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samba4: security bump to version 4.5.7

PATCH New Peter Korsgaard 2 participants 3 messages Mar 28, 2017 – Mar 31, 2017

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PATCH 1/1 samba4: security bump to version 4.5.7

Fixes CVE-2017-2619:

All versions of Samba prior to 4.6.1, 4.5.7, 4.4.11 are vulnerable to a malicious client using a symlink race to allow access to areas of the server file system not exported under the share definition.

Samba uses the realpath() system call to ensure when a client requests access to a pathname that it is under the exported share path on the server file system.

Clients that have write access to the exported part of the file system via SMB1 unix extensions or NFS to create symlinks can race the server by renaming a realpath() checked path and then creating a symlink. If the client wins the race it can cause the server to access the new symlink target after the exported share path check has been done. This new symlink target can point to anywhere on the server file system.

This is a difficult race to win, but theoretically possible. Note that the proof of concept code supplied wins the race reliably only when the server is slowed down using the strace utility running on the server. Exploitation of this bug has not been seen in the wild.

---
 package/samba4/samba4.hash | 2 +-
 package/samba4/samba4.mk   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
package/samba4/samba4.hash +1 -1
index 4fec55dd6..71d24f7fe 100644
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 # Locally calculated
-sha256	bff02762b3e4ee030f02266c6e24a0b888248b387246219b7fbe3e1758ef2184	samba-4.5.5.tar.gz
+sha256	ac70f09af80639d8189e1b9bc0a554841ee44df2b1ef58e7e682ad5400fd9400	samba-4.5.7.tar.gz
package/samba4/samba4.mk +1 -1
index f64b684bf..aa7cb576d 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-SAMBA4_VERSION = 4.5.5
+SAMBA4_VERSION = 4.5.7
 SAMBA4_SITE = https://download.samba.org/pub/samba/stable
 SAMBA4_SOURCE = samba-$(SAMBA4_VERSION).tar.gz
 SAMBA4_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 samba4: security bump to version 4.5.7

Hello,

Quoted 22 lines · Peter Korsgaard

Fixes CVE-2017-2619:

All versions of Samba prior to 4.6.1, 4.5.7, 4.4.11 are vulnerable to a malicious client using a symlink race to allow access to areas of the server file system not exported under the share definition.

Samba uses the realpath() system call to ensure when a client requests access to a pathname that it is under the exported share path on the server file system.

Clients that have write access to the exported part of the file system via SMB1 unix extensions or NFS to create symlinks can race the server by renaming a realpath() checked path and then creating a symlink. If the client wins the race it can cause the server to access the new symlink target after the exported share path check has been done. This new symlink target can point to anywhere on the server file system.

This is a difficult race to win, but theoretically possible. Note that the proof of concept code supplied wins the race reliably only when the server is slowed down using the strace utility running on the server. Exploitation of this bug has not been seen in the wild.

Quoted 5 lines
---
 package/samba4/samba4.hash | 2 +-
 package/samba4/samba4.mk   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Applied to master, thanks. Obviously for the LTS branch! :)

Thomas

Signature · 3 lines
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Free Electrons
Embedded Linux, Kernel and Android engineering
http://free-electrons.com
#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 samba4: security bump to version 4.5.7

In reply to Peter Korsgaard
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> writes:

Fixes CVE-2017-2619:
All versions of Samba prior to 4.6.1, 4.5.7, 4.4.11 are vulnerable to a malicious client using a symlink race to allow access to areas of the server file system not exported under the share definition.

Samba uses the realpath() system call to ensure when a client requests access to a pathname that it is under the exported share path on the server file system.

Clients that have write access to the exported part of the file system via SMB1 unix extensions or NFS to create symlinks can race the server by renaming a realpath() checked path and then creating a symlink. If the client wins the race it can cause the server to access the new symlink target after the exported share path check has been done. This new symlink target can point to anywhere on the server file system.

Quoted 6 lines

This is a difficult race to win, but theoretically possible. Note that the proof of concept code supplied wins the race reliably only when the server is slowed down using the strace utility running on the server. Exploitation of this bug has not been seen in the wild.

Committed to 2017.02.x, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard