Skip to contentSkip to conversation

x86: Memory Protection Keys (v7)

PATCH In review Dave Hansen 7 participants 50 messages Dec 14, 2015 – Mar 29, 2016

Subsystems (42)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

cover x86: Memory Protection Keys (v7)

Memory Protection Keys for User pages is a CPU feature which will first appear on Skylake Servers, but will also be supported on future non-server parts (there is also a QEMU implementation). It provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables when an application changes protection domains. See the Documentation/ patch for more details.

This set enables for two things in the end:
1. Allows "execute-only" memory
2. Enables KVM to run Protection-Key-enabled guests

Changes from v6:
* fix up ??'s showing up in in smaps' VmFlags field
* added execute-only support
* removed all the new syscalls from this set. We can discuss them in detail after this is merged.

Changes from v5:

* make types in read_pkru() u32's, not ints
* rework VM_* bits to avoid using __ffsl() and clean up vma_pkey()
* rework pte_allows_gup() to use p??_val() instead of passing around p{te,md,ud}_t types.
* Fix up some inconsistent bool vs. int usage
* corrected name of ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS in patch description
* remove NR_PKEYS... config option. Just define it directly

Changes from v4:

* Made "allow setting of XSAVE state" safe if we got preempted between when we saved our FPU state and when we restore it. (I would appreciate a look from Ingo on this patch).
* Fixed up a few things from Thomas's latest comments: splt up siginfo in to x86 and generic, removed extra 'eax' variable in rdpkru function, reworked vm_flags assignment, reworded a comment in pte_allows_gup()
* Add missing DISABLED/REQUIRED_MASK14 in cpufeature.h
* Added comment about compile optimization in fault path
* Left get_user_pages_locked() alone. Andrea thinks we need it.

Changes from RFCv3:

* Added 'current' and 'foreign' variants of get_user_pages() to help indicate whether protection keys should be enforced. Thanks to Jerome Glisse for pointing out this issue.
* Added "allocation" and set/get system calls so that we can do management of proection keys in the kernel. This opens the door to use of specific protection keys for kernel use in the future, such as for execute-only memory.
* Removed the kselftest code for the moment. It will be submitted separately.

Thanks Ingo and Thomas for most of these):
Changes from RFCv2 (Thanks Ingo and Thomas for most of these):

* few minor compile warnings
* changed 'nopku' interaction with cpuid bits. Now, we do not clear the PKU cpuid bit, we just skip enabling it.
* changed __pkru_allows_write() to also check access disable bit
* removed the unused write_pkru()
* made si_pkey a u64 and added some patch description details. Also made it share space in siginfo with MPX and clarified comments.
* give some real text for the Processor Trace xsave state
* made vma_pkey() less ugly (and much more optimized actually)
* added SEGV_PKUERR to copy_siginfo_to_user()
* remove page table walk when filling in si_pkey, added some big fat comments about it being inherently racy.
* added self test code

This code is not runnable to anyone outside of Intel unless they have some special hardware or a fancy simulator. There is a qemu model to emulate the feature, but it is not currently implemented fully enough to be usable. If you are interested in running this for real, please get in touch with me. Hardware is available to a very small but nonzero number of people.

This set is also available here:

	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/daveh/x86-pkeys.git pkeys-v018

=== diffstat ===

Dave Hansen (32):
mm, gup: introduce concept of "foreign" get_user_pages() x86, fpu: add placeholder for Processor Trace XSAVE state x86, pkeys: Add Kconfig option
x86, pkeys: cpuid bit definition
x86, pkeys: define new CR4 bit
x86, pkeys: add PKRU xsave fields and data structure(s) x86, pkeys: PTE bits for storing protection key
x86, pkeys: new page fault error code bit: PF_PK
x86, pkeys: store protection in high VMA flags
x86, pkeys: arch-specific protection bits
x86, pkeys: pass VMA down in to fault signal generation code signals, pkeys: notify userspace about protection key faults x86, pkeys: fill in pkey field in siginfo
x86, pkeys: add functions to fetch PKRU
mm: factor out VMA fault permission checking
x86, mm: simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling x86, pkeys: check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
mm: add gup flag to indicate "foreign" mm access
x86, pkeys: optimize fault handling in access_error() x86, pkeys: differentiate instruction fetches
x86, pkeys: dump PKRU with other kernel registers x86, pkeys: dump PTE pkey in /proc/pid/smaps
x86, pkeys: add Kconfig prompt to existing config option x86, pkeys: actually enable Memory Protection Keys in CPU mm, multi-arch: pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits() x86, pkeys: add arch_validate_pkey()
x86: separate out LDT init from context init
x86, fpu: allow setting of XSAVE state
x86, pkeys: allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register x86, pkeys: create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags x86, pkeys: execute-only support
x86, pkeys: Documentation

 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt         |   3 +
 Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt       |  27 +++
 arch/mips/mm/gup.c                          |   3 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h             |   5 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h      |  12 ++
 arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h         |  12 ++
 arch/s390/mm/gup.c                          |   3 +-
 arch/sh/mm/gup.c                            |   2 +-
 arch/sparc/mm/gup.c                         |   2 +-
 arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h    |  12 ++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                            |  16 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h           |  56 +++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h    |  13 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h         |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h            |  12 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h           |   4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h          |  85 ++++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h              |  38 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h        |  34 +++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h                |  34 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h    |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h        |  22 +++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h            |  22 +++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                |  42 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c                  |  63 +++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                | 185 +++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c                       |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c                |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c                     |   9 +
 arch/x86/mm/Makefile                        |   2 +
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                         | 171 +++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/mm/gup.c                           |  46 +++--
 arch/x86/mm/mpx.c                           |   4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c                         | 101 +++++++++++
 drivers/char/agp/frontend.c                 |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c     |   4 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_userptr.c     |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c         |   4 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/via/via_dmablit.c           |   3 +-
 drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/infiniband/core/umem_odp.c          |   8 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mthca/mthca_memfree.c |   3 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/qib/qib_user_pages.c  |   3 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/usnic/usnic_uiom.c    |   2 +-
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c                |   8 +-
 drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-udma.c          |   4 +-
 drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-yuv.c           |  10 +-
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.c   |   3 +-
 drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grufault.c             |   3 +-
 drivers/scsi/st.c                           |   2 -
 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c            |   4 +-
 drivers/video/fbdev/pvr2fb.c                |   4 +-
 drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c               |   5 +-
 fs/exec.c                                   |   8 +-
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                          |  14 ++
 include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h              |  12 ++
 include/linux/mm.h                          |  60 +++++--
 include/linux/mman.h                        |   6 +-
 include/linux/pkeys.h                       |  33 ++++
 include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h          |  17 +-

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/32 mm, gup: introduce concept of "foreign" get_user_pages()

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

For protection keys, we need to understand whether protections should be enforced in software or not. In general, we enforce protections when working on our own task, but not when on others. We call these "current" and "foreign" operations.

This introduces two new get_user_pages() variants:

get_current_user_pages()
get_foreign_user_pages()

get_current_user_pages() is a drop-in replacement for when get_user_pages() was called with (current, current->mm, ...) as arguments. Using it makes a few of the call sites look a bit nicer.

get_foreign_user_pages() is a replacement for when get_user_pages() is called on non-current tsk/mm.

We leave a stub get_user_pages() around with a __deprecated warning.

Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]>

---

 b/arch/mips/mm/gup.c                          |    3 -
 b/arch/s390/mm/gup.c                          |    3 -
 b/arch/sh/mm/gup.c                            |    2 -
 b/arch/sparc/mm/gup.c                         |    2 -
 b/arch/x86/mm/gup.c                           |    2 -
 b/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c                           |    4 +-
 b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c     |    4 +-
 b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_userptr.c     |    2 -
 b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c         |    4 +-
 b/drivers/gpu/drm/via/via_dmablit.c           |    3 -
 b/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c              |    2 -
 b/drivers/infiniband/core/umem_odp.c          |    8 ++--
 b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mthca/mthca_memfree.c |    3 -
 b/drivers/infiniband/hw/qib/qib_user_pages.c  |    3 -
 b/drivers/infiniband/hw/usnic/usnic_uiom.c    |    2 -
 b/drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-udma.c          |    4 +-
 b/drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-yuv.c           |   10 ++---
 b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.c   |    3 -
 b/drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grufault.c             |    3 -
 b/drivers/scsi/st.c                           |    2 -
 b/drivers/video/fbdev/pvr2fb.c                |    4 +-
 b/drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c               |    5 +-
 b/fs/exec.c                                   |    8 +++-
 b/include/linux/mm.h                          |   39 +++++++++++++------
 b/kernel/events/uprobes.c                     |    4 +-
 b/mm/frame_vector.c                           |    2 -
 b/mm/gup.c                                    |   51 ++++++++++++++++----------
 b/mm/memory.c                                 |    2 -
 b/mm/mempolicy.c                              |    6 +--
 b/mm/nommu.c                                  |   34 ++++++++++-------
 b/mm/process_vm_access.c                      |    6 ++-
 b/mm/util.c                                   |    4 --
 b/net/ceph/pagevec.c                          |    2 -
 b/security/tomoyo/domain.c                    |    9 ++++
 b/virt/kvm/async_pf.c                         |    2 -
 b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c                         |   13 +++---
 36 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-)
arch/mips/mm/gup.c renamed from arch/mips/mm/gup.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -2
diff -puN arch/mips/mm/gup.c~get_current_user_pages arch/mips/mm/gup.c
@@ -301,8 +301,7 @@ slow_irqon:
 	start += nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
 	pages += nr;
 
-	ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(current, mm, start,
-				      (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
+	ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
 				      write, 0, pages);
 
 	/* Have to be a bit careful with return values */
arch/s390/mm/gup.c renamed from arch/s390/mm/gup.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -2
diff -puN arch/s390/mm/gup.c~get_current_user_pages arch/s390/mm/gup.c
@@ -241,8 +241,7 @@ int get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long st
 	/* Try to get the remaining pages with get_user_pages */
 	start += nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
 	pages += nr;
-	ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(current, mm, start,
-			     nr_pages - nr, write, 0, pages);
+	ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(start, nr_pages - nr, write, 0, pages);
 	/* Have to be a bit careful with return values */
 	if (nr > 0)
 		ret = (ret < 0) ? nr : ret + nr;
arch/sh/mm/gup.c renamed from arch/sh/mm/gup.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -1
diff -puN arch/sh/mm/gup.c~get_current_user_pages arch/sh/mm/gup.c
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ slow_irqon:
 		start += nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
 		pages += nr;
 
-		ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(current, mm, start,
+		ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(start,
 			(end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT, write, 0, pages);
 
 		/* Have to be a bit careful with return values */
arch/sparc/mm/gup.c renamed from arch/sparc/mm/gup.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -1
diff -puN arch/sparc/mm/gup.c~get_current_user_pages arch/sparc/mm/gup.c
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ slow:
 		start += nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
 		pages += nr;
 
-		ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(current, mm, start,
+		ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(start,
 			(end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT, write, 0, pages);
 
 		/* Have to be a bit careful with return values */
arch/x86/mm/gup.c renamed from arch/x86/mm/gup.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -1
diff -puN arch/x86/mm/gup.c~get_current_user_pages arch/x86/mm/gup.c
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ slow_irqon:
 		start += nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
 		pages += nr;
 
-		ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(current, mm, start,
+		ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(start,
 					      (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
 					      write, 0, pages);
 
arch/x86/mm/mpx.c renamed from arch/x86/mm/mpx.c~get_current_user_pages +2 -2
diff -puN arch/x86/mm/mpx.c~get_current_user_pages arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
@@ -546,8 +546,8 @@ static int mpx_resolve_fault(long __user
 	int nr_pages = 1;
 	int force = 0;
 
-	gup_ret = get_user_pages(current, current->mm, (unsigned long)addr,
-				 nr_pages, write, force, NULL, NULL);
+	gup_ret = get_current_user_pages((unsigned long)addr, nr_pages, write,
+			force, NULL, NULL);
 	/*
 	 * get_user_pages() returns number of pages gotten.
 	 * 0 means we failed to fault in and get anything,
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c renamed from drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c~get_current_user_pages +2 -2
diff -puN drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c
@@ -518,8 +518,8 @@ static int amdgpu_ttm_tt_pin_userptr(str
 		uint64_t userptr = gtt->userptr + pinned * PAGE_SIZE;
 		struct page **pages = ttm->pages + pinned;
 
-		r = get_user_pages(current, current->mm, userptr, num_pages,
-				   write, 0, pages, NULL);
+		r = get_current_user_pages(userptr, num_pages, write, 0, pages,
+				NULL);
 		if (r < 0)
 			goto release_pages;
 
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_userptr.c renamed from drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_userptr.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -1
diff -puN drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_userptr.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_userptr.c
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ __i915_gem_userptr_get_pages_worker(stru
 
 		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
 		while (pinned < num_pages) {
-			ret = get_user_pages(work->task, mm,
+			ret = get_foreign_user_pages(work->task, mm,
 					     obj->userptr.ptr + pinned * PAGE_SIZE,
 					     num_pages - pinned,
 					     !obj->userptr.read_only, 0,
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c renamed from drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c~get_current_user_pages +2 -2
diff -puN drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c
@@ -554,8 +554,8 @@ static int radeon_ttm_tt_pin_userptr(str
 		uint64_t userptr = gtt->userptr + pinned * PAGE_SIZE;
 		struct page **pages = ttm->pages + pinned;
 
-		r = get_user_pages(current, current->mm, userptr, num_pages,
-				   write, 0, pages, NULL);
+		r = get_current_user_pages(userptr, num_pages, write, 0, pages,
+				NULL);
 		if (r < 0)
 			goto release_pages;
 
drivers/gpu/drm/via/via_dmablit.c renamed from drivers/gpu/drm/via/via_dmablit.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -2
diff -puN drivers/gpu/drm/via/via_dmablit.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/gpu/drm/via/via_dmablit.c
@@ -239,8 +239,7 @@ via_lock_all_dma_pages(drm_via_sg_info_t
 	if (NULL == vsg->pages)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
-	ret = get_user_pages(current, current->mm,
-			     (unsigned long)xfer->mem_addr,
+	ret = get_current_user_pages((unsigned long)xfer->mem_addr,
 			     vsg->num_pages,
 			     (vsg->direction == DMA_FROM_DEVICE),
 			     0, vsg->pages, NULL);
drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c renamed from drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -1
diff -puN drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ struct ib_umem *ib_umem_get(struct ib_uc
 	sg_list_start = umem->sg_head.sgl;
 
 	while (npages) {
-		ret = get_user_pages(current, current->mm, cur_base,
+		ret = get_current_user_pages(cur_base,
 				     min_t(unsigned long, npages,
 					   PAGE_SIZE / sizeof (struct page *)),
 				     1, !umem->writable, page_list, vma_list);
drivers/infiniband/core/umem_odp.c renamed from drivers/infiniband/core/umem_odp.c~get_current_user_pages +4 -4
diff -puN drivers/infiniband/core/umem_odp.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/infiniband/core/umem_odp.c
@@ -572,10 +572,10 @@ int ib_umem_odp_map_dma_pages(struct ib_
 		 * complex (and doesn't gain us much performance in most use
 		 * cases).
 		 */
-		npages = get_user_pages(owning_process, owning_mm, user_virt,
-					gup_num_pages,
-					access_mask & ODP_WRITE_ALLOWED_BIT, 0,
-					local_page_list, NULL);
+		npages = get_foreign_user_pages(owning_process, owning_mm,
+				user_virt, gup_num_pages,
+				access_mask & ODP_WRITE_ALLOWED_BIT,
+				0, local_page_list, NULL);
 		up_read(&owning_mm->mmap_sem);
 
 		if (npages < 0)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mthca/mthca_memfree.c renamed from drivers/infiniband/hw/mthca/mthca_memfree.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -2
diff -puN drivers/infiniband/hw/mthca/mthca_memfree.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/infiniband/hw/mthca/mthca_memfree.c
@@ -472,8 +472,7 @@ int mthca_map_user_db(struct mthca_dev *
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ret = get_user_pages(current, current->mm, uaddr & PAGE_MASK, 1, 1, 0,
-			     pages, NULL);
+	ret = get_current_user_pages(uaddr & PAGE_MASK, 1, 1, 0, pages, NULL);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
drivers/infiniband/hw/qib/qib_user_pages.c renamed from drivers/infiniband/hw/qib/qib_user_pages.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -2
diff -puN drivers/infiniband/hw/qib/qib_user_pages.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/infiniband/hw/qib/qib_user_pages.c
@@ -66,8 +66,7 @@ static int __qib_get_user_pages(unsigned
 	}
 
 	for (got = 0; got < num_pages; got += ret) {
-		ret = get_user_pages(current, current->mm,
-				     start_page + got * PAGE_SIZE,
+		ret = get_current_user_pages(start_page + got * PAGE_SIZE,
 				     num_pages - got, 1, 1,
 				     p + got, NULL);
 		if (ret < 0)
drivers/infiniband/hw/usnic/usnic_uiom.c renamed from drivers/infiniband/hw/usnic/usnic_uiom.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -1
diff -puN drivers/infiniband/hw/usnic/usnic_uiom.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/infiniband/hw/usnic/usnic_uiom.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static int usnic_uiom_get_pages(unsigned
 	ret = 0;
 
 	while (npages) {
-		ret = get_user_pages(current, current->mm, cur_base,
+		ret = get_current_user_pages(cur_base,
 					min_t(unsigned long, npages,
 					PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct page *)),
 					1, !writable, page_list, NULL);
drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-udma.c renamed from drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-udma.c~get_current_user_pages +2 -2
diff -puN drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-udma.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-udma.c
@@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ int ivtv_udma_setup(struct ivtv *itv, un
 	}
 
