namei: permit linking with CAP_FOWNER in userns
PATCH 1/1 namei: permit linking with CAP_FOWNER in userns
Attempting to hardlink to an unsafe file (e.g. a setuid binary) from within an unprivileged user namespace fails, even if CAP_FOWNER is held within the namespace. This may cause various failures, such as a gentoo installation within a lxc container failing to build and install specific packages.
This change permits hardlinking of files owned by mapped uids, if CAP_FOWNER is held for that namespace. Furthermore, it improves consistency by using the existing inode_owner_or_capable(), which is aware of namespaced capabilities as of 23adbe12ef7d3 ("fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid").
Signed-off-by Dirk Steinmetz <[email protected]>
--- fs/namei.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +2 -5
@@ -955,26 +955,23 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)* - sysctl_protected_hardlinks enabled * - fsuid does not match inode * - hardlink source is unsafe (see safe_hardlink_source() above) -* - not CAP_FOWNER +* - not CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the inode owner uid mapped * * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. */ static int may_linkat (struct path *link) { -const struct cred *cred;struct inode *inode;if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)return 0 ; - cred =current_cred (); inode = link->dentry->d_inode;/* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like, * otherwise, it must be a safe source. */ -if (uid_eq (cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid) ||safe_hardlink_source (inode) || -capable (CAP_FOWNER )) +if (inode_owner_or_capable (inode) ||safe_hardlink_source (inode))return 0 ;audit_log_link_denied ("linkat" , link);
Signature · 1 line
2.1.4