4.12.3-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.12.3 release. There are 84 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri Jul 21 09:22:37 UTC 2017. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.12.3-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.12.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.12.3-rc1

Haozhong Zhang <[email protected]>
kvm: vmx: allow host to access guest MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS

Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
kvm: vmx: Check value written to IA32_BNDCFGS

Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
kvm: x86: Guest BNDCFGS requires guest MPX support

Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
kvm: vmx: Do not disable intercepts for BNDCFGS

Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
PM / QoS: return -EINVAL for bogus strings

Hui Wang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/realtek - change the location for one of two front microphones

Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
ALSA: x86: Clear the pdata.notify_lpe_audio pointer before teardown

Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
pstore: Fix leaked pstore_record in pstore_get_backend_records()

Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
PM / wakeirq: Convert to SRCU

Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
sched/topology: Fix overlapping sched_group_mask

Lauro Ramos Venancio <[email protected]>
sched/topology: Optimize build_group_mask()

Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
sched/topology: Fix building of overlapping sched-groups

Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]>
sched/headers/uapi: Fix linux/sched/types.h userspace compilation errors

Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
KEYS: DH: validate __spare field

Horia Geantă <[email protected]>
crypto: caam - fix signals handling

David Gstir <[email protected]>
crypto: caam - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt

Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
crypto: sha1-ssse3 - Disable avx2

Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel - only treat EBUSY as transient if backlog

Martin Hicks <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - Extend max key length for SHA384/512-HMAC and AEAD

Helge Deller <[email protected]>
mm: fix overflow check in expand_upwards()

Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
selftests/capabilities: Fix the test_execve test

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
mnt: Make propagate_umount less slow for overlapping mount propagation trees

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
mnt: In propgate_umount handle visiting mounts in any order

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
mnt: In umount propagation reparent in a separate pass

Michael Kelley <[email protected]>
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Close timing hole that can corrupt per-cpu page

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
nvmem: core: fix leaks on registration errors

Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
rcu: Add memory barriers for NOCB leader wakeup

Adam Borowski <[email protected]>
vt: fix unchecked __put_user() in tioclinux ioctls

Dong Bo <[email protected]>
arm64: Preventing READ_IMPLIES_EXEC propagation

Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
ARM64: dts: marvell: armada37xx: Fix timer interrupt specifiers

Balbir Singh <[email protected]>
powerpc/kexec: Fix radix to hash kexec due to IAMR/AMOR

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
s390: reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
powerpc: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
arm64: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
arm: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4MB

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE

Cyril Bur <[email protected]>
checkpatch: silence perl 5.26.0 unescaped left brace warnings

Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>

    fs/dcache.c: fix spin lockup issue on nlru->lock

Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>
mm/list_lru.c: fix list_lru_count_node() to be race free

Marcin Nowakowski <[email protected]>
kernel/extable.c: mark core_kernel_text notrace

Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
thp, mm: fix crash due race in MADV_FREE handling

David Rientjes <[email protected]>
compiler, clang: always inline when CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING is disabled

Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
tools/lib/lockdep: Reduce MAX_LOCK_DEPTH to avoid overflowing lock_chain/: Depth

Helge Deller <[email protected]>
parisc/mm: Ensure IRQs are off in switch_mm()

Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
parisc: DMA API: return error instead of BUG_ON for dma ops on non dma devs

Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
parisc: use compat_sys_keyctl()

Helge Deller <[email protected]>
parisc: Report SIGSEGV instead of SIGBUS when running out of stack

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
irqchip/gic-v3: Fix out-of-bound access in gic_set_affinity

Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
kvm-vfio: Decouple only when we match a group

Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Fix typo in XICS-on-XIVE state saving code

Hu Huajun <[email protected]>
KVM: ARM64: fix phy counter access failure in guest.

Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu/gfx6: properly cache mc_arb_ramcfg

Srinivas Dasari <[email protected]>
cfg80211: Check if NAN service ID is of expected size

Srinivas Dasari <[email protected]>
cfg80211: Check if PMKID attribute is of expected size

Srinivas Dasari <[email protected]>
cfg80211: Validate frequencies nested in NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES

Srinivas Dasari <[email protected]>

    cfg80211: Define nla_policy for NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE

Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
efi: Process the MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP is enabled

Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen

Peter S. Housel <[email protected]>
brcmfmac: Fix glom_skb leak in brcmf_sdiod_recv_chain

Christophe Jaillet <[email protected]>
brcmfmac: Fix a memory leak in error handling path in 'brcmf_cfg80211_attach'

Nitin Gupta <[email protected]>
sparc64: Fix gup_huge_pmd

Nagarathnam Muthusamy <[email protected]>
Adding the type of exported symbols

Nagarathnam Muthusamy <[email protected]>
sed regex in Makefile.build requires line break between exported symbols

Nagarathnam Muthusamy <[email protected]>
Adding asm-prototypes.h for genksyms to generate crc

Bert Kenward <[email protected]>
sfc: don't read beyond unicast address list

Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()

Eduardo Valentin <[email protected]>
bridge: mdb: fix leak on complete_info ptr on fail path

WANG Cong <[email protected]>
tap: convert a mutex to a spinlock

Guilherme G. Piccoli <[email protected]>
cxgb4: fix BUG() on interrupt deallocating path of ULD

Huy Nguyen <[email protected]>

    net/mlx5e: Initialize CEE's getpermhwaddr address buffer to 0xff

Sowmini Varadhan <[email protected]>
rds: tcp: use sock_create_lite() to create the accept socket

Jason Wang <[email protected]>
virtio-net: fix leaking of ctx array

Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
vrf: fix bug_on triggered by rx when destroying a vrf

David Ahern <[email protected]>
net: ipv6: Compare lwstate in detecting duplicate nexthops

Derek Chickles <[email protected]>
liquidio: fix bug in soft reset failure detection

Alban Browaeys <[email protected]>
net: core: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in netdev_stats_to_stats64

Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
geneve: fix hlist corruption

Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
vxlan: fix hlist corruption

Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
ipv6: dad: don't remove dynamic addresses if link is down

Gal Pressman <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: Fix TX carrier errors report in get stats ndo

Mohamad Haj Yahia <[email protected]>
net/mlx5: Cancel delayed recovery work when unloading the driver

Gal Pressman <[email protected]>
net/mlx5: Fix driver load error flow when firmware is stuck

Gleb Fotengauer-Malinovskiy <[email protected]>
staging: android: uapi: drop definitions of removed ION_IOC_{FREE,SHARE} ioctls

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h                         |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi       |  12 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h                       |  18 +-
 arch/parisc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h              |  11 +-
 arch/parisc/include/asm/mmu_context.h              |  15 +-
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscall_table.S                 |   2 +-
 arch/parisc/mm/fault.c                             |   2 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h                     |  13 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/misc_64.S                      |  12 ++
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xive.c                     |   4 +-
 arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h                        |  15 +-
 arch/sparc/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h            |  24 +++
 arch/sparc/lib/atomic_64.S                         |  44 +++--
 arch/sparc/lib/checksum_64.S                       |   1 +
 arch/sparc/lib/csum_copy.S                         |   1 +
 arch/sparc/lib/memscan_64.S                        |   2 +
 arch/sparc/lib/memset.S                            |   1 +
 arch/sparc/mm/gup.c                                |   4 +-
 arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_glue.c                  |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h                         |  13 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h                   |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h                               |   8 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                                 |  10 +-
 arch/x86/xen/efi.c                                 |  45 ++---
 drivers/base/power/sysfs.c                         |   2 +
 drivers/base/power/wakeup.c                        |  32 ++--
 drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c                         |   4 +-
 drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c                      |  20 +-
 drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c                     |   2 +-
 drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c                      |   2 +-
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c                           |   7 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c                         |   3 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v6_0.c              |   3 +-
 drivers/hv/hv.c                                    |   7 +-
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c                       |   3 +
 .../ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn23xx_pf_device.c    |   2 +-
 .../net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_device.c   |   2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c    |  16 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_uld.c     |  42 ++--
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_dcbnl.c |   2 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c  |   2 -
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c   |  15 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c     |   4 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c                    |   8 +-
 drivers/net/geneve.c                               |  48 +++--
 drivers/net/tap.c                                  |  18 +-
 drivers/net/virtio_net.c                           |   1 +
 drivers/net/vrf.c                                  |  11 +-
 drivers/net/vxlan.c                                |  30 ++-
 .../wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c  |   7 +-
 .../broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c         |   8 +-
 drivers/nvmem/core.c                               |  13 +-
 drivers/parisc/ccio-dma.c                          |  12 ++
 drivers/parisc/dino.c                              |   5 +-
 drivers/parisc/lba_pci.c                           |   6 +-
 drivers/parisc/sba_iommu.c                         |  14 ++
 drivers/staging/android/uapi/ion.h                 |  18 --
 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c                                |   6 +-
 fs/binfmt_elf.c                                    |  59 +++++-
 fs/dcache.c                                        |   5 +-
 fs/exec.c                                          |  11 +-
 fs/mount.h                                         |   1 +
 fs/namespace.c                                     |   1 +
 fs/pnode.c                                         | 212 ++++++++++++++++-----
 fs/pstore/platform.c                               |   4 +-
 include/linux/compiler-clang.h                     |   8 -
 include/linux/compiler-gcc.h                       |  18 +-
 include/linux/list_lru.h                           |   1 +
 include/linux/mlx5/driver.h                        |   1 +
 include/net/ip6_route.h                            |   8 +
 include/net/vxlan.h                                |  10 +-
 include/uapi/linux/sched/types.h                   |  16 +-
 kernel/extable.c                                   |   2 +-
 kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h                           |   2 +
 kernel/sched/topology.c                            |  24 ++-
 mm/huge_memory.c                                   |   2 +-
 mm/list_lru.c                                      |  14 +-
 mm/mmap.c                                          |   2 +-
 net/bridge/br_mdb.c                                |   3 +-
 net/core/dev.c                                     |   2 +-
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c                                |  18 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c                                 |   5 +-
 net/ipv6/route.c                                   |   8 +-
 net/rds/tcp_listen.c                               |   2 +-
 net/wireless/nl80211.c                             |  10 +-
 scripts/checkpatch.pl                              |   6 +-
 security/keys/compat_dh.c                          |   2 +
 security/keys/dh.c                                 |   5 +
 sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c                      |  14 ++
 sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c                       |   5 +
 tools/lib/lockdep/uinclude/linux/lockdep.h         |   2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/capabilities/test_execve.c |   7 +-
 virt/kvm/arm/arm.c                                 |   4 +-
 virt/kvm/vfio.c                                    |  13 +-
 95 files changed, 766 insertions(+), 389 deletions(-)

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gleb Fotengauer-Malinovskiy <[email protected]>

commit f7a320ffebe2bdce3a189ecb531a401c653f754f upstream.

This problem was found by strace ioctl list generator.

---
 drivers/staging/android/uapi/ion.h |   18 ------------------
 1 file changed, 18 deletions(-)

@@ -131,24 +131,6 @@ struct ion_heap_query {
 				      struct ion_allocation_data)
 
 /**
- * DOC: ION_IOC_FREE - free memory
- *
- * Takes an ion_handle_data struct and frees the handle.
- */
-#define ION_IOC_FREE		_IOWR(ION_IOC_MAGIC, 1, struct ion_handle_data)
-
-/**
- * DOC: ION_IOC_SHARE - creates a file descriptor to use to share an allocation
- *
- * Takes an ion_fd_data struct with the handle field populated with a valid
- * opaque handle.  Returns the struct with the fd field set to a file
- * descriptor open in the current address space.  This file descriptor
- * can then be passed to another process.  The corresponding opaque handle can
- * be retrieved via ION_IOC_IMPORT.
- */
-#define ION_IOC_SHARE		_IOWR(ION_IOC_MAGIC, 4, struct ion_fd_data)
-
-/**
  * DOC: ION_IOC_HEAP_QUERY - information about available heaps
  *
  * Takes an ion_heap_query structure and populates information about

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gal Pressman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ce59b16b4b6eacedaec1f7b652b4781cdbfe15f ]

When wait for firmware init fails, previous code would mistakenly return success and cause inconsistency in the driver state.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ static int mlx5_load_one(struct mlx5_cor
 	if (err) {
 		dev_err(&dev->pdev->dev, "Firmware over %d MS in pre-initializing state, aborting\n",
 			FW_PRE_INIT_TIMEOUT_MILI);
-		goto out;
+		goto out_err;
 	}
 
 	err = mlx5_cmd_init(dev);

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mohamad Haj Yahia <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2a0165a034ac024b60cca49c61e46f4afa2e4d98 ]

Draining the health workqueue will ignore future health works including the one that report hardware failure and thus we can't enter error state Instead cancel the recovery flow and make sure only recovery flow won't be scheduled.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c   |    2 +-
 include/linux/mlx5/driver.h                      |    1 +
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ enum {
 
 enum {
 	MLX5_DROP_NEW_HEALTH_WORK,
+	MLX5_DROP_NEW_RECOVERY_WORK,
 };
 
 static u8 get_nic_state(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)

