kprobes: unpoison stack in jprobe_return() for KASAN
Subsystems (4)
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerPATCH v4 1/1 kprobes: unpoison stack in jprobe_return() for KASAN
KASAN stack instrumentation poisons stack redzones on function entry and unpoisons them on function exit. If a function exits abnormally (e.g. with a longjmp like jprobe_return()), stack redzones are left poisoned. Later this leads to random KASAN false reports.
Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over before doing actual longjmp in jprobe_return().
--
Changes since v1:
- leave kasan_unpoison_remaining_stack() intact
- instead add kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to()
- rename kasan_unpoison_remaining_stack() to kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below()
Changes since v2:
- fix build by adding return type to kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to() (tested v2 with it, but forgot to git add)
Changes since v3:
- fix build warning in kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to() related to void*/const void* conversion
I observe false positives due to this in sctp code. sctp uses jprobe_return() in jsctp_sf_eat_sack(). The stray 0xf4 in shadow memory are stack redzones.
[ 376.492209] ================================================================== [ 376.500368] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0xe9/0x150 at addr ffff88005e48f480 [ 376.509522] Read of size 1 by task syz-executor/18535 [ 376.515249] page:ffffea00017923c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 [ 376.524377] flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() [ 376.528645] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 376.534939] CPU: 1 PID: 18535 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #28 [ 376.542375] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 [ 376.552669] ffff88005e48f2d0 ffffffff82d2b849 ffffffff0bc91e90 fffffbfff10971e8 [ 376.561599] ffffed000bc91e90 ffffed000bc91e90 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 [ 376.570486] ffff88005e48f480 ffff88005e48f350 ffffffff817d3169 ffff88005e48f370 [ 376.579348] Call Trace: [ 376.582196] [<ffffffff82d2b849>] dump_stack+0x12e/0x185 [ 376.588190] [<ffffffff817d3169>] kasan_report+0x489/0x4b0 [ 376.594378] [<ffffffff82d49529>] ? memcmp+0xe9/0x150 [ 376.600099] [<ffffffff8126377e>] ? update_stack_state.constprop.4+0xde/0x150 [ 376.608187] [<ffffffff817d31a9>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 [ 376.615620] [<ffffffff82d49529>] memcmp+0xe9/0x150 [ 376.621148] [<ffffffff82df7486>] depot_save_stack+0x176/0x5c0 [ 376.627722] [<ffffffff85b03f19>] ? skb_free_head+0x79/0xb0 [ 376.634006] [<ffffffff817d2031>] save_stack+0xb1/0xd0 [ 376.639805] [<ffffffff811fc8ab>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 [ 376.646369] [<ffffffff817d1fc6>] ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 376.652366] [<ffffffff817d27f2>] ? kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 376.658837] [<ffffffff817d05b8>] ? kfree+0xc8/0x2a0 [ 376.664454] [<ffffffff85b03f19>] ? skb_free_head+0x79/0xb0 [ 376.670736] [<ffffffff85b0900a>] ? skb_release_data+0x37a/0x420 [ 376.677517] [<ffffffff85b090ff>] ? skb_release_all+0x4f/0x60 [ 376.683992] [<ffffffff85b11348>] ? consume_skb+0x138/0x370 [ 376.690284] [<ffffffff8676ad7b>] ? sctp_chunk_put+0xcb/0x180 [ 376.696761] [<ffffffff8676ae88>] ? sctp_chunk_free+0x58/0x70 [ 376.703234] [<ffffffff8677fa5f>] ? sctp_inq_pop+0x68f/0xef0 [ 376.709616] [<ffffffff8675ee36>] ? sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd6/0x4b0 [ 376.716379] [<ffffffff8677f2c1>] ? sctp_inq_push+0x131/0x190 [ 376.722946] [<ffffffff867bad69>] ? sctp_backlog_rcv+0xe9/0xa20 [ 376.729615] [<ffffffff85af70dc>] ? __release_sock+0x12c/0x3a0 [ 376.736186] [<ffffffff85af73ae>] ? release_sock+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 376.742465] [<ffffffff8679fc62>] ? sctp_sendmsg+0xd82/0x2e00 [ 376.748935] [<ffffffff85f83c43>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x303/0x4c0 [ 376.755318] [<ffffffff85aeab0f>] ? sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110 [ 376.761599] [<ffffffff85aebc1d>] ? SYSC_sendto+0x20d/0x340 [ 376.767882] [<ffffffff85aee175>] ? SyS_sendto+0x45/0x60 [ 376.773885] [<ffffffff81008783>] ? do_syscall_64+0x1d3/0x620 [ 376.780372] [<ffffffff86d8e9cd>] ? entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 [ 376.787832] [<ffffffff86751c79>] ? sctp_do_sm+0x3689/0x4e90 [ 376.794215] [<ffffffff81467040>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 376.801948] [<ffffffff8674e5f0>] ? sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike.isra.19+0x900/0x900 [ 376.810918] [<ffffffff81466ed0>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x250/0x3c0 [ 376.818650] [<ffffffff817d27f2>] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 376.824945] [<ffffffff817d05b8>] kfree+0xc8/0x2a0 [ 376.830374] [<ffffffff85b03f19>] skb_free_head+0x79/0xb0 [ 376.836466] [<ffffffff85b0900a>] skb_release_data+0x37a/0x420 [ 376.843036] [<ffffffff85b090ff>] skb_release_all+0x4f/0x60 [ 376.849319] [<ffffffff85b11348>] consume_skb+0x138/0x370 [ 376.855411] [<ffffffff8676ad7b>] sctp_chunk_put+0xcb/0x180 [ 376.861702] [<ffffffff8676ae88>] sctp_chunk_free+0x58/0x70 [ 376.867990] [<ffffffff8677fa5f>] sctp_inq_pop+0x68f/0xef0 [ 376.874182] [<ffffffff8675ee36>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd6/0x4b0 [ 376.880759] [<ffffffff8677f2c1>] sctp_inq_push+0x131/0x190 [ 376.887055] [<ffffffff867bad69>] sctp_backlog_rcv+0xe9/0xa20 [ 376.893532] [<ffffffff814667dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 376.900107] [<ffffffff81369bed>] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xad/0x190 [ 376.907161] [<ffffffff85af70dc>] __release_sock+0x12c/0x3a0 [ 376.913540] [<ffffffff85af73ae>] release_sock+0x5e/0x1c0 [ 376.919922] [<ffffffff8679fc62>] sctp_sendmsg+0xd82/0x2e00 [ 376.926209] [<ffffffff8679eee0>] ? sctp_id2assoc+0x330/0x330 [ 376.932696] [<ffffffff81467040>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 376.940417] [<ffffffff814a6127>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x77/0x90 [ 376.947858] [<ffffffff814a6127>] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x77/0x90 [ 376.955293] [<ffffffff85f83940>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x4b0/0x4b0 [ 376.961675] [<ffffffff85f83b48>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x208/0x4c0 [ 376.968064] [<ffffffff85f83c43>] inet_sendmsg+0x303/0x4c0 [ 376.974261] [<ffffffff85f839b8>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x78/0x4c0 [ 376.980546] [<ffffffff85f83940>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x4b0/0x4b0 [ 376.986929] [<ffffffff85aeab0f>] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110 [ 376.993025] [<ffffffff85aebc1d>] SYSC_sendto+0x20d/0x340 [ 376.999125] [<ffffffff85aeba10>] ? SYSC_connect+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 377.005510] [<ffffffff8188cc33>] ? __fd_install+0x233/0x560 [ 377.011894] [<ffffffff81007b93>] ? perf_trace_sys_enter+0x443/0x9d0 [ 377.019051] [<ffffffff81007750>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0xe00/0xe00 [ 377.026109] [<ffffffff8158887f>] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x4f/0x60 [ 377.033466] [<ffffffff85aee175>] SyS_sendto+0x45/0x60 [ 377.039278] [<ffffffff85aee130>] ? SyS_getpeername+0x30/0x30 [ 377.045752] [<ffffffff81008783>] do_syscall_64+0x1d3/0x620 [ 377.052035] [<ffffffff8100501a>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 377.059281] [<ffffffff86d8e9cd>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 [ 377.066509] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 377.071935] ffff88005e48f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 377.080024] ffff88005e48f400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 377.088117] >ffff88005e48f480: f4 f4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 377.096205] ^ [ 377.099900] ffff88005e48f500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 377.107994] ffff88005e48f580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 377.116079] ================================================================== --- arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/kasan.h | 2 ++ mm/kasan/kasan.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S +1 -1
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ ENTRY(_cpu_resume) #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN mov x0, sp - bl kasan_unpoison_remaining_stack + bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below #endif ldp x19, x20, [x29, #16]
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c +4 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@#include <linux/kallsyms.h> #include <linux/ftrace.h> #include <linux/frame.h> +#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <asm/text-patching.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -1080,6 +1081,9 @@ void jprobe_return(void) {struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb =get_kprobe_ctlblk (); +/* Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over. */ +kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (kcb->jprobe_saved_sp); + asm volatile (#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 " xchg %%rbx,%%rsp \n"
include/linux/kasan.h +2 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void)void kasan_unpoison_shadow (const void *address,size_t size);void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task); +void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (const void *watermark);void kasan_alloc_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);void kasan_free_pages (struct page *page,unsigned int order);
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);static inline void kasan_unpoison_shadow (const void *address,size_t size) {}static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack (struct task_struct *task) {} +static inline void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (const void *watermark) {}static inline void kasan_enable_current (void ) {}static inline void kasan_disable_current (void ) {}
mm/kasan/kasan.c +18 -3
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size) } } -static void __kasan_unpoison_stack (struct task_struct *task,void *sp) +static void __kasan_unpoison_stack (struct task_struct *task,const void *sp) {void *base =task_stack_page (task);size_t size = sp - base;
@@ -77,9 +77,24 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) }/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */ -asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_remaining_stack(void *sp) +asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark) { -__kasan_unpoison_stack (current, sp); +__kasan_unpoison_stack (current, watermark); +} + +/* +* Clear all poison for the region between the current SP and a provided +* watermark value, as is sometimes required prior to hand-crafted asm function +* returns in the middle of functions. +*/ +void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (const void *watermark) +{ +const void *sp = (void *)current_stack_pointer (); +size_t size = watermark - sp; + +if (WARN_ON (sp > watermark)) +return ; +kasan_unpoison_shadow (sp, size); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.8.0.rc3.226.g39d4020
Mark Rutland
reviewerQuoted 10 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
KASAN stack instrumentation poisons stack redzones on function entry and unpoisons them on function exit. If a function exits abnormally (e.g. with a longjmp like
jprobe_return()), stack redzones are left poisoned. Later this leads to random KASAN false reports.Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over before doing actual longjmp in
jprobe_return().Signed-off-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
... judging by the kbuild test robot I spoke too soon, and should have been more thorough. :/
mm/kasan/kasan.c void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) · line 92
Quoted 8 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.c +8
-0+/* +* Clear all poison for the region between the current SP and a provided +* watermark value, as is sometimes required prior to hand-crafted asm function +* returns in the middle of functions. +*/ +void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (const void *watermark) +{ +const void *sp = (void *)current_stack_pointer ();
Aargh; it seems current_stack_pointer() is only function-like on some arches, and not on others (arm64 included). I should have known better; sorry for the bad suggestion.
I'm not overjoyed about taking the address of a stack variable to implement this ourselves. Can we use __builtin_frame_address(0) instead? Or are there cases where that won't work on x86?
mm/kasan/kasan.c void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) · line 96
Quoted 4 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.c +4
-0+size_t size = watermark - sp; + +if (WARN_ON (sp > watermark)) +return ;
... not a new problem, but we should also include <linux/bug.h> for WARN_ON().
Thanks,
Mark.
Dmitry Vyukov
reviewerQuoted 28 lines · Mark Rutland
Quoted 10 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
KASAN stack instrumentation poisons stack redzones on function entry and unpoisons them on function exit. If a function exits abnormally (e.g. with a longjmp like
jprobe_return()), stack redzones are left poisoned. Later this leads to random KASAN false reports.Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over before doing actual longjmp in
jprobe_return().Signed-off-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Mark Rutland <[email protected]>... judging by the kbuild test robot I spoke too soon, and should have been more thorough. :/
mm/kasan/kasan.c void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) · line 92
Quoted 8 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.c +8
-0+/* +* Clear all poison for the region between the current SP and a provided +* watermark value, as is sometimes required prior to hand-crafted asm function +* returns in the middle of functions. +*/ +void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to (const void *watermark) +{ +const void *sp = (void *)current_stack_pointer ();Aargh; it seems
current_stack_pointer()is only function-like on some arches, and not on others (arm64 included). I should have known better; sorry for the bad suggestion.
Quoted 3 lines
I'm not overjoyed about taking the address of a stack variable to implement this ourselves. Can we use
__builtin_frame_address(0)instead? Or are there cases where that won't work on x86?
Mailed v5 with __builtin_frame_address(0).
Built mm/kasan/kasan.o for arm64.
I see that __builtin_frame_address(0) is used on several arches including x86 and arm64.
So I hope we are good here.
Quoted 8 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.c void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) · line 96
Quoted 5 lines
mm/kasan/kasan.c +4
-0+size_t size = watermark - sp; + +if (WARN_ON (sp > watermark)) +return ;... not a new problem, but we should also include <
linux/bug.h> forWARN_ON().
Done