request_key_auth.c +1 -1
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id) .index_key.type = &key_type_request_key_auth, .index_key.description = description, .cred = current_cred(), - .match_data.cmp = user_match, + .match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp, .match_data.raw_data = description, .match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, };
security/keys/trusted.c +0 -1
@@ -1096,7 +1096,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_trusted = { .name = "trusted", .instantiate = trusted_instantiate, .update = trusted_update, - .match = user_match, .destroy = trusted_destroy, .describe = user_describe, .read = trusted_read,
security/keys/user_defined.c +0 -12
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_user = { .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .update = user_update, - .match = user_match, .revoke = user_revoke, .destroy = user_destroy, .describe = user_describe,
@@ -51,7 +50,6 @@ struct key_type key_type_logon = { .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .update = user_update, - .match = user_match, .revoke = user_revoke, .destroy = user_destroy, .describe = user_describe,
@@ -137,16 +135,6 @@ error:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (user_update);/* -* match users on their name -*/ -int user_match (const struct key *key,const struct key_match_data *match_data) -{ -return strcmp (key->description, match_data->raw_data) ==0 ; -} - -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (user_match); - -/* * dispose of the links from a revoked keyring * - called with the key sem write-locked */
David Howells
maintainerPATCH 5/10 KEYS: Make the key matching functions return bool [ver #2]
In reply to David HowellsMake the key matching functions pointed to by key_match_data::cmp return bool rather than int.
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/key-type.h | 10 ++++++---- net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 4 ++-- security/keys/internal.h | 8 ++++---- security/keys/keyring.c | 4 ++-- security/keys/process_keys.c | 4 ++-- 6 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +2 -2
@@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);* "id:<id>" - request a key matching the ID * "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype */ -static int asymmetric_key_cmp (const struct key *key, -const struct key_match_data *match_data) +static bool asymmetric_key_cmp (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data) {const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype =asymmetric_key_subtype (key);const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
include/linux/key-type.h +6 -4
@@ -56,10 +56,12 @@ typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key,* Preparsed matching criterion. */ struct key_match_data { -/* Comparison function, defaults to type->match, but can be replaced by -* type->match_preparse(). */ -int (*cmp)(const struct key *key, -const struct key_match_data *match_data); +/* Comparison function, defaults to exact description match, but can be +* overridden by type->match_preparse(). Should return true if a match +* is found and false if not. +*/ +bool (*cmp)(const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data);const void *raw_data;/* Raw match data */ void *preparsed;/* For ->match_preparse() to stash stuff */
net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +2 -2
@@ -176,8 +176,8 @@ static void dns_resolver_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)* The domain name may be a simple name or an absolute domain name (which * should end with a period). The domain name is case-independent. */ -static int dns_resolver_cmp (const struct key *key, -const struct key_match_data *match_data) +static bool dns_resolver_cmp (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data) {int slen, dlen, ret =0 ;const char *src = key->description, *dsp = match_data->raw_data;
security/keys/internal.h +4 -4
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ struct keyring_search_context {struct timespec now; }; -extern int key_default_cmp (const struct key *key, -const struct key_match_data *match_data); +extern bool key_default_cmp (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data);extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux (key_ref_t keyring_ref,struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,struct key *dest_keyring, unsigned long flags); -extern int lookup_user_key_possessed (const struct key *key, -const struct key_match_data *match_data); +extern bool lookup_user_key_possessed (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data);extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key (key_serial_t id,unsigned long flags,key_perm_t perm);#define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE 0x01
security/keys/keyring.c +2 -2
@@ -513,8 +513,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);/* * By default, we keys found by getting an exact match on their descriptions. */ -int key_default_cmp (const struct key *key, -const struct key_match_data *match_data) +bool key_default_cmp (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data) {return strcmp (key->description, match_data->raw_data) ==0 ; }
security/keys/process_keys.c +2 -2
@@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ found:/* * See if the key we're looking at is the target key. */ -int lookup_user_key_possessed (const struct key *key, -const struct key_match_data *match_data) +bool lookup_user_key_possessed (const struct key *key, +const struct key_match_data *match_data) {return key == match_data->raw_data; }
David Howells
maintainerPATCH 6/10 KEYS: Update the keyrings documentation for match changes [ver #2]
In reply to David Howells---
Documentation/security/keys.txt | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
Documentation/security/keys.txt +52 -13
@@ -888,11 +888,11 @@ payload contents" for more information. const char *callout_info); This is used to request a key or keyring with a description that matches - the description specified according to the key type's match function. This - permits approximate matching to occur. If callout_string is not NULL, then - /sbin/request-key will be invoked in an attempt to obtain the key from - userspace. In that case, callout_string will be passed as an argument to - the program. + the description specified according to the key type's match_preparse() + method. This permits approximate matching to occur. If callout_string is + not NULL, then /sbin/request-key will be invoked in an attempt to obtain + the key from userspace. In that case, callout_string will be passed as an + argument to the program. Should the function fail error ENOKEY, EKEYEXPIRED or EKEYREVOKED will be returned.