 	/* Get user pages for DMA Xfer */
-	err = get_user_pages_unlocked(current, current->mm,
-			user_dma.uaddr, user_dma.page_count, 0, 1, dma->map);
+	err = get_user_pages_unlocked(user_dma.uaddr, user_dma.page_count, 0,
+			1, dma->map);
 
 	if (user_dma.page_count != err) {
 		IVTV_DEBUG_WARN("failed to map user pages, returned %d instead of %d\n",
drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-yuv.c renamed from drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-yuv.c~get_current_user_pages +4 -6
diff -puN drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-yuv.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-yuv.c
@@ -75,14 +75,12 @@ static int ivtv_yuv_prep_user_dma(struct
 	ivtv_udma_get_page_info (&uv_dma, (unsigned long)args->uv_source, 360 * uv_decode_height);
 
 	/* Get user pages for DMA Xfer */
-	y_pages = get_user_pages_unlocked(current, current->mm,
-				y_dma.uaddr, y_dma.page_count, 0, 1,
-				&dma->map[0]);
+	y_pages = get_user_pages_unlocked(y_dma.uaddr,
+			y_dma.page_count, 0, 1, &dma->map[0]);
 	uv_pages = 0; /* silence gcc. value is set and consumed only if: */
 	if (y_pages == y_dma.page_count) {
-		uv_pages = get_user_pages_unlocked(current, current->mm,
-					uv_dma.uaddr, uv_dma.page_count, 0, 1,
-					&dma->map[y_pages]);
+		uv_pages = get_user_pages_unlocked(uv_dma.uaddr,
+				uv_dma.page_count, 0, 1, &dma->map[y_pages]);
 	}
 
 	if (y_pages != y_dma.page_count || uv_pages != uv_dma.page_count) {
drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.c renamed from drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -2
diff -puN drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.c
@@ -181,8 +181,7 @@ static int videobuf_dma_init_user_locked
 	dprintk(1, "init user [0x%lx+0x%lx => %d pages]\n",
 		data, size, dma->nr_pages);
 
-	err = get_user_pages(current, current->mm,
-			     data & PAGE_MASK, dma->nr_pages,
+	err = get_current_user_pages(data & PAGE_MASK, dma->nr_pages,
 			     rw == READ, 1, /* force */
 			     dma->pages, NULL);
 
drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grufault.c renamed from drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grufault.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -2
diff -puN drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grufault.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grufault.c
@@ -198,8 +198,7 @@ static int non_atomic_pte_lookup(struct
 #else
 	*pageshift = PAGE_SHIFT;
 #endif
-	if (get_user_pages
-	    (current, current->mm, vaddr, 1, write, 0, &page, NULL) <= 0)
+	if (get_current_user_pages(vaddr, 1, write, 0, &page, NULL) <= 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 	*paddr = page_to_phys(page);
 	put_page(page);
drivers/scsi/st.c renamed from drivers/scsi/st.c~get_current_user_pages +0 -2
diff -puN drivers/scsi/st.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/scsi/st.c
@@ -4786,8 +4786,6 @@ static int sgl_map_user_pages(struct st_
         /* Try to fault in all of the necessary pages */
         /* rw==READ means read from drive, write into memory area */
 	res = get_user_pages_unlocked(
-		current,
-		current->mm,
 		uaddr,
 		nr_pages,
 		rw == READ,
drivers/video/fbdev/pvr2fb.c renamed from drivers/video/fbdev/pvr2fb.c~get_current_user_pages +2 -2
diff -puN drivers/video/fbdev/pvr2fb.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/video/fbdev/pvr2fb.c
@@ -686,8 +686,8 @@ static ssize_t pvr2fb_write(struct fb_in
 	if (!pages)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ret = get_user_pages_unlocked(current, current->mm, (unsigned long)buf,
-				      nr_pages, WRITE, 0, pages);
+	ret = get_user_pages_unlocked((unsigned long)buf, nr_pages, WRITE,
+			0, pages);
 
 	if (ret < nr_pages) {
 		nr_pages = ret;
drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c renamed from drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c~get_current_user_pages +2 -3
diff -puN drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c~get_current_user_pages drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c
@@ -244,9 +244,8 @@ static long ioctl_memcpy(struct fsl_hv_i
 
 	/* Get the physical addresses of the source buffer */
 	down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
-	num_pinned = get_user_pages(current, current->mm,
-		param.local_vaddr - lb_offset, num_pages,
-		(param.source == -1) ? READ : WRITE,
+	num_pinned = get_current_user_pages(param.local_vaddr - lb_offset,
+		num_pages, (param.source == -1) ? READ : WRITE,
 		0, pages, NULL);
 	up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 
fs/exec.c renamed from fs/exec.c~get_current_user_pages +6 -2
diff -puN fs/exec.c~get_current_user_pages fs/exec.c
@@ -198,8 +198,12 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct
 			return NULL;
 	}
 #endif
-	ret = get_user_pages(current, bprm->mm, pos,
-			1, write, 1, &page, NULL);
+	/*
+	 * We are doing an exec().  'current' is the process
+	 * doing the exec and bprm->mm is the new process's mm.
+	 */
+	ret = get_foreign_user_pages(current, bprm->mm, pos, 1, write,
+			1, &page, NULL);
 	if (ret <= 0)
 		return NULL;
 
include/linux/mm.h renamed from include/linux/mm.h~get_current_user_pages +27 -12
diff -puN include/linux/mm.h~get_current_user_pages include/linux/mm.h
@@ -1191,24 +1191,39 @@ long __get_user_pages(struct task_struct
 		      unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
 		      unsigned int foll_flags, struct page **pages,
 		      struct vm_area_struct **vmas, int *nonblocking);
-long get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
-		    unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
-		    int write, int force, struct page **pages,
-		    struct vm_area_struct **vmas);
-long get_user_pages_locked(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
-		    unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
-		    int write, int force, struct page **pages,
-		    int *locked);
-long __get_user_pages_unlocked(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
-			       unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
+long get_foreign_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
+			    unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
+			    int write, int force, struct page **pages,
+			    struct vm_area_struct **vmas);
+long get_current_user_pages(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
+			    int write, int force, struct page **pages,
+			    struct vm_area_struct **vmas);
+long get_user_pages_locked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
+		    int write, int force, struct page **pages, int *locked);
+long __get_user_pages_unlocked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
 			       int write, int force, struct page **pages,
 			       unsigned int gup_flags);
-long get_user_pages_unlocked(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
-		    unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
+long get_user_pages_unlocked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
 		    int write, int force, struct page **pages);
 int get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long start, int nr_pages, int write,
 			struct page **pages);
 
+/*
+ * All callers should use get_foreign_user_pages() or
+ * get_current_user_pages().  The foreign variant is the most
+ * permissive and is the least likely to break something in
+ * a negative way.
+ */
+static inline __deprecated
+long get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
+		    unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
+		    int write, int force, struct page **pages,
+		    struct vm_area_struct **vmas)
+{
+	return get_foreign_user_pages(tsk, mm, start, nr_pages, write, force,
+				      pages, vmas);
+}
+
 /* Container for pinned pfns / pages */
 struct frame_vector {
 	unsigned int nr_allocated;	/* Number of frames we have space for */
kernel/events/uprobes.c renamed from kernel/events/uprobes.c~get_current_user_pages +2 -2
diff -puN kernel/events/uprobes.c~get_current_user_pages kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ int uprobe_write_opcode(struct mm_struct
 
 retry:
 	/* Read the page with vaddr into memory */
-	ret = get_user_pages(NULL, mm, vaddr, 1, 0, 1, &old_page, &vma);
+	ret = get_foreign_user_pages(NULL, mm, vaddr, 1, 0, 1, &old_page, &vma);
 	if (ret <= 0)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ static int is_trap_at_addr(struct mm_str
 	if (likely(result == 0))
 		goto out;
 
-	result = get_user_pages(NULL, mm, vaddr, 1, 0, 1, &page, NULL);
+	result = get_current_user_pages(vaddr, 1, 0, 1, &page, NULL);
 	if (result < 0)
 		return result;
 
mm/frame_vector.c renamed from mm/frame_vector.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -1
diff -puN mm/frame_vector.c~get_current_user_pages mm/frame_vector.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ int get_vaddr_frames(unsigned long start
 	if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP))) {
 		vec->got_ref = true;
 		vec->is_pfns = false;
-		ret = get_user_pages_locked(current, mm, start, nr_frames,
+		ret = get_user_pages_locked(start, nr_frames,
 			write, force, (struct page **)(vec->ptrs), &locked);
 		goto out;
 	}
mm/gup.c renamed from mm/gup.c~get_current_user_pages +33 -18

103 lines not on this page · raw message

mm/memory.c renamed from mm/memory.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -1
diff -puN mm/memory.c~get_current_user_pages mm/memory.c
@@ -3659,7 +3659,7 @@ static int __access_remote_vm(struct tas
 		void *maddr;
 		struct page *page = NULL;
 
-		ret = get_user_pages(tsk, mm, addr, 1,
+		ret = get_foreign_user_pages(tsk, mm, addr, 1,
 				write, 1, &page, &vma);
 		if (ret <= 0) {
 #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT
mm/mempolicy.c renamed from mm/mempolicy.c~get_current_user_pages +3 -3
diff -puN mm/mempolicy.c~get_current_user_pages mm/mempolicy.c
@@ -813,12 +813,12 @@ static void get_policy_nodemask(struct m
 	}
 }
 
-static int lookup_node(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
+static int lookup_node(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	struct page *p;
 	int err;
 
-	err = get_user_pages(current, mm, addr & PAGE_MASK, 1, 0, 0, &p, NULL);
+	err = get_current_user_pages(addr & PAGE_MASK, 1, 0, 0, &p, NULL);
 	if (err >= 0) {
 		err = page_to_nid(p);
 		put_page(p);
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ static long do_get_mempolicy(int *policy
 
 	if (flags & MPOL_F_NODE) {
 		if (flags & MPOL_F_ADDR) {
-			err = lookup_node(mm, addr);
+			err = lookup_node(addr);
 			if (err < 0)
 				goto out;
 			*policy = err;
mm/nommu.c renamed from mm/nommu.c~get_current_user_pages +20 -14
diff -puN mm/nommu.c~get_current_user_pages mm/nommu.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ finish_or_fault:
  *   slab page or a secondary page from a compound page
  * - don't permit access to VMAs that don't support it, such as I/O mappings
  */
-long get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
+long get_foreign_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
 		    unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
 		    int write, int force, struct page **pages,
 		    struct vm_area_struct **vmas)
@@ -199,35 +199,41 @@ long get_user_pages(struct task_struct *
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_user_pages);
 
-long get_user_pages_locked(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
-			   unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
+long get_user_pages_locked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
 			   int write, int force, struct page **pages,
 			   int *locked)
 {
-	return get_user_pages(tsk, mm, start, nr_pages, write, force,
-			      pages, NULL);
+	return get_user_pages(current, current->mm, start, nr_pages, write,
+			      force, pages, NULL);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_user_pages_locked);
 
-long __get_user_pages_unlocked(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
-			       unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
+long get_current_user_pages(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
+		    int write, int force, struct page **pages,
+		    struct vm_area_struct **vmas)
+{
+	return get_foreign_user_pages(current, current->mm, start, nr_pages,
+				      write, force, pages, vmas);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_current_user_pages);
+
+long __get_user_pages_unlocked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
 			       int write, int force, struct page **pages,
 			       unsigned int gup_flags)
 {
 	long ret;
-	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-	ret = get_user_pages(tsk, mm, start, nr_pages, write, force,
-			     pages, NULL);
-	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+	ret = get_current_user_pages(start, nr_pages, write, force,
+				     pages, NULL);
+	up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_pages_unlocked);
 
-long get_user_pages_unlocked(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
-			     unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
+long get_user_pages_unlocked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
 			     int write, int force, struct page **pages)
 {
-	return __get_user_pages_unlocked(tsk, mm, start, nr_pages, write,
+	return __get_user_pages_unlocked(start, nr_pages, write,
 					 force, pages, 0);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_user_pages_unlocked);
mm/process_vm_access.c renamed from mm/process_vm_access.c~get_current_user_pages +4 -2
diff -puN mm/process_vm_access.c~get_current_user_pages mm/process_vm_access.c
@@ -99,8 +99,10 @@ static int process_vm_rw_single_vec(unsi
 		size_t bytes;
 
 		/* Get the pages we're interested in */
-		pages = get_user_pages_unlocked(task, mm, pa, pages,
-						vm_write, 0, process_pages);
+		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+		pages = get_foreign_user_pages(task, mm, pa, pages, vm_write,
+						0, process_pages, NULL);
+		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
 		if (pages <= 0)
 			return -EFAULT;
 
mm/util.c renamed from mm/util.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -3
diff -puN mm/util.c~get_current_user_pages mm/util.c
@@ -277,9 +277,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__get_user_pages_fast)
 int __weak get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long start,
 				int nr_pages, int write, struct page **pages)
 {
-	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
-	return get_user_pages_unlocked(current, mm, start, nr_pages,
-				       write, 0, pages);
+	return get_user_pages_unlocked(start, nr_pages, write, 0, pages);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_user_pages_fast);
 
net/ceph/pagevec.c renamed from net/ceph/pagevec.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -1
diff -puN net/ceph/pagevec.c~get_current_user_pages net/ceph/pagevec.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ struct page **ceph_get_direct_page_vecto
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
 	while (got < num_pages) {
-		rc = get_user_pages_unlocked(current, current->mm,
+		rc = get_user_pages_unlocked(
 		    (unsigned long)data + ((unsigned long)got * PAGE_SIZE),
 		    num_pages - got, write_page, 0, pages + got);
 		if (rc < 0)
security/tomoyo/domain.c renamed from security/tomoyo/domain.c~get_current_user_pages +8 -1
diff -puN security/tomoyo/domain.c~get_current_user_pages security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -874,7 +874,14 @@ bool tomoyo_dump_page(struct linux_binpr
 	}
 	/* Same with get_arg_page(bprm, pos, 0) in fs/exec.c */
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
-	if (get_user_pages(current, bprm->mm, pos, 1, 0, 1, &page, NULL) <= 0)
+	/*
+	 * This is called at execve() time in order to dig around
+	 * in the argv/environment of the new proceess
+	 * (represented by bprm).  'current' is the process doing
+	 * the execve().
+	 */
+	if (get_foreign_user_pages(current, bprm->mm, pos, 1,
+				0, 1, &page, NULL) <= 0)
 		return false;
 #else
 	page = bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE];
virt/kvm/async_pf.c renamed from virt/kvm/async_pf.c~get_current_user_pages +1 -1
diff -puN virt/kvm/async_pf.c~get_current_user_pages virt/kvm/async_pf.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static void async_pf_execute(struct work
 
 	might_sleep();
 
-	get_user_pages_unlocked(NULL, mm, addr, 1, 1, 0, NULL);
+	get_user_pages_unlocked(addr, 1, 1, 0, NULL);
 	kvm_async_page_present_sync(vcpu, apf);
 
 	spin_lock(&vcpu->async_pf.lock);
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c renamed from virt/kvm/kvm_main.c~get_current_user_pages +6 -7
diff -puN virt/kvm/kvm_main.c~get_current_user_pages virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1274,15 +1274,16 @@ unsigned long kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot(s
 	return gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(slot, gfn, writable);
 }
 
-static int get_user_page_nowait(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
-	unsigned long start, int write, struct page **page)
+static int get_user_page_nowait(unsigned long start, int write,
+		struct page **page)
 {
 	int flags = FOLL_TOUCH | FOLL_NOWAIT | FOLL_HWPOISON | FOLL_GET;
 
 	if (write)
 		flags |= FOLL_WRITE;
 
-	return __get_user_pages(tsk, mm, start, 1, flags, page, NULL, NULL);
+	return __get_user_pages(current, current->mm, start, 1, flags, page,
+			NULL, NULL);
 }
 
 static inline int check_user_page_hwpoison(unsigned long addr)
@@ -1344,12 +1345,10 @@ static int hva_to_pfn_slow(unsigned long
 
 	if (async) {
 		down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
-		npages = get_user_page_nowait(current, current->mm,
-					      addr, write_fault, page);
+		npages = get_user_page_nowait(addr, write_fault, page);
 		up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 	} else
-		npages = __get_user_pages_unlocked(current, current->mm, addr, 1,
-						   write_fault, 0, page,
+		npages = __get_user_pages_unlocked(addr, 1, write_fault, 0, page,
 						   FOLL_TOUCH|FOLL_HWPOISON);
 	if (npages != 1)
 		return npages;

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 01/32] mm, gup: introduce concept of "foreign" get_user_pages()

Quoted 17 lines · Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

For protection keys, we need to understand whether protections should be enforced in software or not. In general, we enforce protections when working on our own task, but not when on others. We call these "current" and "foreign" operations.

This introduces two new get_user_pages() variants:

get_current_user_pages()
get_foreign_user_pages()

get_current_user_pages() is a drop-in replacement for when get_user_pages() was called with (current, current->mm, ...) as arguments. Using it makes a few of the call sites look a bit nicer.

Quoted 5 lines

get_foreign_user_pages() is a replacement for when get_user_pages() is called on non-current tsk/mm.

We leave a stub get_user_pages() around with a __deprecated warning.

Changelog doesn't mention that get_user_pages_unlocked() is also changed to be effectively get_current_user_pages_unlocked(). It's a bit non-obvious and the inconsistent naming is unfortunate, but I can see how get_current_user_pages_unlocked() would be too long, and just deleting the parameters from get_user_pages() would be too large and intrusive. But please mention this in changelog?

Thanks.

