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Revert "net/ipv6: add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit"

PATCH In review Sabrina Dubroca 6 participants 12 messages Sep 2, 2015 – Sep 11, 2015

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Revert "net/ipv6: add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit"

This reverts commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4.

There are several issues with this patch.
It completely cancels the security changes introduced by 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface").
The current default value (min hop limit = 1) can result in the same denial of service that 6fd99094de2b prevents, but it is hard to define a correct and sane default value.
More generally, it is yet another IPv6 sysctl, and we already have too many.

This was introduced to satisfy a TAHI test case which, in my opinion, is too strict, turning the RFC's "SHOULD" into a "MUST":

If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.

The behavior of this sysctl is wrong in multiple ways. Some are fixable, but let's not rush this commit into mainline, and revert this while we still can, then we can come up with a better solution.

---
 Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt |  8 --------
 include/linux/ipv6.h                   |  1 -
 include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h              |  1 -
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c                    | 10 ----------
 net/ipv6/ndisc.c                       | 16 +++++++++-------
 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt +0 -8
index ebe94f2cab98..c845aca413c8 100644
@@ -1371,14 +1371,6 @@ accept_ra_from_local - BOOLEAN
 	   disabled if accept_ra_from_local is disabled
                on a specific interface.
 
-accept_ra_min_hop_limit - INTEGER
-	Minimum hop limit Information in Router Advertisement.
-
-	Hop limit Information in Router Advertisement less than this
-	variable shall be ignored.
-
-	Default: 1
-
 accept_ra_pinfo - BOOLEAN
 	Learn Prefix Information in Router Advertisement.
 
include/linux/ipv6.h +0 -1
index f1f32af6d9b9..5e6d3b8f5a42 100644
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ struct ipv6_devconf {
 	__s32		max_desync_factor;
 	__s32		max_addresses;
 	__s32		accept_ra_defrtr;
-	__s32		accept_ra_min_hop_limit;
 	__s32		accept_ra_pinfo;
 	__s32		ignore_routes_with_linkdown;
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h +0 -1
index 38b4fef20219..44d13121de52 100644
@@ -172,7 +172,6 @@ enum {
 	DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_MTU,
 	DEVCONF_STABLE_SECRET,
 	DEVCONF_USE_OIF_ADDRS_ONLY,
-	DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_MIN_HOP_LIMIT,
 	DEVCONF_IGNORE_ROUTES_WITH_LINKDOWN,
 	DEVCONF_MAX
 };
net/ipv6/addrconf.c +0 -10
index 99c0f2b843f0..c8829ce0bbe7 100644
@@ -195,7 +195,6 @@ static struct ipv6_devconf ipv6_devconf __read_mostly = {
 	.max_addresses		= IPV6_MAX_ADDRESSES,
 	.accept_ra_defrtr	= 1,
 	.accept_ra_from_local	= 0,
-	.accept_ra_min_hop_limit= 1,
 	.accept_ra_pinfo	= 1,
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
 	.accept_ra_rtr_pref	= 1,
@@ -239,7 +238,6 @@ static struct ipv6_devconf ipv6_devconf_dflt __read_mostly = {
 	.max_addresses		= IPV6_MAX_ADDRESSES,
 	.accept_ra_defrtr	= 1,
 	.accept_ra_from_local	= 0,
-	.accept_ra_min_hop_limit= 1,
 	.accept_ra_pinfo	= 1,
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
 	.accept_ra_rtr_pref	= 1,
@@ -4658,7 +4656,6 @@ static inline void ipv6_store_devconf(struct ipv6_devconf *cnf,
 	array[DEVCONF_MAX_DESYNC_FACTOR] = cnf->max_desync_factor;
 	array[DEVCONF_MAX_ADDRESSES] = cnf->max_addresses;
 	array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_DEFRTR] = cnf->accept_ra_defrtr;
-	array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_MIN_HOP_LIMIT] = cnf->accept_ra_min_hop_limit;
 	array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_PINFO] = cnf->accept_ra_pinfo;
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
 	array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_RTR_PREF] = cnf->accept_ra_rtr_pref;
@@ -5594,13 +5591,6 @@ static struct addrconf_sysctl_table
 			.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 		},
 		{
-			.procname	= "accept_ra_min_hop_limit",
-			.data		= &ipv6_devconf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit,
-			.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
-			.mode		= 0644,
-			.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
-		},
-		{
 			.procname	= "accept_ra_pinfo",
 			.data		= &ipv6_devconf.accept_ra_pinfo,
 			.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
net/ipv6/ndisc.c +9 -7
index 64a71354b069..fac72658bf59 100644
@@ -1235,16 +1235,18 @@ static void ndisc_router_discovery(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	if (rt)
 		rt6_set_expires(rt, jiffies + (HZ * lifetime));
-	if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit < 256 &&
-	    ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
-		if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit <= ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
+	if (ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
+		/* Only set hop_limit on the interface if it is higher than
+		 * the current hop_limit.
+		 */
+		if (in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit < ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
 			in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit = ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit;
-			if (rt)
-				dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT,
-					       ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit);
 		} else {
-			ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: Got route advertisement with lower hop_limit than minimum\n");
+			ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: Got route advertisement with lower hop_limit than current\n");
 		}
+		if (rt)
+			dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT,
+				       ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit);
 	}
 
