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4.9.27-stable review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 3 participants 12 messages May 6, 2017 – May 8, 2017

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Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 4.9.27-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.27 release. There are 9 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Mon May 8 20:38:28 UTC 2017. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.27-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.9.27-rc1

Adrian Salido <[email protected]>
dm ioctl: prevent stack leak in dm ioctl call

Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
cpu/hotplug: Serialize callback invocations proper

Yan, Zheng <[email protected]>
ceph: try getting buffer capability for readahead/fadvise

Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>
8250_pci: Fix potential use-after-free in error path

Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
hwmon: (it87) Avoid registering the same chip on both SIO addresses

Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
scsi: storvsc: Workaround for virtual DVD SCSI version

Maciej S. Szmigiero <[email protected]>
tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero

Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Handle mismatched open calls

Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                           |  4 +--
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c   | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 drivers/hwmon/it87.c               | 24 ++++++++++++----
 drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c              |  2 +-
 drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c         | 27 +++++++++++-------
 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c | 12 ++++----
 fs/ceph/addr.c                     | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 fs/ceph/caps.c                     | 21 ++++++++++++++
 fs/ceph/file.c                     |  3 +-
 fs/ceph/super.h                    |  2 ++
 fs/cifs/cifsglob.h                 | 11 ++++++++
 fs/cifs/cifssmb.c                  |  4 +++
 fs/cifs/connect.c                  | 13 +++++++--
 fs/cifs/smb2misc.c                 | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c                  |  4 +++
 fs/cifs/smb2proto.h                |  7 +++++
 fs/cifs/smb2transport.c            | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 fs/cifs/transport.c                |  2 ++
 fs/timerfd.c                       | 17 +++++++++--
 kernel/cpu.c                       | 17 +++++------
 20 files changed, 307 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/9 timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

commit 1e38da300e1e395a15048b0af1e5305bd91402f6 upstream.

The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and lead to list corruptions or use after free.

Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.

The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can race vs. the actual list operation.

---
 fs/timerfd.c |   17 ++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/timerfd.c +14 -3
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct timerfd_ctx {
 	short unsigned settime_flags;	/* to show in fdinfo */
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
 	struct list_head clist;
+	spinlock_t cancel_lock;
 	bool might_cancel;
 };
 
@@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ void timerfd_clock_was_set(void)
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
-static void timerfd_remove_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
+static void __timerfd_remove_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx->might_cancel) {
 		ctx->might_cancel = false;
@@ -122,6 +123,13 @@ static void timerfd_remove_cancel(struct
 	}
 }
 
+static void timerfd_remove_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	spin_lock(&ctx->cancel_lock);
+	__timerfd_remove_cancel(ctx);
+	spin_unlock(&ctx->cancel_lock);
+}
+
 static bool timerfd_canceled(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	if (!ctx->might_cancel || ctx->moffs.tv64 != KTIME_MAX)
@@ -132,6 +140,7 @@ static bool timerfd_canceled(struct time
 
 static void timerfd_setup_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx, int flags)
 {
+	spin_lock(&ctx->cancel_lock);
 	if ((ctx->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME ||
 	     ctx->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM) &&
 	    (flags & TFD_TIMER_ABSTIME) && (flags & TFD_TIMER_CANCEL_ON_SET)) {
@@ -141,9 +150,10 @@ static void timerfd_setup_cancel(struct
 			list_add_rcu(&ctx->clist, &cancel_list);
 			spin_unlock(&cancel_lock);
 		}
-	} else if (ctx->might_cancel) {
-		timerfd_remove_cancel(ctx);
+	} else {
+		__timerfd_remove_cancel(ctx);
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&ctx->cancel_lock);
 }
 
 static ktime_t timerfd_get_remaining(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
@@ -400,6 +410,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(timerfd_create, int, clo
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	init_waitqueue_head(&ctx->wqh);
+	spin_lock_init(&ctx->cancel_lock);
 	ctx->clockid = clockid;
 
 	if (isalarm(ctx))
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/9 Handle mismatched open calls

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>

commit 38bd49064a1ecb67baad33598e3d824448ab11ec upstream.

A signal can interrupt a SendReceive call which result in incoming responses to the call being ignored. This is a problem for calls such as open which results in the successful response being ignored. This results in an open file resource on the server.