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 01/32] mm, gup: introduce concept of "foreign" get_user_pages()

Quoted 7 lines · Vlastimil Babka

Changelog doesn't mention that get_user_pages_unlocked() is also changed to be effectively get_current_user_pages_unlocked(). It's a bit non-obvious and the inconsistent naming is unfortunate, but I can see how get_current_user_pages_unlocked() would be too long, and just deleting the parameters from get_user_pages() would be too large and intrusive. But please mention this in changelog?

Thanks for the review! Good point about the churn there. I'll add some changelog comments.

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/32 x86, fpu: add placeholder for Processor Trace XSAVE state

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

x86 Maintainers,

I submitted this independently, but it must be applied before adding subsequent patches. Please drop this if it has already been applied.

---

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

There is an XSAVE state component for Intel Processor Trace. But, we do not use it and do not expect to ever use it.

We add a placeholder in the code for it so it is not a mystery and also so we do not need an explicit enum initialization for Protection Keys in a moment.

Why will we never use it? According to Andi Kleen:

The XSAVE support assumes that there is a single buffer for each thread. But perf generally doesn't work this way, it usually has only a single perf event per CPU per user, and when tracing multiple threads on that CPU it inherits perf event buffers between different threads. So XSAVE per thread cannot handle this inheritance case directly.

Using multiple XSAVE areas (another one per perf event) would defeat some of the state caching that the CPUs do.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h |    1 +
 b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c     |   10 ++++++++--
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h~pt-xstate-bit +1 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h~pt-xstate-bit arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ enum xfeature {
 	XFEATURE_OPMASK,
 	XFEATURE_ZMM_Hi256,
 	XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM,
+	XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR,
 
 	XFEATURE_MAX,
 };
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c~pt-xstate-bit +8 -2
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c~pt-xstate-bit arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 
+/*
+ * Although we spell it out in here, the Processor Trace
+ * xfeature is completely unused.  We use other mechanisms
+ * to save/restore PT state in Linux.
+ */
 static const char *xfeature_names[] =
 {
 	"x87 floating point registers"	,
@@ -23,7 +28,7 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] =
 	"AVX-512 opmask"		,
 	"AVX-512 Hi256"			,
 	"AVX-512 ZMM_Hi256"		,
-	"unknown xstate feature"	,
+	"Processor Trace (unused)"	,
 };
 
 /*
@@ -469,7 +474,8 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(
 	 * numbers.
 	 */
 	if ((nr < XFEATURE_YMM) ||
-	    (nr >= XFEATURE_MAX)) {
+	    (nr >= XFEATURE_MAX) ||
+	    (nr == XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "no structure for xstate: %d\n", nr);
 		XSTATE_WARN_ON(1);
 	}

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#5 lore raw

PATCH 3/32 x86, pkeys: Add Kconfig option

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

I don't have a strong opinion on whether we need a Kconfig prompt or not. Protection Keys has relatively little code associated with it, and it is not a heavyweight feature to keep enabled. However, I can imagine that folks would still appreciate being able to disable it.

Note that, with disabled-features.h, the checks in the code for protection keys are always the same:

	cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PKU)

With the config option disabled, this essentially turns into an #ifdef.

We will hide the prompt for now.

---

 b/arch/x86/Kconfig |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig renamed from arch/x86/Kconfig~pkeys-01-kconfig +4 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/Kconfig~pkeys-01-kconfig arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1680,6 +1680,10 @@ config X86_INTEL_MPX
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	def_bool y
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#6 lore raw

PATCH 4/32 x86, pkeys: cpuid bit definition

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

There are two CPUID bits for protection keys. One is for whether the CPU contains the feature, and the other will appear set once the OS enables protection keys. Specifically:

Bit 04: OSPKE. If 1, OS has set CR4.PKE to enable Protection keys (and the RDPKRU/WRPKRU instructions)

This is because userspace can not see CR4 contents, but it can see CPUID contents.

X86_FEATURE_PKU is referred to as "PKU" in the hardware documentation:

	CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):ECX.PKU [bit 3]

X86_FEATURE_OSPKE is "OSPKU":

	CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):ECX.OSPKE [bit 4]

These are the first CPU features which need to look at the ECX word in CPUID leaf 0x7, so this patch also includes fetching that word in to the cpuinfo->x86_capability[] array.

Add it to the disabled-features mask when its config option is off. Even though we are not using it here, we also extend the REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET() macro to keep it mirroring the DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET() version.

This means that in almost all code, you should use:

	cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PKU)

and *not* the CONFIG option.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h        |   56 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |   13 ++++++
 b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h |    5 ++
 b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c             |    1 
 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h~pkeys-01-cpuid +35 -21
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h~pkeys-01-cpuid arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/disabled-features.h>
 #endif
 
-#define NCAPINTS	14	/* N 32-bit words worth of info */
+#define NCAPINTS	15	/* N 32-bit words worth of info */
 #define NBUGINTS	1	/* N 32-bit bug flags */
 
 /*
@@ -258,6 +258,10 @@
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (ebx), word 13 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO	(13*32+0) /* CLZERO instruction */
 
+/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ecx), word 13 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PKU		(14*32+ 3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
+#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE	(14*32+ 4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
+
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
  */
@@ -298,28 +302,38 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[
 	 test_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)((c)->x86_capability))
 
 #define REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit)					\
-	 ( (((bit)>>5)==0 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK0)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==1 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK1)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==2 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK2)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==3 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK3)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==4 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK4)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==5 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK5)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==6 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK6)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==7 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK7)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==8 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK8)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==9 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK9)) )
+	 ( (((bit)>>5)==0  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK0 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==1  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK1 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==2  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK2 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==3  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK3 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==4  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK4 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==5  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK5 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==6  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK6 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==7  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK7 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==8  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK8 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==9  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK9 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==10 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK10)) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==11 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK11)) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==12 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK12)) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==12 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK13)) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==13 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & REQUIRED_MASK14)) )
 
 #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit)					\
-	 ( (((bit)>>5)==0 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK0)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==1 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK1)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==2 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK2)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==3 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK3)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==4 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK4)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==5 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK5)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==6 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK6)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==7 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK7)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==8 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK8)) ||	\
-	   (((bit)>>5)==9 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK9)) )
+	 ( (((bit)>>5)==0  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK0 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==1  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK1 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==2  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK2 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==3  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK3 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==4  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK4 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==5  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK5 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==6  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK6 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==7  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK7 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==8  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK8 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==9  && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK9 )) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==10 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK10)) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==11 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK11)) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==12 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK12)) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==12 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK13)) ||	\
+	   (((bit)>>5)==13 && (1UL<<((bit)&31) & DISABLED_MASK14)) )
 
 #define cpu_has(c, bit)							\
 	(__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 :	\
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h~pkeys-01-cpuid +13 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h~pkeys-01-cpuid arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@
 # define DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR	0
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+# define DISABLE_PKU		(1<<(X86_FEATURE_PKU))
+# define DISABLE_OSPKE		(1<<(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+#else
+# define DISABLE_PKU		0
+# define DISABLE_OSPKE		0
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
 /*
  * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
  */
@@ -41,5 +49,10 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK7	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK8	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK9	(DISABLE_MPX)
+#define DISABLED_MASK10	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK11	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK12	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK13	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK14	(DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE)
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h~pkeys-01-cpuid +5 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h~pkeys-01-cpuid arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h
@@ -92,5 +92,10 @@
 #define REQUIRED_MASK7	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK8	0
 #define REQUIRED_MASK9	0
+#define REQUIRED_MASK10	0
+#define REQUIRED_MASK11	0
+#define REQUIRED_MASK12	0
+#define REQUIRED_MASK13	0
+#define REQUIRED_MASK14	0
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c~pkeys-01-cpuid +1 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c~pkeys-01-cpuid arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -619,6 +619,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
 
 		c->x86_capability[9] = ebx;
+		c->x86_capability[14] = ecx;
 	}
 
 	/* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#7 lore raw

PATCH 5/32 x86, pkeys: define new CR4 bit

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

There is a new bit in CR4 for enabling protection keys. We will actually enable it later in the series.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h renamed from arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h~pkeys-02-cr4 +2 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h~pkeys-02-cr4 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@
 #define X86_CR4_SMEP		_BITUL(X86_CR4_SMEP_BIT)
 #define X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT	21 /* enable SMAP support */
 #define X86_CR4_SMAP		_BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT)
+#define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT		22 /* enable Protection Keys support */
+#define X86_CR4_PKE		_BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
 
 /*
  * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#8 lore raw

PATCH 6/32 x86, pkeys: add PKRU xsave fields and data structure(s)

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

The protection keys register (PKRU) is saved and restored using xsave. Define the data structure that we will use to access it inside the xsave buffer.

Note that we also have to widen the printk of the xsave feature masks since this is feature 0x200 and we only did two characters before.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h  |   11 +++++++++++
 b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h |    4 +++-
 b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c      |    7 ++++++-
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h~pkeys-03-xsave +11 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h~pkeys-03-xsave arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ enum xfeature {
 	XFEATURE_ZMM_Hi256,
 	XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM,
 	XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR,
+	XFEATURE_PKRU,
 
 	XFEATURE_MAX,
 };
@@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ enum xfeature {
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK		(1 << XFEATURE_OPMASK)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256		(1 << XFEATURE_ZMM_Hi256)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM		(1 << XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU		(1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
 
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE		(XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512		(XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK \
@@ -213,6 +215,15 @@ struct avx_512_hi16_state {
 	struct reg_512_bit		hi16_zmm[16];
 } __packed;
 
+/*
+ * State component 9: 32-bit PKRU register.  The state is
+ * 8 bytes long but only 4 bytes is used currently.
+ */
+struct pkru_state {
+	u32				pkru;
+	u32				pad;
+} __packed;
+
 struct xstate_header {
 	u64				xfeatures;
 	u64				xcomp_bv;
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h~pkeys-03-xsave +3 -1
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h~pkeys-03-xsave arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -27,7 +27,9 @@
 				 XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM)
 
 /* Supported features which require eager state saving */
-#define XFEATURE_MASK_EAGER	(XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_EAGER	(XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | \
+				 XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | \
+				 XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU)
 
 /* All currently supported features */
 #define XCNTXT_MASK	(XFEATURE_MASK_LAZY | XFEATURE_MASK_EAGER)
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c~pkeys-03-xsave +6 -1
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c~pkeys-03-xsave arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] =
 	"AVX-512 Hi256"			,
 	"AVX-512 ZMM_Hi256"		,
 	"Processor Trace (unused)"	,
+	"Protection Keys User registers",
+	"unknown xstate feature"	,
 };
 
 /*
@@ -57,6 +59,7 @@ void fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps(void
 	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512ER);
 	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX512CD);
 	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MPX);
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PKU);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -235,7 +238,7 @@ static void __init print_xstate_feature(
 	const char *feature_name;
 
 	if (cpu_has_xfeatures(xstate_mask, &feature_name))
-		pr_info("x86/fpu: Supporting XSAVE feature 0x%02Lx: '%s'\n", xstate_mask, feature_name);
+		pr_info("x86/fpu: Supporting XSAVE feature 0x%03Lx: '%s'\n", xstate_mask, feature_name);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -251,6 +254,7 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features
 	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK);
 	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256);
 	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM);
+	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -467,6 +471,7 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(
 	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_OPMASK,    struct avx_512_opmask_state);
 	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_ZMM_Hi256, struct avx_512_zmm_uppers_state);
 	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM,  struct avx_512_hi16_state);
+	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PKRU,      struct pkru_state);
 
 	/*
 	 * Make *SURE* to add any feature numbers in below if

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#9 lore raw

PATCH 7/32 x86, pkeys: PTE bits for storing protection key

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

Previous documentation has referred to these 4 bits as "ignored". That means that software could have made use of them. But, as far as I know, the kernel never used them.

They are still ignored when protection keys is not enabled, so they could theoretically still get used for software purposes.

We also implement "empty" versions so that code that references to them can be optimized away by the compiler when the config option is not enabled.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |   17 ++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h~pkeys-04-ptebits +16 -1
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h~pkeys-04-ptebits arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -25,7 +25,11 @@
 #define _PAGE_BIT_SPLITTING	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2 /* only valid on a PSE pmd */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_HIDDEN	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 /* hidden by kmemcheck */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 /* software dirty tracking */
-#define _PAGE_BIT_NX           63       /* No execute: only valid after cpuid check */
+#define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0	59       /* Protection Keys, bit 1/4 */
+#define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1	60       /* Protection Keys, bit 2/4 */
+#define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT2	61       /* Protection Keys, bit 3/4 */
+#define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT3	62       /* Protection Keys, bit 4/4 */
+#define _PAGE_BIT_NX		63       /* No execute: only valid after cpuid check */
 
 /* If _PAGE_BIT_PRESENT is clear, we use these: */
 /* - if the user mapped it with PROT_NONE; pte_present gives true */
@@ -47,6 +51,17 @@
 #define _PAGE_SPECIAL	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SPECIAL)
 #define _PAGE_CPA_TEST	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_CPA_TEST)
 #define _PAGE_SPLITTING	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SPLITTING)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+#define _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0)
+#define _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1)
+#define _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT2)
+#define _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT3)
+#else
+#define _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
+#define _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
+#define _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
+#define _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
+#endif
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SPECIAL
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KMEMCHECK

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#10 lore raw

PATCH 8/32 x86, pkeys: new page fault error code bit: PF_PK

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

Note: "PK" is how the Intel SDM refers to this bit, so we also use that nomenclature.

This only defines the bit, it does not plumb it anywhere to be handled.

---

 b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c renamed from arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-05-pfec +8 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-05-pfec arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
  *   bit 2 ==	 0: kernel-mode access	1: user-mode access
  *   bit 3 ==				1: use of reserved bit detected
  *   bit 4 ==				1: fault was an instruction fetch
+ *   bit 5 ==				1: protection keys block access
  */
 enum x86_pf_error_code {
 
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
 	PF_USER		=		1 << 2,
 	PF_RSVD		=		1 << 3,
 	PF_INSTR	=		1 << 4,
+	PF_PK		=		1 << 5,
 };
 
 /*
@@ -916,6 +918,12 @@ static int spurious_fault_check(unsigned
 
 	if ((error_code & PF_INSTR) && !pte_exec(*pte))
 		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Note: We do not do lazy flushing on protection key
+	 * changes, so no spurious fault will ever set PF_PK.
+	 */
+	if ((error_code & PF_PK))
+		return 1;
 
 	return 1;
 }

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#11 lore raw

PATCH 9/32 x86, pkeys: store protection in high VMA flags

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

vma->vm_flags is an 'unsigned long', so has space for 32 flags on 32-bit architectures. The high 32 bits are unused on 64-bit platforms. We've steered away from using the unused high VMA bits for things because we would have difficulty supporting it on 32-bit.

Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode, so there is no concern about supporting this feature in 32-bit mode or on 32-bit CPUs.

This patch carves out 4 bits from the high half of vma->vm_flags and allows architectures to set config option to make them available.

Sparse complains about these constants unless we explicitly call them "UL".

---

 b/arch/x86/Kconfig   |    1 +
 b/include/linux/mm.h |   11 +++++++++++
 b/mm/Kconfig         |    3 +++
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig renamed from arch/x86/Kconfig~pkeys-06-eat-high-vma-flags +1 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/Kconfig~pkeys-06-eat-high-vma-flags arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ config X86
 	select VIRT_TO_BUS
 	select X86_DEV_DMA_OPS			if X86_64
 	select X86_FEATURE_NAMES		if PROC_FS
+	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS		if X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 
 config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
 	def_bool y
include/linux/mm.h renamed from include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-06-eat-high-vma-flags +11 -0
diff -puN include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-06-eat-high-vma-flags include/linux/mm.h
@@ -158,6 +158,17 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void
 #define VM_NOHUGEPAGE	0x40000000	/* MADV_NOHUGEPAGE marked this vma */
 #define VM_MERGEABLE	0x80000000	/* KSM may merge identical pages */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0	32	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1	33	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2	34	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3	35	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86)
 # define VM_PAT		VM_ARCH_1	/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
mm/Kconfig renamed from mm/Kconfig~pkeys-06-eat-high-vma-flags +3 -0
diff -puN mm/Kconfig~pkeys-06-eat-high-vma-flags mm/Kconfig
@@ -668,3 +668,6 @@ config ZONE_DEVICE
 
 config FRAME_VECTOR
 	bool
+
+config ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+	bool

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#12 lore raw

PATCH 10/32 x86, pkeys: arch-specific protection bits

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

Lots of things seem to do:

        vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(flags);

and the ptes get created right from things we pull out of ->vm_page_prot. So it is very convenient if we can store the protection key in flags and vm_page_prot, just like the existing permission bits (_PAGE_RW/PRESENT). It greatly reduces the amount of plumbing and arch-specific hacking we have to do in generic code.

This also takes the new PROT_PKEY{0,1,2,3} flags and turns *those* in to VM_ flags for vma->vm_flags.

The protection key values are stored in 4 places:
1. "prot" argument to system calls
2. vma->vm_flags, filled from the mmap "prot"
3. vma->vm_page prot, filled from vma->vm_flags
4. the PTE itself.

The pseudocode for these for steps are as follows:

	mmap(PROT_PKEY*)
	vma->vm_flags 	  = ... | arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(mmap_prot);
	vma->vm_page_prot = ... | arch_vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
	pte = pfn | vma->vm_page_prot

Note that this provides a new definitions for x86:

	arch_vm_get_page_prot()

---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h   |   11 +++++++++++
 b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |   12 ++++++++++--
 b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h     |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 b/include/linux/mm.h                   |    7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-07-store-pkey-in-vma +11 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-07-store-pkey-in-vma arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -243,4 +243,15 @@ static inline void arch_unmap(struct mm_
 		mpx_notify_unmap(mm, vma, start, end);
 }
 
+static inline int vma_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	u16 pkey = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	unsigned long vma_pkey_mask = VM_PKEY_BIT0 | VM_PKEY_BIT1 |
+				      VM_PKEY_BIT2 | VM_PKEY_BIT3;
+	pkey = (vma->vm_flags & vma_pkey_mask) >> VM_PKEY_SHIFT;
+#endif
+	return pkey;
+}
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMU_CONTEXT_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h~pkeys-07-store-pkey-in-vma +10 -2
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h~pkeys-07-store-pkey-in-vma arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -111,7 +111,12 @@
 #define _KERNPG_TABLE	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED |	\
 			 _PAGE_DIRTY)
 
-/* Set of bits not changed in pte_modify */
+/*
+ * Set of bits not changed in pte_modify.  The pte's
+ * protection key is treated like _PAGE_RW, for
+ * instance, and is *not* included in this mask since
+ * pte_modify() does modify it.
+ */
 #define _PAGE_CHG_MASK	(PTE_PFN_MASK | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT |		\
 			 _PAGE_SPECIAL | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY |	\
 			 _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY)
@@ -227,7 +232,10 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
 /* Extracts the PFN from a (pte|pmd|pud|pgd)val_t of a 4KB page */
 #define PTE_PFN_MASK		((pteval_t)PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK)
 
-/* Extracts the flags from a (pte|pmd|pud|pgd)val_t of a 4KB page */
+/*
+ *  Extracts the flags from a (pte|pmd|pud|pgd)val_t
+ *  This includes the protection key value.
+ */
 #define PTE_FLAGS_MASK		(~PTE_PFN_MASK)
 
 typedef struct pgprot { pgprotval_t pgprot; } pgprot_t;
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h renamed from arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h~pkeys-07-store-pkey-in-vma +16 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h~pkeys-07-store-pkey-in-vma arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
@@ -6,6 +6,22 @@
 #define MAP_HUGE_2MB    (21 << MAP_HUGE_SHIFT)
 #define MAP_HUGE_1GB    (30 << MAP_HUGE_SHIFT)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+/*
+ * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags
+ * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in
+ * to a pte.
+ *
+ * Only override these if Protection Keys are available
+ * (which is only on 64-bit).
+ */
+#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags)	__pgprot(	\
+		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) |	\
+		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) |	\
+		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |	\
+		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+#endif
+
 #include <asm-generic/mman.h>
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
include/linux/mm.h renamed from include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-07-store-pkey-in-vma +7 -0
diff -puN include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-07-store-pkey-in-vma include/linux/mm.h
@@ -171,6 +171,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86)
 # define VM_PAT		VM_ARCH_1	/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
+#if defined (CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS)
+# define VM_PKEY_SHIFT	VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0
+# define VM_PKEY_BIT0	VM_HIGH_ARCH_0	/* A protection key is a 4-bit value */
+# define VM_PKEY_BIT1	VM_HIGH_ARCH_1
+# define VM_PKEY_BIT2	VM_HIGH_ARCH_2
+# define VM_PKEY_BIT3	VM_HIGH_ARCH_3
+#endif
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
 # define VM_SAO		VM_ARCH_1	/* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC)

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#13 lore raw

PATCH 11/32 x86, pkeys: pass VMA down in to fault signal generation code

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

During a page fault, we look up the VMA to ensure that the fault is in a region with a valid mapping. But, in the top-level page fault code we don't need the VMA for much else. Once we have decided that an access is bad, we are going to send a signal no matter what and do not need the VMA any more. So we do not pass it down in to the signal generation code.

But, for protection keys, we need the VMA. It tells us *which* protection key we violated if we get a PF_PK. So, we need to pass the VMA down and fill in siginfo->si_pkey.

---

 b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c |   50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c renamed from arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-08-pass-down-vma +28 -22
diff -puN arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-08-pass-down-vma arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -171,7 +171,8 @@ is_prefetch(struct pt_regs *regs, unsign
 
 static void
 force_sig_info_fault(int si_signo, int si_code, unsigned long address,
-		     struct task_struct *tsk, int fault)
+		     struct task_struct *tsk, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		     int fault)
 {
 	unsigned lsb = 0;
 	siginfo_t info;
@@ -656,6 +657,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigne
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int sig;
+	/* No context means no VMA to pass down */
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL;
 
 	/* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */
 	if (fixup_exception(regs)) {
@@ -679,7 +682,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigne
 			tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
 
 			/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
-			force_sig_info_fault(signal, si_code, address, tsk, 0);
+			force_sig_info_fault(signal, si_code, address,
+					     tsk, vma, 0);
 		}
 
 		/*
@@ -756,7 +760,8 @@ show_signal_msg(struct pt_regs *regs, un
 
 static void
 __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
-		       unsigned long address, int si_code)
+		       unsigned long address, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		       int si_code)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 
@@ -799,7 +804,7 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *r
 		tsk->thread.error_code	= error_code;
 		tsk->thread.trap_nr	= X86_TRAP_PF;
 
-		force_sig_info_fault(SIGSEGV, si_code, address, tsk, 0);
+		force_sig_info_fault(SIGSEGV, si_code, address, tsk, vma, 0);
 
 		return;
 	}
@@ -812,14 +817,14 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *r
 
 static noinline void
 bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
-		     unsigned long address)
+		     unsigned long address, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
-	__bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, SEGV_MAPERR);
+	__bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, vma, SEGV_MAPERR);
 }
 
 static void
 __bad_area(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
-	   unsigned long address, int si_code)
+	   unsigned long address,  struct vm_area_struct *vma, int si_code)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
 
@@ -829,25 +834,25 @@ __bad_area(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigne
 	 */
 	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
 
-	__bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, si_code);
+	__bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, vma, si_code);
 }
 
 static noinline void
 bad_area(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
 {
-	__bad_area(regs, error_code, address, SEGV_MAPERR);
+	__bad_area(regs, error_code, address, NULL, SEGV_MAPERR);
 }
 
 static noinline void
 bad_area_access_error(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
-		      unsigned long address)
+		      unsigned long address, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
-	__bad_area(regs, error_code, address, SEGV_ACCERR);
+	__bad_area(regs, error_code, address, vma, SEGV_ACCERR);
 }
 
 static void
 do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address,
-	  unsigned int fault)
+	  struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned int fault)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	int code = BUS_ADRERR;
@@ -874,12 +879,13 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned
 		code = BUS_MCEERR_AR;
 	}
 #endif
-	force_sig_info_fault(SIGBUS, code, address, tsk, fault);
+	force_sig_info_fault(SIGBUS, code, address, tsk, vma, fault);
 }
 
 static noinline void
 mm_fault_error(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
-	       unsigned long address, unsigned int fault)
+	       unsigned long address, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+	       unsigned int fault)
 {
 	if (fatal_signal_pending(current) && !(error_code & PF_USER)) {
 		no_context(regs, error_code, address, 0, 0);
@@ -903,9 +909,9 @@ mm_fault_error(struct pt_regs *regs, uns
 	} else {
 		if (fault & (VM_FAULT_SIGBUS|VM_FAULT_HWPOISON|
 			     VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE))
-			do_sigbus(regs, error_code, address, fault);
+			do_sigbus(regs, error_code, address, vma, fault);
 		else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV)
-			bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
+			bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, vma);
 		else
 			BUG();
 	}
@@ -1119,7 +1125,7 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, un
 		 * Don't take the mm semaphore here. If we fixup a prefetch
 		 * fault we could otherwise deadlock:
 		 */
-		bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
+		bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, NULL);
 
 		return;
 	}
@@ -1132,7 +1138,7 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, un
 		pgtable_bad(regs, error_code, address);
 
 	if (unlikely(smap_violation(error_code, regs))) {
-		bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
+		bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, NULL);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -1141,7 +1147,7 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, un
 	 * in a region with pagefaults disabled then we must not take the fault
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(faulthandler_disabled() || !mm)) {
-		bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
+		bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, NULL);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -1185,7 +1191,7 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, un
 	if (unlikely(!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem))) {
 		if ((error_code & PF_USER) == 0 &&
 		    !search_exception_tables(regs->ip)) {
-			bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
+			bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, NULL);
 			return;
 		}
 retry:
@@ -1233,7 +1239,7 @@ retry:
 	 */
 good_area:
 	if (unlikely(access_error(error_code, vma))) {
-		bad_area_access_error(regs, error_code, address);
+		bad_area_access_error(regs, error_code, address, vma);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -1271,7 +1277,7 @@ good_area:
 
 	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
 	if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) {
-		mm_fault_error(regs, error_code, address, fault);
+		mm_fault_error(regs, error_code, address, vma, fault);
 		return;
 	}
 

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#14 lore raw

PATCH 12/32 signals, pkeys: notify userspace about protection key faults

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

A protection key fault is very similar to any other access error. There must be a VMA, etc... We even want to take the same action (SIGSEGV) that we do with a normal access fault.

However, we do need to let userspace know that something is different. We do this the same way what we did with SEGV_BNDERR with Memory Protection eXtensions (MPX): define a new SEGV code:
SEGV_PKUERR.

We add a siginfo field: si_pkey that reveals to userspace which protection key was set on the PTE that we faulted on. There is no other easy way for userspace to figure this out. They could parse smaps but that would be a bit cruel.

We share space with in siginfo with _addr_bnd. #BR faults from MPX are completely separate from page faults (#PF) that trigger from protection key violations, so we never need both at the same time.

Note that _pkey is a 64-bit value. The current hardware only supports 4-bit protection keys. We do this because there is _plenty_ of space in _sigfault and it is possible that future processors would support more than 4 bits of protection keys.

The x86 code to actually fill in the siginfo is in the next patch.

---

 b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h |   17 ++++++++++++-----
 b/kernel/signal.c                    |    4 ++++
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h renamed from include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h~pkeys-09-siginfo-core +12 -5
diff -puN include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h~pkeys-09-siginfo-core include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -91,10 +91,15 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 			int _trapno;	/* TRAP # which caused the signal */
 #endif
 			short _addr_lsb; /* LSB of the reported address */
-			struct {
-				void __user *_lower;
-				void __user *_upper;
-			} _addr_bnd;
+			union {
+				/* used when si_code=SEGV_BNDERR */
+				struct {
+					void __user *_lower;
+					void __user *_upper;
+				} _addr_bnd;
+				/* used when si_code=SEGV_PKUERR */
+				u64 _pkey;
+			};
 		} _sigfault;
 
 		/* SIGPOLL */
@@ -137,6 +142,7 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define si_addr_lsb	_sifields._sigfault._addr_lsb
 #define si_lower	_sifields._sigfault._addr_bnd._lower
 #define si_upper	_sifields._sigfault._addr_bnd._upper
+#define si_pkey		_sifields._sigfault._pkey
 #define si_band		_sifields._sigpoll._band
 #define si_fd		_sifields._sigpoll._fd
 #ifdef __ARCH_SIGSYS
@@ -206,7 +212,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define SEGV_MAPERR	(__SI_FAULT|1)	/* address not mapped to object */
 #define SEGV_ACCERR	(__SI_FAULT|2)	/* invalid permissions for mapped object */
 #define SEGV_BNDERR	(__SI_FAULT|3)  /* failed address bound checks */
-#define NSIGSEGV	3
+#define SEGV_PKUERR	(__SI_FAULT|4)  /* failed protection key checks */
+#define NSIGSEGV	4
 
 /*
  * SIGBUS si_codes
kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~pkeys-09-siginfo-core +4 -0
diff -puN kernel/signal.c~pkeys-09-siginfo-core kernel/signal.c
@@ -2709,6 +2709,10 @@ int copy_siginfo_to_user(siginfo_t __use
 			err |= __put_user(from->si_upper, &to->si_upper);
 		}
 #endif
+#ifdef SEGV_PKUERR
+		if (from->si_signo == SIGSEGV && from->si_code == SEGV_PKUERR)
+			err |= __put_user(from->si_pkey, &to->si_pkey);
+#endif
 		break;
 	case __SI_CHLD:
 		err |= __put_user(from->si_pid, &to->si_pid);

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#15 lore raw

PATCH 13/32 x86, pkeys: fill in pkey field in siginfo

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

This fills in the new siginfo field: si_pkey to indicate to userspace which protection key was set on the PTE that we faulted on.

Note though that *ALL* protection key faults have to be generated by a valid, present PTE at some point. But this code does no PTE lookups which seeds odd. The reason is that we take advantage of the way we generate PTEs from VMAs. All PTEs under a VMA share some attributes. For instance, they are _all_ either PROT_READ *OR* PROT_NONE. They also always share a protection key, so we never have to walk the page tables; we just use the VMA.

Note that _pkey is a 64-bit value. The current hardware only supports 4-bit protection keys. We do this because there is _plenty_ of space in _sigfault and it is possible that future processors would support more than 4 bits of protection keys.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |    5 ++
 b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c                  |   64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h~pkeys-09-siginfo-x86 +5 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h~pkeys-09-siginfo-x86 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@
 #endif
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SPECIAL
 
+#define _PAGE_PKEY_MASK (_PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 | \
+			 _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 | \
+			 _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 | \
+			 _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3)
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KMEMCHECK
 #define _PAGE_HIDDEN	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_HIDDEN)
 #else
arch/x86/mm/fault.c renamed from arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-09-siginfo-x86 +63 -1

94 lines not on this page · raw message

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#16 lore raw

PATCH 14/32 x86, pkeys: add functions to fetch PKRU

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

This adds the raw instruction to access PKRU as well as some accessor functions that correctly handle when the CPU does not support the instruction. We don't use it here, but we will use read_pkru() in the next patch.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h       |    8 ++++++++
 b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h~pkeys-10-kernel-pkru-instructions +8 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h~pkeys-10-kernel-pkru-instructions arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -102,6 +102,14 @@ static inline int pte_dirty(pte_t pte)
 	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY;
 }
 
+
+static inline u32 read_pkru(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+		return __read_pkru();
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)
 {
 	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h~pkeys-10-kernel-pkru-instructions +22 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h~pkeys-10-kernel-pkru-instructions arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
@@ -98,6 +98,28 @@ static inline void native_write_cr8(unsi
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+static inline u32 __read_pkru(void)
+{
+	u32 ecx = 0;
+	u32 edx, pkru;
+
+	/*
+	 * "rdpkru" instruction.  Places PKRU contents in to EAX,
+	 * clears EDX and requires that ecx=0.
+	 */
+	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
+		     : "=a" (pkru), "=d" (edx)
+		     : "c" (ecx));
+	return pkru;
+}
+#else
+static inline u32 __read_pkru(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 static inline void native_wbinvd(void)
 {
 	asm volatile("wbinvd": : :"memory");

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

Reviewed-by on v1 14/32
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 14/32] x86, pkeys: add functions to fetch PKRU

Quoted 6 lines · Dave Hansen

This adds the raw instruction to access PKRU as well as some accessor functions that correctly handle when the CPU does not support the instruction. We don't use it here, but we will use read_pkru() in the next patch.

#18 lore raw

PATCH 15/32 mm: factor out VMA fault permission checking

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

This code matches a fault condition up with the VMA and ensures that the VMA allows the fault to be handled instead of just erroring out.

We will be extending this in a moment to comprehend protection keys.

---

 b/mm/gup.c |   16 +++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/gup.c renamed from mm/gup.c~pkeys-10-pte-fault +13 -3
diff -puN mm/gup.c~pkeys-10-pte-fault mm/gup.c
@@ -557,6 +557,18 @@ next_page:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_pages);
 
+bool vma_permits_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned int fault_flags)
+{
+	vm_flags_t vm_flags;
+
+	vm_flags = (fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) ? VM_WRITE : VM_READ;
+
+	if (!(vm_flags & vma->vm_flags))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 /*
  * fixup_user_fault() - manually resolve a user page fault
  * @tsk:	the task_struct to use for page fault accounting, or
@@ -588,15 +600,13 @@ int fixup_user_fault(struct task_struct
 		     unsigned long address, unsigned int fault_flags)
 {
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
-	vm_flags_t vm_flags;
 	int ret;
 
 	vma = find_extend_vma(mm, address);
 	if (!vma || address < vma->vm_start)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	vm_flags = (fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) ? VM_WRITE : VM_READ;
-	if (!(vm_flags & vma->vm_flags))
+	if (!vma_permits_fault(vma, fault_flags))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	ret = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, fault_flags);

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#19 lore raw

PATCH 16/32 x86, mm: simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

The current get_user_pages() code is a wee bit more complicated than it needs to be for pte bit checking. Currently, it establishes a mask of required pte _PAGE_* bits and ensures that the pte it goes after has all those bits.

This consolidates the three identical copies of this code.