 skip_defrtr:
Signature · 1 line
2.5.1
maintainer
#1 lore raw

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 11:43:01 +0200

Quoted 14 lines

This reverts commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4.

There are several issues with this patch.
It completely cancels the security changes introduced by 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface").
The current default value (min hop limit = 1) can result in the same denial of service that 6fd99094de2b prevents, but it is hard to define a correct and sane default value.
More generally, it is yet another IPv6 sysctl, and we already have too many.

This was introduced to satisfy a TAHI test case which, in my opinion, is too strict, turning the RFC's "SHOULD" into a "MUST":

Quoted 8 lines

If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.

The behavior of this sysctl is wrong in multiple ways. Some are fixable, but let's not rush this commit into mainline, and revert this while we still can, then we can come up with a better solution.

I don't agree with this revert.

If you look at the original commit, the quoted RFC recommends adding a configurable method to protect against this.

And that's exactly what the commit you are trying to revert is doing.

The only thing I would entertain is potentially an adjustment of the default, working in concert with the TAHI folks to make sure their tests still pass with any new default.

Thanks.

#2 lore raw
Quoted 24 lines · David Miller

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 11:43:01 +0200

Quoted 21 lines

This reverts commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4.

There are several issues with this patch.
It completely cancels the security changes introduced by 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface").
The current default value (min hop limit = 1) can result in the same denial of service that 6fd99094de2b prevents, but it is hard to define a correct and sane default value.
More generally, it is yet another IPv6 sysctl, and we already have too many.

This was introduced to satisfy a TAHI test case which, in my opinion, is too strict, turning the RFC's "SHOULD" into a "MUST":

If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.

The behavior of this sysctl is wrong in multiple ways. Some are fixable, but let's not rush this commit into mainline, and revert this while we still can, then we can come up with a better solution.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

I don't agree with this revert.

If you look at the original commit, the quoted RFC recommends adding a configurable method to protect against this.

Which also means it recommends a configurable method to NOT protect against this.

Which begs the question in which scenario you would want to configure end hosts in such a way that an RA can shrink hoplimit to values where machines can't talk to internet hosts anymore.

Quoted 3 lines

The only thing I would entertain is potentially an adjustment of the default, working in concert with the TAHI folks to make sure their tests still pass with any new default.

So, assuming we would change the default to 64 (the hoplimit default). Where would it make sense to reconfigure this to a lower value?

Moreover, if we would (hypothetically) assume that an administrator wants a smaller hop limit value and has to change knob to allow e.g. min hoplimit of 10 they might as well just change the default hoplimit value rather than altering min hoplimit and then set it via RA...?

#3 lore raw
In reply to David Miller
Quoted 28 lines · David Miller

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 11:43:01 +0200

Quoted 14 lines

This reverts commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4.

There are several issues with this patch.
It completely cancels the security changes introduced by 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface").
The current default value (min hop limit = 1) can result in the same denial of service that 6fd99094de2b prevents, but it is hard to define a correct and sane default value.
More generally, it is yet another IPv6 sysctl, and we already have too many.

This was introduced to satisfy a TAHI test case which, in my opinion, is too strict, turning the RFC's "SHOULD" into a "MUST":

Quoted 8 lines

If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.