@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: The method should return 0 if successful or a negative error code otherwise. - + (*) void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); This method is only required if the preparse() method is provided,
@@ -1225,16 +1225,55 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: It is safe to sleep in this method. - (*) int (*match)(const struct key *key, const void *desc); + (*) int (*match_preparse)(struct key_match_data *match_data); + + This method is optional. It is called when a key search is about to be + performed. It is given the following structure: - This method is called to match a key against a description. It should - return non-zero if the two match, zero if they don't. + struct key_match_data { + bool (*cmp)(const struct key *key, + const struct key_match_data *match_data); + const void *raw_data; + void *preparsed; + unsigned lookup_type; + }; - This method should not need to lock the key in any way. The type and - description can be considered invariant, and the payload should not be - accessed (the key may not yet be instantiated). + On entry, raw_data will be pointing to the criteria to be used in matching + a key by the caller and should not be modified. (*cmp)() will be pointing + to the default matcher function (which does an exact description match + against raw_data) and lookup_type will be set to indicate a direct lookup. - It is not safe to sleep in this method; the caller may hold spinlocks. + The following lookup_type values are available: + + [*] KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT - A direct lookup hashes the type and + description to narrow down the search to a small number of keys. + + [*] KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE - An iterative lookup walks all the + keys in the keyring until one is matched. This must be used for any + search that's not doing a simple direct match on the key description. + + The method may set cmp to point to a function of its choice that does some + other form of match, may set lookup_type to KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE + and may attach something to the preparsed pointer for use by (*cmp)(). + (*cmp)() should return true if a key matches and false otherwise. + + If preparsed is set, it may be necessary to use the match_free() method to + clean it up. + + The method should return 0 if successful or a negative error code + otherwise. + + It is permitted to sleep in this method, but (*cmp)() may not sleep as + locks will be held over it. + + If match_preparse() is not provided, keys of this type will be matched + exactly by their description. + + + (*) void (*match_free)(struct key_match_data *match_data); + + This method is optional. If given, it called to clean up + match_data->preparsed after a successful call to match_preparse(). (*) void (*revoke)(struct key *key);
David Howells
maintainerPATCH 7/10 KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling [ver #2]
In reply to David HowellsImplement the first step in using binary key IDs for asymmetric keys rather than hex string keys.
The previously added match data preparsing will be able to convert hex criterion strings into binary which can then be compared more rapidly.
Further, we actually want more then one ID string per public key. The problem is that X.509 certs refer to other X.509 certs by matching Issuer + AuthKeyId to Subject + SubjKeyId, but PKCS#7 messages match against X.509 Issuer + SerialNumber.
This patch just provides facilities for a later patch to make use of.
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h | 4 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/keys/asymmetric-type.h | 38 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 131 insertions(+)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h +4 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@*/ int asymmetric_keyid_match (const char *kid,const char *id); +extern bool asymmetric_match_key_ids (const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids, +const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id); + +extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id (const char *id);static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id (const struct key *key) {
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +89 -0
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include/keys/asymmetric-type.h +38 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,44 @@extern struct key_type key_type_asymmetric;/* +* Identifiers for an asymmetric key ID. We have three ways of looking up a +* key derived from an X.509 certificate: +* +* (1) Serial Number & Issuer. Non-optional. This is the only valid way to +* map a PKCS#7 signature to an X.509 certificate. +* +* (2) Issuer & Subject Unique IDs. Optional. These were the original way to +* match X.509 certificates, but have fallen into disuse in favour of (3). +* +* (3) Auth & Subject Key Identifiers. Optional. SKIDs are only provided on +* CA keys that are intended to sign other keys, so don't appear in end +* user certificates unless forced. +* +* We could also support an PGP key identifier, which is just a SHA1 sum of the +* public key and certain parameters, but since we don't support PGP keys at +* the moment, we shall ignore those. +* +* What we actually do is provide a place where binary identifiers can be +* stashed and then compare against them when checking for an id match. +*/ +struct asymmetric_key_id { +unsigned short len; +unsigned char data[]; +}; + +struct asymmetric_key_ids { +void *id[2 ]; +}; + +extern bool asymmetric_key_id_same (const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1, +const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2); + +extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_generate_id (const void *val_1, +size_t len_1, +const void *val_2, +size_t len_2); + +/* * The payload is at the discretion of the subtype. */
David Howells
maintainerPATCH 8/10 KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys [ver #2]
In reply to David HowellsMake use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made:
(1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message:
id: serial number + issuer
skid: subjKeyId + subject
authority: authKeyId + issuer
(2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present).
