kprobes: unpoison stack in jprobe_return() for KASAN
Subsystems (4)
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerPATCH v3 1/1 kprobes: unpoison stack in jprobe_return() for KASAN
KASAN stack instrumentation poisons stack redzones on function entry and unpoisons them on function exit. If a function exits abnormally (e.g. with a longjmp like jprobe_return()), stack redzones are left poisoned. Later this leads to random KASAN false reports.
Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over before doing actual longjmp in jprobe_return().
--
Changes since v1:
- leave kasan_unpoison_remaining_stack() intact
- instead add kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to()
- rename kasan_unpoison_remaining_stack() to kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below()
Changes since v2:
- fix build by adding return type to kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (tested v2 with it, but forgot to git add)
I observe false positives due to this in sctp code. sctp uses jprobe_return() in jsctp_sf_eat_sack(). The stray 0xf4 in shadow memory are stack redzones.
[ 376.492209] ================================================================== [ 376.500368] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0xe9/0x150 at addr ffff88005e48f480 [ 376.509522] Read of size 1 by task syz-executor/18535 [ 376.515249] page:ffffea00017923c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 [ 376.524377] flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() [ 376.528645] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 376.534939] CPU: 1 PID: 18535 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #28 [ 376.542375] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 [ 376.552669] ffff88005e48f2d0 ffffffff82d2b849 ffffffff0bc91e90 fffffbfff10971e8 [ 376.561599] ffffed000bc91e90 ffffed000bc91e90 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 [ 376.570486] ffff88005e48f480 ffff88005e48f350 ffffffff817d3169 ffff88005e48f370 [ 376.579348] Call Trace: [ 376.582196] [<ffffffff82d2b849>] dump_stack+0x12e/0x185 [ 376.588190] [<ffffffff817d3169>] kasan_report+0x489/0x4b0 [ 376.594378] [<ffffffff82d49529>] ? memcmp+0xe9/0x150 [ 376.600099] [<ffffffff8126377e>] ? update_stack_state.constprop.4+0xde/0x150 [ 376.608187] [<ffffffff817d31a9>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 [ 376.615620] [<ffffffff82d49529>] memcmp+0xe9/0x150 [ 376.621148] [<ffffffff82df7486>] depot_save_stack+0x176/0x5c0 [ 376.627722] [<ffffffff85b03f19>] ? skb_free_head+0x79/0xb0 [ 376.634006] [<ffffffff817d2031>] save_stack+0xb1/0xd0 [ 376.639805] [<ffffffff811fc8ab>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 [ 376.646369] [<ffffffff817d1fc6>] ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 376.652366] [<ffffffff817d27f2>] ? kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 376.658837] [<ffffffff817d05b8>] ? kfree+0xc8/0x2a0 [ 376.664454] [<ffffffff85b03f19>] ? skb_free_head+0x79/0xb0 [ 376.670736] [<ffffffff85b0900a>] ? skb_release_data+0x37a/0x420 [ 376.677517] [<ffffffff85b090ff>] ? skb_release_all+0x4f/0x60 [ 376.683992] [<ffffffff85b11348>] ? consume_skb+0x138/0x370 [ 376.690284] [<ffffffff8676ad7b>] ? sctp_chunk_put+0xcb/0x180 [ 376.696761] [<ffffffff8676ae88>] ? sctp_chunk_free+0x58/0x70 [ 376.703234] [<ffffffff8677fa5f>] ? sctp_inq_pop+0x68f/0xef0 [ 376.709616] [<ffffffff8675ee36>] ? sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd6/0x4b0 [ 376.716379] [<ffffffff8677f2c1>] ? sctp_inq_push+0x131/0x190 [ 376.722946] [<ffffffff867bad69>] ? sctp_backlog_rcv+0xe9/0xa20 [ 376.729615] [<ffffffff85af70dc>] ? __release_sock+0x12c/0x3a0 [ 376.736186] [<ffffffff85af73ae>] ? release_sock+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 376.742465] [<ffffffff8679fc62>] ? sctp_sendmsg+0xd82/0x2e00 [ 376.748935] [<ffffffff85f83c43>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x303/0x4c0 [ 