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Add support for secure boot on Keystone2 SoCs

PATCH New Andrew F. Davis 4 participants 30 messages Apr 7, 2017 – Apr 10, 2017

Subsystems (4)
Arm (32-bit) Arm sub-architectures OMAP2+ support Arm/Texas instrument Keystone architecture
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Andrew F. Davis

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover Add support for secure boot on Keystone2 SoCs

Hello all,

This series adds support for secure Keystone2 K2E, K2G, and K2HK devices, much of the work is borrowed from the OMAP style devices as the secure workings are very similar, allowing minimal changes for this support.

Thanks,
Andrew

Changes from v1:
- Add Reviewed-bys
- Add k2g_hs_evm_defconfig
- Rebase on upstream/master

Andrew F. Davis (2):
defconfig: k2hk_hs_evm: Add k2hk_hs_evm_defconfig
defconfig: k2g_hs_evm: Add k2g_hs_evm_defconfig

Madan Srinivas (5):
image: Fixes build warning with CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS
arm: mach-omap2: Add secure image name common to OMAP and keystone
ARM: Keystone2: Build secure images for K2
doc: Updates info on using Keystone2 secure devices
Kconfig: Adds SYS_TEXT_BASE config option for Keystone2

Vitaly Andrianov (3):
arm: mach-keystone: Implements FIT post-processing call for keystone
SoCs
arm: mach-omap2: Enable Kconfig support for K2 HS devices
defconfig: k2e_hs_evm: Add k2e_hs_evm_defconfig

 Kconfig                                            |  2 +-
 arch/arm/mach-keystone/config.mk                   |  6 ++
 arch/arm/mach-keystone/mon.c                       | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mach-omap2/Kconfig                        |  2 +-
 arch/arm/mach-omap2/config_secure.mk               |  6 ++
 configs/k2e_evm_defconfig                          |  1 +
 .../{k2e_evm_defconfig => k2e_hs_evm_defconfig}    | 15 ++---
 configs/k2g_evm_defconfig                          |  1 +
 .../{k2g_evm_defconfig => k2g_hs_evm_defconfig}    | 13 ++--
 configs/k2hk_evm_defconfig                         |  1 +
 .../{k2hk_evm_defconfig => k2hk_hs_evm_defconfig}  | 13 ++--
 configs/k2l_evm_defconfig                          |  1 +
 doc/README.ti-secure                               | 20 ++++++
 include/image.h                                    |  3 +-
 14 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
 copy configs/{k2e_evm_defconfig => k2e_hs_evm_defconfig} (78%)
 copy configs/{k2g_evm_defconfig => k2g_hs_evm_defconfig} (82%)
 copy configs/{k2hk_evm_defconfig => k2hk_hs_evm_defconfig} (80%)
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/10 image: Fixes build warning with CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

The function 'board_fit_image_post_process' is defined only when the config option CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS is enabled. For secure systems that do not use SPL but do use FIT kernel images, only CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS will be defined, which will result in an implicit declaration of function 'board_fit_image_post_process' warning while building u-boot. Fix this warning.

Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
---
 include/image.h | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/image.h +2 -1
index 2372518960..3f26f9bd1f 100644
@@ -1256,7 +1256,8 @@ void android_print_contents(const struct andr_img_hdr *hdr);
  */
 int board_fit_config_name_match(const char *name);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SPL_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS
+#if defined(CONFIG_SPL_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS) || \
+	defined(CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS)
 /**
  * board_fit_image_post_process() - Do any post-process on FIT binary data
  *
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/10 image: Fixes build warning with CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS

Quoted 9 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

The function 'board_fit_image_post_process' is defined only when the config option CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS is enabled. For secure systems that do not use SPL but do use FIT kernel images, only CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS will be defined, which will result in an implicit declaration of function 'board_fit_image_post_process' warning while building u-boot. Fix this warning.

Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Thanks and regards,
Lokesh

#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/10 image: Fixes build warning with CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS

In reply to Andrew F. Davis
Quoted 9 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

The function 'board_fit_image_post_process' is defined only when the config option CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS is enabled. For secure systems that do not use SPL but do use FIT kernel images, only CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS will be defined, which will result in an implicit declaration of function 'board_fit_image_post_process' warning while building u-boot. Fix this warning.

Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
---
 include/image.h | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Reviewed-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/10 image: Fixes build warning with CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS

In reply to Andrew F. Davis
Quoted 9 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

The function 'board_fit_image_post_process' is defined only when the config option CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS is enabled. For secure systems that do not use SPL but do use FIT kernel images, only CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS will be defined, which will result in an implicit declaration of function 'board_fit_image_post_process' warning while building u-boot. Fix this warning.

Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/10 arm: mach-keystone: Implements FIT post-processing call for keystone SoCs

In reply to Andrew F. Davis

From: Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>

This commit implements the board_fit_image_post_process() function for the keystone architecture. This function calls into the secure boot monitor for secure authentication/decryption of the image. All needed work is handled by the boot monitor and, depending on the keystone platform, the security functions may be offloaded to other secure processing elements in the SoC.

The boot monitor acts as the gateway to these secure functions and the boot monitor for secure devices is available as part of the SECDEV package for KS2. For more details refer doc/README.ti-secure

Signed-off-by Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm/mach-keystone/mon.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 73 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mach-keystone/mon.c +73 -0
index 256f6300ed..81009848d0 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <common.h>
 #include <command.h>
 #include <mach/mon.h>
+#include <spl.h>
 asm(".arch_extension sec\n\t");
 
 int mon_install(u32 addr, u32 dpsc, u32 freq)

@@ -61,3 +62,75 @@ int mon_power_off(int core_id)
 		: "cc", "r0", "r1", "memory");
 	return  result;
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TI_SECURE_DEVICE
+#define KS2_HS_SEC_HEADER_LEN	0x60
+#define KS2_HS_SEC_TAG_OFFSET	0x34
+#define KS2_AUTH_CMD		130
+
+/**
+ * k2_hs_bm_auth() - Invokes security functions using a
+ * proprietary TI interface. This binary and source for
+ * this is available in the secure development package or
+ * SECDEV. For details on how to access this please refer
+ * doc/README.ti-secure
+ *
+ * @cmd: Secure monitor command
+ * @arg1: Argument for command
+ *
+ * returns non-zero value on success, zero on error
+ */
+static int k2_hs_bm_auth(int cmd, void *arg1)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	asm volatile (
+		"stmfd  r13!, {r4-r12, lr}\n"
+		"mov r0, %1\n"
+		"mov r1, %2\n"
+		"smc #2\n"
+		"ldmfd r13!, {r4-r12, lr}\n"
+		: "=&r" (result)
+		: "r" (cmd), "r" (arg1)
+		: "cc", "r0", "r1", "memory");
+
+	return  result;
+}
+
+void board_fit_image_post_process(void **p_image, size_t *p_size)
+{
+	int result = 0;
+	void *image = *p_image;
+
+	if (strncmp(image + KS2_HS_SEC_TAG_OFFSET, "KEYS", 4)) {
+		printf("No signature found in image!\n");
+		hang();
+	}
+
+	result = k2_hs_bm_auth(KS2_AUTH_CMD, image);
+	if (result == 0) {
+		printf("Authentication failed!\n");
+		hang();
+	}
+
+	/*
+	* Overwrite the image headers after authentication
+	* and decryption. Update size to reflect removal
+	* of header.
+	*/
+	memcpy(image, image + KS2_HS_SEC_HEADER_LEN, *p_size);
+	*p_size -= KS2_HS_SEC_HEADER_LEN;
+
+	/*
+	 * Output notification of successful authentication to re-assure the
+	 * user that the secure code is being processed as expected. However
+	 * suppress any such log output in case of building for SPL and booting
+	 * via YMODEM. This is done to avoid disturbing the YMODEM serial
+	 * protocol transactions.
+	 */
+	if (!(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD) &&
+	      IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_YMODEM_SUPPORT) &&
+	      spl_boot_device() == BOOT_DEVICE_UART))
+		printf("Authentication passed\n");
+}
+#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#6 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/10 arm: mach-keystone: Implements FIT post-processing call for keystone SoCs

Quoted 9 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>

This commit implements the board_fit_image_post_process() function for the keystone architecture. This function calls into the secure boot monitor for secure authentication/decryption of the image. All needed work is handled by the boot monitor and, depending on the keystone platform, the security functions may be offloaded to other secure processing elements in the SoC.

Quoted 8 lines

The boot monitor acts as the gateway to these secure functions and the boot monitor for secure devices is available as part of the SECDEV package for KS2. For more details refer doc/README.ti-secure

Signed-off-by Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Thanks and regards,
Lokesh

#7 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/10 arm: mach-keystone: Implements FIT post-processing call for keystone SoCs

In reply to Andrew F. Davis
Quoted 13 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>

This commit implements the board_fit_image_post_process() function for the keystone architecture. This function calls into the secure boot monitor for secure authentication/decryption of the image. All needed work is handled by the boot monitor and, depending on the keystone platform, the security functions may be offloaded to other secure processing elements in the SoC.

The boot monitor acts as the gateway to these secure functions and the boot monitor for secure devices is available as part of the SECDEV package for KS2. For more details refer doc/README.ti-secure

Quoted 5 lines
Signed-off-by Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#8 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/10 arm: mach-omap2: Enable Kconfig support for K2 HS devices

In reply to Andrew F. Davis

From: Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>

Like the OMAP54xx, AM43xx, & AM33xx family SoCs, the keystone family of SoCs also have high security enabled models. Allow K2E devices to be built with HS Device Type Support.

Signed-off-by Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm/mach-omap2/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/mach-omap2/Kconfig +1 -1
index 24bc485195..d74b068abc 100644
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 config TI_SECURE_DEVICE
 	bool "HS Device Type Support"
-	depends on OMAP54XX || AM43XX || AM33XX
+	depends on OMAP54XX || AM43XX || AM33XX || ARCH_KEYSTONE
 	help
 	  If a high secure (HS) device type is being used, this config
 	  must be set. This option impacts various aspects of the
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#9 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/10 arm: mach-omap2: Enable Kconfig support for K2 HS devices

Quoted 10 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>

Like the OMAP54xx, AM43xx, & AM33xx family SoCs, the keystone family of SoCs also have high security enabled models. Allow K2E devices to be built with HS Device Type Support.

Signed-off-by Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Thanks and regards,
Lokesh

#10 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/10 arm: mach-omap2: Enable Kconfig support for K2 HS devices

In reply to Andrew F. Davis
Quoted 11 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>

Like the OMAP54xx, AM43xx, & AM33xx family SoCs, the keystone family of SoCs also have high security enabled models. Allow K2E devices to be built with HS Device Type Support.

Signed-off-by Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#11 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/10 arm: mach-omap2: Add secure image name common to OMAP and keystone

In reply to Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

As K2 can directly boot U-Boot, add u-boot_HS_MLO as the secure image name for secure K2 devices, for all boot modes other than SPI flash.

Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm/mach-omap2/config_secure.mk | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mach-omap2/config_secure.mk +6 -0
index 0c843338d7..0346cb93ab 100644
@@ -77,6 +77,12 @@ u-boot-spl_HS_ISSW: $(obj)/u-boot-spl.bin FORCE
 u-boot-spl_HS_SPI_X-LOADER: $(obj)/u-boot-spl.bin FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,mkomapsecimg)
 
+# For supporting single stage boot on keystone, the image is a full u-boot
+# file, not an SPL. This will work for all boot devices, other than SPI
+# flash
+u-boot_HS_MLO: $(obj)/u-boot.bin
+	$(call if_changed,mkomapsecimg)
+
 # For supporting single stage XiP QSPI on AM43xx, the image is a full u-boot
 # file, not an SPL. In this case the mkomapsecimg command looks for a
 # u-boot-HS_* prefix
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#12 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/10 arm: mach-omap2: Add secure image name common to OMAP and keystone

Quoted 8 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

As K2 can directly boot U-Boot, add u-boot_HS_MLO as the secure image name for secure K2 devices, for all boot modes other than SPI flash.

Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Thanks and regards,
Lokesh

#13 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/10 arm: mach-omap2: Add secure image name common to OMAP and keystone

In reply to Andrew F. Davis
Quoted 9 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

As K2 can directly boot U-Boot, add u-boot_HS_MLO as the secure image name for secure K2 devices, for all boot modes other than SPI flash.

Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#14 lore raw

PATCH v2 5/10 ARM: Keystone2: Build secure images for K2

In reply to Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

Adds an additional image type needed for supporting secure keystone devices. The build generates u-boot_HS_MLO which can be used to boot from all media on secure keystone devices.

Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm/mach-keystone/config.mk | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mach-keystone/config.mk +6 -0
index 9ae1e9ac91..db556ea0a8 100644
@@ -5,9 +5,15 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier:     GPL-2.0+
 #
 
+include  $(srctree)/arch/arm/mach-omap2/config_secure.mk
+
 ifndef CONFIG_SPL_BUILD
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_TI_SECURE_DEVICE),y)
+ALL-y += u-boot_HS_MLO
+else
 ALL-y += MLO
 endif
+endif
 
 MKIMAGEFLAGS_u-boot-spl.gph = -A $(ARCH) -T gpimage -C none \
 	-a $(CONFIG_SPL_TEXT_BASE) -e $(CONFIG_SPL_TEXT_BASE) -n SPL
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#15 lore raw

PATCH v2 5/10 ARM: Keystone2: Build secure images for K2

Quoted 5 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

Adds an additional image type needed for supporting secure keystone devices. The build generates u-boot_HS_MLO which can be used to boot from all media on secure keystone devices.

SPI boot has a different image on non-HS devices. Does this cover here?

Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Thanks and regards,
Lokesh

#16 lore raw

PATCH v2 5/10 ARM: Keystone2: Build secure images for K2

In reply to Andrew F. Davis
Quoted 10 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

Adds an additional image type needed for supporting secure keystone devices. The build generates u-boot_HS_MLO which can be used to boot from all media on secure keystone devices.

Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#17 lore raw

PATCH v2 6/10 doc: Updates info on using Keystone2 secure devices

In reply to Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

Add a section describing the secure boot image used on Keystone2 secure devices.

Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
---
 doc/README.ti-secure | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
doc/README.ti-secure +20 -0
index 9b0fbf9732..4b5380c0f3 100644
@@ -133,6 +133,26 @@ Booting of U-Boot SPL
 	u-boot-spl_HS_X-LOADER - boot image for all other flash memories
 		including QSPI and NOR flash
 
+	Invoking the script for Keystone2 Secure Devices
+	=============================================
+
+	create-boot-image.sh \
+		<UNUSED> <INPUT_FILE> <OUTPUT_FILE> <UNUSED>
+
+	<UNUSED> is currently ignored and reserved for future use.
+
+	<INPUT_FILE> is the full path and filename of the public world boot
+	loader binary file (only u-boot.bin is currently supported on
+	Keystone2 devices, u-boot-spl.bin is not currently supported).
+
+	<OUTPUT_FILE> is the full path and filename of the final secure image.
+	The output binary images should be used in place of the standard
+	non-secure binary images (see the platform-specific user's guides
+	and releases notes for how the non-secure images are typically used)
+	u-boot_HS_MLO - signed and encrypted boot image that can be used to
+		boot from all media. Secure boot from SPI NOR flash is not
+		currently supported.
+
 Booting of Primary U-Boot (u-boot.img)
 ======================================
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#19 lore raw

PATCH v2 6/10 doc: Updates info on using Keystone2 secure devices

In reply to Andrew F. Davis
Quoted 9 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

Add a section describing the secure boot image used on Keystone2 secure devices.

Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#20 lore raw

PATCH v2 7/10 Kconfig: Adds SYS_TEXT_BASE config option for Keystone2

In reply to Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

This patch makes SYS_TEXT_BASE a config option for Keystone2 so that it can be used to load u-boot at different addresses on secure and non-secure Keystone2 devices.

Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
---
 Kconfig                    | 2 +-
 configs/k2e_evm_defconfig  | 1 +
 configs/k2g_evm_defconfig  | 1 +
 configs/k2hk_evm_defconfig | 1 +
 configs/k2l_evm_defconfig  | 1 +
 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Kconfig +1 -1
index bbf4784119..1cf990dfce 100644
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ config SYS_EXTRA_OPTIONS
 config SYS_TEXT_BASE
 	depends on ARC || X86 || ARCH_UNIPHIER || ARCH_ZYNQMP || \
 		(M68K && !TARGET_ASTRO_MCF5373L) || MICROBLAZE || MIPS || \
-		ARCH_ZYNQ
+		ARCH_ZYNQ || ARCH_KEYSTONE
 	depends on !EFI_APP
 	hex "Text Base"
 	help
configs/k2e_evm_defconfig +1 -0
index d319705b67..63db1aef7c 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ CONFIG_SPL_SERIAL_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_SPI_FLASH_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_SPI_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_POWER_SUPPORT=y
+CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE=0x0c000000
 CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE="keystone-k2e-evm"
 CONFIG_OF_BOARD_SETUP=y
 CONFIG_SYS_CONSOLE_INFO_QUIET=y
configs/k2g_evm_defconfig +1 -0
index bbdcc2f136..44c9dff747 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ CONFIG_SPL_SERIAL_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_SPI_FLASH_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_SPI_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_POWER_SUPPORT=y
+CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE=0x0c000000
 CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE="keystone-k2g-evm"
 CONFIG_OF_BOARD_SETUP=y
 CONFIG_SYS_CONSOLE_INFO_QUIET=y
configs/k2hk_evm_defconfig +1 -0
index b22086d477..12b80472d9 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ CONFIG_SPL_SERIAL_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_SPI_FLASH_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_SPI_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_POWER_SUPPORT=y
+CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE=0x0c000000
 CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE="keystone-k2hk-evm"
 CONFIG_OF_BOARD_SETUP=y
 CONFIG_SYS_CONSOLE_INFO_QUIET=y
configs/k2l_evm_defconfig +1 -0
index 5a28112857..39a992d797 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ CONFIG_SPL_SERIAL_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_SPI_FLASH_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_SPI_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_SPL_POWER_SUPPORT=y
+CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE=0x0c000000
 CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE="keystone-k2l-evm"
 CONFIG_OF_BOARD_SETUP=y
 CONFIG_SYS_CONSOLE_INFO_QUIET=y
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#21 lore raw

PATCH v2 7/10 Kconfig: Adds SYS_TEXT_BASE config option for Keystone2

Quoted 9 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

This patch makes SYS_TEXT_BASE a config option for Keystone2 so that it can be used to load u-boot at different addresses on secure and non-secure Keystone2 devices.

Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Thanks and regards,
Lokesh

#22 lore raw

PATCH v2 7/10 Kconfig: Adds SYS_TEXT_BASE config option for Keystone2

In reply to Andrew F. Davis
Quoted 10 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>

This patch makes SYS_TEXT_BASE a config option for Keystone2 so that it can be used to load u-boot at different addresses on secure and non-secure Keystone2 devices.

Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Tom Rini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Lokesh Vutla <[email protected]>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#23 lore raw

PATCH v2 8/10 defconfig: k2e_hs_evm: Add k2e_hs_evm_defconfig

In reply to Andrew F. Davis

From: Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>

TI K2E secure devices have to be built with TI_SECURE_DEVICE, FIT, and FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS enabled. Add a dedicated defconfig for this.

Signed-off-by Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>
---
 configs/k2e_hs_evm_defconfig | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 configs/k2e_hs_evm_defconfig
configs/k2e_hs_evm_defconfig new file +51 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d515cedaca
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+CONFIG_ARM=y
+CONFIG_ARCH_KEYSTONE=y
+CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE=0x0c000060
+CONFIG_TARGET_K2E_EVM=y
+CONFIG_TI_SECURE_DEVICE=y
+CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE="keystone-k2e-evm"
+CONFIG_FIT=y
+CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS=y
+CONFIG_OF_BOARD_SETUP=y
+CONFIG_SYS_CONSOLE_INFO_QUIET=y
+CONFIG_VERSION_VARIABLE=y
+CONFIG_HUSH_PARSER=y
+CONFIG_SYS_PROMPT="K2E HS EVM # "
+CONFIG_CMD_BOOTZ=y
+# CONFIG_CMD_IMLS is not set
+CONFIG_CMD_ASKENV=y
+# CONFIG_CMD_FLASH is not set
+CONFIG_CMD_NAND=y
+CONFIG_CMD_PART=y
+CONFIG_CMD_SF=y
+CONFIG_CMD_SPI=y
+CONFIG_CMD_I2C=y
+CONFIG_CMD_USB=y
+# CONFIG_CMD_SETEXPR is not set
+CONFIG_CMD_DHCP=y
+CONFIG_CMD_MII=y
+CONFIG_CMD_PING=y
+CONFIG_CMD_EXT2=y
+CONFIG_CMD_EXT4=y
+CONFIG_CMD_EXT4_WRITE=y
+CONFIG_CMD_FAT=y
+CONFIG_CMD_FS_GENERIC=y
+CONFIG_CMD_UBI=y
+CONFIG_ISO_PARTITION=y
+CONFIG_EFI_PARTITION=y
+CONFIG_OF_CONTROL=y
+CONFIG_NET_RANDOM_ETHADDR=y
+CONFIG_DM=y
+CONFIG_TI_AEMIF=y
+# CONFIG_MMC is not set
+CONFIG_DM_SPI_FLASH=y
+CONFIG_SPI_FLASH=y
+CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_STMICRO=y
+CONFIG_DM_ETH=y
+CONFIG_DM_SERIAL=y
+CONFIG_SYS_NS16550=y
+CONFIG_DM_SPI=y
+CONFIG_USB=y
+CONFIG_USB_XHCI_HCD=y
+CONFIG_USB_XHCI_DWC3=y
+CONFIG_USB_STORAGE=y
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#24 lore raw