---

 b/arch/x86/mm/gup.c |   39 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/gup.c renamed from arch/x86/mm/gup.c~pkeys-12-gup-swizzle +22 -17
diff -puN arch/x86/mm/gup.c~pkeys-12-gup-swizzle arch/x86/mm/gup.c
@@ -64,6 +64,24 @@ retry:
 }
 
 /*
+ * 'pteval' can come from a pte, pmd or pud.  We only check
+ * _PAGE_PRESENT, _PAGE_USER, and _PAGE_RW in here which are the
+ * same value on all 3 types.
+ */
+static inline int pte_allows_gup(unsigned long pteval, int write)
+{
+	unsigned long need_pte_bits = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER;
+
+	if (write)
+		need_pte_bits |= _PAGE_RW;
+
+	if ((pteval & need_pte_bits) != need_pte_bits)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
  * The performance critical leaf functions are made noinline otherwise gcc
  * inlines everything into a single function which results in too much
  * register pressure.
@@ -71,13 +89,8 @@ retry:
 static noinline int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr,
 		unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
 {
-	unsigned long mask;
 	pte_t *ptep;
 
-	mask = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER;
-	if (write)
-		mask |= _PAGE_RW;
-
 	ptep = pte_offset_map(&pmd, addr);
 	do {
 		pte_t pte = gup_get_pte(ptep);
@@ -88,8 +101,8 @@ static noinline int gup_pte_range(pmd_t
 			pte_unmap(ptep);
 			return 0;
 		}
-
-		if ((pte_flags(pte) & (mask | _PAGE_SPECIAL)) != mask) {
+		if (!pte_allows_gup(pte_val(pte), write) ||
+		    pte_special(pte)) {
 			pte_unmap(ptep);
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -117,14 +130,10 @@ static inline void get_head_page_multipl
 static noinline int gup_huge_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr,
 		unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
 {
-	unsigned long mask;
 	struct page *head, *page;
 	int refs;
 
-	mask = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER;
-	if (write)
-		mask |= _PAGE_RW;
-	if ((pmd_flags(pmd) & mask) != mask)
+	if (!pte_allows_gup(pmd_val(pmd), write))
 		return 0;
 	/* hugepages are never "special" */
 	VM_BUG_ON(pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_SPECIAL);
@@ -193,14 +202,10 @@ static int gup_pmd_range(pud_t pud, unsi
 static noinline int gup_huge_pud(pud_t pud, unsigned long addr,
 		unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
 {
-	unsigned long mask;
 	struct page *head, *page;
 	int refs;
 
-	mask = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER;
-	if (write)
-		mask |= _PAGE_RW;
-	if ((pud_flags(pud) & mask) != mask)
+	if (!pte_allows_gup(pud_val(pud), write))
 		return 0;
 	/* hugepages are never "special" */
 	VM_BUG_ON(pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_SPECIAL);

_

Reviewed-by on v1 16/32
#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 16/32] x86, mm: simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling

Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen

The current get_user_pages() code is a wee bit more complicated than it needs to be for pte bit checking. Currently, it establishes a mask of required pte _PAGE_* bits and ensures that the pte it goes after has all those bits.

This consolidates the three identical copies of this code.

#21 lore raw

PATCH 17/32 x86, pkeys: check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

Today, for normal faults and page table walks, we check the VMA and/or PTE to ensure that it is compatible with the action. For instance, if we get a write fault on a non-writeable VMA, we SIGSEGV.

We try to do the same thing for protection keys. Basically, we try to make sure that if a user does this:

	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE);
	*ptr = foo;

they see the same effects with protection keys when they do this:

	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE);
	set_pkey(ptr, size, 4);
	wrpkru(0xffffff3f); // access disable pkey 4
	*ptr = foo;

The state to do that checking is in the VMA, but we also sometimes have to do it on the page tables only, like when doing a get_user_pages_fast() where we have no VMA.

We add two functions and expose them to generic code:

arch_pte_access_permitted(pte_flags, write) arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write)

These are, of course, backed up in x86 arch code with checks against the PTE or VMA's protection key.

But, there are also cases where we do not want to respect protection keys. When we ptrace(), for instance, we do not want to apply the tracer's PKRU permissions to the PTEs from the process being traced.

---

 b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h   |   11 ++++++
 b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h      |   11 ++++++
 b/arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h |   11 ++++++
 b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h       |   49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h           |   29 +++++++++++++++++
 b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c                      |   21 +++++++++++-
 b/arch/x86/mm/gup.c                        |    5 ++
 b/include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h           |   11 ++++++
 b/mm/gup.c                                 |   18 ++++++++--
 b/mm/memory.c                              |    4 ++
 10 files changed, 166 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-13-pte-fault +11 -0
diff -puN arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-13-pte-fault arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -148,5 +148,16 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str
 {
 }
 
+static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write)
+{
+	/* by default, allow everything */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write)
+{
+	/* by default, allow everything */
+	return true;
+}
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 #endif /* __ASM_POWERPC_MMU_CONTEXT_H */
arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-13-pte-fault +11 -0
diff -puN arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-13-pte-fault arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -130,4 +130,15 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str
 {
 }
 
+static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write)
+{
+	/* by default, allow everything */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write)
+{
+	/* by default, allow everything */
+	return true;
+}
 #endif /* __S390_MMU_CONTEXT_H */
arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-13-pte-fault +11 -0
diff -puN arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-13-pte-fault arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -97,4 +97,15 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str
 {
 }
 
+static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write)
+{
+	/* by default, allow everything */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write)
+{
+	/* by default, allow everything */
+	return true;
+}
 #endif
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-13-pte-fault +49 -0

53 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h~pkeys-13-pte-fault +29 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h~pkeys-13-pte-fault arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -910,6 +910,35 @@ static inline pte_t pte_swp_clear_soft_d
 }
 #endif
 
+#define PKRU_AD_BIT 0x1
+#define PKRU_WD_BIT 0x2
+
+static inline bool __pkru_allows_read(u32 pkru, u16 pkey)
+{
+	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * 2;
+	return !(pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT << pkru_pkey_bits));
+}
+
+static inline bool __pkru_allows_write(u32 pkru, u16 pkey)
+{
+	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * 2;
+	/*
+	 * Access-disable disables writes too so we need to check
+	 * both bits here.
+	 */
+	return !(pkru & ((PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT) << pkru_pkey_bits));
+}
+
+static inline u16 pte_flags_pkey(unsigned long pte_flags)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	/* ifdef to avoid doing 59-bit shift on 32-bit values */
+	return (pte_flags & _PAGE_PKEY_MASK) >> _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0;
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
 #include <asm-generic/pgtable.h>
 #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
arch/x86/mm/fault.c renamed from arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-13-pte-fault +20 -1
diff -puN arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-13-pte-fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -897,6 +897,16 @@ bad_area(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned
 	__bad_area(regs, error_code, address, NULL, SEGV_MAPERR);
 }
 
+static inline bool bad_area_access_from_pkeys(unsigned long error_code,
+		struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+		return false;
+	if (error_code & PF_PK)
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
 static noinline void
 bad_area_access_error(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 		      unsigned long address, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
@@ -906,7 +916,7 @@ bad_area_access_error(struct pt_regs *re
 	 * But, doing it this way allows compiler optimizations
 	 * if pkeys are compiled out.
 	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE) && (error_code & PF_PK))
+	if (bad_area_access_from_pkeys(error_code, vma))
 		__bad_area(regs, error_code, address, vma, SEGV_PKUERR);
 	else
 		__bad_area(regs, error_code, address, vma, SEGV_ACCERR);
@@ -1081,6 +1091,15 @@ int show_unhandled_signals = 1;
 static inline int
 access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Access or read was blocked by protection keys. We do
+	 * this check before any others because we do not want
+	 * to, for instance, confuse a protection-key-denied
+	 * write with one for which we should do a COW.
+	 */
+	if (error_code & PF_PK)
+		return 1;
+
 	if (error_code & PF_WRITE) {
 		/* write, present and write, not present: */
 		if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
arch/x86/mm/gup.c renamed from arch/x86/mm/gup.c~pkeys-13-pte-fault +5 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/mm/gup.c~pkeys-13-pte-fault arch/x86/mm/gup.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
 static inline pte_t gup_get_pte(pte_t *ptep)
@@ -78,6 +79,10 @@ static inline int pte_allows_gup(unsigne
 	if ((pteval & need_pte_bits) != need_pte_bits)
 		return 0;
 
+	/* Check memory protection keys permissions. */
+	if (!__pkru_allows_pkey(pte_flags_pkey(pteval), write))
+		return 0;
+
 	return 1;
 }
 
include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h renamed from include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h~pkeys-13-pte-fault +11 -0
diff -puN include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h~pkeys-13-pte-fault include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h
@@ -26,4 +26,15 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str
 {
 }
 
+static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write)
+{
+	/* by default, allow everything */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write)
+{
+	/* by default, allow everything */
+	return true;
+}
 #endif	/* _ASM_GENERIC_MM_HOOKS_H */
mm/gup.c renamed from mm/gup.c~pkeys-13-pte-fault +15 -3
diff -puN mm/gup.c~pkeys-13-pte-fault mm/gup.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 
@@ -391,6 +392,8 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_are
 		if (!(vm_flags & VM_MAYREAD))
 			return -EFAULT;
 	}
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE)))
+		return -EFAULT;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -559,13 +562,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_pages);
 
 bool vma_permits_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned int fault_flags)
 {
-	vm_flags_t vm_flags;
-
-	vm_flags = (fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) ? VM_WRITE : VM_READ;
+	bool write = !!(fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
+	vm_flags_t vm_flags = write ? VM_WRITE : VM_READ;
 
 	if (!(vm_flags & vma->vm_flags))
 		return false;
 
+	/*
+	 * The architecture might have a hardware protection
+	 * mechanism other than read/write that can deny access
+	 */
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write))
+		return false;
+
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -1102,6 +1111,9 @@ static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsi
 			pte_protnone(pte) || (write && !pte_write(pte)))
 			goto pte_unmap;
 
+		if (!arch_pte_access_permitted(pte, write))
+			goto pte_unmap;
+
 		VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte)));
 		page = pte_page(pte);
 
mm/memory.c renamed from mm/memory.c~pkeys-13-pte-fault +4 -0
diff -puN mm/memory.c~pkeys-13-pte-fault mm/memory.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
 #include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
 
 #include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/tlb.h>
@@ -3344,6 +3345,9 @@ static int __handle_mm_fault(struct mm_s
 	pmd_t *pmd;
 	pte_t *pte;
 
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV;
+
 	if (unlikely(is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)))
 		return hugetlb_fault(mm, vma, address, flags);
 

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#22 lore raw

PATCH 18/32 mm: add gup flag to indicate "foreign" mm access

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

We try to enforce protection keys in software the same way that we do in hardware. (See long example below).

But, we only want to do this when accessing our *own* process's memory. If GDB set PKRU[6].AD=1 (disable access to PKEY 6), then tried to PTRACE_POKE a target process which just happened to have some mprotect_pkey(pkey=6) memory, we do *not* want to deny the debugger access to that memory. PKRU is fundamentally a thread-local structure and we do not want to enforce it on access to _another_ thread's data.

This gets especially tricky when we have workqueues or other delayed-work mechanisms that might run in a random process's context. We can check that we only enforce pkeys when operating on our *own* mm, but delayed work gets performed when a random user context is active. We might end up with a situation where a delayed-work gup fails when running randomly under its "own" task but succeeds when running under another process. We want to avoid that.

To avoid that, we add a GUP flag: FOLL_FOREIGN and a fault flag:
FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN. They indicate that we are walking an mm which is not guranteed to be the same as current->mm and should not be subject to protection key enforcement.

Thanks to Jerome Glisse for pointing out this scenario.

*** Why do we enforce protection keys in software?? ***

Imagine that we disabled access to the memory pointer to by 'buf'. The, we implemented sys_write() like this:

	sys_read(fd, buf, len...)
	{
		struct page *page = follow_page(buf);
		void *buf_mapped = kmap(page);
		memcpy(buf_mapped, fd_data, len);
		...
	}

This writes to 'buf' via a *kernel* mapping, without a protection key. While this implementation does the same thing:

	sys_read(fd, buf, len...)
	{
		copy_to_user(buf, fd_data, len);
		...
	}

but would hit a protection key fault because the userspace 'buf' mapping has a protection key set.

To provide consistency, and to make key-protected memory work as much like mprotect()ed memory as possible, we try to enforce the same protections as the hardware would when the *kernel* walks the page tables (and other mm structures).

---

 b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h   |    3 ++-
 b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h      |    3 ++-
 b/arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h |    3 ++-
 b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h       |    5 +++--
 b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c             |    8 +++++---
 b/include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h           |    3 ++-
 b/include/linux/mm.h                       |    2 ++
 b/mm/gup.c                                 |   15 ++++++++++-----
 b/mm/ksm.c                                 |   10 ++++++++--
 b/mm/memory.c                              |    3 ++-
 10 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag +2 -1
diff -puN arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str
 {
 }
 
-static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write)
+static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		bool write, bool foreign)
 {
 	/* by default, allow everything */
 	return true;
arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag +2 -1
diff -puN arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -130,7 +130,8 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str
 {
 }
 
-static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write)
+static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		bool write, bool foreign)
 {
 	/* by default, allow everything */
 	return true;
arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag +2 -1
diff -puN arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str
 {
 }
 
-static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write)
+static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		bool write, bool foreign)
 {
 	/* by default, allow everything */
 	return true;
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag +3 -2
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -290,10 +290,11 @@ static inline bool vma_is_foreign(struct
 	return false;
 }
 
-static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write)
+static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		bool write, bool foreign)
 {
 	/* allow access if the VMA is not one from this process */
-	if (vma_is_foreign(vma))
+	if (foreign || vma_is_foreign(vma))
 		return true;
 	return __pkru_allows_pkey(vma_pkey(vma), write);
 }
drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c renamed from drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag +5 -3
diff -puN drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c
@@ -500,9 +500,11 @@ static void do_fault(struct work_struct
 	struct mm_struct *mm;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	u64 address;
-	int ret, write;
+	int ret, flags;
 
-	write = !!(fault->flags & PPR_FAULT_WRITE);
+	if (fault->flags & PPR_FAULT_WRITE)
+		flags = FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
+	flags |= FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN;
 
 	mm = fault->state->mm;
 	address = fault->address;
@@ -523,7 +525,7 @@ static void do_fault(struct work_struct
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ret = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, write);
+	ret = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, flags);
 	if (ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR) {
 		/* failed to service fault */
 		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h renamed from include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag +2 -1
diff -puN include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h
@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str
 {
 }
 
-static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write)
+static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		bool write, bool foreign)
 {
 	/* by default, allow everything */
 	return true;
include/linux/mm.h renamed from include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag +2 -0
diff -puN include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag include/linux/mm.h
@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ extern pgprot_t protection_map[16];
 #define FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE	0x10	/* The fault task is in SIGKILL killable region */
 #define FAULT_FLAG_TRIED	0x20	/* Second try */
 #define FAULT_FLAG_USER		0x40	/* The fault originated in userspace */
+#define FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN	0x80	/* faulting for non current tsk/mm */
 
 /*
  * vm_fault is filled by the the pagefault handler and passed to the vma's
@@ -2143,6 +2144,7 @@ static inline struct page *follow_page(s
 #define FOLL_MIGRATION	0x400	/* wait for page to replace migration entry */
 #define FOLL_TRIED	0x800	/* a retry, previous pass started an IO */
 #define FOLL_MLOCK	0x1000	/* lock present pages */
+#define FOLL_FOREIGN	0x2000	/* we are working on non-current tsk/mm */
 
 typedef int (*pte_fn_t)(pte_t *pte, pgtable_t token, unsigned long addr,
 			void *data);
mm/gup.c renamed from mm/gup.c~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag +10 -5
diff -puN mm/gup.c~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag mm/gup.c
@@ -310,6 +310,8 @@ static int faultin_page(struct task_stru
 		return -ENOENT;
 	if (*flags & FOLL_WRITE)
 		fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
+	if (*flags & FOLL_FOREIGN)
+		fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN;
 	if (nonblocking)
 		fault_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
 	if (*flags & FOLL_NOWAIT)
@@ -360,11 +362,13 @@ static int faultin_page(struct task_stru
 static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)
 {
 	vm_flags_t vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
+	int write = (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE);
+	int foreign = (gup_flags & FOLL_FOREIGN);
 
 	if (vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE) {
+	if (write) {
 		if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
 			if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
 				return -EFAULT;
@@ -392,7 +396,7 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_are
 		if (!(vm_flags & VM_MAYREAD))
 			return -EFAULT;
 	}
-	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE)))
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, foreign))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -562,7 +566,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_pages);
 
 bool vma_permits_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned int fault_flags)
 {
-	bool write = !!(fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
+	bool write   = !!(fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
+	bool foreign = !!(fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN);
 	vm_flags_t vm_flags = write ? VM_WRITE : VM_READ;
 
 	if (!(vm_flags & vma->vm_flags))
@@ -570,9 +575,9 @@ bool vma_permits_fault(struct vm_area_st
 
 	/*
 	 * The architecture might have a hardware protection
-	 * mechanism other than read/write that can deny access
+	 * mechanism other than read/write that can deny access.
 	 */
-	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write))
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, foreign))
 		return false;
 
 	return true;
mm/ksm.c renamed from mm/ksm.c~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag +8 -2
diff -puN mm/ksm.c~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag mm/ksm.c
@@ -359,6 +359,10 @@ static inline bool ksm_test_exit(struct
  * in case the application has unmapped and remapped mm,addr meanwhile.
  * Could a ksm page appear anywhere else?  Actually yes, in a VM_PFNMAP
  * mmap of /dev/mem or /dev/kmem, where we would not want to touch it.
+ *
+ * FAULT_FLAG/FOLL_FOREIGN are because we do this outside the context
+ * of the process that owns 'vma'.  We also do not want to enforce
+ * protection keys here anyway.
  */
 static int break_ksm(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
 {
@@ -367,12 +371,14 @@ static int break_ksm(struct vm_area_stru
 
 	do {
 		cond_resched();
-		page = follow_page(vma, addr, FOLL_GET | FOLL_MIGRATION);
+		page = follow_page(vma, addr,
+				FOLL_GET | FOLL_MIGRATION | FOLL_FOREIGN);
 		if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page))
 			break;
 		if (PageKsm(page))
 			ret = handle_mm_fault(vma->vm_mm, vma, addr,
-							FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
+							FAULT_FLAG_WRITE |
+							FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN);
 		else
 			ret = VM_FAULT_WRITE;
 		put_page(page);
mm/memory.c renamed from mm/memory.c~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag +2 -1
diff -puN mm/memory.c~pkeys-14-gup-fault-foreign-flag mm/memory.c
@@ -3345,7 +3345,8 @@ static int __handle_mm_fault(struct mm_s
 	pmd_t *pmd;
 	pte_t *pte;
 
-	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE,
+					    flags & FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN))
 		return VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV;
 
 	if (unlikely(is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)))

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#23 lore raw

PATCH 19/32 x86, pkeys: optimize fault handling in access_error()

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

We might not strictly have to make modifictions to access_error() to check the VMA here.

