toolchain: granular choice for stack protector
PATCH v3 1/1 toolchain: granular choice for stack protector
From: Steven Noonan <[email protected]>
Currently, we only support two levels of stach-smashing protection:
- entirely disabled,
- protect _all_ functions with -fstack-protector-all.
-fstack-protector-all tends to be far too aggressive and impacts performance too much to be worth on a real product.
Add a choice that allows us to select between different levels of stack-smashing protection:
- none
- basic (NEW)
- strong (NEW)
- all
The differences are documented in the GCC online documentation:
https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.2/gcc/Optimize-Options.html
[yann.morin.1998 at free.fr:
- rebase
- add legacy handling
- SSP-strong depends on gcc >= 4.9
- slightly simple ifeq-block in package/Makefile.in
- keep the comment in the choice; add a comment shen strong is not available
- drop the defaults (only keep the legacy)
- update commit log
]
---
Changes v2 -> v3:
- drop the new defaults, only keep legacy (Thomas)
Changes v1 -> v2:
- rebase
- add legacy handling
- SSP-strong depends on gcc >= 4.9
- slightly simple ifeq-block in package/Makefile.in
- keep the comment in the choice; add a comment shen strong is not available
- update commit log
---
Note: I (Yann) have only slightly tested this patch. More testing is in order before we can apply this. Steven, care to see if it still fits your need? Thanks! :-)
--- Config.in | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- Config.in.legacy | 8 ++++++++ package/Makefile.in | 8 +++++++- 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Config.in +43 -5
@@ -522,12 +522,12 @@ config BR2_GOOGLE_BREAKPAD_INCLUDE_FILES endif -config BR2_ENABLE_SSP +choice bool "build code with Stack Smashing Protection" - depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + default BR2_SSP_ALL if BR2_ENABLE_SSP # legacy help - Enable stack smashing protection support using GCCs - -fstack-protector-all option. + Enable stack smashing protection support using GCC's + -fstack-protector option family. See http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/hints/downloads/files/ssp.txt for details.
@@ -536,9 +536,47 @@ config BR2_ENABLE_SSP support. This is always the case for glibc and eglibc toolchain, but is optional in uClibc toolchains. -comment "enabling Stack Smashing Protection requires support in the toolchain" +config BR2_SSP_NONE + bool "None" + help + Disable stack-smashing protection. + +comment "Stack Smashing Protection needs a toolchain w/ SSP" depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP +config BR2_SSP_REGULAR + bool "-fstack-protector" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + help + Emit extra code to check for buffer overflows, such as stack + smashing attacks. This is done by adding a guard variable to + functions with vulnerable objects. This includes functions + that call alloca, and functions with buffers larger than 8 + bytes. The guards are initialized when a function is entered + and then checked when the function exits. If a guard check + fails, an error message is printed and the program exits. + +config BR2_SSP_STRONG + bool "-fstack-protector-strong" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_GCC_AT_LEAST_4_9 + help + Like -fstack-protector but includes additional functions to be + protected - those that have local array definitions, or have + references to local frame addresses. + +comment "Stack Smashing Protection strong needs a toolchain w/ gcc >= 4.9" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_GCC_AT_LEAST_4_9 + +config BR2_SSP_ALL + bool "-fstack-protector-all" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + help + Like -fstack-protector except that all functions are protected. + +endchoice + choice bool "libraries" default BR2_SHARED_LIBS if BR2_BINFMT_SUPPORTS_SHARED
Config.in.legacy +8 -0
@@ -145,6 +145,14 @@ endif ############################################################################### comment "Legacy options removed in 2016.02" +# BR2_ENABLE_SSP is still referenced in Config.in (default in choice) +config BR2_ENABLE_SSP + bool "Stack Smashing protection now has different levels" + help + The protection offered by SSP can now be selected from different + protection levels. Be sure to review the SSP level in the build + options menu. + config BR2_PACKAGE_DIRECTFB_CLE266 bool "cle266 driver for directfb removed" select BR2_LEGACY
package/Makefile.in +7 -1
@@ -159,7 +159,13 @@ TARGET_CFLAGS += -msep-data TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -msep-data endif -ifeq ($(BR2_ENABLE_SSP),y) +ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_REGULAR),y) +TARGET_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector +TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -fstack-protector +else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_STRONG),y) +TARGET_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector-strong +TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -fstack-protector-strong +else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_ALL),y) TARGET_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector-all TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -fstack-protector-all endif
Signature · 1 line
1.9.1
PATCH v3 1/1 toolchain: granular choice for stack protector
Quoted 61 lines · Yann E. MORIN
From: Steven Noonan <[email protected]>
Currently, we only support two levels of stach-smashing protection:
- entirely disabled,
- protect _all_ functions with -fstack-protector-all.-fstack-protector-all tends to be far too aggressive and impacts performance too much to be worth on a real product.