376.755318] [<ffffffff85aeab0f>] ? sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110 [ 376.761599] [<ffffffff85aebc1d>] ? SYSC_sendto+0x20d/0x340 [ 376.767882] [<ffffffff85aee175>] ? SyS_sendto+0x45/0x60 [ 376.773885] [<ffffffff81008783>] ? do_syscall_64+0x1d3/0x620 [ 376.780372] [<ffffffff86d8e9cd>] ? entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 [ 376.787832] [<ffffffff86751c79>] ? sctp_do_sm+0x3689/0x4e90 [ 376.794215] [<ffffffff81467040>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 376.801948] [<ffffffff8674e5f0>] ? sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike.isra.19+0x900/0x900 [ 376.810918] [<ffffffff81466ed0>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x250/0x3c0 [ 376.818650] [<ffffffff817d27f2>] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 376.824945] [<ffffffff817d05b8>] kfree+0xc8/0x2a0 [ 376.830374] [<ffffffff85b03f19>] skb_free_head+0x79/0xb0 [ 376.836466] [<ffffffff85b0900a>] skb_release_data+0x37a/0x420 [ 376.843036] [<ffffffff85b090ff>] skb_release_all+0x4f/0x60 [ 376.849319] [<ffffffff85b11348>] consume_skb+0x138/0x370 [ 376.855411] [<ffffffff8676ad7b>] sctp_chunk_put+0xcb/0x180 [ 376.861702] [<ffffffff8676ae88>] sctp_chunk_free+0x58/0x70 [ 376.867990] [<ffffffff8677fa5f>] sctp_inq_pop+0x68f/0xef0 [ 376.874182] [<ffffffff8675ee36>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd6/0x4b0 [ 376.880759] [<ffffffff8677f2c1>] sctp_inq_push+0x131/0x190 [ 376.887055] [<ffffffff867bad69>] sctp_backlog_rcv+0xe9/0xa20 [ 376.893532] [<ffffffff814667dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 376.900107] [<ffffffff81369bed>] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xad/0x190 [ 376.907161] [<ffffffff85af70dc>] __release_sock+0x12c/0x3a0 [ 376.913540] [<ffffffff85af73ae>] release_sock+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 376.919922] [<ffffffff8679fc62>] sctp_sendmsg+0xd82/0x2e00 [ 376.926209] [<ffffffff8679eee0>] ? sctp_id2assoc+0x330/0x330 [ 376.932696] [<ffffffff81467040>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 376.940417] [<ffffffff814a6127>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x77/0x90 [ 376.947858] [<ffffffff814a6127>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x77/0x90 [ 376.955293] [<ffffffff85f83940>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x4b0/0x4b0 [ 376.961675] [<ffffffff85f83b48>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x208/0x4c0 [ 376.968064] [<ffffffff85f83c43>] inet_sendmsg+0x303/0x4c0 [ 376.974261] [<ffffffff85f839b8>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x78/0x4c0 [ 376.980546] [<ffffffff85f83940>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x4b0/0x4b0 [ 376.986929] [<ffffffff85aeab0f>] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110 [ 376.993025] [<ffffffff85aebc1d>] SYSC_sendto+0x20d/0x340 [ 376.999125] [<ffffffff85aeba10>] ? SYSC_connect+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 377.005510] [<ffffffff8188cc33>] ? __fd_install+0x233/0x560 [ 377.011894] [<ffffffff81007b93>] ? perf_trace_sys_enter+0x443/0x9d0 [ 377.019051] [<ffffffff81007750>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0xe00/0xe00 [ 377.026109] [<ffffffff8158887f>] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x4f/0x60 [ 377.033466] [<ffffffff85aee175>] SyS_sendto+0x45/0x60 [ 377.039278] [<ffffffff85aee130>] ? SyS_getpeername+0x30/0x30 [ 377.045752] [<ffffffff81008783>] do_syscall_64+0x1d3/0x620 [ 377.052035] [<ffffffff8100501a>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 377.059281] [<ffffffff86d8e9cd>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 [ 377.066509] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 377.071935] ffff88005e48f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 377.080024] ffff88005e48f400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 377.088117] >ffff88005e48f480: f4 f4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 377.096205] ^ [ 377.099900] ffff88005e48f500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 377.107994] ffff88005e48f580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 377.116079] ================================================================== --- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/kasan.h | 2 ++ mm/kasan/kasan.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ ENTRY(_cpu_resume) #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN mov x0, sp - bl kasan_unpoison_remaining_stack + bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endif ldp x19, x20, [x29, #16]