PATCH v2 8/10 defconfig: k2e_hs_evm: Add k2e_hs_evm_defconfig

Quoted 9 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>

TI K2E secure devices have to be built with TI_SECURE_DEVICE, FIT, and FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS enabled. Add a dedicated defconfig for this.

Signed-off-by Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>

Can you update Maintainers file or else buildman will complain.

Thanks and regards,
Lokesh

#25 lore raw

PATCH v2 8/10 defconfig: k2e_hs_evm: Add k2e_hs_evm_defconfig

In reply to Andrew F. Davis
Quoted 9 lines · Andrew F. Davis

From: Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>

TI K2E secure devices have to be built with TI_SECURE_DEVICE, FIT, and FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS enabled. Add a dedicated defconfig for this.

Signed-off-by Vitaly Andrianov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Madan Srinivas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#26 lore raw

PATCH v2 9/10 defconfig: k2hk_hs_evm: Add k2hk_hs_evm_defconfig

In reply to Andrew F. Davis

TI K2HK secure devices have to be built with TI_SECURE_DEVICE, FIT, and FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS enabled. Add a dedicated defconfig for this.

Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
---
 configs/k2hk_hs_evm_defconfig | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 configs/k2hk_hs_evm_defconfig
configs/k2hk_hs_evm_defconfig new file +51 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9fe91ea19c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+CONFIG_ARM=y
+CONFIG_ARCH_KEYSTONE=y
+CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE=0x0c000060
+CONFIG_TARGET_K2HK_EVM=y
+CONFIG_TI_SECURE_DEVICE=y
+CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE="keystone-k2hk-evm"
+CONFIG_FIT=y
+CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS=y
+CONFIG_OF_BOARD_SETUP=y
+CONFIG_SYS_CONSOLE_INFO_QUIET=y
+CONFIG_VERSION_VARIABLE=y
+CONFIG_HUSH_PARSER=y
+CONFIG_SYS_PROMPT="K2HK EVM # "
+CONFIG_CMD_BOOTZ=y
+# CONFIG_CMD_IMLS is not set
+CONFIG_CMD_ASKENV=y
+# CONFIG_CMD_FLASH is not set
+CONFIG_CMD_NAND=y
+CONFIG_CMD_PART=y
+CONFIG_CMD_SF=y
+CONFIG_CMD_SPI=y
+CONFIG_CMD_I2C=y
+CONFIG_CMD_USB=y
+# CONFIG_CMD_SETEXPR is not set
+CONFIG_CMD_DHCP=y
+CONFIG_CMD_MII=y
+CONFIG_CMD_PING=y
+CONFIG_CMD_EXT2=y
+CONFIG_CMD_EXT4=y
+CONFIG_CMD_EXT4_WRITE=y
+CONFIG_CMD_FAT=y
+CONFIG_CMD_FS_GENERIC=y
+CONFIG_CMD_UBI=y
+CONFIG_ISO_PARTITION=y
+CONFIG_EFI_PARTITION=y
+CONFIG_OF_CONTROL=y
+CONFIG_NET_RANDOM_ETHADDR=y
+CONFIG_DM=y
+CONFIG_TI_AEMIF=y
+# CONFIG_MMC is not set
+CONFIG_DM_SPI_FLASH=y
+CONFIG_SPI_FLASH=y
+CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_STMICRO=y
+CONFIG_DM_ETH=y
+CONFIG_DM_SERIAL=y
+CONFIG_SYS_NS16550=y
+CONFIG_DM_SPI=y
+CONFIG_USB=y
+CONFIG_USB_XHCI_HCD=y
+CONFIG_USB_XHCI_DWC3=y
+CONFIG_USB_STORAGE=y
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#27 lore raw

