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eCryptfs: Clean up crypto initialization

PATCH Dan Carpenter 2 participants 2 messages Jan 25, 2016 – Jan 26, 2016

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#0 lore raw

Hello Michael Halcrow,

The patch e5d9cbde6ce0: "[PATCH] eCryptfs: Clean up crypto initialization" from Oct 30, 2006, leads to the following static checker warning:

	fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1625 ecryptfs_process_key_cipher()
	error: get_random_bytes() 'dummy_key' too small (64 vs 4294967295)

fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
1593 static int
1594 ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm,
1595 char *cipher_name, size_t *key_size)
1596 {

  1597          char dummy_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES];
  1598          char *full_alg_name = NULL;
  1599          int rc;
  1600  
  1601          *key_tfm = NULL;
  1602          if (*key_size > ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES) {
  1603                  rc = -EINVAL;
  1604                  printk(KERN_ERR "Requested key size is [%zd] bytes; maximum "
  1605                        "allowable is [%d]\n", *key_size, ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES);
  1606                  goto out;
  1607          }
  1608          rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name, cipher_name,
  1609                                                      "ecb");
  1610          if (rc)
  1611                  goto out;
  1612          *key_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
  1613          if (IS_ERR(*key_tfm)) {
  1614                  rc = PTR_ERR(*key_tfm);
  1615                  printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate crypto cipher with name "
  1616                         "[%s]; rc = [%d]\n", full_alg_name, rc);
  1617                  goto out;
  1618          }
  1619          crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(*key_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
  1620          if (*key_size == 0) {

1621 struct blkcipher_alg *alg = crypto_blkcipher_alg(*key_tfm);
1622
1623 *key_size = alg->max_keysize;

My concern here is that arc4 has a max_keysize of ARC4_MAX_KEY_SIZE (256).

  1624          }
  1625          get_random_bytes(dummy_key, *key_size);

Potentially leading to memory corruption here. This is static analysis work so I may be wrong.

  1626          rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(*key_tfm, dummy_key, *key_size);
  1627          if (rc) {
  1628                  printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to set key of size [%zd] for "
  1629                         "cipher [%s]; rc = [%d]\n", *key_size, full_alg_name,
  1630                         rc);
  1631                  rc = -EINVAL;
  1632                  goto out;
  1633          }
  1634  out:
  1635          kfree(full_alg_name);
  1636          return rc;
  1637  }

regards,
dan carpenter

#1 lore raw

[fixed mhalcrow's email address]

Hi Dan - thanks for the alert. I think the code is fine in this situation.

Quoted 42 lines · Dan Carpenter

Hello Michael Halcrow,

The patch e5d9cbde6ce0: "[PATCH] eCryptfs: Clean up crypto initialization" from Oct 30, 2006, leads to the following static checker warning:

	fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1625 ecryptfs_process_key_cipher()
	error: get_random_bytes() 'dummy_key' too small (64 vs 4294967295)

fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
1593 static int
1594 ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm,
1595 char *cipher_name, size_t *key_size)
1596 {

  1597          char dummy_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES];
  1598          char *full_alg_name = NULL;
  1599          int rc;
  1600  
  1601          *key_tfm = NULL;
  1602          if (*key_size > ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES) {
  1603                  rc = -EINVAL;
  1604                  printk(KERN_ERR "Requested key size is [%zd] bytes; maximum "
  1605                        "allowable is [%d]\n", *key_size, ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES);
  1606                  goto out;
  1607          }
  1608          rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name, cipher_name,
  1609                                                      "ecb");
  1610          if (rc)
  1611                  goto out;
  1612          *key_tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
  1613          if (IS_ERR(*key_tfm)) {
  1614                  rc = PTR_ERR(*key_tfm);
  1615                  printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate crypto cipher with name "
  1616                         "[%s]; rc = [%d]\n", full_alg_name, rc);
  1617                  goto out;
  1618          }
  1619          crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(*key_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
  1620          if (*key_size == 0) {

1621 struct blkcipher_alg *alg = crypto_blkcipher_alg(*key_tfm);
1622
1623 *key_size = alg->max_keysize;

Quoted 7 lines

My concern here is that arc4 has a max_keysize of ARC4_MAX_KEY_SIZE (256).

  1624          }
  1625          get_random_bytes(dummy_key, *key_size);

Potentially leading to memory corruption here. This is static analysis work so I may be wrong.

There are two things stopping this from being an issue. The first is the check on key_size at line 1602. The second is that eCryptfs only supports a small set of ciphers that have max key sizes well within ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES:

fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
962 /* Add support for additional ciphers by adding elements here. The
963 * cipher_code is whatever OpenPGP applicatoins use to identify the
964 * ciphers. List in order of probability. */
965 static struct ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map_elem
966 ecryptfs_cipher_code_str_map[] = {

   967          {"aes",RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_128 },
   968          {"blowfish", RFC2440_CIPHER_BLOWFISH},
   969          {"des3_ede", RFC2440_CIPHER_DES3_EDE},
   970          {"cast5", RFC2440_CIPHER_CAST_5},
   971          {"twofish", RFC2440_CIPHER_TWOFISH},
   972          {"cast6", RFC2440_CIPHER_CAST_6},
   973          {"aes", RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_192},
   974          {"aes", RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_256}

975 };

Tyler