02/20: openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Quoted 2 lines · On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:22:26PM +0000, [email protected] wrote:
rpurdie pushed a commit to branch jethro
in repository openembedded-core.
This change and CVE-2016-8610.patch seems to be missing in krogoth branch.
OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | grep CVE
- file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
- file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2180.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch \
file://CVE-2016-6303.patch \
file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \
file://CVE-2016-6306.patch \- file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \
- file://CVE-2016-8610.patch \
Is there some pending pull request for krogoth? There is also that tzdata version lower in krogoth than jethro I've reported a while ago:
OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/
meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb renamed from meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb +0 -0
Quoted 331 lines
commit
5781eb9a6e6bf8984b090a488d2a326bf9fafcf8
Author: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Sat Jul 16 16:04:11 2016 -0700openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177
Affects openssl <= 1.0.2h
CVSS v2 Base Score: 7.5 HIGHSigned-off-by Armin Kuster <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ross Burton <[email protected]>(cherry picked from commit 2848c7d3e454cbc84cba9183f23ccdf3e9200ec9)Signed-off-by Armin Kuster <[email protected]>--- .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch new file +286
-0@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ +From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic + +A common idiom in the codebase is: + +if (p + len > limit) +{ + return; /* Too long */ +} + +Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and +limit == p + SIZE + +"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS +message). + +The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well +defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually +undefined behaviour. + +For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation +provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for +values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit! + +Issue reported by Guido Vranken. + +CVE-2016-2177 + +Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2016-2177 + +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <[email protected]> + + +--- + ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++------- + ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +- + ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c +index ab28702..ab7f690 100644 +--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c ++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c +@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + +- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { ++ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + /* get the session-id */ + j = *(p++); + +- if (p + j > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < j) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* cookie stuff */ +- if (p + 1 > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < 1) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + cookie_len = *(p++); + +- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + } + } + +- if (p + 2 > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + } + + /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ +- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { + /* not enough data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); +@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + + /* compression */ + i = *(p++); +- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < i) { + /* not enough data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +index b182998..54ee783 100644 +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, + int r; + #endif + +- if (session_id + len > limit) { ++ if (limit - session_id < len) { + fatal = 1; + goto err; + } +diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c +index fb64607..cdac011 100644 +--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c +@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ + }; + +- if (data >= (limit - 2)) ++ if (limit - data <= 2) + return; + data += 2; + +- if (data > (limit - 4)) ++ if (limit - data < 4) + return; + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); +@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + return; + +- if (data + size > limit) ++ if (limit - data < size) + return; + data += size; + +@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); + const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); + +- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) + return; + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) + return; +@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + } else { + const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); + +- if (data + len != limit) ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len)) + return; + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) + return; +@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, + if (data == limit) + goto ri_check; + +- if (data > (limit - 2)) ++ if (limit - data < 2) + goto err; + + n2s(data, len); + +- if (data + len != limit) ++ if (limit - data != len) + goto err; + +- while (data <= (limit - 4)) { ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + +- if (data + size > (limit)) ++ if (limit - data < size) + goto err; + # if 0 + fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); +@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, + if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) + return 1; + +- if (data >= limit - 2) ++ if (limit - data <= 2) + return 1; + n2s(data, len); + +- if (data > limit - len) ++ if (limit - data < len) + return 1; + +- while (data <= limit - 4) { ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + +- if (data + size > limit) ++ if (limit - data < size) + return 1; + if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) + return 0; +@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, + SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); + # endif + +- if (data >= (d + n - 2)) ++ if ((d + n) - data <= 2) + goto ri_check; + + n2s(data, length); +- if (data + length != d + n) { ++ if ((d + n) - data != length) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + +- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { ++ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + +- if (data + size > (d + n)) ++ if ((d + n) - data < size) + goto ri_check; + + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) +@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, + /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + i = *(p++); +- p += i; +- if (p >= limit) ++ ++ if (limit - p <= i) + return -1; ++ ++ p += i; + } + /* Skip past cipher list */ + n2s(p, i); +- p += i; +- if (p >= limit) ++ if (limit - p <= i) + return -1; ++ p += i; ++ + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ + i = *(p++); +- p += i; +- if (p > limit) ++ if (limit - p < i) + return -1; ++ p += i; ++ + /* Now at start of extensions */ +- if ((p + 2) >= limit) ++ if (limit - p <= 2) + return 0; + n2s(p, i); +- while ((p + 4) <= limit) { ++ while (limit - p >= 4) { + unsigned short type, size; + n2s(p, type); + n2s(p, size); +- if (p + size > limit) ++ if (limit - p < size) + return 0; + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { + int r; +-- +2.3.5 +meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb +1
-0@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \ file://openssl-1.0.2a-x32-asm.patch \ file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch \ file://parallel.patch \ + file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"Signature · 8 lines
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Signature · 1 line
Martin 'JaMa' Jansa jabber: [email protected]
Quoted 4 lines · Martin Jansa
Quoted 2 lines · On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:22:26PM +0000, [email protected] wrote:
rpurdie pushed a commit to branch jethro
in repository openembedded-core.This change and CVE-2016-8610.patch seems to be missing in krogoth branch.
got them now.
Quoted 15 lines
OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | grep CVE
(quoted diff) +2
-4- file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \ - file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \ + file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \ + file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \ file://CVE-2016-2180.patch \ file://CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch \ file://CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch \ file://CVE-2016-6303.patch \ file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \ file://CVE-2016-6306.patch \ - file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \ - file://CVE-2016-8610.patch \
Quoted 1 line
Is there some pending pull request for krogoth? There is also that tzdata version lower in krogoth than jethro I've reported a while ago:
Yes there was a pull request but it did not contain that change. got this too now.
Armin
Quoted 340 lines
OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/
meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb renamed from meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb +0
-0Quoted 332 lines
commit
5781eb9a6e6bf8984b090a488d2a326bf9fafcf8
Author: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Sat Jul 16 16:04:11 2016 -0700openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177
Affects openssl <= 1.0.2h
CVSS v2 Base Score: 7.5 HIGHSigned-off-by Armin Kuster <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ross Burton <[email protected]>(cherry picked from commit 2848c7d3e454cbc84cba9183f23ccdf3e9200ec9)Signed-off-by Armin Kuster <[email protected]>--- .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch new file +286
-0@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ +From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic + +A common idiom in the codebase is: + +if (p + len > limit) +{ + return; /* Too long */ +} + +Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and +limit == p + SIZE + +"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS +message). + +The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well +defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually +undefined behaviour. + +For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation +provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for +values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit! + +Issue reported by Guido Vranken. + +CVE-2016-2177 + +Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2016-2177 + +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <[email protected]> + + +--- + ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++------- + ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +- + ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c +index ab28702..ab7f690 100644 +--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c ++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c +@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + +- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { ++ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + /* get the session-id */ + j = *(p++); + +- if (p + j > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < j) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* cookie stuff */ +- if (p + 1 > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < 1) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + cookie_len = *(p++); + +- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + } + } + +- if (p + 2 > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + } + + /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ +- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { + /* not enough data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); +@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + + /* compression */ + i = *(p++); +- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < i) { + /* not enough data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +index b182998..54ee783 100644 +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, + int r; + #endif + +- if (session_id + len > limit) { ++ if (limit - session_id < len) { + fatal = 1; + goto err; + } +diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c +index fb64607..cdac011 100644 +--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c +@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ + }; + +- if (data >= (limit - 2)) ++ if (limit - data <= 2) + return; + data += 2; + +- if (data > (limit - 4)) ++ if (limit - data < 4) + return; + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); +@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + return; + +- if (data + size > limit) ++ if (limit - data < size) + return; + data += size; + +@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); + const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); + +- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) + return; + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) + return; +@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + } else { + const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); + +- if (data + len != limit) ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len)) + return; + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) + return; +@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, + if (data == limit) + goto ri_check; + +- if (data > (limit - 2)) ++ if (limit - data < 2) + goto err; + + n2s(data, len); + +- if (data + len != limit) ++ if (limit - data != len) + goto err; + +- while (data <= (limit - 4)) { ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + +- if (data + size > (limit)) ++ if (limit - data < size) + goto err; + # if 0 + fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); +@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, + if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) + return 1; + +- if (data >= limit - 2) ++ if (limit - data <= 2) + return 1; + n2s(data, len); + +- if (data > limit - len) ++ if (limit - data < len) + return 1; + +- while (data <= limit - 4) { ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + +- if (data + size > limit) ++ if (limit - data < size) + return 1; + if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) + return 0; +@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, + SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); + # endif + +- if (data >= (d + n - 2)) ++ if ((d + n) - data <= 2) + goto ri_check; + + n2s(data, length); +- if (data + length != d + n) { ++ if ((d + n) - data != length) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + +- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { ++ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + +- if (data + size > (d + n)) ++ if ((d + n) - data < size) + goto ri_check; + + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) +@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, + /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + i = *(p++); +- p += i; +- if (p >= limit) ++ ++ if (limit - p <= i) + return -1; ++ ++ p += i; + } + /* Skip past cipher list */ + n2s(p, i); +- p += i; +- if (p >= limit) ++ if (limit - p <= i) + return -1; ++ p += i; ++ + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ + i = *(p++); +- p += i; +- if (p > limit) ++ if (limit - p < i) + return -1; ++ p += i; ++ + /* Now at start of extensions */ +- if ((p + 2) >= limit) ++ if (limit - p <= 2) + return 0; + n2s(p, i); +- while ((p + 4) <= limit) { ++ while (limit - p >= 4) { + unsigned short type, size; + n2s(p, type); + n2s(p, size); +- if (p + size > limit) ++ if (limit - p < size) + return 0; + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { + int r; +-- +2.3.5 +meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb +1
-0@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \ file://openssl-1.0.2a-x32-asm.patch \ file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch \ file://parallel.patch \ + file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"Signature · 8 lines
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