The patch looks into responses which were cancelled after being sent and in case of successful open closes the open fids.

For this patch, the check is only done in SendReceive2()

RH-bz: 1403319

---
 fs/cifs/cifsglob.h      |   11 +++++++++
 fs/cifs/cifssmb.c       |    4 +++
 fs/cifs/connect.c       |   13 +++++++++-
 fs/cifs/smb2misc.c      |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c       |    4 +++
 fs/cifs/smb2proto.h     |    7 +++++
 fs/cifs/smb2transport.c |   58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 fs/cifs/transport.c     |    2 +
 8 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/cifsglob.h +11 -0
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations {
 	/* verify the message */
 	int (*check_message)(char *, unsigned int, struct TCP_Server_Info *);
 	bool (*is_oplock_break)(char *, struct TCP_Server_Info *);
+	int (*handle_cancelled_mid)(char *, struct TCP_Server_Info *);
 	void (*downgrade_oplock)(struct TCP_Server_Info *,
 					struct cifsInodeInfo *, bool);
 	/* process transaction2 response */
@@ -1314,12 +1315,19 @@ struct mid_q_entry {
 	void *callback_data;	  /* general purpose pointer for callback */
 	void *resp_buf;		/* pointer to received SMB header */
 	int mid_state;	/* wish this were enum but can not pass to wait_event */
+	unsigned int mid_flags;
 	__le16 command;		/* smb command code */
 	bool large_buf:1;	/* if valid response, is pointer to large buf */
 	bool multiRsp:1;	/* multiple trans2 responses for one request  */
 	bool multiEnd:1;	/* both received */
 };
 
+struct close_cancelled_open {
+	struct cifs_fid         fid;
+	struct cifs_tcon        *tcon;
+	struct work_struct      work;
+};
+
 /*	Make code in transport.c a little cleaner by moving
 	update of optional stats into function below */
 #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_STATS2
@@ -1451,6 +1459,9 @@ static inline void free_dfs_info_array(s
 #define   MID_RESPONSE_MALFORMED 0x10
 #define   MID_SHUTDOWN		 0x20
 
+/* Flags */
+#define   MID_WAIT_CANCELLED	 1 /* Cancelled while waiting for response */
+
 /* Types of response buffer returned from SendReceive2 */
 #define   CIFS_NO_BUFFER        0    /* Response buffer not returned */
 #define   CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER     1
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c +4 -0
@@ -1423,6 +1423,8 @@ cifs_readv_discard(struct TCP_Server_Inf
 
 	length = discard_remaining_data(server);
 	dequeue_mid(mid, rdata->result);
+	mid->resp_buf = server->smallbuf;
+	server->smallbuf = NULL;
 	return length;
 }
 
@@ -1534,6 +1536,8 @@ cifs_readv_receive(struct TCP_Server_Inf
 		return cifs_readv_discard(server, mid);
 
 	dequeue_mid(mid, false);
+	mid->resp_buf = server->smallbuf;
+	server->smallbuf = NULL;
 	return length;
 }
 
fs/cifs/connect.c +11 -2
@@ -882,10 +882,19 @@ cifs_demultiplex_thread(void *p)
 
 		server->lstrp = jiffies;
 		if (mid_entry != NULL) {
+			if ((mid_entry->mid_flags & MID_WAIT_CANCELLED) &&
+			     mid_entry->mid_state == MID_RESPONSE_RECEIVED &&
+					server->ops->handle_cancelled_mid)
+				server->ops->handle_cancelled_mid(
+							mid_entry->resp_buf,
+							server);
+
 			if (!mid_entry->multiRsp || mid_entry->multiEnd)
 				mid_entry->callback(mid_entry);
-		} else if (!server->ops->is_oplock_break ||
-			   !server->ops->is_oplock_break(buf, server)) {
+		} else if (server->ops->is_oplock_break &&
+			   server->ops->is_oplock_break(buf, server)) {
+			cifs_dbg(FYI, "Received oplock break\n");
+		} else {
 			cifs_dbg(VFS, "No task to wake, unknown frame received! NumMids %d\n",
 				 atomic_read(&midCount));
 			cifs_dump_mem("Received Data is: ", buf,
fs/cifs/smb2misc.c +44 -0

47 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +4 -0
@@ -1565,6 +1565,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb20_oper
 	.clear_stats = smb2_clear_stats,
 	.print_stats = smb2_print_stats,
 	.is_oplock_break = smb2_is_valid_oplock_break,
+	.handle_cancelled_mid = smb2_handle_cancelled_mid,
 	.downgrade_oplock = smb2_downgrade_oplock,
 	.need_neg = smb2_need_neg,
 	.negotiate = smb2_negotiate,
@@ -1645,6 +1646,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb21_oper
 	.clear_stats = smb2_clear_stats,
 	.print_stats = smb2_print_stats,
 	.is_oplock_break = smb2_is_valid_oplock_break,
+	.handle_cancelled_mid = smb2_handle_cancelled_mid,
 	.downgrade_oplock = smb2_downgrade_oplock,
 	.need_neg = smb2_need_neg,
 	.negotiate = smb2_negotiate,
@@ -1727,6 +1729,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb30_oper
 	.print_stats = smb2_print_stats,
 	.dump_share_caps = smb2_dump_share_caps,
 	.is_oplock_break = smb2_is_valid_oplock_break,
+	.handle_cancelled_mid = smb2_handle_cancelled_mid,
 	.downgrade_oplock = smb2_downgrade_oplock,
 	.need_neg = smb2_need_neg,
 	.negotiate = smb2_negotiate,
@@ -1815,6 +1818,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb311_ope
 	.print_stats = smb2_print_stats,
 	.dump_share_caps = smb2_dump_share_caps,
 	.is_oplock_break = smb2_is_valid_oplock_break,
+	.handle_cancelled_mid = smb2_handle_cancelled_mid,
 	.downgrade_oplock = smb2_downgrade_oplock,
 	.need_neg = smb2_need_neg,
 	.negotiate = smb2_negotiate,
fs/cifs/smb2proto.h +7 -0
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ extern struct mid_q_entry *smb2_setup_re
 			      struct smb_rqst *rqst);
 extern struct mid_q_entry *smb2_setup_async_request(
 			struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_rqst *rqst);
+extern struct cifs_ses *smb2_find_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+					   __u64 ses_id);
+extern struct cifs_tcon *smb2_find_smb_tcon(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+						__u64 ses_id, __u32  tid);
 extern int smb2_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
 				struct TCP_Server_Info *server);
 extern int smb3_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
@@ -158,6 +162,9 @@ extern int SMB2_set_compression(const un
 extern int SMB2_oplock_break(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
 			     const u64 persistent_fid, const u64 volatile_fid,
 			     const __u8 oplock_level);
+extern int smb2_handle_cancelled_mid(char *buffer,
+					struct TCP_Server_Info *server);
+void smb2_cancelled_close_fid(struct work_struct *work);
 extern int SMB2_QFS_info(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
 			 u64 persistent_file_id, u64 volatile_file_id,
 			 struct kstatfs *FSData);
fs/cifs/smb2transport.c +52 -6

88 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/cifs/transport.c +2 -0
@@ -727,9 +727,11 @@ SendReceive2(const unsigned int xid, str
 
 	rc = wait_for_response(ses->server, midQ);
 	if (rc != 0) {
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "Cancelling wait for mid %llu\n",	midQ->mid);
 		send_cancel(ses->server, buf, midQ);
 		spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
 		if (midQ->mid_state == MID_REQUEST_SUBMITTED) {
+			midQ->mid_flags |= MID_WAIT_CANCELLED;
 			midQ->callback = DeleteMidQEntry;
 			spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
 			cifs_small_buf_release(buf);
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/9 tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej S. Szmigiero <[email protected]>

commit 1d70fe9d9c3a4c627f9757cbba5d628687b121c1 upstream.

Since commit 1107d065fdf1 ("tpm_tis: Introduce intermediate layer for TPM access") Atmel 3203 TPM on ThinkPad X61S (TPM firmware version 13.9) no longer works. The initialization proceeds fine until we get and start using chip-reported timeouts - and the chip reports C and D timeouts of zero.

It turns out that until commit 8e54caf407b98e ("tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts") we had actually let default timeout values remain in this case, so let's bring back this behavior to make chips like Atmel 3203 work again.

Use a common code that was introduced by that commit so a warning is printed in this case and /sys/class/tpm/tpm*/timeouts correctly says the timeouts aren't chip-original.

This is a backport for 4.9 kernel version of the original commit, with renaming of "TPM_TIS_ITPM_POSSIBLE" flag removed since it was only a cosmetic change and not a part of the real bug fix.

Fixes 1107d065fdf1 ("tpm_tis: Introduce intermediate layer for TPM access")
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c |   53 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +32 -21
@@ -489,8 +489,7 @@ static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *
 int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
 	struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
-	unsigned long new_timeout[4];
-	unsigned long old_timeout[4];
+	unsigned long timeout_old[4], timeout_chip[4], timeout_eff[4];
 	struct duration_t *duration_cap;
 	ssize_t rc;
 
@@ -542,11 +541,15 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *ch
 	    != sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 4 * sizeof(u32))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	old_timeout[0] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.a);
-	old_timeout[1] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.b);
-	old_timeout[2] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.c);
-	old_timeout[3] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.d);
-	memcpy(new_timeout, old_timeout, sizeof(new_timeout));
+	timeout_old[0] = jiffies_to_usecs(chip->timeout_a);
+	timeout_old[1] = jiffies_to_usecs(chip->timeout_b);
+	timeout_old[2] = jiffies_to_usecs(chip->timeout_c);
+	timeout_old[3] = jiffies_to_usecs(chip->timeout_d);
+	timeout_chip[0] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.a);
+	timeout_chip[1] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.b);
+	timeout_chip[2] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.c);
+	timeout_chip[3] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.d);
+	memcpy(timeout_eff, timeout_chip, sizeof(timeout_eff));
 
 	/*
 	 * Provide ability for vendor overrides of timeout values in case
@@ -554,16 +557,24 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *ch
 	 */
 	if (chip->ops->update_timeouts != NULL)
 		chip->timeout_adjusted =
-			chip->ops->update_timeouts(chip, new_timeout);
+			chip->ops->update_timeouts(chip, timeout_eff);
 
 	if (!chip->timeout_adjusted) {
-		/* Don't overwrite default if value is 0 */
-		if (new_timeout[0] != 0 && new_timeout[0] < 1000) {
-			int i;
+		/* Restore default if chip reported 0 */
+		int i;
 
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(timeout_eff); i++) {
+			if (timeout_eff[i])
+				continue;
+
+			timeout_eff[i] = timeout_old[i];
+			chip->timeout_adjusted = true;
+		}
+
+		if (timeout_eff[0] != 0 && timeout_eff[0] < 1000) {
 			/* timeouts in msec rather usec */
-			for (i = 0; i != ARRAY_SIZE(new_timeout); i++)
-				new_timeout[i] *= 1000;
+			for (i = 0; i != ARRAY_SIZE(timeout_eff); i++)
+				timeout_eff[i] *= 1000;
 			chip->timeout_adjusted = true;
 		}
 	}
@@ -572,16 +583,16 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *ch
 	if (chip->timeout_adjusted) {
 		dev_info(&chip->dev,
 			 HW_ERR "Adjusting reported timeouts: A %lu->%luus B %lu->%luus C %lu->%luus D %lu->%luus\n",
-			 old_timeout[0], new_timeout[0],
-			 old_timeout[1], new_timeout[1],
-			 old_timeout[2], new_timeout[2],
-			 old_timeout[3], new_timeout[3]);
+			 timeout_chip[0], timeout_eff[0],
+			 timeout_chip[1], timeout_eff[1],
+			 timeout_chip[2], timeout_eff[2],
+			 timeout_chip[3], timeout_eff[3]);
 	}
 
-	chip->timeout_a = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[0]);
-	chip->timeout_b = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[1]);
-	chip->timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[2]);
-	chip->timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[3]);
+	chip->timeout_a = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout_eff[0]);
+	chip->timeout_b = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout_eff[1]);
+	chip->timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout_eff[2]);
+	chip->timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout_eff[3]);
 
 duration:
 	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/9 scsi: storvsc: Workaround for virtual DVD SCSI version

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>

commit f1c635b439a5c01776fe3a25b1e2dc546ea82e6f upstream.

Hyper-V host emulation of SCSI for virtual DVD device reports SCSI version 0 (UNKNOWN) but is still capable of supporting REPORTLUN.

Without this patch, a GEN2 Linux guest on Hyper-V will not boot 4.11 successfully with virtual DVD ROM device. What happens is that the SCSI scan process falls back to doing sequential probing by INQUIRY. But the storvsc driver has a previous workaround that masks/blocks all errors reports from INQUIRY (or MODE_SENSE) commands. This workaround causes the scan to then populate a full set of bogus LUN's on the target and then sends kernel spinning off into a death spiral doing block reads on the non-existent LUNs.

By setting the correct blacklist flags, the target with the DVD device is scanned with REPORTLUN and that works correctly.

Patch needs to go in current 4.11, it is safe but not necessary in older kernels.

---
 drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c |   27 +++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c +17 -10
@@ -400,8 +400,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(storvsc_vcpus_per_sub_c
  */
 static int storvsc_timeout = 180;
 
-static int msft_blist_flags = BLIST_TRY_VPD_PAGES;
-
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SCSI_FC_ATTRS)
 static struct scsi_transport_template *fc_transport_template;
 #endif
@@ -1283,6 +1281,22 @@ static int storvsc_do_io(struct hv_devic
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int storvsc_device_alloc(struct scsi_device *sdevice)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Set blist flag to permit the reading of the VPD pages even when
+	 * the target may claim SPC-2 compliance. MSFT targets currently
+	 * claim SPC-2 compliance while they implement post SPC-2 features.
+	 * With this flag we can correctly handle WRITE_SAME_16 issues.
+	 *
+	 * Hypervisor reports SCSI_UNKNOWN type for DVD ROM device but
+	 * still supports REPORT LUN.
+	 */
+	sdevice->sdev_bflags = BLIST_REPORTLUN2 | BLIST_TRY_VPD_PAGES;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int storvsc_device_configure(struct scsi_device *sdevice)
 {
 
@@ -1298,14 +1312,6 @@ static int storvsc_device_configure(stru
 	sdevice->no_write_same = 1;
 
 	/*
-	 * Add blist flags to permit the reading of the VPD pages even when
-	 * the target may claim SPC-2 compliance. MSFT targets currently
-	 * claim SPC-2 compliance while they implement post SPC-2 features.
-	 * With this patch we can correctly handle WRITE_SAME_16 issues.
-	 */
-	sdevice->sdev_bflags |= msft_blist_flags;
-
-	/*
 	 * If the host is WIN8 or WIN8 R2, claim conformance to SPC-3
 	 * if the device is a MSFT virtual device.  If the host is
 	 * WIN10 or newer, allow write_same.
@@ -1569,6 +1575,7 @@ static struct scsi_host_template scsi_dr
 	.eh_host_reset_handler =	storvsc_host_reset_handler,
 	.proc_name =		"storvsc_host",
 	.eh_timed_out =		storvsc_eh_timed_out,
+	.slave_alloc =		storvsc_device_alloc,
 	.slave_configure =	storvsc_device_configure,
 	.cmd_per_lun =		255,
 	.this_id =		-1,
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/9 hwmon: (it87) Avoid registering the same chip on both SIO addresses

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>

commit 8358378b22518d92424597503d3c1cd302a490b6 upstream.

IT8705F is known to respond on both SIO addresses. Registering it twice may result in system lockups.

Fixes e84bd9535e2b ("hwmon: (it87) Add support for second Super-IO chip")
Cc Jean Delvare <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/hwmon/it87.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/it87.c +19 -5
@@ -3115,7 +3115,7 @@ static int __init sm_it87_init(void)
 {
 	int sioaddr[2] = { REG_2E, REG_4E };
 	struct it87_sio_data sio_data;
-	unsigned short isa_address;
+	unsigned short isa_address[2];
 	bool found = false;
 	int i, err;
 
@@ -3125,15 +3125,29 @@ static int __init sm_it87_init(void)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sioaddr); i++) {
 		memset(&sio_data, 0, sizeof(struct it87_sio_data));
-		isa_address = 0;
-		err = it87_find(sioaddr[i], &isa_address, &sio_data);
-		if (err || isa_address == 0)
+		isa_address[i] = 0;
+		err = it87_find(sioaddr[i], &isa_address[i], &sio_data);
+		if (err || isa_address[i] == 0)
 			continue;
+		/*
+		 * Don't register second chip if its ISA address matches
+		 * the first chip's ISA address.
+		 */
+		if (i && isa_address[i] == isa_address[0])
+			break;
 
-		err = it87_device_add(i, isa_address, &sio_data);
+		err = it87_device_add(i, isa_address[i], &sio_data);
 		if (err)
 			goto exit_dev_unregister;
+
 		found = true;
+
+		/*
+		 * IT8705F may respond on both SIO addresses.
+		 * Stop probing after finding one.
+		 */
+		if (sio_data.type == it87)
+			break;
 	}
 
 	if (!found) {
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/9 8250_pci: Fix potential use-after-free in error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>

commit c130b666a9a711f985a0a44b58699ebe14bb7245 upstream.

Commit f209fa03fc9d ("serial: 8250_pci: Detach low-level driver during PCI error recovery") introduces a potential use-after-free in case the pciserial_init_ports call in serial8250_io_resume fails, which may happen if a memory allocation fails or if the .init quirk failed for whatever reason). If this happen, further pci_get_drvdata will return a pointer to freed memory.

This patch reworks the PCI recovery resume hook to restore the old priv structure in this case, which should be ok, since the ports were already detached. Such error during recovery causes us to give up on the recovery.

Fixes f209fa03fc9d ("serial: 8250_pci: Detach low-level driver during PCI error recovery")
---
 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c |   12 +++++-------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c +5 -7
@@ -5621,17 +5621,15 @@ static pci_ers_result_t serial8250_io_sl
 static void serial8250_io_resume(struct pci_dev *dev)
 {
 	struct serial_private *priv = pci_get_drvdata(dev);
-	const struct pciserial_board *board;
+	struct serial_private *new;
 
 	if (!priv)
 		return;
 
-	board = priv->board;
-	kfree(priv);
-	priv = pciserial_init_ports(dev, board);
-
-	if (!IS_ERR(priv)) {
-		pci_set_drvdata(dev, priv);
+	new = pciserial_init_ports(dev, priv->board);
+	if (!IS_ERR(new)) {
+		pci_set_drvdata(dev, new);
+		kfree(priv);
 	}
 }
 
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/9 ceph: try getting buffer capability for readahead/fadvise

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yan, Zheng <[email protected]>

commit 2b1ac852eb67a6e95595e576371d23519105559f upstream.

For readahead/fadvise cases, caller of ceph_readpages does not hold buffer capability. Pages can be added to page cache while there is no buffer capability. This can cause data integrity issue.

---
 fs/ceph/addr.c  |   58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 fs/ceph/caps.c  |   21 ++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/ceph/file.c  |    3 +-
 fs/ceph/super.h |    2 +
 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/addr.c +48 -10
@@ -315,7 +315,32 @@ static int start_read(struct inode *inod
 	struct page **pages;
 	pgoff_t next_index;
 	int nr_pages = 0;
-	int ret;
+	int got = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (!current->journal_info) {
+		/* caller of readpages does not hold buffer and read caps
+		 * (fadvise, madvise and readahead cases) */
+		int want = CEPH_CAP_FILE_CACHE;
+		ret = ceph_try_get_caps(ci, CEPH_CAP_FILE_RD, want, &got);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			dout("start_read %p, error getting cap\n", inode);
+		} else if (!(got & want)) {
+			dout("start_read %p, no cache cap\n", inode);
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+		if (ret <= 0) {
+			if (got)
+				ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, got);
+			while (!list_empty(page_list)) {
+				page = list_entry(page_list->prev,
+						  struct page, lru);
+				list_del(&page->lru);
+				put_page(page);
+			}
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
 
 	off = (u64) page_offset(page);
 
@@ -338,15 +363,18 @@ static int start_read(struct inode *inod
 				    CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ, NULL,
 				    ci->i_truncate_seq, ci->i_truncate_size,
 				    false);
-	if (IS_ERR(req))
-		return PTR_ERR(req);
+	if (IS_ERR(req)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(req);
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* build page vector */
 	nr_pages = calc_pages_for(0, len);
 	pages = kmalloc(sizeof(*pages) * nr_pages, GFP_KERNEL);
-	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	if (!pages)
-		goto out;
+	if (!pages) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_put;
+	}
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; ++i) {
 		page = list_entry(page_list->prev, struct page, lru);
 		BUG_ON(PageLocked(page));
@@ -379,6 +407,12 @@ static int start_read(struct inode *inod
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out_pages;
 	ceph_osdc_put_request(req);
+
+	/* After adding locked pages to page cache, the inode holds cache cap.
+	 * So we can drop our cap refs. */
+	if (got)
+		ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, got);
+
 	return nr_pages;
 