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c +4 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@#include <linux/kallsyms.h> #include <linux/ftrace.h> #include <linux/frame.h> +#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <asm/text-patching.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -1080,6 +1081,9 @@ void jprobe_return(void) {struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb =get_kprobe_ctlblk (); +/* Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over. */ +kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (kcb->jprobe_saved_sp); + asm volatile (#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 " xchg %%rbx,%%rsp \n"
include/linux/kasan.h +2 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void)void kasan_unpoison_shadow (const void *address,size_t size);void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); +void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (const void *watermark);void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);static inline void kasan_unpoison_shadow (const void *address,size_t size) {}static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} +static inline void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (const void *watermark) {}static inline void kasan_enable_current (void ) {}static inline void kasan_disable_current (void ) {}
mm/kasan/kasan.c +17 -2
@@ -77,9 +77,24 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) }/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */ -asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_remaining_stack(void *sp) +asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark) { -__kasan_unpoison_stack (current, sp); +__kasan_unpoison_stack (current, watermark); +} + +/* +* Clear all poison for the region between the current SP and a provided +* watermark value, as is sometimes required prior to hand-crafted asm function +* returns in the middle of functions. +*/ +void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (const void *watermark) +{ +const void *sp = (void *)current_stack_pointer (); +size_t size = watermark - sp; + +if (WARN_ON (sp > watermark)) +return ; +kasan_unpoison_shadow (sp, size); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.8.0.rc3.226.g39d4020
Quoted 17 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
KASAN stack instrumentation poisons stack redzones on function entry and unpoisons them on function exit. If a function exits abnormally (e.g. with a longjmp like
jprobe_return()), stack redzones are left poisoned. Later this leads to random KASAN false reports.Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over before doing actual longjmp in
jprobe_return().Signed-off-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>Cc Lorenzo Pieralisi <[email protected]>Cc Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>Cc Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <[email protected]>Cc Anil S Keshavamurthy <[email protected]>Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Both the core and arm64 parts look right to me, so FWIW:
Catalin, Will, are you happy to ack the arm64 part? A core function got renamed, and we have to update the call site in sleep.S, but there should be no functional change. The rest of the patch adds some generic infrastructure required by x86.
Thanks,
Mark.
