Accessing user-land memory without safe functions
I Have been auditing a few drivers and have found some of them are accessing user-land memory without either mapping the pages in, or copying the data via the safe user access apis.
The thing I have mostly been seeing is something along the lines of:
ioctl(etc, etc, arg) {
char buf[32];__user *some_struct = (type cast) arg;
size_t amount = some_struct->amount;
** do size check on amount **
copy_from_user(buf, some_struct->some_uland_addr, amount);
}
Above you see 2 unsafe user-land dereferences, the some_struct->amount and some_struct->some_uland_addr.
Since I've seen this a couple times now I'm wondering if my understanding of touching user-land memory is flawed.
For the above example Ioctl, the proper way to get access to those fields through the safe copy_from_user or get_user() functions, correct?
I'm wondering if I should submit patches to fix the issues I've found, but now I'm doubting whether they're really issues at all.
Thanks,
Scotty
Quoted 8 lines · On Thu, 3 Dec 2015 13:54:30 -0700 Scotty Bauer <[email protected]> wrote:
Since I've seen this a couple times now I'm wondering if my understanding of touching user-land memory is flawed.
For the above example Ioctl, the proper way to get access to those fields through the safe
copy_from_userorget_user()functions, correct?I'm wondering if I should submit patches to fix the issues I've found, but now I'm doubting whether they're really issues at all.
They sound like bugs to me, though it would be easier to say for sure with a pointer to a specific function in the kernel source. Please point something out, or, perhaps better, send a patch fixing one of them.
Thanks,
jon
Hi Jon,
Thanks for the response.
Here is one such example, although benign due to the
function being called with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. I'll work on patches for some of the other issues and send those soon as well.
https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/1/566
Quoted 25 lines · Jonathan Corbet
Quoted 8 lines · On Thu, 3 Dec 2015 13:54:30 -0700 Scotty Bauer <[email protected]> wrote:
Since I've seen this a couple times now I'm wondering if my understanding of touching user-land memory is flawed.
For the above example Ioctl, the proper way to get access to those fields through the safe
copy_from_userorget_user()functions, correct?I'm wondering if I should submit patches to fix the issues I've found, but now I'm doubting whether they're really issues at all.
They sound like bugs to me, though it would be easier to say for sure with a pointer to a specific function in the kernel source. Please point something out, or, perhaps better, send a patch fixing one of them.
Thanks,
jon
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/