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ext4: remove redundant check for encrypted file on dio write path

PATCH Applied Eric Biggers 4 participants 6 messages May 23, 2017 – May 24, 2017

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ext4: remove redundant check for encrypted file on dio write path

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Currently we don't allow direct I/O on encrypted regular files, so in such cases we return 0 early in ext4_direct_IO(). There was also an additional BUG_ON() check in ext4_direct_IO_write(), but it can never be hit because of the earlier check for the exact same condition in ext4_direct_IO(). There was also no matching check on the read path, which made the write path specific check seem very ad-hoc.

Just remove the unnecessary BUG_ON().

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +0 -3
index 1bd0bfa547f6..7c6e715b4d2e 100644
@@ -3629,9 +3629,6 @@ static ssize_t ext4_direct_IO_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 		get_block_func = ext4_dio_get_block_unwritten_async;
 		dio_flags = DIO_LOCKING;
 	}
-#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
-	BUG_ON(ext4_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode));
-#endif
 	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, inode->i_sb->s_bdev, iter,
 				   get_block_func, ext4_end_io_dio, NULL,
 				   dio_flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.13.0.303.g4ebf302169-goog
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw

Hi Eric,

Quoted 34 lines · Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Currently we don't allow direct I/O on encrypted regular files, so in such cases we return 0 early in ext4_direct_IO(). There was also an additional BUG_ON() check in ext4_direct_IO_write(), but it can never be hit because of the earlier check for the exact same condition in ext4_direct_IO(). There was also no matching check on the read path, which made the write path specific check seem very ad-hoc.

Just remove the unnecessary BUG_ON().

---
fs/ext4/inode.c | 3 ---

1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +0 -3
index 1bd0bfa547f6..7c6e715b4d2e 100644
@@ -3629,9 +3629,6 @@ static ssize_t ext4_direct_IO_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 		get_block_func = ext4_dio_get_block_unwritten_async;
 		dio_flags = DIO_LOCKING;
 	}
-#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
-	BUG_ON(ext4_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode));
-#endif
 	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, inode->i_sb->s_bdev, iter,
 				   get_block_func, ext4_end_io_dio, NULL,
 				   dio_flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.13.0.303.g4ebf302169-goog

LGTM.

David

reviewer
#2 lore raw
In reply to Eric Biggers
Quoted 9 lines · Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Currently we don't allow direct I/O on encrypted regular files, so in such cases we return 0 early in ext4_direct_IO(). There was also an additional BUG_ON() check in ext4_direct_IO_write(), but it can never be hit because of the earlier check for the exact same condition in ext4_direct_IO(). There was also no matching check on the read path, which made the write path specific check seem very ad-hoc.

Quoted 3 lines

Just remove the unnecessary BUG_ON().

Yeah, the check is rather before the BUG_ON so I guess that there's no big point in the BUG_ON. When looking at this code I have one question though:

So when you mount the filesystem with 'dioread_nolock', do overwriting direct write to the file, and just after we do inode_unlock() in ext4_direct_IO_write() someone calls EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl on the file, the BUG_ON could actually trigger. So I think you need to wait for outstanding direct IO for the file when setting encryption policy. Likely in ext4_set_context() or maybe in the generic fscrypt code (you need to wait after acquiring inode_lock), I'm not sure how other filesystems using fscrypt handle this and whether it would make more sense in the generic code or in ext4 specific one.

Honza

Quoted 21 lines
---
 fs/ext4/inode.c | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +0 -3
index 1bd0bfa547f6..7c6e715b4d2e 100644
@@ -3629,9 +3629,6 @@ static ssize_t ext4_direct_IO_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 		get_block_func = ext4_dio_get_block_unwritten_async;
 		dio_flags = DIO_LOCKING;
 	}
-#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
-	BUG_ON(ext4_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode));
-#endif
 	ret = __blockdev_direct_IO(iocb, inode, inode->i_sb->s_bdev, iter,
 				   get_block_func, ext4_end_io_dio, NULL,
 				   dio_flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.13.0.303.g4ebf302169-goog
Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
SUSE Labs, CR
#3 lore raw

Hi Jan,

Quoted 17 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 9 lines · Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Currently we don't allow direct I/O on encrypted regular files, so in such cases we return 0 early in ext4_direct_IO(). There was also an additional BUG_ON() check in ext4_direct_IO_write(), but it can never be hit because of the earlier check for the exact same condition in ext4_direct_IO(). There was also no matching check on the read path, which made the write path specific check seem very ad-hoc.

Quoted 3 lines

Just remove the unnecessary BUG_ON().

Yeah, the check is rather before the BUG_ON so I guess that there's no big point in the BUG_ON. When looking at this code I have one question though:

Quoted 10 lines

So when you mount the filesystem with 'dioread_nolock', do overwriting direct write to the file, and just after we do inode_unlock() in ext4_direct_IO_write() someone calls EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl on the file, the BUG_ON could actually trigger. So I think you need to wait for outstanding direct IO for the file when setting encryption policy. Likely in ext4_set_context() or maybe in the generic fscrypt code (you need to wait after acquiring inode_lock), I'm not sure how other filesystems using fscrypt handle this and whether it would make more sense in the generic code or in ext4 specific one.

That's not possible because the ioctl can only set an encryption policy on a directory, and specifically an empty one. Other files can only acquire an encryption policy through inheritance. There have been thoughts about implementing "in-place" encryption but it's not something we currently support.

Eric

reviewer Reviewed-by
#4 lore raw
Quoted 32 lines · Eric Biggers

Hi Jan,

Quoted 18 lines · Jan Kara
Quoted 9 lines · Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Currently we don't allow direct I/O on encrypted regular files, so in such cases we return 0 early in ext4_direct_IO(). There was also an additional BUG_ON() check in ext4_direct_IO_write(), but it can never be hit because of the earlier check for the exact same condition in ext4_direct_IO(). There was also no matching check on the read path, which made the write path specific check seem very ad-hoc.

Quoted 3 lines

Just remove the unnecessary BUG_ON().

Yeah, the check is rather before the BUG_ON so I guess that there's no big point in the BUG_ON. When looking at this code I have one question though:

Quoted 10 lines

So when you mount the filesystem with 'dioread_nolock', do overwriting direct write to the file, and just after we do inode_unlock() in ext4_direct_IO_write() someone calls EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl on the file, the BUG_ON could actually trigger. So I think you need to wait for outstanding direct IO for the file when setting encryption policy. Likely in ext4_set_context() or maybe in the generic fscrypt code (you need to wait after acquiring inode_lock), I'm not sure how other filesystems using fscrypt handle this and whether it would make more sense in the generic code or in ext4 specific one.

Quoted 5 lines

That's not possible because the ioctl can only set an encryption policy on a directory, and specifically an empty one. Other files can only acquire an encryption policy through inheritance. There have been thoughts about implementing "in-place" encryption but it's not something we currently support.

Ah, good. Thanks for explanation. Then you can add:

to your patch.

Honza

Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]>
SUSE Labs, CR