The behavior of this sysctl is wrong in multiple ways. Some are fixable, but let's not rush this commit into mainline, and revert this while we still can, then we can come up with a better solution.

I don't agree with this revert.

Quoted 8 lines

If you look at the original commit, the quoted RFC recommends adding a configurable method to protect against this.

And that's exactly what the commit you are trying to revert is doing.

The only thing I would entertain is potentially an adjustment of the default, working in concert with the TAHI folks to make sure their tests still pass with any new default.

Would you agree with a default of 64, as Florian suggested?

Can we still modify the behavior of this sysctl? It's already been in Linus's tree for a while, but if we can, I would rather restrict the values we let the user write to accept_ra_min_hop_limit, as anything outside [0..255] does not really make sense.

Allowing an RA to update the hop limit if

current hop limit < RA.hop_limit < accept_ra_min_hop_limit

might also be desirable, but I'm not so sure about this case.

Signature · 1 line
Sabrina
#4 lore raw

Hi Sabrina,

2015-09-09 18:10 GMT+08:00 Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>:

Quoted 32 lines
Quoted 31 lines · David Miller

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 11:43:01 +0200

Quoted 14 lines

This reverts commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4.

There are several issues with this patch.
It completely cancels the security changes introduced by 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface").
The current default value (min hop limit = 1) can result in the same denial of service that 6fd99094de2b prevents, but it is hard to define a correct and sane default value.
More generally, it is yet another IPv6 sysctl, and we already have too many.

This was introduced to satisfy a TAHI test case which, in my opinion, is too strict, turning the RFC's "SHOULD" into a "MUST":

Quoted 8 lines

If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.

The behavior of this sysctl is wrong in multiple ways. Some are fixable, but let's not rush this commit into mainline, and revert this while we still can, then we can come up with a better solution.

I don't agree with this revert.

If you look at the original commit, the quoted RFC recommends adding a configurable method to protect against this.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

And that's exactly what the commit you are trying to revert is doing.

The only thing I would entertain is potentially an adjustment of the default, working in concert with the TAHI folks to make sure their tests still pass with any new default.

Would you agree with a default of 64, as Florian suggested?

Set default to 64 make sense to me. It can make the system more security by default.

Quoted 6 lines

Can we still modify the behavior of this sysctl? It's already been in Linus's tree for a while, but if we can, I would rather restrict the values we let the user write to accept_ra_min_hop_limit, as anything outside [0..255] does not really make sense.

Yes, so the checked if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit < 256 && ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) make sure we only update the value between [1..255].

Quoted 6 lines

Allowing an RA to update the hop limit if

current hop limit < RA.hop_limit < accept_ra_min_hop_limit

might also be desirable, but I'm not so sure about this case.

Yes, and we also should allow an RA to update the hop limit if

accept_ra_min_hop_limit <= RA.hop_limit < current hop limit

e.g accept_ra_min_hop_limit = RA.hop_limit =64, current hop limit = 128

Thanks
Hangbin Liu

#5 lore raw

Hello,

Quoted 8 lines · Hangbin Liu
Quoted 4 lines

Can we still modify the behavior of this sysctl? It's already been in Linus's tree for a while, but if we can, I would rather restrict the values we let the user write to accept_ra_min_hop_limit, as anything outside [0..255] does not really make sense.

Yes, so the checked if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit < 256 && ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) make sure we only update the value between [1..255].

I was thinking of returning -EINVAL when the user tries to set it to 300, using proc_dointvec_minmax.

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Allowing an RA to update the hop limit if

current hop limit < RA.hop_limit < accept_ra_min_hop_limit

might also be desirable, but I'm not so sure about this case.

Yes, and we also should allow an RA to update the hop limit if

accept_ra_min_hop_limit <= RA.hop_limit < current hop limit

e.g accept_ra_min_hop_limit = RA.hop_limit =64, current hop limit = 128

Yes, that's what we're doing at the moment, and I would leave it as is.

Thanks,

Signature · 1 line
Sabrina
#6 lore raw

Hi Sabrina,

2015-09-10 17:19 GMT+08:00 Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>:

Quoted 8 lines

Hello,

Quoted 5 lines · Hangbin Liu
Quoted 4 lines

Can we still modify the behavior of this sysctl? It's already been in Linus's tree for a while, but if we can, I would rather restrict the values we let the user write to accept_ra_min_hop_limit, as anything outside [0..255] does not really make sense.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Yes, so the checked if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit < 256 && ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) make sure we only update the value between [1..255].