If we do not, we will do this:
1. app sets VMA pkey to K
2. app touches a !present page
3. do_page_fault(), allocates and maps page, sets pte.pkey=K
4. return to userspace
5. touch instruction reexecutes, but triggers PF_PK
6. do PKEY signal

What happens with this patch applied:
1. app sets VMA pkey to K
2. app touches a !present page
3. do_page_fault() notices that K is inaccessible
4. do PKEY signal

We basically skip the fault that does an allocation.

So what this lets us do is protect areas from even being *populated* unless it is accessible according to protection keys. That seems handy to me and makes protection keys work more like an mprotect()'d mapping.

---

 b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c |   15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c renamed from arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-15-access_error +15 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-15-access_error arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -900,10 +900,16 @@ bad_area(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned
 static inline bool bad_area_access_from_pkeys(unsigned long error_code,
 		struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
+	/* This code is always called on the current mm */
+	bool foreign = false;
+
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
 		return false;
 	if (error_code & PF_PK)
 		return true;
+	/* this checks permission keys on the VMA: */
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), foreign))
+		return true;
 	return false;
 }
 
@@ -1091,6 +1097,8 @@ int show_unhandled_signals = 1;
 static inline int
 access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
+	/* This is only called for the current mm, so: */
+	bool foreign = false;
 	/*
 	 * Access or read was blocked by protection keys. We do
 	 * this check before any others because we do not want
@@ -1099,6 +1107,13 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, s
 	 */
 	if (error_code & PF_PK)
 		return 1;
+	/*
+	 * Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform
+	 * faults just to hit a PF_PK as soon as we fill in a
+	 * page.
+	 */
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), foreign))
+		return 1;
 
 	if (error_code & PF_WRITE) {
 		/* write, present and write, not present: */

_

#24 lore raw

PATCH 20/32 x86, pkeys: differentiate instruction fetches

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

As discussed earlier, we attempt to enforce protection keys in software.

However, the code checks all faults to ensure that they are not violating protection key permissions. It was assumed that all faults are either write faults where we check PKRU[key].WD (write disable) or read faults where we check the AD (access disable) bit.

But, there is a third category of faults for protection keys:
instruction faults. Instruction faults never run afoul of protection keys because they do not affect instruction fetches.

So, plumb the PF_INSTR bit down in to the arch_vma_access_permitted() function where we do the protection key checks.

We also add a new FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION. This is because handle_mm_fault() is not passed the architecture-specific error_code where we keep PF_INSTR, so we need to encode the instruction fetch information in to the arch-generic fault flags.

---

 b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h |    2 +-
 b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h    |    2 +-
 b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h     |    5 ++++-
 b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c                    |    8 ++++++--
 b/include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h         |    2 +-
 b/include/linux/mm.h                     |    1 +
 b/mm/gup.c                               |   11 +++++++++--
 b/mm/memory.c                            |    1 +
 8 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable +1 -1
diff -puN arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str
 }
 
 static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
-		bool write, bool foreign)
+		bool write, bool execute, bool foreign)
 {
 	/* by default, allow everything */
 	return true;
arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable +1 -1
diff -puN arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str
 }
 
 static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
-		bool write, bool foreign)
+		bool write, bool execute, bool foreign)
 {
 	/* by default, allow everything */
 	return true;
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable +4 -1
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -291,8 +291,11 @@ static inline bool vma_is_foreign(struct
 }
 
 static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
-		bool write, bool foreign)
+		bool write, bool execute, bool foreign)
 {
+	/* pkeys never affect instruction fetches */
+	if (execute)
+		return true;
 	/* allow access if the VMA is not one from this process */
 	if (foreign || vma_is_foreign(vma))
 		return true;
arch/x86/mm/fault.c renamed from arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable +6 -2
diff -puN arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -908,7 +908,8 @@ static inline bool bad_area_access_from_
 	if (error_code & PF_PK)
 		return true;
 	/* this checks permission keys on the VMA: */
-	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), foreign))
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE),
+				(error_code & PF_INSTR), foreign))
 		return true;
 	return false;
 }
@@ -1112,7 +1113,8 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, s
 	 * faults just to hit a PF_PK as soon as we fill in a
 	 * page.
 	 */
-	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), foreign))
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE),
+				(error_code & PF_INSTR), foreign))
 		return 1;
 
 	if (error_code & PF_WRITE) {
@@ -1267,6 +1269,8 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, un
 
 	if (error_code & PF_WRITE)
 		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
+	if (error_code & PF_INSTR)
+		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION;
 
 	/*
 	 * When running in the kernel we expect faults to occur only to
include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h renamed from include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable +1 -1
diff -puN include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str
 }
 
 static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
-		bool write, bool foreign)
+		bool write, bool execute, bool foreign)
 {
 	/* by default, allow everything */
 	return true;
include/linux/mm.h renamed from include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable +1 -0
diff -puN include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable include/linux/mm.h
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ extern pgprot_t protection_map[16];
 #define FAULT_FLAG_TRIED	0x20	/* Second try */
 #define FAULT_FLAG_USER		0x40	/* The fault originated in userspace */
 #define FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN	0x80	/* faulting for non current tsk/mm */
+#define FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION  0x100	/* The fault was during an instruction fetch */
 
 /*
  * vm_fault is filled by the the pagefault handler and passed to the vma's
mm/gup.c renamed from mm/gup.c~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable +9 -2
diff -puN mm/gup.c~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable mm/gup.c
@@ -396,7 +396,11 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_are
 		if (!(vm_flags & VM_MAYREAD))
 			return -EFAULT;
 	}
-	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, foreign))
+	/*
+	 * gups are always data accesses, not instruction
+	 * fetches, so execute=false here
+	 */
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, false, foreign))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -576,8 +580,11 @@ bool vma_permits_fault(struct vm_area_st
 	/*
 	 * The architecture might have a hardware protection
 	 * mechanism other than read/write that can deny access.
+	 *
+	 * gup always represents data access, not instruction
+	 * fetches, so execute=false here:
 	 */
-	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, foreign))
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, false, foreign))
 		return false;
 
 	return true;
mm/memory.c renamed from mm/memory.c~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable +1 -0
diff -puN mm/memory.c~pkeys-16-allow-execute-on-unreadable mm/memory.c
@@ -3346,6 +3346,7 @@ static int __handle_mm_fault(struct mm_s
 	pte_t *pte;
 
 	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE,
+					    flags & FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION,
 					    flags & FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN))
 		return VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV;
 

_

#25 lore raw

PATCH 21/32 x86, pkeys: dump PKRU with other kernel registers

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

Protection Keys never affect kernel mappings. But, they can affect whether the kernel will fault when it touches a user mapping. The kernel doesn't touch user mappings without some careful choreography and these accesses don't generally result in oopses. But, if one does, we definitely want to have PKRU available so we can figure out if protection keys played a role.

---

 b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c~pkeys-30-kernel-error-dumps +2 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c~pkeys-30-kernel-error-dumps arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, i
 	printk(KERN_DEFAULT "DR0: %016lx DR1: %016lx DR2: %016lx\n", d0, d1, d2);
 	printk(KERN_DEFAULT "DR3: %016lx DR6: %016lx DR7: %016lx\n", d3, d6, d7);
 
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+		printk(KERN_DEFAULT "PKRU: %08x\n", read_pkru());
 }
 
 void release_thread(struct task_struct *dead_task)

_

#26 lore raw

PATCH 22/32 x86, pkeys: dump PTE pkey in /proc/pid/smaps

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

The protection key can now be just as important as read/write permissions on a VMA. We need some debug mechanism to help figure out if it is in play. smaps seems like a logical place to expose it.

arch/x86/kernel/setup.c is a bit of a weirdo place to put this code, but it already had seq_file.h and there was not a much better existing place to put it.

We also use no #ifdef. If protection keys is .config'd out we will get the same function as if we used the weak generic function.

---

 b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c |    9 +++++++++
 b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c      |   14 ++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/setup.c~pkeys-40-smaps +9 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/setup.c~pkeys-40-smaps arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/prom.h>
 #include <asm/microcode.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 
 /*
  * max_low_pfn_mapped: highest direct mapped pfn under 4GB
@@ -1282,3 +1283,11 @@ static int __init register_kernel_offset
 	return 0;
 }
 __initcall(register_kernel_offset_dumper);
+
+void arch_show_smap(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+		return;
+
+	seq_printf(m, "ProtectionKey:  %8u\n", vma_pkey(vma));
+}
fs/proc/task_mmu.c renamed from fs/proc/task_mmu.c~pkeys-40-smaps +14 -0
diff -puN fs/proc/task_mmu.c~pkeys-40-smaps fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -615,11 +615,20 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct s
 		[ilog2(VM_MERGEABLE)]	= "mg",
 		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_MISSING)]= "um",
 		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_WP)]	= "uw",
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+		/* These come out via ProtectionKey: */
+		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT0)]	= "",
+		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT1)]	= "",
+		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT2)]	= "",
+		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT3)]	= "",
+#endif
 	};
 	size_t i;
 
 	seq_puts(m, "VmFlags: ");
 	for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG; i++) {
+		if (!mnemonics[i][0])
+			continue;
 		if (vma->vm_flags & (1UL << i)) {
 			seq_printf(m, "%c%c ",
 				   mnemonics[i][0], mnemonics[i][1]);
@@ -657,6 +666,10 @@ static int smaps_hugetlb_range(pte_t *pt
 }
 #endif /* HUGETLB_PAGE */
 
+void __weak arch_show_smap(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+}
+
 static int show_smap(struct seq_file *m, void *v, int is_pid)
 {
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = v;
@@ -713,6 +726,7 @@ static int show_smap(struct seq_file *m,
 		   (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) ?
 			(unsigned long)(mss.pss >> (10 + PSS_SHIFT)) : 0);
 
+	arch_show_smap(m, vma);
 	show_smap_vma_flags(m, vma);
 	m_cache_vma(m, vma);
 	return 0;

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#27 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 22/32] x86, pkeys: dump PTE pkey in /proc/pid/smaps

Quoted 1 line · Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

$SUBJ is a bit confusing in that it's dumping stuff from VMA, not PTE's?

It could be also useful to extend dump_vma() appropriately. Currently there are no string translations for the new "flags" (but one can figure it out from the raw value). But maybe we should print pkey separately in dump_vma() as you do here. I have a series in flight [1] that touches dump_vma() and the flags printing in general, so to avoid conflicts, handling pkeys there could wait. But mentioning it now for less chance of being forgotten...

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/18/178 - a previous version is in mmotm and this should replace it after 4.5-rc1

Quoted 89 lines

The protection key can now be just as important as read/write permissions on a VMA. We need some debug mechanism to help figure out if it is in play. smaps seems like a logical place to expose it.

arch/x86/kernel/setup.c is a bit of a weirdo place to put this code, but it already had seq_file.h and there was not a much better existing place to put it.

We also use no #ifdef. If protection keys is .config'd out we will get the same function as if we used the weak generic function.

---

  b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c |    9 +++++++++
  b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c      |   14 ++++++++++++++
  2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/setup.c~pkeys-40-smaps arch/x86/kernel/setup.c

arch/x86/kernel/setup.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/setup.c~pkeys-40-smaps +9 -0
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@
  #include <asm/alternative.h>
  #include <asm/prom.h>
  #include <asm/microcode.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 
  /*
   * max_low_pfn_mapped: highest direct mapped pfn under 4GB
@@ -1282,3 +1283,11 @@ static int __init register_kernel_offset
  	return 0;
  }
  __initcall(register_kernel_offset_dumper);
+
+void arch_show_smap(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+		return;
+
+	seq_printf(m, "ProtectionKey:  %8u\n", vma_pkey(vma));
+}

diff -puN fs/proc/task_mmu.c~pkeys-40-smaps fs/proc/task_mmu.c

fs/proc/task_mmu.c renamed from fs/proc/task_mmu.c~pkeys-40-smaps +14 -0
@@ -615,11 +615,20 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct s
  		[ilog2(VM_MERGEABLE)]	= "mg",
  		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_MISSING)]= "um",
  		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_WP)]	= "uw",
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+		/* These come out via ProtectionKey: */
+		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT0)]	= "",
+		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT1)]	= "",
+		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT2)]	= "",
+		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT3)]	= "",
+#endif
  	};
  	size_t i;
 
  	seq_puts(m, "VmFlags: ");
  	for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG; i++) {
+		if (!mnemonics[i][0])
+			continue;
  		if (vma->vm_flags & (1UL << i)) {
  			seq_printf(m, "%c%c ",
  				   mnemonics[i][0], mnemonics[i][1]);
@@ -657,6 +666,10 @@ static int smaps_hugetlb_range(pte_t *pt
  }
  #endif /* HUGETLB_PAGE */
 
+void __weak arch_show_smap(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+}
+
  static int show_smap(struct seq_file *m, void *v, int is_pid)
  {
  	struct vm_area_struct *vma = v;
@@ -713,6 +726,7 @@ static int show_smap(struct seq_file *m,
  		   (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) ?
  			(unsigned long)(mss.pss >> (10 + PSS_SHIFT)) : 0);
 
+	arch_show_smap(m, vma);
  	show_smap_vma_flags(m, vma);
  	m_cache_vma(m, vma);
  	return 0;

_

Quoted 6 lines

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#28 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 22/32] x86, pkeys: dump PTE pkey in /proc/pid/smaps

Quoted 4 lines · Vlastimil Babka
Quoted 1 line · Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

$SUBJ is a bit confusing in that it's dumping stuff from VMA, not PTE's?

Yeah, absolutely. That's a relic from when I thought I'd need to be walking the page tables to figure this out. I'll update it.

Quoted 10 lines

It could be also useful to extend dump_vma() appropriately. Currently there are no string translations for the new "flags" (but one can figure it out from the raw value). But maybe we should print pkey separately in dump_vma() as you do here. I have a series in flight [1] that touches dump_vma() and the flags printing in general, so to avoid conflicts, handling pkeys there could wait. But mentioning it now for less chance of being forgotten...

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/18/178 - a previous version is in mmotm and this should replace it after 4.5-rc1

Ahhh, very nice. I'll go back and add support for it once your patch lands.

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#29 lore raw

PATCH 23/32 x86, pkeys: add Kconfig prompt to existing config option

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

I don't have a strong opinion on whether we need this or not. Protection Keys has relatively little code associated with it, and it is not a heavyweight feature to keep enabled. However, I can imagine that folks would still appreciate being able to disable it.

Here's the option if folks want it.

---

 b/arch/x86/Kconfig |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig renamed from arch/x86/Kconfig~pkeys-40-kconfig-prompt +10 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/Kconfig~pkeys-40-kconfig-prompt arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1682,8 +1682,18 @@ config X86_INTEL_MPX
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
 config X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	prompt "Intel Memory Protection Keys"
 	def_bool y
+	# Note: only available in 64-bit mode
 	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+	---help---
+	  Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing
+	  page-based protections, but without requiring modification of the
+	  page tables when an application changes protection domains.
+
+	  For details, see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
+
+	  If unsure, say y.
 
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#30 lore raw

PATCH 24/32 x86, pkeys: actually enable Memory Protection Keys in CPU

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

This sets the bit in 'cr4' to actually enable the protection keys feature. We also include a boot-time disable for the feature "nopku".

Seting X86_CR4_PKE will cause the X86_FEATURE_OSPKE cpuid bit to appear set. At this point in boot, identify_cpu() has already run the actual CPUID instructions and populated the "cpu features" structures. We need to go back and re-run identify_cpu() to make sure it gets updated values.

We *could* simply re-populate the 11th word of the cpuid data, but this is probably quick enough.

Also note that with the cpu_has() check and X86_FEATURE_PKU present in disabled-features.h, we do not need an #ifdef for setup_pku().

---

 b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |    3 ++
 b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c        |   41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c~pkeys-50-should-be-last-patch +41 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c~pkeys-50-should-be-last-patch arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -289,6 +289,46 @@ static __always_inline void setup_smap(s
 }
 
 /*
+ * Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
+ */
+static bool pku_disabled;
+static __always_inline void setup_pku(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PKU))
+		return;
+	if (pku_disabled)
+		return;
+
+	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PKE);
+	/*
+	 * Seting X86_CR4_PKE will cause the X86_FEATURE_OSPKE
+	 * cpuid bit to be set.  We need to ensure that we
+	 * update that bit in this CPU's "cpu_info".
+	 */
+	get_cpu_cap(c);
+}
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Do not clear the X86_FEATURE_PKU bit.  All of the
+	 * runtime checks are against OSPKE so clearing the
+	 * bit does nothing.
+	 *
+	 * This way, we will see "pku" in cpuinfo, but not
+	 * "ospke", which is exactly what we want.  It shows
+	 * that the CPU has PKU, but the OS has not enabled it.
+	 * This happens to be exactly how a system would look
+	 * if we disabled the config option.
+	 */
+	pr_info("x86: 'nopku' specified, disabling Memory Protection Keys\n");
+	pku_disabled = true;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+/*
  * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
  * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
  * software.  Add those features to this table to auto-disable them.
@@ -948,6 +988,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_
 	init_hypervisor(c);
 	x86_init_rdrand(c);
 	x86_init_cache_qos(c);
+	setup_pku(c);
 
 	/*
 	 * Clear/Set all flags overriden by options, need do it
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt renamed from Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt~pkeys-50-should-be-last-patch +3 -0
diff -puN Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt~pkeys-50-should-be-last-patch Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -958,6 +958,9 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			See Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt for more
 			information about the feature.
 