(3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches:
(a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs recorded on the key.
(b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will look for an exact match on the key description.
(4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing will turn it back into a binary ID.
(5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate signature.
(6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information block signature.
Additional changes:
(1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG.
(2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint.
(3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well.
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h | 4 - crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 133 ++++++++++++----------------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 38 ++++++-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 5 - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 6 - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 44 ++++------ crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 55 +++++++----- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 5 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 89 +++++++++++-------- include/crypto/public_key.h | 5 + 10 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h +2 -2
@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. */ -int asymmetric_keyid_match (const char *kid,const char *id);extern bool asymmetric_match_key_ids (const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids,const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id);extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id (const char *id); -static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id (const struct key *key) +static inline +const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids (const struct key *key) {return key->type_data.p[1 ]; }
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +56 -77
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crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c +27 -11
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {enum OID last_oid;/* Last OID encountered */ unsigned x509_index;unsigned sinfo_index; +const void *raw_serial; +unsigned raw_serial_size; +unsigned raw_issuer_size; +const void *raw_issuer; };/*
@@ -39,6 +43,7 @@ static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)if (sinfo) {mpi_free (sinfo->sig.mpi[0 ]);kfree (sinfo->sig.digest); +kfree (sinfo->signing_cert_id);kfree (sinfo); } }
@@ -251,10 +256,10 @@ int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,if (IS_ERR (x509))return PTR_ERR (x509); -pr_debug ("Got cert for %s\n" , x509->subject); -pr_debug ("- fingerprint %s\n" , x509->fingerprint); - x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index; +pr_debug ("Got cert %u for %s\n" , x509->index, x509->subject); +pr_debug ("- fingerprint %*phN\n" , x509->id->len, x509->id->data); + *ctx->ppcerts = x509; ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;return 0 ;
@@ -343,8 +348,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen, const void *value, size_t vlen) {struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; - ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value; - ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen; + ctx->raw_serial = value; + ctx->raw_serial_size = vlen;return 0 ; }
@@ -356,8 +361,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen, const void *value, size_t vlen) {struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; - ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value; - ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen; + ctx->raw_issuer = value; + ctx->raw_issuer_size = vlen;return 0 ; }
@@ -390,10 +395,21 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen, const void *value, size_t vlen) {struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; - - ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index; - *ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo; - ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next; +struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo; +struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; + +/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */ + kid =asymmetric_key_generate_id (ctx->raw_serial, + ctx->raw_serial_size, + ctx->raw_issuer, + ctx->raw_issuer_size); +if (IS_ERR (kid)) +return PTR_ERR (kid); + + sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid; + sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index; + *ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo; + ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next; ctx->sinfo =kzalloc (sizeof (struct pkcs7_signed_info ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!ctx->sinfo)return -ENOMEM ;
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h +1 -4
@@ -33,10 +33,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {const void *authattrs;/* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */ -const void *raw_serial; -unsigned raw_serial_size; -unsigned raw_issuer_size; -const void *raw_issuer; +struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;/* Message signature. *
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +2 -4
@@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,/* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted * keys. */ - key =x509_request_asymmetric_key (trust_keyring, x509->subject, - x509->fingerprint); + key =x509_request_asymmetric_key (trust_keyring, x509->id);if (!IS_ERR (key))/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
@@ -82,8 +81,7 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,return -ENOKEY ; } - key =x509_request_asymmetric_key (trust_keyring, last->issuer, - last->authority); + key =x509_request_asymmetric_key (trust_keyring, last->authority);if (IS_ERR (key))return PTR_ERR (key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY ; x509 = last;
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +20 -24
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crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +33 -22
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crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +3 -2
@@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ struct x509_certificate {struct public_key_signature sig;/* Signature parameters */ char *issuer;/* Name of certificate issuer */ char *subject;/* Name of certificate subject */ -char *fingerprint;/* Key fingerprint as hex */ -char *authority;/* Authority key fingerprint as hex */ +struct asymmetric_key_id *id;/* Issuer + serial number */ +struct asymmetric_key_id *skid;/* Subject key identifier */ +struct asymmetric_key_id *authority;/* Authority key identifier */ struct tm valid_from;struct tm valid_to;const void *tbs;/* Signed data */
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +51 -38
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include/crypto/public_key.h +3 -2
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H#include <linux/mpi.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> enum pkey_algo {
@@ -98,8 +99,8 @@ struct key;extern int verify_signature (const struct key *key,const struct public_key_signature *sig); +struct asymmetric_key_id ;extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key (struct key *keyring, -const char *issuer, -const char *key_id); +const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid);#endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */
David Howells
maintainerPATCH 9/10 PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto [ver #2]
In reply to David HowellsProvide better handling of unsupported crypto when verifying a PKCS#7 message. If we can't bridge the gap between a pair of X.509 certs or between a signed info block and an X.509 cert because it involves some crypto we don't support, that's not necessarily the end of the world as there may be other ways points at which we can intersect with a ring of trusted keys.
