Skip to contentSkip to conversation

vfs.git pile 11

GIT PULL Al Viro 3 participants 6 messages Jul 6, 2017 – Jul 7, 2017 VFS

lore
Share & tools
lore

Al Viro

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

iov_iter/uaccess/hardening pile. For one thing, it trims the
inline part of copy_to_user/copy_from_user to the minimum that *does* need to be inlined - object size checks, basically. For another, it sanitizes the checks for iov_iter primitives. There are 4 groups of checks: access_ok(), might_fault(), object size and KASAN.
* access_ok() had been verified by whoever had set the iov_iter
up. However, that has happened in a function far away, so proving that there's no path to actual copying bypassing those checks is hard and proving that iov_iter has not been buggered in the meanwhile is also not pleasant. So we want those redone in actual copyin/copyout.
* might_fault() is better off consolidated - we know whether
it needs to be checked as soon as we enter iov_iter primitive and observe the iov_iter flavour. No need to wait until the copyin/copyout. The call chains are short enough to make sure we won't miss anything - in fact, it's more robust that way, since there are cases where we do e.g. forced fault-in before getting to copyin/copyout.
* KASAN checks belong in copyin/copyout - at the same level
where other iov_iter flavours would've hit them in memcpy().
* object size checks should apply to *all* iov_iter flavours,
not just iovec-backed ones.
There are two groups of primitives - one gets the kernel object
described as pointer + size (copy_to_iter(), etc.) while another gets it as page + offset + size (copy_page_to_iter(), etc.)
For the first group the checks are best done where we actually
have a chance to find the object size. In other words, those belong in inline wrappers in uio.h, before calling into iov_iter.c. Same kind as we have for inlined part of copy_to_user().
For the second group there is no object to look at - offset in
page is just a number, it bears no type information. So we do them in the common helper called by iov_iter.c primitives of that kind. All it currently does is checking that we are not trying to access outside of the compound page; eventually we might want to add some sanity checks on the page involved.

So the things we need in copyin/copyout part of iov_iter.c
do not quite match anything in uaccess.h (we want no zeroing, we *do* want access_ok() and KASAN and we want no might_fault() or object size checks done on that level). OTOH, these needs are simple enough to provide a couple of helpers (static in iov_iter.c) doing just what we need...

The following changes since commit 2ea659a9ef488125eb46da6eb571de5eae5c43f6:

Linux 4.12-rc1 (2017-05-13 13:19:49 -0700)

are available in the git repository at:

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs.git uaccess-work.iov_iter

for you to fetch changes up to ea93a426af164d346a0b4fe0836143bf32177330:

iov_iter: saner checks on copyin/copyout (2017-06-29 22:29:36 -0400)

----------------------------------------------------------------
Al Viro (5):
copy_{from,to}_user(): move kasan checks and might_fault() out-of-line copy_{to,from}_user(): consolidate object size checks iov_iter/hardening: move object size checks to inlined part
iov_iter: sanity checks for copy to/from page primitives
iov_iter: saner checks on copyin/copyout

 include/linux/thread_info.h | 27 +++++++++++++
 include/linux/uaccess.h     | 44 +++++----------------
 include/linux/uio.h         | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 lib/iov_iter.c              | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 lib/usercopy.c              | 10 ++++-
 5 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
#1 lore raw
Quoted 49 lines · Al Viro

iov_iter/uaccess/hardening pile. For one thing, it trims the
inline part of copy_to_user/copy_from_user to the minimum that *does* need to be inlined - object size checks, basically. For another, it sanitizes the checks for iov_iter primitives. There are 4 groups of checks: access_ok(), might_fault(), object size and KASAN.
* access_ok() had been verified by whoever had set the iov_iter
up. However, that has happened in a function far away, so proving that there's no path to actual copying bypassing those checks is hard and proving that iov_iter has not been buggered in the meanwhile is also not pleasant. So we want those redone in actual copyin/copyout.
* might_fault() is better off consolidated - we know whether
it needs to be checked as soon as we enter iov_iter primitive and observe the iov_iter flavour. No need to wait until the copyin/copyout. The call chains are short enough to make sure we won't miss anything - in fact, it's more robust that way, since there are cases where we do e.g. forced fault-in before getting to copyin/copyout.
* KASAN checks belong in copyin/copyout - at the same level
where other iov_iter flavours would've hit them in memcpy().
* object size checks should apply to *all* iov_iter flavours,
not just iovec-backed ones.
There are two groups of primitives - one gets the kernel object
described as pointer + size (copy_to_iter(), etc.) while another gets it as page + offset + size (copy_page_to_iter(), etc.)
For the first group the checks are best done where we actually
have a chance to find the object size. In other words, those belong in inline wrappers in uio.h, before calling into iov_iter.c. Same kind as we have for inlined part of copy_to_user().
For the second group there is no object to look at - offset in
page is just a number, it bears no type information. So we do them in the common helper called by iov_iter.c primitives of that kind. All it currently does is checking that we are not trying to access outside of the compound page; eventually we might want to add some sanity checks on the page involved.