 out_pages:
@@ -387,8 +421,11 @@ out_pages:
 		unlock_page(pages[i]);
 	}
 	ceph_put_page_vector(pages, nr_pages, false);
-out:
+out_put:
 	ceph_osdc_put_request(req);
+out:
+	if (got)
+		ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, got);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -425,7 +462,6 @@ static int ceph_readpages(struct file *f
 		rc = start_read(inode, page_list, max);
 		if (rc < 0)
 			goto out;
-		BUG_ON(rc == 0);
 	}
 out:
 	ceph_fscache_readpages_cancel(inode, page_list);
@@ -1372,9 +1408,11 @@ static int ceph_filemap_fault(struct vm_
 	     inode, off, (size_t)PAGE_SIZE, ceph_cap_string(got));
 
 	if ((got & (CEPH_CAP_FILE_CACHE | CEPH_CAP_FILE_LAZYIO)) ||
-	    ci->i_inline_version == CEPH_INLINE_NONE)
+	    ci->i_inline_version == CEPH_INLINE_NONE) {
+		current->journal_info = vma->vm_file;
 		ret = filemap_fault(vma, vmf);
-	else
+		current->journal_info = NULL;
+	} else
 		ret = -EAGAIN;
 
 	dout("filemap_fault %p %llu~%zd dropping cap refs on %s ret %d\n",
fs/ceph/caps.c +21 -0
@@ -2479,6 +2479,27 @@ static void check_max_size(struct inode
 		ceph_check_caps(ci, CHECK_CAPS_AUTHONLY, NULL);
 }
 
+int ceph_try_get_caps(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, int need, int want, int *got)
+{
+	int ret, err = 0;
+
+	BUG_ON(need & ~CEPH_CAP_FILE_RD);
+	BUG_ON(want & ~(CEPH_CAP_FILE_CACHE|CEPH_CAP_FILE_LAZYIO));
+	ret = ceph_pool_perm_check(ci, need);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = try_get_cap_refs(ci, need, want, 0, true, got, &err);
+	if (ret) {
+		if (err == -EAGAIN) {
+			ret = 0;
+		} else if (err < 0) {
+			ret = err;
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * Wait for caps, and take cap references.  If we can't get a WR cap
  * due to a small max_size, make sure we check_max_size (and possibly
fs/ceph/file.c +2 -1
@@ -1249,8 +1249,9 @@ again:
 		dout("aio_read %p %llx.%llx %llu~%u got cap refs on %s\n",
 		     inode, ceph_vinop(inode), iocb->ki_pos, (unsigned)len,
 		     ceph_cap_string(got));
-
+		current->journal_info = filp;
 		ret = generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
+		current->journal_info = NULL;
 	}
 	dout("aio_read %p %llx.%llx dropping cap refs on %s = %d\n",
 	     inode, ceph_vinop(inode), ceph_cap_string(got), (int)ret);
fs/ceph/super.h +2 -0
@@ -905,6 +905,8 @@ extern int ceph_encode_dentry_release(vo
 
 extern int ceph_get_caps(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, int need, int want,
 			 loff_t endoff, int *got, struct page **pinned_page);
+extern int ceph_try_get_caps(struct ceph_inode_info *ci,
+			     int need, int want, int *got);
 
 /* for counting open files by mode */
 extern void __ceph_get_fmode(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, int mode);
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/9 cpu/hotplug: Serialize callback invocations proper

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>

commit dc434e056fe1dada20df7ba07f32739d3a701adf upstream.

The setup/remove_state/instance() functions in the hotplug core code are serialized against concurrent CPU hotplug, but unfortunately not serialized against themself.

As a consequence a concurrent invocation of these function results in corruption of the callback machinery because two instances try to invoke callbacks on remote cpus at the same time. This results in missing callback invocations and initiator threads waiting forever on the completion.

The obvious solution to replace get_cpu_online() with cpu_hotplug_begin() is not possible because at least one callsite calls into these functions from a get_online_cpu() locked region.

Extend the protection scope of the cpuhp_state_mutex from solely protecting the state arrays to cover the callback invocation machinery as well.

---
 kernel/cpu.c |   17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/cpu.c +9 -8
@@ -1441,14 +1441,12 @@ static void cpuhp_store_callbacks(enum c
 	/* (Un)Install the callbacks for further cpu hotplug operations */
 	struct cpuhp_step *sp;
 
-	mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 	sp = cpuhp_get_step(state);
 	sp->startup.single = startup;
 	sp->teardown.single = teardown;
 	sp->name = name;
 	sp->multi_instance = multi_instance;
 	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sp->list);
-	mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 }
 
 static void *cpuhp_get_teardown_cb(enum cpuhp_state state)
@@ -1518,16 +1516,13 @@ static int cpuhp_reserve_state(enum cpuh
 {
 	enum cpuhp_state i;
 
-	mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 	for (i = CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN; i <= CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN_END; i++) {
 		if (cpuhp_ap_states[i].name)
 			continue;
 
 		cpuhp_ap_states[i].name = "Reserved";
-		mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 		return i;
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 	WARN(1, "No more dynamic states available for CPU hotplug\n");
 	return -ENOSPC;
 }
@@ -1544,6 +1539,7 @@ int __cpuhp_state_add_instance(enum cpuh
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	get_online_cpus();
+	mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 
 	if (!invoke || !sp->startup.multi)
 		goto add_node;
@@ -1568,11 +1564,10 @@ int __cpuhp_state_add_instance(enum cpuh
 	}
 add_node:
 	ret = 0;
-	mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 	hlist_add_head(node, &sp->list);
-	mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 
 err:
+	mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 	put_online_cpus();
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1601,6 +1596,7 @@ int __cpuhp_setup_state(enum cpuhp_state
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	get_online_cpus();
+	mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 
 	/* currently assignments for the ONLINE state are possible */
 	if (state == CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN) {
@@ -1636,6 +1632,8 @@ int __cpuhp_setup_state(enum cpuhp_state
 		}
 	}
 out:
+	mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
+
 	put_online_cpus();
 	if (!ret && dyn_state)
 		return state;
@@ -1655,6 +1653,8 @@ int __cpuhp_state_remove_instance(enum c
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	get_online_cpus();
+	mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
+
 	if (!invoke || !cpuhp_get_teardown_cb(state))
 		goto remove;
 	/*
@@ -1671,7 +1671,6 @@ int __cpuhp_state_remove_instance(enum c
 	}
 
 remove:
-	mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 	hlist_del(node);
 	mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 	put_online_cpus();
@@ -1696,6 +1695,7 @@ void __cpuhp_remove_state(enum cpuhp_sta
 	BUG_ON(cpuhp_cb_check(state));
 
 	get_online_cpus();
+	mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 
 	if (sp->multi_instance) {
 		WARN(!hlist_empty(&sp->list),
@@ -1721,6 +1721,7 @@ void __cpuhp_remove_state(enum cpuhp_sta
 	}
 remove:
 	cpuhp_store_callbacks(state, NULL, NULL, NULL, false);
+	mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
 	put_online_cpus();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cpuhp_remove_state);
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/9 dm ioctl: prevent stack leak in dm ioctl call

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Salido <[email protected]>

commit 4617f564c06117c7d1b611be49521a4430042287 upstream.

When calling a dm ioctl that doesn't process any data (IOCTL_FLAGS_NO_PARAMS), the contents of the data field in struct dm_ioctl are left initialized. Current code is incorrectly extending the size of data copied back to user, causing the contents of kernel stack to be leaked to user. Fix by only copying contents before data and allow the functions processing the ioctl to override.

---
 drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ static int ctl_ioctl(uint command, struc
 	if (r)
 		goto out;
 
-	param->data_size = sizeof(*param);
+	param->data_size = offsetof(struct dm_ioctl, data);
 	r = fn(param, input_param_size);
 
 	if (unlikely(param->flags & DM_BUFFER_FULL_FLAG) &&
#10 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.27 release. There are 9 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Mon May 8 20:38:28 UTC 2017. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 145 pass: 145 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 122 pass: 122 fail: 0

Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.

Guenter

#11 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.27 release. There are 9 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Mon May 8 20:38:28 UTC 2017. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.27-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah