fs/proc/kcore.c: Make bounce buffer global for read
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/2 fs/proc/kcore.c: Make bounce buffer global for read
Next patch adds bounce buffer for ktext area, so it's convenient to have single bounce buffer for both vmalloc/module and ktext cases.
--- fs/proc/kcore.c | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/proc/kcore.c +14 -10
@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ static void elf_kcore_store_hdr(char *bufp, int nphdr, int dataoff)static ssize_t read_kcore (struct file *file,char __user *buffer,size_t buflen,loff_t *fpos) { +char *buf = file->private_data;ssize_t acc =0 ;size_t size, tsz;size_t elf_buflen;
@@ -500,18 +501,10 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)if (clear_user (buffer, tsz))return -EFAULT ; }else if (is_vmalloc_or_module_addr ((void *)start)) { -char * elf_buf; - - elf_buf =kzalloc (tsz,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!elf_buf) -return -ENOMEM ; -vread (elf_buf, (char *)start, tsz); +vread (buf, (char *)start, tsz);/* we have to zero-fill user buffer even if no read */ -if (copy_to_user (buffer, elf_buf, tsz)) { -kfree (elf_buf); +if (copy_to_user (buffer, buf, tsz))return -EFAULT ; - } -kfree (elf_buf); }else {if (kern_addr_valid (start)) {unsigned long n;
@@ -549,6 +542,11 @@ static int open_kcore(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) {if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ))return -EPERM ; + + filp->private_data =kmalloc (PAGE_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!filp->private_data) +return -ENOMEM ; +if (kcore_need_update)kcore_update_ram ();if (i_size_read (inode) != proc_root_kcore->size) {
@@ -559,10 +557,16 @@ static int open_kcore(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)return 0 ; } +static int release_kcore (struct inode *inode,struct file *file) +{ +kfree (file->private_data); +return 0 ; +}static const struct file_operations proc_kcore_operations = { .read = read_kcore, .open = open_kcore, + .release = release_kcore, .llseek = default_llseek, };
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
PATCH 2/2 fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data
We hit hardened usercopy feature check for kernel text access by reading kcore file:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffffffff8179a01f (<kernel text>) (4065 bytes) kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:75!
Bypassing this check for kcore by adding bounce buffer for ktext data.
--- fs/proc/kcore.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/proc/kcore.c +6 -1
@@ -509,7 +509,12 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)if (kern_addr_valid (start)) {unsigned long n; - n =copy_to_user (buffer, (char *)start, tsz); +/* +* Using bounce buffer to bypass the +* hardened user copy kernel text checks. +*/ +memcpy (buf, (char *) start, tsz); + n =copy_to_user (buffer, buf, tsz);/* * We cannot distinguish between fault on source * and fault on destination. When this happens
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Quoted 6 lines · Jiri Olsa
Next patch adds bounce buffer for ktext area, so it's convenient to have single bounce buffer for both vmalloc/module and ktext cases.
Suggested-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
For this and the 2/2:
Thanks!
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Nexus Security
Quoted 5 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 4 lines · Jiri Olsa
Next patch adds bounce buffer for ktext area, so it's convenient to have single bounce buffer for both vmalloc/module and ktext cases.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Suggested-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>For this and the 2/2:
Acked-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Thanks!
hi,
I still dont see those pulled in.. which tree is it going to take?
thanks,
jirka
Quoted 2 lines · Jiri Olsa
I still dont see those pulled in.. which tree is it going to take?
I guess I'll take them directly,
Linus