+	nopku		[X86] Disable Memory Protection Keys CPU feature found
+			in some Intel CPUs.
+
 	eagerfpu=	[X86]
 			on	enable eager fpu restore
 			off	disable eager fpu restore

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

Reviewed-by on v1 24/32
#31 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 24/32] x86, pkeys: actually enable Memory Protection Keys in CPU

Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen

This sets the bit in 'cr4' to actually enable the protection keys feature. We also include a boot-time disable for the feature "nopku".

Seting X86_CR4_PKE will cause the X86_FEATURE_OSPKE cpuid bit to appear set. At this point in boot, identify_cpu() has already run the actual CPUID instructions and populated the "cpu features" structures. We need to go back and re-run identify_cpu() to make sure it gets updated values.

Quoted 8 lines

We *could* simply re-populate the 11th word of the cpuid data, but this is probably quick enough.

Also note that with the cpu_has() check and X86_FEATURE_PKU present in disabled-features.h, we do not need an #ifdef for setup_pku().

#32 lore raw

PATCH 25/32 mm, multi-arch: pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits()

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

This plumbs a protection key through calc_vm_flag_bits(). We could have done this in calc_vm_prot_bits(), but I did not feel super strongly which way to go. It was pretty arbitrary which one to use.

---

 b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h  |    5 +++--
 b/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c      |    2 +-
 b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c |    4 ++--
 b/include/linux/mman.h             |    6 +++---
 b/mm/mmap.c                        |    2 +-
 b/mm/mprotect.c                    |    2 +-
 b/mm/nommu.c                       |    2 +-
 7 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h renamed from arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits +3 -2
diff -puN arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -18,11 +18,12 @@
  * This file is included by linux/mman.h, so we can't use cacl_vm_prot_bits()
  * here.  How important is the optimization?
  */
-static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot)
+static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
+		unsigned long pkey)
 {
 	return (prot & PROT_SAO) ? VM_SAO : 0;
 }
-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot)
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
 
 static inline pgprot_t arch_vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags)
 {
drivers/char/agp/frontend.c renamed from drivers/char/agp/frontend.c~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits +1 -1
diff -puN drivers/char/agp/frontend.c~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits drivers/char/agp/frontend.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static pgprot_t agp_convert_mmap_flags(i
 {
 	unsigned long prot_bits;
 
-	prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot) | VM_SHARED;
+	prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0) | VM_SHARED;
 	return vm_get_page_prot(prot_bits);
 }
 
drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c renamed from drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits +2 -2
diff -puN drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
@@ -372,8 +372,8 @@ static int ashmem_mmap(struct file *file
 	}
 
 	/* requested protection bits must match our allowed protection mask */
-	if (unlikely((vma->vm_flags & ~calc_vm_prot_bits(asma->prot_mask)) &
-		     calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_MASK))) {
+	if (unlikely((vma->vm_flags & ~calc_vm_prot_bits(asma->prot_mask, 0)) &
+		     calc_vm_prot_bits(PROT_MASK, 0))) {
 		ret = -EPERM;
 		goto out;
 	}
include/linux/mman.h renamed from include/linux/mman.h~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits +3 -3
diff -puN include/linux/mman.h~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits include/linux/mman.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline void vm_unacct_memory(long
  */
 
 #ifndef arch_calc_vm_prot_bits
-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot) 0
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) 0
 #endif
 
 #ifndef arch_vm_get_page_prot
@@ -70,12 +70,12 @@ static inline int arch_validate_prot(uns
  * Combine the mmap "prot" argument into "vm_flags" used internally.
  */
 static inline unsigned long
-calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot)
+calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot, unsigned long pkey)
 {
 	return _calc_vm_trans(prot, PROT_READ,  VM_READ ) |
 	       _calc_vm_trans(prot, PROT_WRITE, VM_WRITE) |
 	       _calc_vm_trans(prot, PROT_EXEC,  VM_EXEC) |
-	       arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot);
+	       arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey);
 }
 
 /*
mm/mmap.c renamed from mm/mmap.c~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits +1 -1
diff -puN mm/mmap.c~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits mm/mmap.c
@@ -1309,7 +1309,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
 	 * to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open
 	 * of the memory object, so we don't do any here.
 	 */
-	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
+	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
 			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
 
 	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
mm/mprotect.c renamed from mm/mprotect.c~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits +1 -1
diff -puN mm/mprotect.c~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits mm/mprotect.c
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long,
 	if ((prot & PROT_READ) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
 		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
 
-	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot);
+	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
 
 	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 
mm/nommu.c renamed from mm/nommu.c~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits +1 -1
diff -puN mm/nommu.c~pkeys-70-calc_vm_prot_bits mm/nommu.c
@@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@ static unsigned long determine_vm_flags(
 {
 	unsigned long vm_flags;
 
-	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags);
+	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags);
 	/* vm_flags |= mm->def_flags; */
 
 	if (!(capabilities & NOMMU_MAP_DIRECT)) {

_

#33 lore raw

PATCH 26/32 x86, pkeys: add arch_validate_pkey()

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

The syscall-level code is passed a protection key and need to return an appropriate error code if the protection key is bogus. We will be using this in subsequent patches.

Note that this also begins a series of arch-specific calls that we need to expose in otherwise arch-independent code. We create a linux/pkeys.h header where we will put *all* the stubs for these functions.

---

 b/arch/x86/Kconfig             |    1 +
 b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h |    6 ++++++
 b/include/linux/pkeys.h        |   25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 b/mm/Kconfig                   |    2 ++
 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h new file +6 -0
diff -puN /dev/null arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
+#define _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
+
+#define arch_max_pkey() (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE) ? 16 : 1)
+
+#endif /*_ASM_X86_PKEYS_H */
arch/x86/Kconfig renamed from arch/x86/Kconfig~pkeys-71-arch_validate_pkey +1 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/Kconfig~pkeys-71-arch_validate_pkey arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ config X86
 	select X86_DEV_DMA_OPS			if X86_64
 	select X86_FEATURE_NAMES		if PROC_FS
 	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS		if X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	select ARCH_HAS_PKEYS			if X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 
 config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
 	def_bool y
include/linux/pkeys.h new file +25 -0
diff -puN /dev/null include/linux/pkeys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#ifndef _LINUX_PKEYS_H
+#define _LINUX_PKEYS_H
+
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
+#include <asm/pkeys.h>
+#else /* ! CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
+#define arch_max_pkey() (1)
+#endif /* ! CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
+
+/*
+ * This is called from mprotect_pkey().
+ *
+ * Returns true if the protection keys is valid.
+ */
+static inline bool validate_pkey(int pkey)
+{
+	if (pkey < 0)
+		return false;
+	return (pkey < arch_max_pkey());
+}
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_PKEYS_H */
mm/Kconfig renamed from mm/Kconfig~pkeys-71-arch_validate_pkey +2 -0
diff -puN mm/Kconfig~pkeys-71-arch_validate_pkey mm/Kconfig
@@ -671,3 +671,5 @@ config FRAME_VECTOR
 
 config ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
 	bool
+config ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
+	bool

_

#34 lore raw

PATCH 27/32 x86: separate out LDT init from context init

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

The arch-specific mm_context_t is a great place to put protection-key allocation state.

But, we need to initialize the allocation state because pkey 0 is always "allocated". All of the runtime initialization of mm_context_t is done in *_ldt() manipulation functions. This renames the existing LDT functions like this:

	init_new_context() -> init_new_context_ldt()
	destroy_context() -> destroy_context_ldt()

and makes init_new_context() and destroy_context() available for generic use.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |   21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c              |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-72-init-ldt-extricate +16 -5
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-72-init-ldt-extricate arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -52,15 +52,15 @@ struct ldt_struct {
 /*
  * Used for LDT copy/destruction.
  */
-int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm);
-void destroy_context(struct mm_struct *mm);
+int init_new_context_ldt(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm);
+void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm);
 #else	/* CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL */
-static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
-				   struct mm_struct *mm)
+static inline int init_new_context_ldt(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				       struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-static inline void destroy_context(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
+static inline void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
 #endif
 
 static inline void load_mm_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm)
@@ -104,6 +104,17 @@ static inline void enter_lazy_tlb(struct
 #endif
 }
 
+static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				   struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	init_new_context_ldt(tsk, mm);
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline void destroy_context(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	destroy_context_ldt(mm);
+}
+
 static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
 			     struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c~pkeys-72-init-ldt-extricate +2 -2
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c~pkeys-72-init-ldt-extricate arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static void free_ldt_struct(struct ldt_s
  * we do not have to muck with descriptors here, that is
  * done in switch_mm() as needed.
  */
-int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
+int init_new_context_ldt(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	struct ldt_struct *new_ldt;
 	struct mm_struct *old_mm;
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ out_unlock:
  *
  * 64bit: Don't touch the LDT register - we're already in the next thread.
  */
-void destroy_context(struct mm_struct *mm)
+void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	free_ldt_struct(mm->context.ldt);
 	mm->context.ldt = NULL;

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#35 lore raw

PATCH 28/32 x86, fpu: allow setting of XSAVE state

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

We want to modify the Protection Key rights inside the kernel, so we need to change PKRU's contents. But, if we do a plain 'wrpkru', when we return to userspace we might do an XRSTOR and wipe out the kernel's 'wrpkru'. So, we need to go after PKRU in the xsave buffer.

We do this by:
1. Ensuring that we have the XSAVE registers (fpregs) in the kernel FPU buffer (fpstate)
2. Looking up the location of a given state in the buffer
3. Filling in the stat
4. Ensuring that the hardware knows that state is present there (basically that the 'init optimization' is not in place).
5. Copying the newly-modified state back to the registers if necessary.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h |    2 
 b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c          |   63 +++++++++++++++++++++
 b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c        |   98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 161 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h~pkeys-76-xsave-set +2 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h~pkeys-76-xsave-set arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
 extern void fpu__activate_curr(struct fpu *fpu);
 extern void fpu__activate_fpstate_read(struct fpu *fpu);
 extern void fpu__activate_fpstate_write(struct fpu *fpu);
+extern void fpu__current_fpstate_write_begin(void);
+extern void fpu__current_fpstate_write_end(void);
 extern void fpu__save(struct fpu *fpu);
 extern void fpu__restore(struct fpu *fpu);
 extern int  fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, int ia32_frame);
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c~pkeys-76-xsave-set +63 -0

69 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c~pkeys-76-xsave-set +96 -2

119 lines not on this page · raw message

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#36 lore raw

PATCH 29/32 x86, pkeys: allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

The Protection Key Rights for User memory (PKRU) is a 32-bit user-accessible register. It contains two bits for each protection key: one to write-disable (WD) access to memory covered by the key and another to access-disable (AD).

Userspace can read/write the register with the RDPKRU and WRPKRU instructions. But, the register is saved and restored with the XSAVE family of instructions, which means we have to treat it like a floating point register.

The kernel needs to write to the register if it wants to implement execute-only memory or if it implements a system call to change PKRU.

To do this, we need to create a 'pkru_state' buffer, read the old contents in to it, modify it, and then tell the FPU code that there is modified data in there so it can (possibly) move the buffer back in to the registers.

This uses the fpu__xfeature_set_state() function that we defined in the previous patch.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h |    5 +-
 b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h   |    3 +
 b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c   |   74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 b/include/linux/pkeys.h          |    5 ++
 4 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h~pkeys-77-arch_set_user_pkey_access +3 -2
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h~pkeys-77-arch_set_user_pkey_access arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -912,16 +912,17 @@ static inline pte_t pte_swp_clear_soft_d
 
 #define PKRU_AD_BIT 0x1
 #define PKRU_WD_BIT 0x2
+#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
 
 static inline bool __pkru_allows_read(u32 pkru, u16 pkey)
 {
-	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * 2;
+	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY;
 	return !(pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT << pkru_pkey_bits));
 }
 
 static inline bool __pkru_allows_write(u32 pkru, u16 pkey)
 {
-	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * 2;
+	int pkru_pkey_bits = pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY;
 	/*
 	 * Access-disable disables writes too so we need to check
 	 * both bits here.
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h~pkeys-77-arch_set_user_pkey_access +3 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h~pkeys-77-arch_set_user_pkey_access arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -3,4 +3,7 @@
 
 #define arch_max_pkey() (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE) ? 16 : 1)
 
+extern int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
+		unsigned long init_val);
+
 #endif /*_ASM_X86_PKEYS_H */
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c~pkeys-77-arch_set_user_pkey_access +74 -0

83 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/pkeys.h renamed from include/linux/pkeys.h~pkeys-77-arch_set_user_pkey_access +5 -0
diff -puN include/linux/pkeys.h~pkeys-77-arch_set_user_pkey_access include/linux/pkeys.h
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
 #include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 
+#define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS	0x1
+#define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE	0x2
+#define PKEY_ACCESS_MASK	(PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS |\
+				 PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 #include <asm/pkeys.h>
 #else /* ! CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#37 lore raw

PATCH 30/32 x86, pkeys: create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

calc_vm_prot_bits() takes PROT_{READ,WRITE,EXECUTE} bits and turns them in to the vma->vm_flags/VM_* bits. We need to do a similar thing for protection keys.

We take a protection key (4 bits) and encode it in to the 4 VM_PKEY_* bits.

Note: this code is not new. It was simply a part of the mprotect_pkey() patch in the past. I broke it out for use in the execute-only support.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h renamed from arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h~pkeys-78-arch_calc_vm_prot_bits +6 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h~pkeys-78-arch_calc_vm_prot_bits arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@
 		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) |	\
 		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |	\
 		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (		\
+		((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) |      \
+		((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) |      \
+		((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |      \
+		((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
 #endif
 
 #include <asm-generic/mman.h>

_

#38 lore raw

PATCH 31/32 x86, pkeys: execute-only support

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware. But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data accesses and never affect instruction fetches. That means that if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via protection keys, we can still execute from it.

This patch uses protection keys to set up mappings to do just that. If a user calls:

	mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
or
	mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);

(note PROT_EXEC-only without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice this, and set a special protection key on the memory. It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable and unwritable.

I haven't found any userspace that does this today.

The security provided by this approach is not comprehensive. The PKRU register which controls access permissions is a normal user register writable from unprivileged userspace. An attacker who can execute the 'wrpkru' instruction can easily disable the protection provided by this feature.

The protection key that is used for execute-only support is permanently dedicated in a process. Even if all of the execute-only mappings go away, the key stays allocated. This could be fixed, but it will involve a reference count or a walk of all of the VMAs.

---

 b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h |   25 ++++++++++
 b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c |    2 
 b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile         |    2 
 b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c          |   13 +++++
 b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c          |  101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 b/include/linux/pkeys.h        |    3 +
 b/mm/mmap.c                    |   10 +++-
 b/mm/mprotect.c                |   10 ++--
 8 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h renamed from arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h~pkeys-79-xonly +25 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h~pkeys-79-xonly arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -6,4 +6,29 @@
 extern int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
 		unsigned long init_val);
 
+/*
+ * Try to dedicate one of the protection keys to be used as an
+ * execute-only protection key.
+ */
+#define PKEY_DEDICATED_EXECUTE_ONLY 15
+extern int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm);
+static inline int execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return __execute_only_pkey(mm);
+}
+
+extern int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		int prot, int pkey);
+static inline int arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		int prot, int pkey)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(vma, prot, pkey);
+}
+
 #endif /*_ASM_X86_PKEYS_H */
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c~pkeys-79-xonly +0 -2
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c~pkeys-79-xonly arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -878,8 +878,6 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct tas
 	int pkey_shift = (pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY);
 	u32 new_pkru_bits = 0;
 
-	if (!validate_pkey(pkey))
-		return -EINVAL;
 	/*
 	 * This check implies XSAVE support.  OSPKE only gets
 	 * set if we enable XSAVE and we enable PKU in XCR0.
arch/x86/mm/fault.c renamed from arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-79-xonly +13 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-79-xonly arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 #include <linux/prefetch.h>		/* prefetchw			*/
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>	/* exception_enter(), ...	*/
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>		/* faulthandler_disabled()	*/
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>		/* PKEY_*			*/
+#include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>		/* boot_cpu_has, ...		*/
 #include <asm/traps.h>			/* dotraplinkage, ...		*/
@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <asm/vsyscall.h>		/* emulate_vsyscall		*/
 #include <asm/vm86.h>			/* struct vm86			*/
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>		/* vma_pkey()			*/
+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>		/* fpregs_active()		*/
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <asm/trace/exceptions.h>
@@ -1108,6 +1111,16 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, s
 	 */
 	if (error_code & PF_PK)
 		return 1;
+
+	if (!(error_code & PF_INSTR)) {
+		/*
+		 * Assume all accesses require either read or execute
+		 * permissions.  This is not an instruction access, so
+		 * it requires read permissions.
+		 */
+		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_READ))
+			return 1;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Make sure to check the VMA so that we do not perform
 	 * faults just to hit a PF_PK as soon as we fill in a
arch/x86/mm/Makefile renamed from arch/x86/mm/Makefile~pkeys-79-xonly +2 -0
diff -puN arch/x86/mm/Makefile~pkeys-79-xonly arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -33,3 +33,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA)		+= srat.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU)		+= numa_emulation.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX)	+= mpx.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
+
arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c new file +101 -0

