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exec: Account for argv/envp pointers

PATCH Applied Kees Cook 3 participants 5 messages Jun 22, 2017 – Jun 23, 2017

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Kees Cook

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 exec: Account for argv/envp pointers

When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit, the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the pointers to the strings. For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721 single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB / 4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884). The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).

Fixes b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
---
 fs/exec.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +16 -4
index 72934df68471..8079ca70cfda 100644
@@ -220,8 +220,18 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
 
 	if (write) {
 		unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
+		unsigned long ptr_size;
 		struct rlimit *rlim;
 
+		/*
+		 * Since the stack will hold pointers to the strings, we
+		 * must account for them as well.
+		 */
+		ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
+		if (ptr_size > ULONG_MAX - size)
+			goto fail;
+		size += ptr_size;
+
 		acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE);
 
 		/*
@@ -239,13 +249,15 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
 		 *    to work from.
 		 */
 		rlim = current->signal->rlim;
-		if (size > ACCESS_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) {
-			put_page(page);
-			return NULL;
-		}
+		if (size > READ_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4)
+			goto fail;
 	}
 
 	return page;
+
+fail:
+	put_page(page);
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
Signature · 6 lines
2.7.4


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Acked-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 19 lines · Kees Cook

When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit,
the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means
that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the pointers to the strings. For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack
rlimit, an exec with 1677721 single-byte strings would consume less than
2MB of stack, the max (8MB / 4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the
strings would consume the remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884). The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust
stack space entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in
pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).

Quoted 3 lines
Fixes b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
#2 lore raw
In reply to Kees Cook
Quoted 30 lines · Kees Cook

When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit, the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the pointers to the strings. For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721 single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB / 4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884). The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).

Fixes b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
---
 fs/exec.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +1 -0
index 72934df68471..8079ca70cfda 100644
@@ -220,8 +220,18 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
 
 	if (write) {
 		unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
+		unsigned long ptr_size;
 		struct rlimit *rlim;
 

fs/exec.c static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos, · line 235

Quoted 10 lines
fs/exec.c +9 -0
+		/*
+		 * Since the stack will hold pointers to the strings, we
+		 * must account for them as well.
+		 */
+		ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
+		if (ptr_size > ULONG_MAX - size)
+			goto fail;
+		size += ptr_size;
+
 		acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE);

Doesn't this over account? I mean this gets called for partial arguments as they fit into a page so a single argument can get into this function multiple times AFAIU. I also do not understand why would you want to account bprm->argc + bprm->envc pointers for each argument.

Quoted 35 lines
fs/exec.c +6 -4
 		/*
@@ -239,13 +249,15 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
 		 *    to work from.
 		 */
 		rlim = current->signal->rlim;
-		if (size > ACCESS_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) {
-			put_page(page);
-			return NULL;
-		}
+		if (size > READ_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4)
+			goto fail;
 	}
 
 	return page;
+
+fail:
+	put_page(page);
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
Signature · 12 lines
2.7.4


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
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Signature · 2 lines
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
author
#3 lore raw
Quoted 31 lines · Michal Hocko
Quoted 30 lines · Kees Cook

When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit, the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the pointers to the strings. For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721 single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB / 4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884). The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).

Fixes b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
---
 fs/exec.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +1 -0
index 72934df68471..8079ca70cfda 100644
@@ -220,8 +220,18 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
 
      if (write) {
              unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
+             unsigned long ptr_size;
              struct rlimit *rlim;
 
Quoted 15 lines

fs/exec.c static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos, · line 235

Quoted 10 lines
fs/exec.c +9 -0
+             /*
+              * Since the stack will hold pointers to the strings, we
+              * must account for them as well.
+              */
+             ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
+             if (ptr_size > ULONG_MAX - size)
+                     goto fail;
+             size += ptr_size;
+
              acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE);

Doesn't this over account? I mean this gets called for partial arguments as they fit into a page so a single argument can get into this function multiple times AFAIU. I also do not understand why would you want to account bprm->argc + bprm->envc pointers for each argument.

Based on what I could understand in acct_arg_size(), this is called repeatedly with with the "current" size (it handles the difference between prior calls, see calls like acct_arg_size(bprm, 0)).

The size calculation is the entire vma while each arg page is built, so each time we get here it's calculating how far it is currently (rather than each call being just the newly added size from the arg page). As a result, we need to always add the entire size of the pointers, so that on the last call to get_arg_page() we'll actually have the entire correct size.

-Kees

Quoted 40 lines
Quoted 31 lines
fs/exec.c +6 -5
              /*
@@ -239,13 +249,15 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
               *    to work from.
               */
              rlim = current->signal->rlim;
-             if (size > ACCESS_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) {
-                     put_page(page);
-                     return NULL;
-             }
+             if (size > READ_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4)
+                     goto fail;
      }
 
      return page;
+
+fail:
+     put_page(page);
+     return NULL;
 }
 
 static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
--

2.7.4

--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

Quoted 5 lines

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM,
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--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Acked-by
#4 lore raw
Quoted 1 line · Kees Cook

On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 6:59 AM, Michal Hocko <[email protected]> wrote:

[...]

Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
fs/exec.c +1 -0
@@ -220,8 +220,18 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
 
      if (write) {
              unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
+             unsigned long ptr_size;
              struct rlimit *rlim;
 
Quoted 15 lines

fs/exec.c static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos, · line 235

Quoted 10 lines
fs/exec.c +9 -0
+             /*
+              * Since the stack will hold pointers to the strings, we
+              * must account for them as well.
+              */
+             ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
+             if (ptr_size > ULONG_MAX - size)
+                     goto fail;
+             size += ptr_size;
+
              acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE);

Doesn't this over account? I mean this gets called for partial arguments as they fit into a page so a single argument can get into this function multiple times AFAIU. I also do not understand why would you want to account bprm->argc + bprm->envc pointers for each argument.

Based on what I could understand in acct_arg_size(), this is called repeatedly with with the "current" size (it handles the difference between prior calls, see calls like acct_arg_size(bprm, 0)).

Quoted 6 lines

The size calculation is the entire vma while each arg page is built, so each time we get here it's calculating how far it is currently (rather than each call being just the newly added size from the arg page). As a result, we need to always add the entire size of the pointers, so that on the last call to get_arg_page() we'll actually have the entire correct size.

Ohh, I forgot about this tricky part. The code just looks confusing becauser we are mixing 2 things together here. This deserves a comment I guess.

Other than that feel free to add

Thanks!

Signature · 2 lines
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs