login related stuff
PATCH 1/1 login related stuff
Give sulogin some access it needs and dontaudit a nat_admin capability check related to systemd for local_login_t.
Allow policykit to stat tmpfs and cgroup filesystems, read urandom, and send dbus messages to all users.
Allow system_dbusd_t to access dri and input_dev devices, this is triggered by gdm3.
Allow chkpwd_t to get selinux enforcing mode.
Allow gpg to read crypto sysctls, and give gpg_agent_t access it needs to be run as part of an X login session (as the parent of other user processes).
policy/modules/system/locallogin.te +4 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ role system_r types sulogin_t; # allow local_login_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid sys_nice sys_resource sys_tty_config }; +dontaudit local_login_t self:capability net_admin; allow local_login_t self:process { setexec setrlimit setsched }; allow local_login_t self:fd use; allow local_login_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
@@ -237,6 +238,9 @@ fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(sulogin_t) files_read_etc_files(sulogin_t) auth_read_shadow(sulogin_t) +auth_login_pgm_domain(sulogin_t) +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(sulogin_t) +selinux_set_generic_booleans(sulogin_t) init_getpgid_script(sulogin_t)
policy/modules/contrib/policykit.te +4 -0
@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ domtrans_pattern(policykit_t, policykit_ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(policykit_t) kernel_read_system_state(policykit_t) +fs_getattr_tmpfs(policykit_t) +fs_getattr_cgroup(policykit_t) +dev_read_urand(policykit_t) dev_read_urand(policykit_t)
@@ -101,6 +104,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_t) userdom_getattr_all_users(policykit_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_t) +userdom_dbus_send_all_users(policykit_t) optional_policy(` dbus_system_domain(policykit_t, policykit_exec_t)
policy/modules/contrib/dbus.te +4 -0
@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(system_dbusd_t) dev_read_urand(system_dbusd_t) dev_read_sysfs(system_dbusd_t) +# gdm3 causes system_dbusd_t to want this access +dev_rw_dri(system_dbusd_t) +dev_rw_input_dev(system_dbusd_t) + domain_use_interactive_fds(system_dbusd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(system_dbusd_t)
policy/modules/system/authlogin.te +2 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ files_list_etc(chkpwd_t) kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chkpwd_t) # is_selinux_enabled kernel_read_system_state(chkpwd_t) +selinux_get_enforce_mode(chkpwd_t) +selinux_getattr_fs(chkpwd_t) domain_dontaudit_use_interactive_fds(chkpwd_t)
policy/modules/contrib/gpg.te +6 -0
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ gpg_stream_connect_agent(gpg_t) domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_exec_t, gpg_agent_t) domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_helper_exec_t, gpg_helper_t) +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(gpg_t) kernel_read_sysctl(gpg_t) # read /proc/cpuinfo kernel_read_system_state(gpg_t)
@@ -214,6 +215,11 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, g manage_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) +xdm_sigchld(gpg_agent_t) +dbus_system_bus_client(gpg_agent_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(gpg_agent_t) +xserver_read_user_xauth(gpg_agent_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t)
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +18 -0
@@ -1561,3 +1561,21 @@ interface(`xserver_unconfined',` typeattribute $1 x_domain; typeattribute $1 xserver_unconfined_type; ') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Allow domain to send sigchld to xdm_t +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`xdm_sigchld',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_t; + ') + + allow $1 xdm_t:process sigchld; +')
PATCH 1/1 login related stuff
Hello.
It is not clear to me the reason why a daemon such as the system dbus instance needs to write the DRI graphical devices (dev_rw_dri())...
Is such permission really critical for running gdm?
And, by the way, I am aware of the fact that gnome-session also requires such permission, although it does not fail to run without it.
The point is that, on one hand gnome-session runs as user_u and therefore it might not be advisable to let user_u write the DRI device, but on the other hand I suppose gnome-session checks for accelerated graphical capabilities and therefore a failure to write the DRI device might imply that the accelerated graphical capabilities are always disabled!
What is your experience, if any, with the latter?
Regards,
Guido
Quoted 146 lines · Russell Coker via refpolicy
Give sulogin some access it needs and dontaudit a
nat_admincapability check
related to systemd forlocal_login_t.Allow policykit to stat tmpfs and cgroup filesystems, read urandom, and send dbus messages to all users.
Allow
system_dbusd_tto access dri andinput_devdevices, this is triggered
by gdm3.Allow
chkpwd_tto get selinux enforcing mode.Allow gpg to read crypto sysctls, and give
gpg_agent_taccess it needs to be
run as part of an X login session (as the parent of other user processes).Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
===================================================================policy/modules/system/locallogin.te +0
-0@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ role system_r types sulogin_t; #allow
local_login_tself:capability { chowndac_overridefowner fsetid kill setgid setuidsys_nicesys_resourcesys_tty_config}; +dontauditlocal_login_tself:capabilitynet_admin;
allowlocal_login_tself:process { setexec setrlimit setsched }; allowlocal_login_tself:fd use;
allowlocal_login_tself:fifo_filerw_fifo_file_perms;policy/modules/system/locallogin.te +3
-0@@ -237,6 +238,9 @@ fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(sulogin_t) files_read_etc_files(sulogin_t) auth_read_shadow(sulogin_t) +auth_login_pgm_domain(sulogin_t) +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(sulogin_t) +selinux_set_generic_booleans(sulogin_t) init_getpgid_script(sulogin_t)Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/contrib/policykit.te
===================================================================policy/modules/contrib/policykit.te +4
-0@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ domtrans_pattern(policykit_t, policykit_ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(policykit_t) kernel_read_system_state(policykit_t) +fs_getattr_tmpfs(policykit_t) +fs_getattr_cgroup(policykit_t) +dev_read_urand(policykit_t) dev_read_urand(policykit_t)@@ -101,6 +104,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_t) userdom_getattr_all_users(policykit_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_t) +userdom_dbus_send_all_users(policykit_t)optional_policy(`
dbus_system_domain(policykit_t, policykit_exec_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.te
===================================================================policy/modules/contrib/dbus.te +4
-0@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(system_dbusd_t) dev_read_urand(system_dbusd_t) dev_read_sysfs(system_dbusd_t) +# gdm3 causes system_dbusd_t to want this access +dev_rw_dri(system_dbusd_t) +dev_rw_input_dev(system_dbusd_t) + domain_use_interactive_fds(system_dbusd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(system_dbusd_t)Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
===================================================================policy/modules/system/authlogin.te +2
-0@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ files_list_etc(chkpwd_t) kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chkpwd_t) # is_selinux_enabled kernel_read_system_state(chkpwd_t) +selinux_get_enforce_mode(chkpwd_t) +selinux_getattr_fs(chkpwd_t) domain_dontaudit_use_interactive_fds(chkpwd_t)Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/contrib/gpg.te
===================================================================policy/modules/contrib/gpg.te +6
-0@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ gpg_stream_connect_agent(gpg_t) domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_exec_t, gpg_agent_t) domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_helper_exec_t, gpg_helper_t) +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(gpg_t) kernel_read_sysctl(gpg_t) # read /proc/cpuinfo kernel_read_system_state(gpg_t)@@ -214,6 +215,11 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, g manage_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) +xdm_sigchld(gpg_agent_t) +dbus_system_bus_client(gpg_agent_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(gpg_agent_t) +xserver_read_user_xauth(gpg_agent_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t,
gpg_agent_tmp_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
===================================================================policy/modules/services/xserver.if +18
-0@@ -1561,3 +1561,21 @@ interface(`xserver_unconfined',` typeattribute $1 x_domain; typeattribute $1 xserver_unconfined_type; ') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Allow domain to send sigchld to xdm_t +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`xdm_sigchld',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_t; + ') + + allow $1 xdm_t:process sigchld; +')_______________________________________________
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PATCH 1/1 login related stuff
Quoted 5 lines · Guido Trentalancia via refpolicy
Hello.
It is not clear to me the reason why a daemon such as the system dbus instance needs to write the DRI graphical devices (
dev_rw_dri())...Is such permission really critical for running gdm?
I suspect this is systemd specific (logind to be precise) but nowaday's all kinds of file descriptors seem to get passed through dbus
Quoted 163 lines
And, by the way, I am aware of the fact that gnome-session also requires such permission, although it does not fail to run without it.