Add a choice that allows us to select between different levels of stack-smashing protection:
- none
- basic (NEW)
- strong (NEW)
- allThe differences are documented in the GCC online documentation:
https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.2/gcc/Optimize-Options.htmlSigned-off-by Steven Noonan <[email protected]>[yann.morin.1998 at free.fr:
- rebase
- add legacy handling
- SSP-strong depends on gcc >= 4.9
- slightly simple ifeq-block in package/Makefile.in
- keep the comment in the choice; add a comment shen strong is not available
- drop the defaults (only keep the legacy)
- update commit log
]Signed-off-by "Yann E. MORIN" <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>---
Changes v2 -> v3:
- drop the new defaults, only keep legacy (Thomas)Changes v1 -> v2:
- rebase
- add legacy handling
- SSP-strong depends on gcc >= 4.9
- slightly simple ifeq-block in package/Makefile.in
- keep the comment in the choice; add a comment shen strong is not available
- update commit log---
Note: I (Yann) have only slightly tested this patch. More testing is in order before we can apply this. Steven, care to see if it still fits your need? Thanks! :-)--- Config.in | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- Config.in.legacy | 8 ++++++++ package/Makefile.in | 8 +++++++- 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)Config.in +0
-0
Config.in config BR2_GOOGLE_BREAKPAD_INCLUDE_FILES · line 527
Quoted 8 lines
Config.in +2
-2@@ -522,12 +522,12 @@ config BR2_GOOGLE_BREAKPAD_INCLUDE_FILES endif -config BR2_ENABLE_SSP +choice bool "build code with Stack Smashing Protection" - depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + default BR2_SSP_ALL if BR2_ENABLE_SSP # legacy
Oh, wait I think I misread this -- I take back my previous comments. We weren't changing the default of SSP enabled or disabled, but rather the default SSP type when it's enabled.
When SSP is *enabled* (BR2_ENABLE_SSP) the default should be BR2_SSP_STRONG (if available). It's generates code that's better-protected than BR2_SSP_REGULAR, but faster and smaller than BR2_SSP_ALL.
Only crazy folks would use BR2_SSP_ALL if BR2_SSP_STRONG is an option. ;)
Quoted 98 lines
Config.in +41
-3help - Enable stack smashing protection support using GCCs - -fstack-protector-all option. + Enable stack smashing protection support using GCC's + -fstack-protector option family. See http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/hints/downloads/files/ssp.txt for details.@@ -536,9 +536,47 @@ config BR2_ENABLE_SSP support. This is always the case for glibc and eglibc toolchain, but is optional in uClibc toolchains. -comment "enabling Stack Smashing Protection requires support in the toolchain" +config BR2_SSP_NONE + bool "None" + help + Disable stack-smashing protection. + +comment "Stack Smashing Protection needs a toolchain w/ SSP" depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP +config BR2_SSP_REGULAR + bool "-fstack-protector" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + help + Emit extra code to check for buffer overflows, such as stack + smashing attacks. This is done by adding a guard variable to + functions with vulnerable objects. This includes functions + that call alloca, and functions with buffers larger than 8 + bytes. The guards are initialized when a function is entered + and then checked when the function exits. If a guard check + fails, an error message is printed and the program exits. + +config BR2_SSP_STRONG + bool "-fstack-protector-strong" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_GCC_AT_LEAST_4_9 + help + Like -fstack-protector but includes additional functions to be + protected - those that have local array definitions, or have + references to local frame addresses. + +comment "Stack Smashing Protection strong needs a toolchain w/ gcc >= 4.9" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_GCC_AT_LEAST_4_9 + +config BR2_SSP_ALL + bool "-fstack-protector-all" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + help + Like -fstack-protector except that all functions are protected. + +endchoice + choice bool "libraries" default BR2_SHARED_LIBS if BR2_BINFMT_SUPPORTS_SHAREDConfig.in.legacy +8
-0@@ -145,6 +145,14 @@ endif ############################################################################### comment "Legacy options removed in 2016.02" +# BR2_ENABLE_SSP is still referenced in Config.in (default in choice) +config BR2_ENABLE_SSP + bool "Stack Smashing protection now has different levels" + help + The protection offered by SSP can now be selected from different + protection levels. Be sure to review the SSP level in the build + options menu. + config BR2_PACKAGE_DIRECTFB_CLE266 bool "cle266 driver for directfb removed" select BR2_LEGACYpackage/Makefile.in +7
-2@@ -159,7 +159,13 @@ TARGET_CFLAGS += -msep-data TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -msep-data endif -ifeq ($(BR2_ENABLE_SSP),y) +ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_REGULAR),y) +TARGET_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector +TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -fstack-protector +else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_STRONG),y) +TARGET_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector-strong +TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -fstack-protector-strong +else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_ALL),y) TARGET_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector-all TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -fstack-protector-all endif --1.9.1
PATCH v3 1/1 toolchain: granular choice for stack protector
Steven, All,
On 2015-12-27 03:39 -0800, Steven Noonan spake thusly:
Quoted 17 lines · Yann E. MORIN
Quoted 16 lines
From: Steven Noonan <[email protected]>
Currently, we only support two levels of stach-smashing protection:
- entirely disabled,
- protect _all_ functions with -fstack-protector-all.-fstack-protector-all tends to be far too aggressive and impacts performance too much to be worth on a real product.
Add a choice that allows us to select between different levels of stack-smashing protection:
- none
- basic (NEW)
- strong (NEW)
- all
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The differences are documented in the GCC online documentation:
https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.2/gcc/Optimize-Options.html
[--SNIP--]
Quoted 10 lines
Config.in config BR2_GOOGLE_BREAKPAD_INCLUDE_FILES · line 527
Quoted 5 lines
Config.in +2
-2-config BR2_ENABLE_SSP +choice bool "build code with Stack Smashing Protection" - depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + default BR2_SSP_ALL if BR2_ENABLE_SSP # legacyOh, wait I think I misread this -- I take back my previous comments. We weren't changing the default of SSP enabled or disabled, but rather the default SSP type when it's enabled.
Quoted 6 lines
When SSP is *enabled* (
BR2_ENABLE_SSP) the default should beBR2_SSP_STRONG(if available). It's generates code that's better-protected thanBR2_SSP_REGULAR, but faster and smaller thanBR2_SSP_ALL.Only crazy folks would use
BR2_SSP_ALLifBR2_SSP_STRONGis an option. ;)
No, we want the legacy BR2_ENABLE_SSP symbol to set the same default as it previously represented.
Currently, BR2_ENABLE_SSP meant 'ssp-all' so we want to keep that behaviour.
Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.
Quoted 98 lines
Quoted 98 lines
help
Config.in +41
-3- Enable stack smashing protection support using GCCs - -fstack-protector-all option. + Enable stack smashing protection support using GCC's + -fstack-protector option family. See http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/hints/downloads/files/ssp.txt for details.@@ -536,9 +536,47 @@ config BR2_ENABLE_SSP support. This is always the case for glibc and eglibc toolchain, but is optional in uClibc toolchains. -comment "enabling Stack Smashing Protection requires support in the toolchain" +config BR2_SSP_NONE + bool "None" + help + Disable stack-smashing protection. + +comment "Stack Smashing Protection needs a toolchain w/ SSP" depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP +config BR2_SSP_REGULAR + bool "-fstack-protector" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + help + Emit extra code to check for buffer overflows, such as stack + smashing attacks. This is done by adding a guard variable to + functions with vulnerable objects. This includes functions + that call alloca, and functions with buffers larger than 8 + bytes. The guards are initialized when a function is entered + and then checked when the function exits. If a guard check + fails, an error message is printed and the program exits. + +config BR2_SSP_STRONG + bool "-fstack-protector-strong" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_GCC_AT_LEAST_4_9 + help + Like -fstack-protector but includes additional functions to be + protected - those that have local array definitions, or have + references to local frame addresses. + +comment "Stack Smashing Protection strong needs a toolchain w/ gcc >= 4.9" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_GCC_AT_LEAST_4_9 + +config BR2_SSP_ALL + bool "-fstack-protector-all" + depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP + help + Like -fstack-protector except that all functions are protected. + +endchoice + choice bool "libraries" default BR2_SHARED_LIBS if BR2_BINFMT_SUPPORTS_SHAREDConfig.in.legacy +8
-0@@ -145,6 +145,14 @@ endif ############################################################################### comment "Legacy options removed in 2016.02" +# BR2_ENABLE_SSP is still referenced in Config.in (default in choice) +config BR2_ENABLE_SSP + bool "Stack Smashing protection now has different levels" + help + The protection offered by SSP can now be selected from different + protection levels. Be sure to review the SSP level in the build + options menu. + config BR2_PACKAGE_DIRECTFB_CLE266 bool "cle266 driver for directfb removed" select BR2_LEGACYpackage/Makefile.in +7
-2@@ -159,7 +159,13 @@ TARGET_CFLAGS += -msep-data TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -msep-data endif -ifeq ($(BR2_ENABLE_SSP),y) +ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_REGULAR),y) +TARGET_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector +TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -fstack-protector +else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_STRONG),y) +TARGET_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector-strong +TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -fstack-protector-strong +else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_ALL),y) TARGET_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector-all TARGET_CXXFLAGS += -fstack-protector-all endif --1.9.1
Signature · 6 lines
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------. | Yann E. MORIN | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: | | +33 662 376 056 | Software Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN | ___ | | +33 223 225 172 `------------.-------: X AGAINST | \e/ There is no | | http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL | v conspiracy. | '------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
PATCH v3 1/1 toolchain: granular choice for stack protector
In reply to Steven NoonanSteven,
Quoted 6 lines · Steven Noonan
When SSP is *enabled* (
BR2_ENABLE_SSP) the default should beBR2_SSP_STRONG(if available). It's generates code that's better-protected thanBR2_SSP_REGULAR, but faster and smaller thanBR2_SSP_ALL.Only crazy folks would use
BR2_SSP_ALLifBR2_SSP_STRONGis an option. ;)
We want to preserve existing behavior as much as possible. So people who enabled BR2_ENABLE_SSP were paying the price of BR2_SSP_ALL, and we should therefore keep using BR2_SSP_ALL for such users. That's the point of legacy handling: minimizing the amount of "surprise" /changes for users upgrading Buildroot.
Best regards,
Thomas
Signature · 3 lines
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Free Electrons Embedded Linux, Kernel and Android engineering http://free-electrons.com
PATCH v3 1/1 toolchain: granular choice for stack protector
Quoted 9 lines · Thomas Petazzoni
Steven,
Quoted 5 lines · Steven Noonan
When SSP is *enabled* (
BR2_ENABLE_SSP) the default should beBR2_SSP_STRONG(if available). It's generates code that's better-protected thanBR2_SSP_REGULAR, but faster and smaller thanBR2_SSP_ALL.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Only crazy folks would use
BR2_SSP_ALLifBR2_SSP_STRONGis an option. ;)We want to preserve existing behavior as much as possible. So people who enabled
BR2_ENABLE_SSPwere paying the price ofBR2_SSP_ALL, and we should therefore keep usingBR2_SSP_ALLfor such users. That's the point of legacy handling: minimizing the amount of "surprise" /changes for users upgrading Buildroot.
I get the argument, but it -is- a solvable problem: you could make BR2_ENABLE_SSP "legacy", force them to explicitly choose an SSP variant. But that would be a separate patch.
PATCH v3 1/1 toolchain: granular choice for stack protector
In reply to Yann E. MORINDear Yann E. MORIN,
Quoted 30 lines · Yann E. MORIN
From: Steven Noonan <[email protected]>
Currently, we only support two levels of stach-smashing protection:
- entirely disabled,
- protect _all_ functions with -fstack-protector-all.-fstack-protector-all tends to be far too aggressive and impacts performance too much to be worth on a real product.
Add a choice that allows us to select between different levels of stack-smashing protection:
- none
- basic (NEW)
- strong (NEW)
- allThe differences are documented in the GCC online documentation:
https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.2/gcc/Optimize-Options.htmlSigned-off-by Steven Noonan <[email protected]>[yann.morin.1998 at free.fr:
- rebase
- add legacy handling
- SSP-strong depends on gcc >= 4.9
- slightly simple ifeq-block in package/Makefile.in
- keep the comment in the choice; add a comment shen strong is not available
- drop the defaults (only keep the legacy)
- update commit log
]
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by "Yann E. MORIN" <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Petazzoni <[email protected]>---
Changes v2 -> v3:
- drop the new defaults, only keep legacy (Thomas)
Applied with the following changes:
[Thomas:
- only show the choice if the toolchain has SSP support
- add details for the BR2_SSP_ALL option that it has a significant performance impact.]
Thanks!
Thomas
Signature · 3 lines
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Free Electrons Embedded Linux, Kernel and Android engineering http://free-electrons.com