Does NFSv4 need to call inode_permission on every write???
Subsystems (2)
Apologies if this has been answered before, however...
In nfsd_write() we have:
if (file) {
err = nfsd_permission(rqstp, fhp->fh_export, fhp->fh_dentry,
NFSD_MAY_WRITE|NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE);
if (err)
goto out;
err = nfsd_vfs_write(rqstp, fhp, file, offset, vec, vlen, cnt,
stablep);
} else {So if a 'file' is already available - because the request came via NFSv4 and there was a valid state id, and a 'struct file' was associated with that state - we still call nfsd_permission().
Is that really needed? The permission check will have been performed at open
- it shouldn't be needed again now.
With NFSv3 we have to check permission at each IO, and this is slightly different from POSIX semantics. We shouldn't have to with NFSv4... should we?
The particular issue that brought this to my attention is that "chattr +i" - to make a file immutable - is not supposed to affect current opens, only future opens. But a current open over NFSv4 is affected.
Is there some reason that we cannot just remove that nfsd_permission() check?
Thanks,
NeilBrown
Quoted 22 lines · NeilBrown
Apologies if this has been answered before, however...
In
nfsd_write()we have:if (file) { err = nfsd_permission(rqstp, fhp->fh_export, fhp->fh_dentry, NFSD_MAY_WRITE|NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE); if (err) goto out; err = nfsd_vfs_write(rqstp, fhp, file, offset, vec, vlen, cnt, stablep); } else {So if a 'file' is already available - because the request came via NFSv4 and there was a valid state id, and a 'struct file' was associated with that state - we still call
nfsd_permission().Is that really needed? The permission check will have been performed at open
- it shouldn't be needed again now.
Quoted 8 lines
With NFSv3 we have to check permission at each IO, and this is slightly different from POSIX semantics. We shouldn't have to with NFSv4... should we?
The particular issue that brought this to my attention is that "chattr +i" - to make a file immutable - is not supposed to affect current opens, only future opens. But a current open over NFSv4 is affected.
Is there some reason that we cannot just remove that
nfsd_permission()check?
The only proof that this write is part of the open is a stateid provided as part of the write arguments. Anyone could sniff or guess that stateid.
We could try to make that work by checking the stateid against the principal from the rpc header. Unfortunately that turns out to be more complicated than "is this the same principal as did the open"; among other things I think it's possible the stateid resulted from opens done by different principals, so we'd need to keep a list. If we added that kind of check, could we drop the per-operation check? It's not obvious to me.
--b.
Quoted 30 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 29 lines · NeilBrown
Apologies if this has been answered before, however...
In
nfsd_write()we have:if (file) { err = nfsd_permission(rqstp, fhp->fh_export, fhp->fh_dentry, NFSD_MAY_WRITE|NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE); if (err) goto out; err = nfsd_vfs_write(rqstp, fhp, file, offset, vec, vlen, cnt, stablep); } else {So if a 'file' is already available - because the request came via NFSv4 and there was a valid state id, and a 'struct file' was associated with that state - we still call
nfsd_permission().Is that really needed? The permission check will have been performed at open
- it shouldn't be needed again now.With NFSv3 we have to check permission at each IO, and this is slightly different from POSIX semantics. We shouldn't have to with NFSv4... should we?
The particular issue that brought this to my attention is that "chattr +i" - to make a file immutable - is not supposed to affect current opens, only future opens. But a current open over NFSv4 is affected.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Is there some reason that we cannot just remove that
nfsd_permission()check?The only proof that this write is part of the open is a stateid provided as part of the write arguments. Anyone could sniff or guess that stateid.
Perhaps like in OSD take a few bits in the state ID for a crypto sig on the stateid+internal-server-counter this way it will be impossible to fake. (The crypto key is only known to the server and is volatile) (Yes you'll need to fake something with the DSs unless you want to communicate public keys for verification)
(No it is not implemented in open-osd, is just provisioned for
in the STD)
Just a thought
Boaz
Quoted 9 lines
We could try to make that work by checking the stateid against the principal from the rpc header. Unfortunately that turns out to be more complicated than "is this the same principal as did the open"; among other things I think it's possible the stateid resulted from opens done by different principals, so we'd need to keep a list. If we added that kind of check, could we drop the per-operation check? It's not obvious to me.
--b.
Quoted 30 lines · On Thu, 21 May 2015 09:07:35 -0400 "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>…
Quoted 29 lines · NeilBrown
Apologies if this has been answered before, however...
In
nfsd_write()we have:if (file) { err = nfsd_permission(rqstp, fhp->fh_export, fhp->fh_dentry, NFSD_MAY_WRITE|NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE); if (err) goto out; err = nfsd_vfs_write(rqstp, fhp, file, offset, vec, vlen, cnt, stablep); } else {So if a 'file' is already available - because the request came via NFSv4 and there was a valid state id, and a 'struct file' was associated with that state - we still call
nfsd_permission().Is that really needed? The permission check will have been performed at open
- it shouldn't be needed again now.With NFSv3 we have to check permission at each IO, and this is slightly different from POSIX semantics. We shouldn't have to with NFSv4... should we?
