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seccomp vs ptrace

DISCUSSION Serge E. Hallyn 3 participants 6 messages Mar 18, 2015

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#0 lore raw

Hi,

I'm writing to ask about

The seccomp check will not be run again after the tracer is notified. (This means that seccomp-based sandboxes MUST NOT allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)

This basically means that seccomp cannot be safely used with for instance an upstart based container. I've been told that Andy was working on changing the order so that ptrace checks would be done before seccomp. Is there any update on that? Is it likely to happen? Scrapped?

thanks,
-serge

#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

Hi,

I'm writing to ask about

The seccomp check will not be run again after the tracer is notified. (This means that seccomp-based sandboxes MUST NOT allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)

Quoted 4 lines

This basically means that seccomp cannot be safely used with for instance an upstart based container. I've been told that Andy was working on changing the order so that ptrace checks would be done before seccomp. Is there any update on that? Is it likely to happen? Scrapped?

There are two problems, as I see it:

1) seccomp filtering happens first, so any following ptrace actions could change the syscall that actually happens (e.g. a filter allows clone and ptrace, meaning it could start a child, ptrace it, issue an allowed syscall, catch it, and change it to a disallowed syscall:
escape from sandbox).

2) even if ptrace was moved ahead of seccomp, a sandboxed process as above and also access to add more filters (via seccomp or prctl syscalls) could use SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, to catch the syscall at the end of the seccomp checks, which would allow the same as above.

Basically, the note is correct: ptrace really cannot be allowed in a filter or it could be used to bypass the filter.

I am, of course, open to ideas on fixing this without introducing loops. The use-case of having a ptrace monitor of a sandboxed process intentionally changing syscalls isn't a use-case I think we need to support. Monitors like that should just perform such calls themselves from the unsandboxed half.

-Kees

Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
#2 lore raw
Quoted 23 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 9 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

Hi,

I'm writing to ask about

The seccomp check will not be run again after the tracer is notified. (This means that seccomp-based sandboxes MUST NOT allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)

Quoted 4 lines

This basically means that seccomp cannot be safely used with for instance an upstart based container. I've been told that Andy was working on changing the order so that ptrace checks would be done before seccomp. Is there any update on that? Is it likely to happen? Scrapped?

There are two problems, as I see it:

1) seccomp filtering happens first, so any following ptrace actions could change the syscall that actually happens (e.g. a filter allows clone and ptrace, meaning it could start a child, ptrace it, issue an allowed syscall, catch it, and change it to a disallowed syscall:
escape from sandbox).

Quoted 4 lines

2) even if ptrace was moved ahead of seccomp, a sandboxed process as above and also access to add more filters (via seccomp or prctl syscalls) could use SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, to catch the syscall at the end of the seccomp checks, which would allow the same as above.

Ouch!

Arguably we messed up by making SECCOMP_RET_TRACE have higher precedence than ERRNO and TRAP. We could add new ERRNO and TRAP actions that have high precedence or a new flag that promotes them in the filter being applied.

--Andy

#3 lore raw
Quoted 29 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 23 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 9 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

Hi,

I'm writing to ask about

The seccomp check will not be run again after the tracer is notified. (This means that seccomp-based sandboxes MUST NOT allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)

Quoted 4 lines

This basically means that seccomp cannot be safely used with for instance an upstart based container. I've been told that Andy was working on changing the order so that ptrace checks would be done before seccomp. Is there any update on that? Is it likely to happen? Scrapped?

There are two problems, as I see it:

1) seccomp filtering happens first, so any following ptrace actions could change the syscall that actually happens (e.g. a filter allows clone and ptrace, meaning it could start a child, ptrace it, issue an allowed syscall, catch it, and change it to a disallowed syscall:
escape from sandbox).

Quoted 4 lines

2) even if ptrace was moved ahead of seccomp, a sandboxed process as above and also access to add more filters (via seccomp or prctl syscalls) could use SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, to catch the syscall at the end of the seccomp checks, which would allow the same as above.

Quoted 6 lines

Ouch!

Arguably we messed up by making SECCOMP_RET_TRACE have higher precedence than ERRNO and TRAP. We could add new ERRNO and TRAP actions that have high precedence or a new flag that promotes them in the filter being applied.

Nope, RET_TRACE is lower. KILL, TRAP, ERRNO, TRACE, ALLOW. Still doesn't help the above cases, but we can't override a blocked syscall just with a new filter. You'd still have to do the ptrace dance with an allowed syscall.

-Kees

Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
#4 lore raw
Quoted 37 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 29 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 23 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 9 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

Hi,

I'm writing to ask about

The seccomp check will not be run again after the tracer is notified. (This means that seccomp-based sandboxes MUST NOT allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)

Quoted 4 lines

This basically means that seccomp cannot be safely used with for instance an upstart based container. I've been told that Andy was working on changing the order so that ptrace checks would be done before seccomp. Is there any update on that? Is it likely to happen? Scrapped?

There are two problems, as I see it:

1) seccomp filtering happens first, so any following ptrace actions could change the syscall that actually happens (e.g. a filter allows clone and ptrace, meaning it could start a child, ptrace it, issue an allowed syscall, catch it, and change it to a disallowed syscall:
escape from sandbox).

Quoted 4 lines

2) even if ptrace was moved ahead of seccomp, a sandboxed process as above and also access to add more filters (via seccomp or prctl syscalls) could use SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, to catch the syscall at the end of the seccomp checks, which would allow the same as above.

Quoted 6 lines

Ouch!

Arguably we messed up by making SECCOMP_RET_TRACE have higher precedence than ERRNO and TRAP. We could add new ERRNO and TRAP actions that have high precedence or a new flag that promotes them in the filter being applied.

Quoted 4 lines

Nope, RET_TRACE is lower. KILL, TRAP, ERRNO, TRACE, ALLOW. Still doesn't help the above cases, but we can't override a blocked syscall just with a new filter. You'd still have to do the ptrace dance with an allowed syscall.

Oh, right, I read it backwards.

We could try to handle TRACE immediately instead of after running all filters. This could be rather tricky given the way the x86 code works, though. Maybe at some point we'll be able to change that without killing performance.

We could add an ugly flag that says that subsequent filters can use TRACE, I suppose. Yuck.

--Andy

#5 lore raw
In reply to Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 9 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

Hi,

I'm writing to ask about

The seccomp check will not be run again after the tracer is notified. (This means that seccomp-based sandboxes MUST NOT allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)

Quoted 4 lines

This basically means that seccomp cannot be safely used with for instance an upstart based container. I've been told that Andy was working on changing the order so that ptrace checks would be done before seccomp. Is there any update on that? Is it likely to happen? Scrapped?

No, just got stalled because I'm too busy. The code is here:

https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/linux.git/log/?h=x86/seccomp

but it's not really adequately tested.

Quoted 3 lines

thanks,
-serge

Signature · 2 lines
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC