netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known protocols
Subsystems (2)
Florian Westphal
maintainerPATCH v2 1/1 netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known protocols
Given following iptables ruleset:
-P FORWARD DROP
-A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
One would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80. Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows *all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT, which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy "generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established state since they will fallback to proto_generic and will match the 'generic' entry.
Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction information will still be preserved for others.
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c +25 -1
@@ -14,6 +14,30 @@static unsigned int nf_ct_generic_timeout__read_mostly =600 *HZ ; +static bool nf_generic_should_process (u8 proto) +{ +switch (proto) { +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_SCTP_MODULE +case IPPROTO_SCTP : +return false; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_DCCP_MODULE +case IPPROTO_DCCP : +return false; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_GRE_MODULE +case IPPROTO_GRE : +return false; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_UDPLITE_MODULE +case IPPROTO_UDPLITE : +return false; +#endif +default : +return true; + } +} +static inline struct nf_generic_net *generic_pernet (struct net *net) {return &net->ct.nf_ct_proto.generic;
@@ -67,7 +91,7 @@ static int generic_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,static bool generic_new (struct nf_conn *ct,const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned int dataoff,unsigned int *timeouts) { -return true; +return nf_generic_should_process (nf_ct_protonum (ct)); }#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NF_CT_NETLINK_TIMEOUT )
Signature · 1 line
1.7.1
Quoted 26 lines · Florian Westphal
Given following iptables ruleset:
(quoted diff) +0
-4-P FORWARD DROP -A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPTOne would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80. Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows *all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT, which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy "generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established state since they will fallback to
proto_genericand will match the 'generic' entry.Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction information will still be preserved for others.
Quoted 6 lines
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by Florian Westphal <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Quoted 50 lines
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_generic.c +25
-1@@ -14,6 +14,30 @@static unsigned int nf_ct_generic_timeout__read_mostly =600 *HZ ; +static bool nf_generic_should_process (u8 proto) +{ +switch (proto) { +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_SCTP_MODULE +case IPPROTO_SCTP : +return false; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_DCCP_MODULE +case IPPROTO_DCCP : +return false; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_GRE_MODULE +case IPPROTO_GRE : +return false; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_UDPLITE_MODULE +case IPPROTO_UDPLITE : +return false; +#endif +default : +return true; + } +} +static inline struct nf_generic_net *generic_pernet (struct net *net) {return &net->ct.nf_ct_proto.generic;@@ -67,7 +91,7 @@ static int generic_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,static bool generic_new (struct nf_conn *ct,const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned int dataoff,unsigned int *timeouts) { -return true; +return nf_generic_should_process (nf_ct_protonum (ct)); }#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NF_CT_NETLINK_TIMEOUT )Signature · 1 line
1.7.1
Best regards,
Jozsef
-
E-mail : [email protected], [email protected] PGP key : http://www.kfki.hu/~kadlec/pgp_public_key.txt
Address : Wigner Research Centre for Physics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
H-1525 Budapest 114, POB. 49, Hungary
Quoted 28 lines · Jozsef Kadlecsik
Quoted 26 lines · Florian Westphal
Given following iptables ruleset:
(quoted diff) +0
-4-P FORWARD DROP -A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPTOne would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80. Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows *all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT, which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy "generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established state since they will fallback to
proto_genericand will match the 'generic' entry.Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction information will still be preserved for others.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by Florian Westphal <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>Acked-by Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]>
Applied, thanks.
Quoted 28 lines · Jozsef Kadlecsik
Quoted 26 lines · Florian Westphal
Given following iptables ruleset:
(quoted diff) +0
-4-P FORWARD DROP -A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPTOne would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80. Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows *all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT, which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy "generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established state since they will fallback to
proto_genericand will match the 'generic' entry.Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction information will still be preserved for others.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by Florian Westphal <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>Acked-by Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]>
Applied, thanks.
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 31 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 30 lines · Jozsef Kadlecsik
Quoted 28 lines · Florian Westphal
Given following iptables ruleset:
(quoted diff) +0
-4-P FORWARD DROP -A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPTOne would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80. Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows *all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT, which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy "generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established state since they will fallback to
proto_genericand will match the 'generic' entry.Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction information will still be preserved for others.
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by Florian Westphal <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>Acked-by Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]>Applied, thanks.
Forget this, I replied the wrong email.