The particular issue that brought this to my attention is that "chattr +i" - to make a file immutable - is not supposed to affect current opens, only future opens. But a current open over NFSv4 is affected.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Is there some reason that we cannot just remove that
nfsd_permission()check?The only proof that this write is part of the open is a stateid provided as part of the write arguments. Anyone could sniff or guess that stateid.
But a stateid is tied to a clientid and the clientid is tied to server credentials....??
I guess it is harder than I at first imagined.
Quoted 8 lines
We could try to make that work by checking the stateid against the principal from the rpc header. Unfortunately that turns out to be more complicated than "is this the same principal as did the open"; among other things I think it's possible the stateid resulted from opens done by different principals, so we'd need to keep a list. If we added that kind of check, could we drop the per-operation check? It's not obvious to me.
Delegations would certainly make that interesting. Who exactly does authentic writes when a delegation is flushed ... I don't remember.
Sounds like this belongs in the too-hard basket.
Thanks,
NeilBrown
Quoted 33 lines · NeilBrown
Quoted 30 lines · On Thu, 21 May 2015 09:07:35 -0400 "J. Bruce Fields" <[email protected]>…
Quoted 29 lines · NeilBrown
Apologies if this has been answered before, however...
In
nfsd_write()we have:if (file) { err = nfsd_permission(rqstp, fhp->fh_export, fhp->fh_dentry, NFSD_MAY_WRITE|NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE); if (err) goto out; err = nfsd_vfs_write(rqstp, fhp, file, offset, vec, vlen, cnt, stablep); } else {So if a 'file' is already available - because the request came via NFSv4 and there was a valid state id, and a 'struct file' was associated with that state - we still call
nfsd_permission().Is that really needed? The permission check will have been performed at open
- it shouldn't be needed again now.With NFSv3 we have to check permission at each IO, and this is slightly different from POSIX semantics. We shouldn't have to with NFSv4... should we?
The particular issue that brought this to my attention is that "chattr +i" - to make a file immutable - is not supposed to affect current opens, only future opens. But a current open over NFSv4 is affected.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Is there some reason that we cannot just remove that
nfsd_permission()check?The only proof that this write is part of the open is a stateid provided as part of the write arguments. Anyone could sniff or guess that stateid.
But a stateid is tied to a clientid
The stateid does have sufficient information to allow the server to determine which NFSv4 client it's associated with.
Quoted 1 line
and the clientid is tied to server credentials....??
I'm not sure what you're thinking of there. It could conceivably be tied to some kind of client credentials, but it isn't really. A write is sent as the user performing the write, but could come from any IP address, from a different user than did the open or the setclientid, etc.
4.1 server state protection does give us more of a client credential, but I don't know that that helps here.
Quoted 11 lines
I guess it is harder than I at first imagined.
Quoted 8 lines
We could try to make that work by checking the stateid against the principal from the rpc header. Unfortunately that turns out to be more complicated than "is this the same principal as did the open"; among other things I think it's possible the stateid resulted from opens done by different principals, so we'd need to keep a list. If we added that kind of check, could we drop the per-operation check? It's not obvious to me.
Quoted 4 lines
Delegations would certainly make that interesting. Who exactly does authentic writes when a delegation is flushed ... I don't remember.
Sounds like this belongs in the too-hard basket.
That's been my conclusion so far.
--b.
Quoted 22 lines · On Thu, 21 May 2015 14:40:29 +1000 NeilBrown <[email protected]> wrote:
Apologies if this has been answered before, however...
In
nfsd_write()we have:if (file) { err = nfsd_permission(rqstp, fhp->fh_export, fhp->fh_dentry, NFSD_MAY_WRITE|NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE); if (err) goto out; err = nfsd_vfs_write(rqstp, fhp, file, offset, vec, vlen, cnt, stablep); } else {So if a 'file' is already available - because the request came via NFSv4 and there was a valid state id, and a 'struct file' was associated with that state - we still call
nfsd_permission().Is that really needed? The permission check will have been performed at open
- it shouldn't be needed again now.
Quoted 9 lines
With NFSv3 we have to check permission at each IO, and this is slightly different from POSIX semantics. We shouldn't have to with NFSv4... should we?
The particular issue that brought this to my attention is that "chattr +i" - to make a file immutable - is not supposed to affect current opens, only future opens. But a current open over NFSv4 is affected.
Is there some reason that we cannot just remove that
nfsd_permission()check?
AIUI (maybe wrong), the stateid is mainly provided in WRITE for ordering purposes (in case of another OPEN or OPEN_DOWNGRADE, or some locking is also going on). From RFC5661:
Except when special stateids are used, the stateid value for a WRITE request represents a value returned from a previous byte-range LOCK or OPEN request or the stateid associated with a delegation. The stateid identifies the associated owners if any and is used by the server to verify that the associated locks are still valid (e.g., have not been revoked).
That last bit is the significant part here...
The actual info for the write itself is supposed to be given in other fields.
While, it probably is a good idea for the server to verify that the current_fh and the fh associated with the stateid actually match, you can't really do that with the creds.
In short, READs and WRITEs are really still quite NFSv3-like in NFSv4...
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>