101 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/pkeys.h renamed from include/linux/pkeys.h~pkeys-79-xonly +3 -0
diff -puN include/linux/pkeys.h~pkeys-79-xonly include/linux/pkeys.h
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@
 #include <asm/pkeys.h>
 #else /* ! CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
 #define arch_max_pkey() (1)
+#define execute_only_pkey(mm) (0)
+#define arch_override_mprotect_pkey(vma, prot, pkey) (0)
+#define PKEY_DEDICATED_EXECUTE_ONLY 0
 #endif /* ! CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
 
 /*
mm/mmap.c renamed from mm/mmap.c~pkeys-79-xonly +9 -1
diff -puN mm/mmap.c~pkeys-79-xonly mm/mmap.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include <linux/memory.h>
 #include <linux/printk.h>
 #include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -1266,6 +1267,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
 			unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	int pkey = 0;
 
 	*populate = 0;
 
@@ -1305,11 +1307,17 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
 	if (offset_in_page(addr))
 		return addr;
 
+	if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
+		pkey = execute_only_pkey(mm);
+		if (pkey < 0)
+			pkey = 0;
+	}
+
 	/* Do simple checking here so the lower-level routines won't have
 	 * to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open
 	 * of the memory object, so we don't do any here.
 	 */
-	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
+	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
 			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
 
 	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
mm/mprotect.c renamed from mm/mprotect.c~pkeys-79-xonly +6 -4
diff -puN mm/mprotect.c~pkeys-79-xonly mm/mprotect.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/migrate.h>
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
 #include <linux/ksm.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -347,10 +348,11 @@ fail:
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len,
 		unsigned long, prot)
 {
-	unsigned long vm_flags, nstart, end, tmp, reqprot;
+	unsigned long nstart, end, tmp, reqprot;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
 	int error = -EINVAL;
 	const int grows = prot & (PROT_GROWSDOWN|PROT_GROWSUP);
+
 	prot &= ~(PROT_GROWSDOWN|PROT_GROWSUP);
 	if (grows == (PROT_GROWSDOWN|PROT_GROWSUP)) /* can't be both */
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -373,14 +375,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long,
 	if ((prot & PROT_READ) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
 		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
 
-	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
-
 	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 
 	vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
 	error = -ENOMEM;
 	if (!vma)
 		goto out;
+
 	prev = vma->vm_prev;
 	if (unlikely(grows & PROT_GROWSDOWN)) {
 		if (vma->vm_start >= end)
@@ -404,10 +405,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long,
 
 	for (nstart = start ; ; ) {
 		unsigned long newflags;
+		int pkey = arch_override_mprotect_pkey(vma, prot, -1);
 
 		/* Here we know that vma->vm_start <= nstart < vma->vm_end. */
 
-		newflags = vm_flags;
+		newflags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey);
 		newflags |= (vma->vm_flags & ~(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC));
 
 		/* newflags >> 4 shift VM_MAY% in place of VM_% */

_

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#39 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 31/32] x86, pkeys: execute-only support

Quoted 16 lines · Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware. But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data accesses and never affect instruction fetches. That means that if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via protection keys, we can still execute from it.

This patch uses protection keys to set up mappings to do just that. If a user calls:

        mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
or
        mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);
Quoted 7 lines

(note PROT_EXEC-only without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice this, and set a special protection key on the memory. It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable and unwritable.

I haven't found any userspace that does this today.

To realistically take advantage of this, it sounds like the linker would need to know to keep bss and data page-aligned away from text, and then set text to PROT_EXEC only?

Do you have any example linker scripts for this?

-Kees

Signature · 8 lines
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to [email protected].  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>
#40 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 31/32] x86, pkeys: execute-only support

Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 6 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware. But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data accesses and never affect instruction fetches. That means that if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via protection keys, we can still execute from it.

...

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

I haven't found any userspace that does this today.

To realistically take advantage of this, it sounds like the linker would need to know to keep bss and data page-aligned away from text, and then set text to PROT_EXEC only?

Do you have any example linker scripts for this?

Nope. My linker-fu is weak.

Can we even depend on the linker by itself? Even if the sections were marked --x, we can't actually use them with those permissions unless we have protection keys.

Do we need some special tag on the section to tell the linker to map it as --x under some conditions and r-x for others?

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#41 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 31/32] x86, pkeys: execute-only support

Quoted 16 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 6 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware. But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data accesses and never affect instruction fetches. That means that if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via protection keys, we can still execute from it.

...

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

I haven't found any userspace that does this today.

To realistically take advantage of this, it sounds like the linker would need to know to keep bss and data page-aligned away from text, and then set text to PROT_EXEC only?

Do you have any example linker scripts for this?

Quoted 8 lines

Nope. My linker-fu is weak.

Can we even depend on the linker by itself? Even if the sections were marked --x, we can't actually use them with those permissions unless we have protection keys.

Do we need some special tag on the section to tell the linker to map it as --x under some conditions and r-x for others?

Yeah, dunno. I was curious to see this working on a real example first, and then we could figure out how the linker should behave generally. Sounds like we need some kind of ELF flag to say "please use unreadable-exec memory mappings for this program, too.

-Kees

Signature · 8 lines
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to [email protected].  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>
#42 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 31/32] x86, pkeys: execute-only support

In reply to Dave Hansen
Quoted 16 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 6 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware. But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data accesses and never affect instruction fetches. That means that if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via protection keys, we can still execute from it.

...

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

I haven't found any userspace that does this today.

To realistically take advantage of this, it sounds like the linker would need to know to keep bss and data page-aligned away from text, and then set text to PROT_EXEC only?

Do you have any example linker scripts for this?

Quoted 9 lines

Nope. My linker-fu is weak.

Can we even depend on the linker by itself? Even if the sections were marked --x, we can't actually use them with those permissions unless we have protection keys.

Do we need some special tag on the section to tell the linker to map it as --x under some conditions and r-x for others?

Why? Wouldn't --x just end up acting like r-x if PKRU is absent?

--Andy

Signature · 8 lines
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to [email protected].  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>
#43 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 31/32] x86, pkeys: execute-only support

Quoted 23 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 22 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 6 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware. But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data accesses and never affect instruction fetches. That means that if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via protection keys, we can still execute from it.

...

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

I haven't found any userspace that does this today.

To realistically take advantage of this, it sounds like the linker would need to know to keep bss and data page-aligned away from text, and then set text to PROT_EXEC only?

Do you have any example linker scripts for this?

Nope. My linker-fu is weak.

Can we even depend on the linker by itself? Even if the sections were marked --x, we can't actually use them with those permissions unless we have protection keys.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Do we need some special tag on the section to tell the linker to map it as --x under some conditions and r-x for others?

Why? Wouldn't --x just end up acting like r-x if PKRU is absent?

Good point!

What was the mixed section problem that came up before? I realize I said "bss/data" before, but that's not right: those are already page-aligned since they're writable, and rodata would be too, only non-executable. What was the case of memory that needed to be readable? ENEEDCOFFEE.

-Kees

Signature · 8 lines
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to [email protected].  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>
#44 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 31/32] x86, pkeys: execute-only support

In reply to Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 10 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

Nope. My linker-fu is weak.

Can we even depend on the linker by itself? Even if the sections were marked --x, we can't actually use them with those permissions unless we have protection keys.

Do we need some special tag on the section to tell the linker to map it as --x under some conditions and r-x for others?

Why? Wouldn't --x just end up acting like r-x if PKRU is absent?

An app doing --x would expect it to be unreadable. I don't think we can just silently turn it in to r-x.

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#45 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 31/32] x86, pkeys: execute-only support

Quoted 7 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Nope. My linker-fu is weak.

Can we even depend on the linker by itself? Even if the sections were marked --x, we can't actually use them with those permissions unless we have protection keys.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Do we need some special tag on the section to tell the linker to map it as --x under some conditions and r-x for others?

Why? Wouldn't --x just end up acting like r-x if PKRU is absent?

An app doing --x would expect it to be unreadable. I don't think we can just silently turn it in to r-x.

I don't see why. After all, an app doing --x right now gets rx. An app doing r-- still gets r-x on some systems.

--Andy

Signature · 8 lines
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to [email protected].  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>
#46 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 31/32] x86, pkeys: execute-only support

Quoted 11 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 9 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

Nope. My linker-fu is weak.

Can we even depend on the linker by itself? Even if the sections were marked --x, we can't actually use them with those permissions unless we have protection keys.

Do we need some special tag on the section to tell the linker to map it as --x under some conditions and r-x for others?

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

Why? Wouldn't --x just end up acting like r-x if PKRU is absent?

An app doing --x would expect it to be unreadable. I don't think we can just silently turn it in to r-x.

I don't see why. After all, an app doing --x right now gets rx. An app doing r-- still gets r-x on some systems.

... and you're right. I'd managed to convince myself otherwise, somehow.

Let me go see if I can get the execve() code to make one of these mappings if I hand it properly-aligned sections.

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>

#47 lore raw

PATCH 32/32 x86, pkeys: Documentation

In reply to Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

---

 b/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt new file +27 -0
diff -puN /dev/null Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature
+which will be found on future Intel CPUs.
+
+Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based
+protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
+when an application changes protection domains.  It works by
+dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a
+"protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
+
+There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
+bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.  Being a CPU
+register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
+thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
+
+There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
+to the new register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
+even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These
+permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
+instruction fetches.
+
+=========================== Config Option ===========================
+
+This config option adds approximately 1.5kb of text. and 50 bytes of
+data to the executable.  A workload which does large O_DIRECT reads
+of holes in XFS files was run to exercise get_user_pages_fast().  No
+performance delta was observed with the config option
+enabled or disabled.

_

#48 lore raw

[tip:x86/urgent] x86/mm/pkeys: Add missing Documentation

x86/mm/pkeys: Add missing Documentation
Commit-ID:  591b1d8d86074ac3a3163d89bcfe7b232cf83902
Gitweb:     http://git.kernel.org/tip/591b1d8d86074ac3a3163d89bcfe7b232cf83902
Author:     Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 11:06:34 -0800
Committer:  Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CommitDate: Tue, 29 Mar 2016 11:21:17 +0200

x86/mm/pkeys: Add missing Documentation

Stefan Richter noticed that the X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS option in arch/x86/Kconfig references Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt, but the file does not exist.

This is a patch merging mishap: the final (v8) version of the pkeys series did not include the documentation patch 32 and v7 included. Add it now.

Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
[ Added changelog. ]
---
 Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt new file +27 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c281ded
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature
+which will be found on future Intel CPUs.
+
+Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based
+protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
+when an application changes protection domains.  It works by
+dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a
+"protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
+
+There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
+bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.  Being a CPU
+register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
+thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
+
+There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
+to the new register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
+even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These
+permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
+instruction fetches.
+
+=========================== Config Option ===========================
+
+This config option adds approximately 1.5kb of text. and 50 bytes of
+data to the executable.  A workload which does large O_DIRECT reads
+of holes in XFS files was run to exercise get_user_pages_fast().  No
+performance delta was observed with the config option
+enabled or disabled.
#49 lore raw
In reply to Dave Hansen

Hi Dave,

Quoted 7 lines · Dave Hansen

Memory Protection Keys for User pages is a CPU feature which will first appear on Skylake Servers, but will also be supported on future non-server parts (there is also a QEMU implementation). It provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables when an application changes protection domains. See the Documentation/ patch for more details.

You've arbitrarily CCed this mail and one other patch in the series to linux-api@. This makes the series hard to review unless one is subscribed to the LKML firehose. Please, for future iterations of this series, CC the entire patchset to linux-api@.

Thanks,

Michael

Quoted 189 lines

This set enables for two things in the end:
1. Allows "execute-only" memory
2. Enables KVM to run Protection-Key-enabled guests

Changes from v6:
* fix up ??'s showing up in in smaps' VmFlags field
* added execute-only support
* removed all the new syscalls from this set. We can discuss them in detail after this is merged.

Changes from v5:

* make types in read_pkru() u32's, not ints
* rework VM_* bits to avoid using __ffsl() and clean up vma_pkey()
* rework pte_allows_gup() to use p??_val() instead of passing around p{te,md,ud}_t types.
* Fix up some inconsistent bool vs. int usage
* corrected name of ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS in patch description
* remove NR_PKEYS... config option. Just define it directly

Changes from v4:

* Made "allow setting of XSAVE state" safe if we got preempted between when we saved our FPU state and when we restore it. (I would appreciate a look from Ingo on this patch).
* Fixed up a few things from Thomas's latest comments: splt up siginfo in to x86 and generic, removed extra 'eax' variable in rdpkru function, reworked vm_flags assignment, reworded a comment in pte_allows_gup()
* Add missing DISABLED/REQUIRED_MASK14 in cpufeature.h
* Added comment about compile optimization in fault path
* Left get_user_pages_locked() alone. Andrea thinks we need it.

Changes from RFCv3:

* Added 'current' and 'foreign' variants of get_user_pages() to help indicate whether protection keys should be enforced. Thanks to Jerome Glisse for pointing out this issue.
* Added "allocation" and set/get system calls so that we can do management of proection keys in the kernel. This opens the door to use of specific protection keys for kernel use in the future, such as for execute-only memory.
* Removed the kselftest code for the moment. It will be submitted separately.

Thanks Ingo and Thomas for most of these):
Changes from RFCv2 (Thanks Ingo and Thomas for most of these):

* few minor compile warnings
* changed 'nopku' interaction with cpuid bits. Now, we do not clear the PKU cpuid bit, we just skip enabling it.
* changed __pkru_allows_write() to also check access disable bit
* removed the unused write_pkru()
* made si_pkey a u64 and added some patch description details. Also made it share space in siginfo with MPX and clarified comments.
* give some real text for the Processor Trace xsave state
* made vma_pkey() less ugly (and much more optimized actually)
* added SEGV_PKUERR to copy_siginfo_to_user()
* remove page table walk when filling in si_pkey, added some big fat comments about it being inherently racy.
* added self test code

This code is not runnable to anyone outside of Intel unless they have some special hardware or a fancy simulator. There is a qemu model to emulate the feature, but it is not currently implemented fully enough to be usable. If you are interested in running this for real, please get in touch with me. Hardware is available to a very small but nonzero number of people.

This set is also available here:

	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/daveh/x86-pkeys.git pkeys-v018

=== diffstat ===

Dave Hansen (32):
mm, gup: introduce concept of "foreign" get_user_pages() x86, fpu: add placeholder for Processor Trace XSAVE state x86, pkeys: Add Kconfig option
x86, pkeys: cpuid bit definition
x86, pkeys: define new CR4 bit
x86, pkeys: add PKRU xsave fields and data structure(s) x86, pkeys: PTE bits for storing protection key
x86, pkeys: new page fault error code bit: PF_PK
x86, pkeys: store protection in high VMA flags
x86, pkeys: arch-specific protection bits
x86, pkeys: pass VMA down in to fault signal generation code signals, pkeys: notify userspace about protection key faults x86, pkeys: fill in pkey field in siginfo
x86, pkeys: add functions to fetch PKRU
mm: factor out VMA fault permission checking
x86, mm: simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling x86, pkeys: check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
mm: add gup flag to indicate "foreign" mm access
x86, pkeys: optimize fault handling in access_error() x86, pkeys: differentiate instruction fetches
x86, pkeys: dump PKRU with other kernel registers x86, pkeys: dump PTE pkey in /proc/pid/smaps
x86, pkeys: add Kconfig prompt to existing config option x86, pkeys: actually enable Memory Protection Keys in CPU mm, multi-arch: pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits() x86, pkeys: add arch_validate_pkey()
x86: separate out LDT init from context init
x86, fpu: allow setting of XSAVE state
x86, pkeys: allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register x86, pkeys: create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags x86, pkeys: execute-only support
x86, pkeys: Documentation

 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt         |   3 +
 Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt       |  27 +++
 arch/mips/mm/gup.c                          |   3 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h             |   5 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h      |  12 ++
 arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h         |  12 ++
 arch/s390/mm/gup.c                          |   3 +-
 arch/sh/mm/gup.c                            |   2 +-
 arch/sparc/mm/gup.c                         |   2 +-
 arch/unicore32/include/asm/mmu_context.h    |  12 ++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                            |  16 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h           |  56 +++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h    |  13 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h         |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h            |  12 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h           |   4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h          |  85 ++++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h              |  38 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h        |  34 +++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h                |  34 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h    |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h        |  22 +++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h            |  22 +++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                |  42 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c                  |  63 +++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                | 185 +++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c                       |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c                |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c                     |   9 +
 arch/x86/mm/Makefile                        |   2 +
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                         | 171 +++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/mm/gup.c                           |  46 +++--
 arch/x86/mm/mpx.c                           |   4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c                         | 101 +++++++++++
 drivers/char/agp/frontend.c                 |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c     |   4 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_userptr.c     |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c         |   4 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/via/via_dmablit.c           |   3 +-
 drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/infiniband/core/umem_odp.c          |   8 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mthca/mthca_memfree.c |   3 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/qib/qib_user_pages.c  |   3 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/usnic/usnic_uiom.c    |   2 +-
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c                |   8 +-
 drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-udma.c          |   4 +-
 drivers/media/pci/ivtv/ivtv-yuv.c           |  10 +-
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.c   |   3 +-
 drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grufault.c             |   3 +-
 drivers/scsi/st.c                           |   2 -
 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c            |   4 +-
 drivers/video/fbdev/pvr2fb.c                |   4 +-
 drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c               |   5 +-
 fs/exec.c                                   |   8 +-
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                          |  14 ++
 include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h              |  12 ++
 include/linux/mm.h                          |  60 +++++--
 include/linux/mman.h                        |   6 +-
 include/linux/pkeys.h                       |  33 ++++
 include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h          |  17 +-

Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Signature · 9 lines
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to [email protected].  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>