Instead, only produce ENOPKG immediately if all the signed info blocks in a PKCS#7 message require unsupported crypto to bridge to the first X.509 cert. Otherwise, we defer the generation of ENOPKG until we get ENOKEY during trust validation.
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 1 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 30 ++++++++++++-------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 1 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 13 +++++++- 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h +1 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {struct x509_certificate *signer;/* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */ unsigned index;bool trusted; +bool unsupported_crypto;/* T if not usable due to missing crypto */ /* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */ const void *msgdigest;
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +19 -11
@@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,kenter (",%u," , sinfo->index); +if (sinfo->unsupported_crypto) { +kleave (" = -ENOPKG [cached]" ); +return -ENOPKG ; + } +for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) {if (x509->seen) {if (x509->verified) {
@@ -139,24 +144,27 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, {struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;struct x509_certificate *p; -int cached_ret =0 , ret; +int cached_ret = -ENOKEY ; +int ret;for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) p->seen = false;for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust_one (pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring); -if (ret <0 ) { -if (ret == -ENOPKG ) { +switch (pkcs7_validate_trust_one (pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring)) { +case -ENOKEY : +continue ; +case -ENOPKG : +if (cached_ret == -ENOKEY ) cached_ret = -ENOPKG ; - }else if (ret == -ENOKEY ) { -if (cached_ret ==0 ) - cached_ret = -ENOKEY ; - }else { -return ret; - } +continue ; +case 0 : + *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted; + cached_ret =0 ; +continue ; +default : +return ret; } - *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted; }return cached_ret;
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +42 -4
85 lines not on this page · raw message
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct x509_certificate {bool seen;/* Infinite recursion prevention */ bool verified;bool trusted; +bool unsupported_crypto;/* T if can't be verified due to missing crypto */ };/*
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +11 -2
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)pr_devel ("==>%s()\n" , __func__); +if (cert->unsupported_crypto) +return -ENOPKG ;if (cert->sig.rsa.s)return 0 ;
@@ -127,8 +129,13 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)* big the hash operational data will be. */ tfm =crypto_alloc_shash (hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo],0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (tfm)) -return (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) ? -ENOPKG :PTR_ERR (tfm); +if (IS_ERR (tfm)) { +if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) { + cert->unsupported_crypto = true; +return -ENOPKG ; + } +return PTR_ERR (tfm); + } desc_size =crypto_shash_descsize (tfm) +sizeof (*desc); digest_size =crypto_shash_digestsize (tfm);
@@ -175,6 +182,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,return ret; ret =public_key_verify_signature (pub, &cert->sig); +if (ret == -ENOPKG ) + cert->unsupported_crypto = true;pr_debug ("Cert Verification: %d\n" , ret);return ret; }
David Howells
maintainerRe: [PATCH 09/10] PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto [ver #2]
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, · line 154
Quoted 1 line · David Howells
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +1
-0+switch (pkcs7_validate_trust_one (pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring)) {
This should be:
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring);
+ switch (ret) {
David
David Howells
maintainerPATCH 10/10 PKCS#7: Handle PKCS#7 messages that contain no X.509 certs [ver #2]
In reply to David HowellsThe X.509 certificate list in a PKCS#7 message is optional. To save space, we can omit the inclusion of any X.509 certificates if we are sure that we can look the relevant public key up by the serial number and issuer given in a signed info block.
This also supports use of a signed info block for which we can't find a matching X.509 cert in the certificate list, though it be populated.
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 16 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +36 -12
@@ -55,13 +55,16 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,* keys. */ key =x509_request_asymmetric_key (trust_keyring, x509->id); -if (!IS_ERR (key)) +if (!IS_ERR (key)) {/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message * is apparently the same as one we already trust. * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate * the signature on the descendant. */ +pr_devel ("sinfo %u: Cert %u as key %x\n" , + sinfo->index, x509->index,key_serial (key)); goto matched; + }if (key ==ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ))return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -81,15 +84,34 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,/* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the * trusted keys. */ -if (!last || !last->issuer || !last->authority) { -kleave (" = -ENOKEY [no backref]" ); -return -ENOKEY ; +if (last && last->authority) { + key =x509_request_asymmetric_key (trust_keyring, last->authority); +if (!IS_ERR (key)) { + x509 = last; +pr_devel ("sinfo %u: Root cert %u signer is key %x\n" , + sinfo->index, x509->index,key_serial (key)); + goto matched; + } +if (PTR_ERR (key) != -ENOKEY ) +return PTR_ERR (key); } - key =x509_request_asymmetric_key (trust_keyring, last->authority); -if (IS_ERR (key)) -return PTR_ERR (key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY ; - x509 = last; +/* As a last resort, see if we have a trusted public key that matches +* the signed info directly. +*/ + key =x509_request_asymmetric_key (trust_keyring, + sinfo->signing_cert_id); +if (!IS_ERR (key)) { +pr_devel ("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n" , + sinfo->index,key_serial (key)); + x509 =NULL ; + goto matched; + } +if (PTR_ERR (key) != -ENOKEY ) +return PTR_ERR (key); + +kleave (" = -ENOKEY [no backref]" ); +return -ENOKEY ; matched: ret =verify_signature (key, sig);
@@ -103,10 +125,12 @@ matched: } verified: - x509->verified = true; -for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) { - p->verified = true; - p->trusted = trusted; +if (x509) { + x509->verified = true; +for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) { + p->verified = true; + p->trusted = trusted; + } } sinfo->trusted = trusted;kleave (" = 0" );
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +11 -5
@@ -154,10 +154,13 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,return 0 ; } -pr_warn ("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n" , - sinfo->index, - sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data); -return -ENOKEY ; +/* The relevant X.509 cert isn't found here, but it might be found in +* the trust keyring. +*/ +pr_debug ("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*phN)\n" , + sinfo->index, + sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data); +return 0 ; }/*
@@ -275,11 +278,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,if (ret <0 )return ret; -/* Find the key for the signature */ +/* Find the key for the signature if there is one */ ret =pkcs7_find_key (pkcs7, sinfo);if (ret <0 )return ret; +if (!sinfo->signer) +return 0 ; +pr_devel ("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n" , sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
David Howells
maintainerRe: [PATCH 11/10] Check hex2bin()'s return when generating an asymmetric key ID
In reply to David HowellsAs it stands, the code to generate an asymmetric key ID prechecks the hex string it is given whilst determining the length, before it allocates the buffer for hex2bin() to translate into - which mean that checking the result of hex2bin() is redundant.
Unfortunately, hex2bin() is marked as __must_check, which means that the following warning may be generated if the return value isn't checked:
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c: In function asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id:
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:110: warning: ignoring return value of hex2bin, declared with attribute warn_unused_result
The warning can't be avoided by casting the result to void.
Instead, use strlen() to check the length of the string and ignore the fact that the string might not be entirely valid hex until after the allocation has been done - in which case we can use the result of hex2bin() for this.
--- asymmetric_type.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +8 -7
@@ -90,15 +90,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_match_key_ids);struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id (const char *id) {struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id; -const char *p; -ptrdiff_t hexlen; +size_t hexlen; +int ret;if (!*id)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); -for (p = id; *p; p++) -if (!isxdigit (*p)) -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); - hexlen = p - id; + hexlen =strlen (id);if (hexlen &1 )return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL );
@@ -107,7 +104,11 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)if (!match_id)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); match_id->len = hexlen /2 ; - (void )hex2bin (match_id->data, id, hexlen /2 ); + ret =hex2bin (match_id->data, id, hexlen /2 ); +if (ret <0 ) { +kfree (match_id); +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + }return match_id; }