Quoted 96 lines
--- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/kasan.h | 2 ++ mm/kasan/kasan.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1
-1@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ ENTRY(_cpu_resume) #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN mov x0, sp - bl kasan_unpoison_remaining_stack + bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endif ldp x19, x20, [x29, #16]arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c +4
-0@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@#include <linux/kallsyms.h> #include <linux/ftrace.h> #include <linux/frame.h> +#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <asm/text-patching.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> @@ -1080,6 +1081,9 @@ void jprobe_return(void) {struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb =get_kprobe_ctlblk (); +/* Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over. */ +kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (kcb->jprobe_saved_sp); + asm volatile (#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 " xchg %%rbx,%%rsp \n" include/linux/kasan.h +2
-0@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void)void kasan_unpoison_shadow (const void *address,size_t size);void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); +void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (const void *watermark);void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);static inline void kasan_unpoison_shadow (const void *address,size_t size) {}static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} +static inline void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (const void *watermark) {}static inline void kasan_enable_current (void ) {}static inline void kasan_disable_current (void ) {}mm/kasan/kasan.c +17
-2@@ -77,9 +77,24 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) }/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */ -asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_remaining_stack(void *sp) +asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark) { -__kasan_unpoison_stack (current, sp); +__kasan_unpoison_stack (current, watermark); +} + +/* +* Clear all poison for the region between the current SP and a provided +* watermark value, as is sometimes required prior to hand-crafted asm function +* returns in the middle of functions. +*/ +void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (const void *watermark) +{ +const void *sp = (void *)current_stack_pointer (); +size_t size = watermark - sp; + +if (WARN_ON (sp > watermark)) +return ; +kasan_unpoison_shadow (sp, size); }/* Signature · 1 line
2.8.0.rc3.226.g39d4020
Quoted 28 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
KASAN stack instrumentation poisons stack redzones on function entry and unpoisons them on function exit. If a function exits abnormally (e.g. with a longjmp like
jprobe_return()), stack redzones are left poisoned. Later this leads to random KASAN false reports.Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over before doing actual longjmp in
jprobe_return().Signed-off-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>Cc Lorenzo Pieralisi <[email protected]>Cc Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>Cc Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <[email protected]>Cc Anil S Keshavamurthy <[email protected]>Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>--
Quoted 8 lines
Changes since v1:
- leavekasan_unpoison_remaining_stack()intact
- instead addkasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to()
- renamekasan_unpoison_remaining_stack()tokasan_unpoison_task_stack_below()Changes since v2:
- fix build by adding return type tokasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to(tested v2 with it, but forgot to git add)
I get build warnings with this patch applied and KASAN enabled:
mm/kasan/kasan.c: In function ‘kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below’:mm/kasan/kasan.c:82:34: warning: passing argument 2 of ‘__kasan_unpoison_stack’ discards ‘const’ qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
__kasan_unpoison_stack(current, watermark);
^~~~~~~~~
mm/kasan/kasan.c:65:13: note: expected ‘void *’ but argument is of type ‘const void *’
static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, void *sp)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
mm/kasan/kasan.c: In function ‘kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to’:
mm/kasan/kasan.c:92:27: error: called object ‘current_stack_pointer’ is not a function or function pointer
const void *sp = (void *)current_stack_pointer();
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from ./include/linux/thread_info.h:54:0,
from ./include/asm-generic/preempt.h:4,
from ./arch/arm64/include/generated/asm/preempt.h:1,
from ./include/linux/preempt.h:59,
from ./include/linux/interrupt.h:8,
from mm/kasan/kasan.c:20:./arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h:69:24: note: declared here
register unsigned long current_stack_pointer asm ("sp");
Will
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerQuoted 42 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 28 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
KASAN stack instrumentation poisons stack redzones on function entry and unpoisons them on function exit. If a function exits abnormally (e.g. with a longjmp like
jprobe_return()), stack redzones are left poisoned. Later this leads to random KASAN false reports.Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over before doing actual longjmp in
jprobe_return().Signed-off-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>Cc Lorenzo Pieralisi <[email protected]>Cc Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>Cc Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <[email protected]>Cc Anil S Keshavamurthy <[email protected]>Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>--
Quoted 8 lines
Changes since v1:
- leavekasan_unpoison_remaining_stack()intact
- instead addkasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to()
- renamekasan_unpoison_remaining_stack()tokasan_unpoison_task_stack_below()Changes since v2:
- fix build by adding return type tokasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to(tested v2 with it, but forgot to git add)I get build warnings with this patch applied and KASAN enabled:
mm/kasan/kasan.c: In function ‘kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below’:mm/kasan/kasan.c:82:34: warning: passing argument 2 of ‘__kasan_unpoison_stack’ discards ‘const’ qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
Quoted 9 lines
__kasan_unpoison_stack(current, watermark);
^~~~~~~~~
mm/kasan/kasan.c:65:13: note: expected ‘void *’ but argument is of type ‘const void *’
static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, void *sp)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
mm/kasan/kasan.c: In function ‘kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to’:
mm/kasan/kasan.c:92:27: error: called object ‘current_stack_pointer’ is not a function or function pointer
const void *sp = (void *)current_stack_pointer();
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Mailed v4.
Thanks