The point is that, on one hand gnome-session runs as
user_uand therefore it might not be advisable to letuser_uwrite the DRI device, but on the other hand I suppose gnome-session checks for accelerated graphical capabilities and therefore a failure to write the DRI device might imply that the accelerated graphical capabilities are always disabled!What is your experience, if any, with the latter?
Regards,
Guido
Quoted 142 lines · Russell Coker via refpolicy
Give sulogin some access it needs and dontaudit a
nat_admincapability check
related to systemd forlocal_login_t.Allow policykit to stat tmpfs and cgroup filesystems, read urandom, and send dbus messages to all users.
Allow
system_dbusd_tto access dri andinput_devdevices, this is triggered
by gdm3.Allow
chkpwd_tto get selinux enforcing mode.Allow gpg to read crypto sysctls, and give
gpg_agent_taccess it needs to be
run as part of an X login session (as the parent of other user processes).Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
===================================================================policy/modules/system/locallogin.te +0
-0@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ role system_r types sulogin_t; #allow
local_login_tself:capability { chowndac_overridefowner fsetid kill setgid setuidsys_nicesys_resourcesys_tty_config}; +dontauditlocal_login_tself:capabilitynet_admin;
allowlocal_login_tself:process { setexec setrlimit setsched }; allowlocal_login_tself:fd use;
allowlocal_login_tself:fifo_filerw_fifo_file_perms;policy/modules/system/locallogin.te +3
-0@@ -237,6 +238,9 @@ fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(sulogin_t) files_read_etc_files(sulogin_t) auth_read_shadow(sulogin_t) +auth_login_pgm_domain(sulogin_t) +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(sulogin_t) +selinux_set_generic_booleans(sulogin_t) init_getpgid_script(sulogin_t)Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/contrib/policykit.te
===================================================================policy/modules/contrib/policykit.te +4
-0@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ domtrans_pattern(policykit_t, policykit_ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(policykit_t) kernel_read_system_state(policykit_t) +fs_getattr_tmpfs(policykit_t) +fs_getattr_cgroup(policykit_t) +dev_read_urand(policykit_t) dev_read_urand(policykit_t)@@ -101,6 +104,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_t) userdom_getattr_all_users(policykit_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_t) +userdom_dbus_send_all_users(policykit_t)optional_policy(`
dbus_system_domain(policykit_t, policykit_exec_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.te
===================================================================policy/modules/contrib/dbus.te +4
-0@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(system_dbusd_t) dev_read_urand(system_dbusd_t) dev_read_sysfs(system_dbusd_t) +# gdm3 causes system_dbusd_t to want this access +dev_rw_dri(system_dbusd_t) +dev_rw_input_dev(system_dbusd_t) + domain_use_interactive_fds(system_dbusd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(system_dbusd_t)Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
===================================================================policy/modules/system/authlogin.te +2
-0@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ files_list_etc(chkpwd_t) kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chkpwd_t) # is_selinux_enabled kernel_read_system_state(chkpwd_t) +selinux_get_enforce_mode(chkpwd_t) +selinux_getattr_fs(chkpwd_t) domain_dontaudit_use_interactive_fds(chkpwd_t)Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/contrib/gpg.te
===================================================================policy/modules/contrib/gpg.te +6
-0@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ gpg_stream_connect_agent(gpg_t) domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_exec_t, gpg_agent_t) domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_helper_exec_t, gpg_helper_t) +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(gpg_t) kernel_read_sysctl(gpg_t) # read /proc/cpuinfo kernel_read_system_state(gpg_t)@@ -214,6 +215,11 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, g manage_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) +xdm_sigchld(gpg_agent_t) +dbus_system_bus_client(gpg_agent_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(gpg_agent_t) +xserver_read_user_xauth(gpg_agent_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t,
gpg_agent_tmp_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
===================================================================policy/modules/services/xserver.if +18
-0@@ -1561,3 +1561,21 @@ interface(`xserver_unconfined',` typeattribute $1 x_domain; typeattribute $1 xserver_unconfined_type; ') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Allow domain to send sigchld to xdm_t +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`xdm_sigchld',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_t; + ') + + allow $1 xdm_t:process sigchld; +')Quoted 4 lines
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Signature · 10 lines
Key fingerprint = 5F4D 3CDB D3F8 3652 FBD8 02D5 3B6C 5F1D 2C7B 6B02 https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3B6C5F1D2C7B6B02 Dominick Grift -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 659 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/attachments/20170417/17ee4955/attachment.bin
PATCH 1/1 login related stuff
Hello.