So the things we need in copyin/copyout part of iov_iter.c
do not quite match anything in uaccess.h (we want no zeroing, we *do* want access_ok() and KASAN and we want no might_fault() or object size checks done on that level). OTOH, these needs are simple enough to provide a couple of helpers (static in iov_iter.c) doing just what we need...

The following changes since commit 2ea659a9ef488125eb46da6eb571de5eae5c43f6:

Linux 4.12-rc1 (2017-05-13 13:19:49 -0700)

are available in the git repository at:

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs.git uaccess-work.iov_iter

Quoted 8 lines

for you to fetch changes up to ea93a426af164d346a0b4fe0836143bf32177330:

iov_iter: saner checks on copyin/copyout (2017-06-29 22:29:36 -0400)

----------------------------------------------------------------
Al Viro (5):
copy_{from,to}_user(): move kasan checks and might_fault() out-of-line copy_{to,from}_user(): consolidate object size checks

We still need to fix the missed-zeroing-on-overflow corner-case:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9826959/

Quoted 1 line

iov_iter/hardening: move object size checks to inlined part

+ if (unlikely(!check_copy_size(addr, bytes, false)))
+ return false;
+ else
+ return _copy_from_iter_full(addr, bytes, i);

Can these be rewritten to avoid the double-negative?

Quoted 1 line

iov_iter: sanity checks for copy to/from page primitives

Nice to see these!

Quoted 1 line

iov_iter: saner checks on copyin/copyout

+ might_fault();

Should this be might_sleep()? Just from reading the patch it looked like you were adding might_sleep()s in the other cases.

Quoted 7 lines
 include/linux/thread_info.h | 27 +++++++++++++
 include/linux/uaccess.h     | 44 +++++----------------
 include/linux/uio.h         | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 lib/iov_iter.c              | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 lib/usercopy.c              | 10 ++++-
 5 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)

-Kees

Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
author maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
(quoted diff) +4 -0
+   if (unlikely(!check_copy_size(addr, bytes, false)))
+       return false;
+   else
+       return _copy_from_iter_full(addr, bytes, i);

Can these be rewritten to avoid the double-negative?

Matter of taste - I've no strong preferences here.

Quoted 4 lines

+ might_fault();

Should this be might_sleep()? Just from reading the patch it looked like you were adding might_sleep()s in the other cases.

D'oh - shouldn't have written that pull request message before the first cup of coffee... might_sleep() it is, of course.

author maintainer
#3 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
(quoted diff) +4 -0
+   if (unlikely(!check_copy_size(addr, bytes, false)))
+       return false;
+   else
+       return _copy_from_iter_full(addr, bytes, i);

Can these be rewritten to avoid the double-negative?

Matter of taste - I've no strong preferences here.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

+ might_fault();

Should this be might_sleep()? Just from reading the patch it looked like you were adding might_sleep()s in the other cases.

D'oh - shouldn't have written that pull request message before the first cup of coffee... might_sleep() it is, of course.

Hrm... Said that, might_sleep() doesn't check one thing might_fault() does - the

#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP)
        if (current->mm)
                might_lock_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);

#endif
thing. Let me think a bit...

author maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 11 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 7 lines · Kees Cook
(quoted diff) +4 -0
+   if (unlikely(!check_copy_size(addr, bytes, false)))
+       return false;
+   else
+       return _copy_from_iter_full(addr, bytes, i);

Can these be rewritten to avoid the double-negative?

Matter of taste - I've no strong preferences here.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

+ might_fault();

Should this be might_sleep()? Just from reading the patch it looked like you were adding might_sleep()s in the other cases.

D'oh - shouldn't have written that pull request message before the first cup of coffee... might_sleep() it is, of course.

Quoted 7 lines

Hrm... Said that, might_sleep() doesn't check one thing might_fault() does - the

#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP)
        if (current->mm)
                might_lock_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);

#endif
thing. Let me think a bit...

FWIW,
* with iovec-backed, any of those primitives under pagefault_disable()
is seriously wrong. To the point where we probably want to complain when called that way. That, of course, needs to be checked at the outermost level - the primitives might do pagefault_disable() internally; that's fine. Outside caller doing that under pagefault_disable() isn't.
* uaccess_kernel() (== set_fs(KERNEL_DS)) has nothing to do with it.
If anything, we should not do copyin/copyout on iovec-backed ones with that present.
* telling lockdep that we might end up grabbing ->mm->mmap_sem, OTOH,
is the right thing to do. In addition to might_sleep().

Linus, could you hold that one back until tomorrow? I want to tweak the last commit in there a bit, but I want to give it a local beating first...

#5 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Al Viro

Linus, could you hold that one back until tomorrow? I want to tweak the last commit in there a bit, but I want to give it a local beating first...

Ok, dropping this one. All your other branches are merged now.

Linus