PATCH v2 9/10 defconfig: k2hk_hs_evm: Add k2hk_hs_evm_defconfig

Quoted 4 lines · Andrew F. Davis

TI K2HK secure devices have to be built with TI_SECURE_DEVICE, FIT, and FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS enabled. Add a dedicated defconfig for this.

Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#28 lore raw

PATCH v2 10/10 defconfig: k2g_hs_evm: Add k2g_hs_evm_defconfig

In reply to Andrew F. Davis

TI K2G secure devices have to be built with TI_SECURE_DEVICE, FIT, and FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS enabled. Add a dedicated defconfig for this.

Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
---
 configs/k2g_hs_evm_defconfig | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 configs/k2g_hs_evm_defconfig
configs/k2g_hs_evm_defconfig new file +55 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c21867408
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+CONFIG_ARM=y
+CONFIG_ARCH_KEYSTONE=y
+CONFIG_TARGET_K2G_EVM=y
+CONFIG_TI_SECURE_DEVICE=y
+CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE=0x0c000060
+CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE="keystone-k2g-evm"
+CONFIG_FIT=y
+CONFIG_OF_BOARD_SETUP=y
+CONFIG_FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS=y
+CONFIG_SYS_CONSOLE_INFO_QUIET=y
+CONFIG_VERSION_VARIABLE=y
+CONFIG_HUSH_PARSER=y
+CONFIG_CMD_BOOTZ=y
+# CONFIG_CMD_IMLS is not set
+CONFIG_CMD_ASKENV=y
+# CONFIG_CMD_FLASH is not set
+CONFIG_CMD_MMC=y
+CONFIG_CMD_PART=y
+CONFIG_CMD_SF=y
+CONFIG_CMD_SPI=y
+CONFIG_CMD_I2C=y
+CONFIG_CMD_USB=y
+CONFIG_CMD_REMOTEPROC=y
+# CONFIG_CMD_SETEXPR is not set
+CONFIG_CMD_DHCP=y
+CONFIG_CMD_MII=y
+CONFIG_CMD_PING=y
+CONFIG_CMD_EXT2=y
+CONFIG_CMD_EXT4=y
+CONFIG_CMD_EXT4_WRITE=y
+CONFIG_CMD_FAT=y
+CONFIG_CMD_FS_GENERIC=y
+CONFIG_CMD_UBI=y
+CONFIG_ISO_PARTITION=y
+CONFIG_EFI_PARTITION=y
+CONFIG_OF_CONTROL=y
+CONFIG_DM=y
+# CONFIG_BLK is not set
+CONFIG_DM_MMC=y
+# CONFIG_DM_MMC_OPS is not set
+CONFIG_MMC_OMAP_HS=y
+CONFIG_DM_SPI_FLASH=y
+CONFIG_SPI_FLASH=y
+CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_BAR=y
+CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_SPANSION=y
+CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_STMICRO=y
+CONFIG_DM_ETH=y
+CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TI_POWER=y
+CONFIG_DM_SERIAL=y
+CONFIG_SYS_NS16550=y
+CONFIG_DM_SPI=y
+CONFIG_USB=y
+CONFIG_USB_XHCI_HCD=y
+CONFIG_USB_XHCI_DWC3=y
+CONFIG_USB_STORAGE=y
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#29 lore raw

PATCH v2 10/10 defconfig: k2g_hs_evm: Add k2g_hs_evm_defconfig

Quoted 4 lines · Andrew F. Davis

TI K2G secure devices have to be built with TI_SECURE_DEVICE, FIT, and FIT_IMAGE_POST_PROCESS enabled. Add a dedicated defconfig for this.

Signed-off-by Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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