pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init
PATCH 1/1 pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init
The ptmx_fops structure is only changed during init, so mark it as such.
--- drivers/tty/pty.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/pty.c +1 -1
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ out_free_file:return retval; } -static struct file_operations ptmx_fops; +static struct file_operations ptmx_fops__ro_after_init ;static void __init unix98_pty_init (void ) {
Signature · 6 lines
2.7.4 -- Kees Cook Nexus Security
Quoted 1 line · Kees Cook
The
ptmx_fopsstructure is only changed during init, so mark it as such.
Right, but I am missing what is the benefit? You would have to elaborate here...
Quoted 11 lines
Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>--- drivers/tty/pty.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/tty/pty.c +0
-0
drivers/tty/pty.c out_free_file: · line 806
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/tty/pty.c +1
-1@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ out_free_file:return retval; } -static struct file_operations ptmx_fops; +static struct file_operations ptmx_fops__ro_after_init ;static void __init unix98_pty_init (void ) {
thanks,
Signature · 2 lines
js suse labs
Quoted 5 lines · On Wed, 14 Sep 2016 09:59:42 +0200 Jiri Slaby <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line · Kees Cook
The
ptmx_fopsstructure is only changed during init, so mark it as such.Right, but I am missing what is the benefit? You would have to elaborate here...
The pages end up marked read only even to the kernel (and in future could even be marked read only forever when in kvm if we get suitable virtual machine extensions). That makes it much harder to patch those vectors when making security attacks.
Quoted 6 lines · One Thousand Gnomes
Quoted 3 lines · On Wed, 14 Sep 2016 09:59:42 +0200 Jiri Slaby <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line · Kees Cook
The
ptmx_fopsstructure is only changed during init, so mark it as such.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Right, but I am missing what is the benefit? You would have to elaborate here...
The pages end up marked read only even to the kernel (and in future could even be marked read only forever when in kvm if we get suitable virtual machine extensions). That makes it much harder to patch those vectors when making security attacks.
Correct, this is a continuing effort to reduce the internal attack surface of the kernel, where one of the most common exploitation methods is overwriting function pointers.
Some examples of attacks and mitigations are here:
http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Exploit_Methods/Function_pointer_overwrite
While this patch isn't a huge change, it's still a viable candidate. I send these as I notice them, and hope that other folks will start to see these opportunities and send more patches too. :)
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Nexus Security
Quoted 10 lines · Kees Cook
Correct, this is a continuing effort to reduce the internal attack surface of the kernel, where one of the most common exploitation methods is overwriting function pointers.
Some examples of attacks and mitigations are here:
http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Exploit_Methods/Function_pointer_overwriteWhile this patch isn't a huge change, it's still a viable candidate. I send these as I notice them, and hope that other folks will start to see these opportunities and send more patches too. :)
I didn't object to the patch. I could imagine the use case. But putting the idea to the commit message would have made it clear.
thanks,
Signature · 2 lines
js suse labs