If it only applies to systemd setups, then please use the appropriate ifdef statement to avoid spreading the permission to every setup.
Thanks,
Guido
Il 17 aprile 2017 15:17:35 CEST, Dominick Grift via refpolicy <[email protected]> ha scritto:
Quoted 186 lines
Quoted 3 lines · Guido Trentalancia via refpolicy
Hello.
It is not clear to me the reason why a daemon such as the system dbus
instance needs to write the DRI graphical devices (
dev_rw_dri())...Quoted 2 lines
Is such permission really critical for running gdm?
I suspect this is systemd specific (logind to be precise) but nowaday's all kinds of file descriptors seem to get passed through dbus
Quoted 2 lines
And, by the way, I am aware of the fact that gnome-session also
requires such permission, although it does not fail to run without it.
Quoted 2 lines
The point is that, on one hand gnome-session runs as
user_uandtherefore it might not be advisable to let
user_uwrite the DRI device, but on the other hand I suppose gnome-session checks for accelerated graphical capabilities and therefore a failure to write the DRI device might imply that the accelerated graphical capabilities are always disabled!Quoted 8 lines
What is your experience, if any, with the latter?
Regards,
Guido
On the 17th April 2017 14:34:34 CEST, Russell Coker via refpolicy
Quoted 1 line · <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line
Give sulogin some access it needs and dontaudit a
nat_admincapability
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
check
related to systemd forlocal_login_t.Allow policykit to stat tmpfs and cgroup filesystems, read urandom,
and
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
send dbus messages to all users.
Allow
system_dbusd_tto access dri andinput_devdevices, this is triggered
by gdm3.Allow
chkpwd_tto get selinux enforcing mode.Allow gpg to read crypto sysctls, and give
gpg_agent_taccess itneeds
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
to be
run as part of an X login session (as the parent of other user processes).Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te
===================================================================policy/modules/system/locallogin.te +0
-0@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ role system_r types sulogin_t; #allow
local_login_tself:capability { chowndac_overridefownerfsetid
Quoted 125 lines
Quoted 116 lines
kill setgid setuid
sys_nicesys_resourcesys_tty_config}; +dontauditlocal_login_tself:capabilitynet_admin; allowlocal_login_tself:process { setexec setrlimit setsched }; allowlocal_login_tself:fd use;
allowlocal_login_tself:fifo_filerw_fifo_file_perms;policy/modules/system/locallogin.te +3
-0@@ -237,6 +238,9 @@ fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(sulogin_t) files_read_etc_files(sulogin_t) auth_read_shadow(sulogin_t) +auth_login_pgm_domain(sulogin_t) +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(sulogin_t) +selinux_set_generic_booleans(sulogin_t) init_getpgid_script(sulogin_t)Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/contrib/policykit.te
===================================================================policy/modules/contrib/policykit.te +4
-0@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ domtrans_pattern(policykit_t, policykit_ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(policykit_t) kernel_read_system_state(policykit_t) +fs_getattr_tmpfs(policykit_t) +fs_getattr_cgroup(policykit_t) +dev_read_urand(policykit_t) dev_read_urand(policykit_t)@@ -101,6 +104,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_t) userdom_getattr_all_users(policykit_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_t) +userdom_dbus_send_all_users(policykit_t)optional_policy(`
dbus_system_domain(policykit_t, policykit_exec_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.te
===================================================================policy/modules/contrib/dbus.te +4
-0@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(system_dbusd_t) dev_read_urand(system_dbusd_t) dev_read_sysfs(system_dbusd_t) +# gdm3 causes system_dbusd_t to want this access +dev_rw_dri(system_dbusd_t) +dev_rw_input_dev(system_dbusd_t) + domain_use_interactive_fds(system_dbusd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(system_dbusd_t)Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te
===================================================================policy/modules/system/authlogin.te +2
-0@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ files_list_etc(chkpwd_t) kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chkpwd_t) # is_selinux_enabled kernel_read_system_state(chkpwd_t) +selinux_get_enforce_mode(chkpwd_t) +selinux_getattr_fs(chkpwd_t) domain_dontaudit_use_interactive_fds(chkpwd_t)Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/contrib/gpg.te
===================================================================policy/modules/contrib/gpg.te +6
-0@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ gpg_stream_connect_agent(gpg_t) domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_exec_t, gpg_agent_t) domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_helper_exec_t, gpg_helper_t) +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(gpg_t) kernel_read_sysctl(gpg_t) # read /proc/cpuinfo kernel_read_system_state(gpg_t)@@ -214,6 +215,11 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, g manage_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) +xdm_sigchld(gpg_agent_t) +dbus_system_bus_client(gpg_agent_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(gpg_agent_t) +xserver_read_user_xauth(gpg_agent_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t,
gpg_agent_tmp_t)
Index: refpolicy-2.20170417/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
===================================================================policy/modules/services/xserver.if +18
-0@@ -1561,3 +1561,21 @@ interface(`xserver_unconfined',` typeattribute $1 x_domain; typeattribute $1 xserver_unconfined_type; ') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Allow domain to send sigchld to xdm_t +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`xdm_sigchld',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_t; + ') + + allow $1 xdm_t:process sigchld; +')Quoted 4 lines
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PATCH 1/1 login related stuff
In reply to Guido TrentalanciaQuoted 2 lines · Guido Trentalancia via refpolicy
It is not clear to me the reason why a daemon such as the system dbus instance needs to write the DRI graphical devices (
dev_rw_dri())...
It always seemed strange to me too.
Quoted 1 line
Is such permission really critical for running gdm?
My recollection is that the last time I tested it aborted when it didn't have such access.
Quoted 10 lines
And, by the way, I am aware of the fact that gnome-session also requires such permission, although it does not fail to run without it.
The point is that, on one hand gnome-session runs as
user_uand therefore it might not be advisable to letuser_uwrite the DRI device, but on the other hand I suppose gnome-session checks for accelerated graphical capabilities and therefore a failure to write the DRI device might imply that the accelerated graphical capabilities are always disabled!What is your experience, if any, with the latter?
I don't have a lot of experience with it, I prefer not to use GNOME. Sddm is the dm I recommend for use in Debian, but I put in a minimal effort to get others working too.
If the general feeling is against that part of the patch then I'll just drop it and let someone else who uses gdm take it up at some future time.
Signature · 2 lines
My Main Blog http://etbe.coker.com.au/ My Documents Blog http://doc.coker.com.au/
PATCH 1/1 login related stuff
Hi.
Thanks for getting back.
Sounds like a bug triggered by systems that use systemd.
As a first precaution, please enclose it within the appropriate ifdef statement (systemd) in the policy.
Apart from that, it shouldn't happen, but without testing it more carefully, I don't know what else to say...
How about the other issue that I mentioned to you? Have you ever experienced the same permission request from gnome-session? I suspect denying it, might prevent the use of accelerated graphical capabilities for every session. But, as already explained, we are limited by gnome-session running in the user domain (already discussed not long time ago).
Regards,
Guido
Quoted 36 lines · Russell Coker
Quoted 2 lines · Guido Trentalancia via refpolicy
It is not clear to me the reason why a daemon such as the system dbus instance needs to write the DRI graphical devices (
dev_rw_dri())...It always seemed strange to me too.
Quoted 1 line
Is such permission really critical for running gdm?
My recollection is that the last time I tested it aborted when it didn't have
such access.Quoted 1 line
And, by the way, I am aware of the fact that gnome-session also
requires
Quoted 3 lines
such permission, although it does not fail to run without it.
The point is that, on one hand gnome-session runs as
user_uandtherefore
Quoted 1 line
it might not be advisable to let
user_uwrite the DRI device, but onthe
Quoted 2 lines
other hand I suppose gnome-session checks for accelerated graphical capabilities and therefore a failure to write the DRI device might
imply
Quoted 3 lines
that the accelerated graphical capabilities are always disabled!
What is your experience, if any, with the latter?
I don't have a lot of experience with it, I prefer not to use GNOME. Sddm is
the dm I recommend for use in Debian, but I put in a minimal effort to get
others working too.If the general feeling is against that part of the patch then I'll just drop
it and let someone else who uses gdm take it up at some future time.