I was thinking of returning -EINVAL when the user tries to set it to 300, using proc_dointvec_minmax.

I'm OK with this. But we can also set cnf.hop_limit to 300, if add check for accept_ra_min_hop_limit, we'd better check all hop_limit values.

Thanks
Hangbin

#7 lore raw
In reply to Sabrina Dubroca
Quoted 32 lines · Sabrina Dubroca
Quoted 31 lines · David Miller

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 11:43:01 +0200

Quoted 14 lines

This reverts commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4.

There are several issues with this patch.
It completely cancels the security changes introduced by 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface").
The current default value (min hop limit = 1) can result in the same denial of service that 6fd99094de2b prevents, but it is hard to define a correct and sane default value.
More generally, it is yet another IPv6 sysctl, and we already have too many.

This was introduced to satisfy a TAHI test case which, in my opinion, is too strict, turning the RFC's "SHOULD" into a "MUST":

Quoted 8 lines

If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.

The behavior of this sysctl is wrong in multiple ways. Some are fixable, but let's not rush this commit into mainline, and revert this while we still can, then we can come up with a better solution.

I don't agree with this revert.

If you look at the original commit, the quoted RFC recommends adding a configurable method to protect against this.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

And that's exactly what the commit you are trying to revert is doing.

The only thing I would entertain is potentially an adjustment of the default, working in concert with the TAHI folks to make sure their tests still pass with any new default.

Would you agree with a default of 64, as Florian suggested?

1 was chosen to restore our behavior before introduction of current hoplimit check. I am not in favor of changing that value.

Plus, 64 is too restrictive and 32 would be enough for global internet, IMHO.

Quoted 6 lines

Can we still modify the behavior of this sysctl? It's already been in Linus's tree for a while, but if we can, I would rather restrict the values we let the user write to accept_ra_min_hop_limit, as anything outside [0..255] does not really make sense.

[1..256], maybe, but it is not harmful to set outside the range. 0 is always ignored. If it is set to 256 or more, the option is completely ignored.

Quoted 8 lines

Allowing an RA to update the hop limit if

current hop limit < RA.hop_limit < accept_ra_min_hop_limit

might also be desirable, but I'm not so sure about this case.

It might be... byt I don't think it is a good idea since it becomes more complex.

Signature · 2 lines
Hideaki Yoshifuji <[email protected]>
Technical Division, MIRACLE LINUX CORPORATION
#8 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
Quoted 6 lines · Sabrina Dubroca
Quoted 3 lines · David Miller

The only thing I would entertain is potentially an adjustment of the default, working in concert with the TAHI folks to make sure their tests still pass with any new default.

Would you agree with a default of 64, as Florian suggested?

1 was chosen to restore our behavior before introduction of current hoplimit check. I am not in favor of changing that value.

But our old behavior had a security issue, which is why the >= current check was introduced.

Quoted 2 lines

Plus, 64 is too restrictive and 32 would be enough for global internet, IMHO.

I guess I could live with that, if 32 is indeed enough for everybody.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Can we still modify the behavior of this sysctl? It's already been in Linus's tree for a while, but if we can, I would rather restrict the values we let the user write to accept_ra_min_hop_limit, as anything outside [0..255] does not really make sense.

[1..256], maybe, but it is not harmful to set outside the range. 0 is always ignored. If it is set to 256 or more, the option is completely ignored.

Not harmful, but maybe slightly misleading, and requires the "< 256" check when processing a RA.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Allowing an RA to update the hop limit if

current hop limit < RA.hop_limit < accept_ra_min_hop_limit

might also be desirable, but I'm not so sure about this case.

It might be... byt I don't think it is a good idea since it becomes more complex.

A bit more complex, yes. But I don't think this should hold us back if it results in better behavior.

Thanks,

Signature · 1 line
Sabrina
#9 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Sabrina Dubroca
Quoted 6 lines · YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
Quoted 5 lines · Sabrina Dubroca
Quoted 3 lines · David Miller

The only thing I would entertain is potentially an adjustment of the default, working in concert with the TAHI folks to make sure their tests still pass with any new default.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

Would you agree with a default of 64, as Florian suggested?

1 was chosen to restore our behavior before introduction of current hoplimit check. I am not in favor of changing that value.

But our old behavior had a security issue, which is why the >= current check was introduced.

We have the knob to "protect" ourselves now but it has drawbacks no to accept lower values than specified. We can never have ultimate default for everybody. The knob might "mitigate" the issue but once we have any rouge routers on our L2, we lose anyway. So, I do want to keep it as-is not to change our traditional behavior.

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Plus, 64 is too restrictive and 32 would be enough for global internet, IMHO.

I guess I could live with that, if 32 is indeed enough for everybody.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Can we still modify the behavior of this sysctl? It's already been in Linus's tree for a while, but if we can, I would rather restrict the values we let the user write to accept_ra_min_hop_limit, as anything outside [0..255] does not really make sense.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

[1..256], maybe, but it is not harmful to set outside the range. 0 is always ignored. If it is set to 256 or more, the option is completely ignored.

Not harmful, but maybe slightly misleading, and requires the "< 256" check when processing a RA.

The "Cur Hop Limit" field is 8bit long...

Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Allowing an RA to update the hop limit if

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

current hop limit < RA.hop_limit < accept_ra_min_hop_limit

might also be desirable, but I'm not so sure about this case.

It might be... byt I don't think it is a good idea since it becomes more complex.

A bit more complex, yes. But I don't think this should hold us back if it results in better behavior.

Thanks,

Signature · 2 lines
Hideaki Yoshifuji <[email protected]>
Technical Division, MIRACLE LINUX CORPORATION
#10 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
Quoted 7 lines · Sabrina Dubroca
Quoted 5 lines · YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
Quoted 1 line · Sabrina Dubroca

Would you agree with a default of 64, as Florian suggested?

1 was chosen to restore our behavior before introduction of current hoplimit check. I am not in favor of changing that value.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

But our old behavior had a security issue, which is why the >= current check was introduced.

We have the knob to "protect" ourselves now but it has drawbacks no to accept lower values than specified. We can never have ultimate default for everybody. The knob might "mitigate" the issue but once we have any rouge routers on our L2, we lose anyway. So, I do want to keep it as-is not to change our traditional behavior.

If that argument is brough forward (and it's a good point!), then the entire case for rejecting 'low' hoplimit values in first place becomes moot.

If this is an important security issue, then either the sysctl has to be removed or the default raised to some 'safe' value (32, for example).

If its not a security issue -- and it isn't if we think "1" is a good default choice -- then we should seriously consider reverting both the added sysctl and the 'original' commit (6fd99094de2b; "ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface").

Cheers,
Florian

#11 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Florian Westphal
Quoted 8 lines · YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
Quoted 7 lines · Sabrina Dubroca
Quoted 5 lines · YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
Quoted 1 line · Sabrina Dubroca

Would you agree with a default of 64, as Florian suggested?

1 was chosen to restore our behavior before introduction of current hoplimit check. I am not in favor of changing that value.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

But our old behavior had a security issue, which is why the >= current check was introduced.

We have the knob to "protect" ourselves now but it has drawbacks no to accept lower values than specified. We can never have ultimate default for everybody. The knob might "mitigate" the issue but once we have any rouge routers on our L2, we lose anyway. So, I do want to keep it as-is not to change our traditional behavior.

If that argument is brough forward (and it's a good point!), then the entire case for rejecting 'low' hoplimit values in first place becomes moot.

Quoted 8 lines

If this is an important security issue, then either the sysctl has to be removed or the default raised to some 'safe' value (32, for example).

If its not a security issue -- and it isn't if we think "1" is a good default choice -- then we should seriously consider reverting both the added sysctl and the 'original' commit (6fd99094de2b; "ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface").

The most common use-case for this is public WiFi. So far, a negible amount of access points have even remote ability to filter "unwanted" L2 traffic.

The fact that a single, empty RA packet with a hop limit of 2 will take down your entire ipv6, even if your infrastructure uses DHCPv6 for addressing is problematic.

There are scenarios where an L2 agent can push a link-local or Peer-to-peer routes with a low hoplimit. These routes would then lower the interface-level hop limit to something that breaks your other routing.

Personally, I think the concept of hop-limit being per interface in IPv6 is disasterously stupid, but I'm not arguing against the RFC there.

//D.S.

Signature · 1 line
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