@@ -193,7 +194,7 @@ static void health_care(struct work_stru
 	mlx5_handle_bad_state(dev);
 
 	spin_lock(&health->wq_lock);
-	if (!test_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_HEALTH_WORK, &health->flags))
+	if (!test_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_RECOVERY_WORK, &health->flags))
 		schedule_delayed_work(&health->recover_work, recover_delay);
 	else
 		dev_err(&dev->pdev->dev,

@@ -313,6 +314,7 @@ void mlx5_start_health_poll(struct mlx5_
 	init_timer(&health->timer);
 	health->sick = 0;
 	clear_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_HEALTH_WORK, &health->flags);
+	clear_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_RECOVERY_WORK, &health->flags);
 	health->health = &dev->iseg->health;
 	health->health_counter = &dev->iseg->health_counter;
 

@@ -335,11 +337,22 @@ void mlx5_drain_health_wq(struct mlx5_co
 
 	spin_lock(&health->wq_lock);
 	set_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_HEALTH_WORK, &health->flags);
+	set_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_RECOVERY_WORK, &health->flags);
 	spin_unlock(&health->wq_lock);
 	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&health->recover_work);
 	cancel_work_sync(&health->work);
 }
 
+void mlx5_drain_health_recovery(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
+{
+	struct mlx5_core_health *health = &dev->priv.health;
+
+	spin_lock(&health->wq_lock);
+	set_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_RECOVERY_WORK, &health->flags);
+	spin_unlock(&health->wq_lock);
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&dev->priv.health.recover_work);
+}
+
 void mlx5_health_cleanup(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
 {
 	struct mlx5_core_health *health = &dev->priv.health;

@@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ static int mlx5_unload_one(struct mlx5_c
 	int err = 0;
 
 	if (cleanup)
-		mlx5_drain_health_wq(dev);
+		mlx5_drain_health_recovery(dev);
 
 	mutex_lock(&dev->intf_state_mutex);
 	if (test_bit(MLX5_INTERFACE_STATE_DOWN, &dev->intf_state)) {

@@ -925,6 +925,7 @@ int mlx5_health_init(struct mlx5_core_de
 void mlx5_start_health_poll(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev);
 void mlx5_stop_health_poll(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev);
 void mlx5_drain_health_wq(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev);
+void mlx5_drain_health_recovery(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev);
 int mlx5_buf_alloc_node(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, int size,
 			struct mlx5_buf *buf, int node);
 int mlx5_buf_alloc(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, int size, struct mlx5_buf *buf);

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gal Pressman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ff93de7668bd81bc8efa819d1184ebd48fae72d ]

Symbol error during carrier counter from PPCNT was mistakenly reported as TX carrier errors in get_stats ndo, although it's an RX counter.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

@@ -3053,8 +3053,6 @@ mlx5e_get_stats(struct net_device *dev,
 		PPORT_802_3_GET(pstats, a_frame_check_sequence_errors);
 	stats->rx_frame_errors = PPORT_802_3_GET(pstats, a_alignment_errors);
 	stats->tx_aborted_errors = PPORT_2863_GET(pstats, if_out_discards);
-	stats->tx_carrier_errors =
-		PPORT_802_3_GET(pstats, a_symbol_error_during_carrier);
 	stats->rx_errors = stats->rx_length_errors + stats->rx_crc_errors +
 			   stats->rx_frame_errors;
 	stats->tx_errors = stats->tx_aborted_errors + stats->tx_carrier_errors;

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ec8add2a4c9df723c94a863b8fcd6d93c472deed ]

Currently, when the link for $DEV is down, this command succeeds but the address is removed immediately by DAD (1):

    ip addr add 1111::12/64 dev $DEV valid_lft 3600 preferred_lft 1800

In the same situation, this will succeed and not remove the address (2):

    ip addr add 1111::12/64 dev $DEV
    ip addr change 1111::12/64 dev $DEV valid_lft 3600 preferred_lft 1800

The comment in addrconf_dad_begin() when !IF_READY makes it look like this is the intended behavior, but doesn't explain why:

* If the device is not ready:
* - keep it tentative if it is a permanent address.
* - otherwise, kill it.

We clearly cannot prevent userspace from doing (2), but we can make (1) work consistently with (2).

addrconf_dad_stop() is only called in two cases: if DAD failed, or to skip DAD when the link is down. In that second case, the fix is to avoid deleting the address, like we already do for permanent addresses.

---
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c |   18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

@@ -1912,15 +1912,7 @@ static void addrconf_dad_stop(struct ine
 	if (dad_failed)
 		ifp->flags |= IFA_F_DADFAILED;
 
-	if (ifp->flags&IFA_F_PERMANENT) {
-		spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
-		addrconf_del_dad_work(ifp);
-		ifp->flags |= IFA_F_TENTATIVE;
-		spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
-		if (dad_failed)
-			ipv6_ifa_notify(0, ifp);
-		in6_ifa_put(ifp);
-	} else if (ifp->flags&IFA_F_TEMPORARY) {
+	if (ifp->flags&IFA_F_TEMPORARY) {
 		struct inet6_ifaddr *ifpub;
 		spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
 		ifpub = ifp->ifpub;

@@ -1933,6 +1925,14 @@ static void addrconf_dad_stop(struct ine
 			spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
 		}
 		ipv6_del_addr(ifp);
+	} else if (ifp->flags&IFA_F_PERMANENT || !dad_failed) {
+		spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
+		addrconf_del_dad_work(ifp);
+		ifp->flags |= IFA_F_TENTATIVE;
+		spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
+		if (dad_failed)
+			ipv6_ifa_notify(0, ifp);
+		in6_ifa_put(ifp);
 	} else {
 		ipv6_del_addr(ifp);
 	}

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 69e766612c4bcb79e19cebed9eed61d4222c1d47 ]

It's not a good idea to add the same hlist_node to two different hash lists. This leads to various hard to debug memory corruptions.

---
 drivers/net/vxlan.c |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
 include/net/vxlan.h |   10 +++++++++-
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

@@ -228,15 +228,15 @@ static struct vxlan_sock *vxlan_find_soc
 
 static struct vxlan_dev *vxlan_vs_find_vni(struct vxlan_sock *vs, __be32 vni)
 {
-	struct vxlan_dev *vxlan;
+	struct vxlan_dev_node *node;
 
 	/* For flow based devices, map all packets to VNI 0 */
 	if (vs->flags & VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA)
 		vni = 0;
 
-	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(vxlan, vni_head(vs, vni), hlist) {
-		if (vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni == vni)
-			return vxlan;
+	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, vni_head(vs, vni), hlist) {
+		if (node->vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni == vni)
+			return node->vxlan;
 	}
 
 	return NULL;

@@ -2365,17 +2365,22 @@ static void vxlan_vs_del_dev(struct vxla
 	struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(vxlan->net, vxlan_net_id);
 
 	spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
-	hlist_del_init_rcu(&vxlan->hlist);
+	hlist_del_init_rcu(&vxlan->hlist4.hlist);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	hlist_del_init_rcu(&vxlan->hlist6.hlist);
+#endif
 	spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
 }
 
-static void vxlan_vs_add_dev(struct vxlan_sock *vs, struct vxlan_dev *vxlan)
+static void vxlan_vs_add_dev(struct vxlan_sock *vs, struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
+			     struct vxlan_dev_node *node)
 {
 	struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(vxlan->net, vxlan_net_id);
 	__be32 vni = vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni;
 
+	node->vxlan = vxlan;
 	spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
-	hlist_add_head_rcu(&vxlan->hlist, vni_head(vs, vni));
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->hlist, vni_head(vs, vni));
 	spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
 }
 

@@ -2819,6 +2824,7 @@ static int __vxlan_sock_add(struct vxlan
 {
 	struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(vxlan->net, vxlan_net_id);
 	struct vxlan_sock *vs = NULL;
+	struct vxlan_dev_node *node;
 
 	if (!vxlan->cfg.no_share) {
 		spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);

@@ -2836,12 +2842,16 @@ static int __vxlan_sock_add(struct vxlan
 	if (IS_ERR(vs))
 		return PTR_ERR(vs);
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-	if (ipv6)
+	if (ipv6) {
 		rcu_assign_pointer(vxlan->vn6_sock, vs);
-	else
+		node = &vxlan->hlist6;
+	} else
 #endif
+	{
 		rcu_assign_pointer(vxlan->vn4_sock, vs);
-	vxlan_vs_add_dev(vs, vxlan);
+		node = &vxlan->hlist4;
+	}
+	vxlan_vs_add_dev(vs, vxlan, node);
 	return 0;
 }
 

@@ -221,9 +221,17 @@ struct vxlan_config {
 	bool			no_share;
 };
 
+struct vxlan_dev_node {
+	struct hlist_node hlist;
+	struct vxlan_dev *vxlan;
+};
+
 /* Pseudo network device */
 struct vxlan_dev {
-	struct hlist_node hlist;	/* vni hash table */
+	struct vxlan_dev_node hlist4;	/* vni hash table for IPv4 socket */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	struct vxlan_dev_node hlist6;	/* vni hash table for IPv6 socket */
+#endif
 	struct list_head  next;		/* vxlan's per namespace list */
 	struct vxlan_sock __rcu *vn4_sock;	/* listening socket for IPv4 */
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alban Browaeys <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9af9959e142c274f4a30fefb71d97d2b028b337f ]

commit 9256645af098 ("net/core: relax BUILD_BUG_ON in netdev_stats_to_stats64") made an attempt to read beyond the size of the source a possibility.

Fix to only copy src size to dest. As dest might be bigger than src.

==================================================================

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in netdev_stats_to_stats64+0xe/0x30 at addr ffff8801be248b20
 Read of size 192 by task VBoxNetAdpCtl/6734
 CPU: 1 PID: 6734 Comm: VBoxNetAdpCtl Tainted: G           O    4.11.4prahal+intel+ #118
 Hardware name: LENOVO 20CDCTO1WW/20CDCTO1WW, BIOS GQET52WW (1.32 ) 05/04/2017
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x63/0x86
  kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70
  kasan_report+0x270/0x520
  ? netdev_stats_to_stats64+0xe/0x30
  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x1b/0x190
  ? __module_address+0x3e/0x3b0
  ? unwind_next_frame+0x1ea/0xb00
  check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
  memcpy+0x23/0x50
  netdev_stats_to_stats64+0xe/0x30
  dev_get_stats+0x1b9/0x230
  rtnl_fill_stats+0x44/0xc00
  ? nla_put+0xc6/0x130
  rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xe9e/0x3700
  ? rtnl_fill_vfinfo+0xde0/0xde0
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock_local+0x120/0x130
  ? __module_address+0x3e/0x3b0
  ? unwind_next_frame+0x1ea/0xb00
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x1b/0x190
  ? VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  ? depot_save_stack+0x1d8/0x4a0
  ? depot_save_stack+0x34f/0x4a0
  ? depot_save_stack+0x34f/0x4a0
  ? save_stack+0xb1/0xd0
  ? save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0
  ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x10d/0x350
  ? __kmalloc_reserve.isra.36+0x2c/0xc0
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x61/0x120
  ? rtmsg_ifinfo.part.25+0x16/0xb0
  ? rtmsg_ifinfo+0x47/0x70
  ? register_netdev+0x15/0x30
  ? vboxNetAdpOsCreate+0xc0/0x1c0 [vboxnetadp]
  ? vboxNetAdpCreate+0x210/0x400 [vboxnetadp]
  ? VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x17f/0xff0
  ? SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
  ? do_syscall_64+0x182/0x390
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  ? init_object+0x64/0xa0
  ? ___slab_alloc+0x1ae/0x5c0
  ? ___slab_alloc+0x1ae/0x5c0
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x246/0x350
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
  ? memset+0x31/0x40
  ? __alloc_skb+0x31f/0x560
  ? napi_consume_skb+0x320/0x320
  ? br_get_link_af_size_filtered+0xb7/0x120 [bridge]
  ? if_nlmsg_size+0x440/0x630
  rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x83/0x120
  rtmsg_ifinfo.part.25+0x16/0xb0
  rtmsg_ifinfo+0x47/0x70
  register_netdevice+0xa2b/0xe50
  ? __kmalloc+0x171/0x2d0
  ? netdev_change_features+0x80/0x80
  register_netdev+0x15/0x30
  vboxNetAdpOsCreate+0xc0/0x1c0 [vboxnetadp]
  vboxNetAdpCreate+0x210/0x400 [vboxnetadp]
  ? vboxNetAdpComposeMACAddress+0x1d0/0x1d0 [vboxnetadp]
  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
  VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  ? VBoxNetAdpLinuxOpen+0x20/0x20 [vboxnetadp]
  ? lock_acquire+0x11c/0x270
  ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x2fb/0x660
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x17f/0xff0
  ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x2fb/0x660
  ? ioctl_preallocate+0x1d0/0x1d0
  ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x2fb/0x660
  ? kmem_cache_free+0xb2/0x250
  ? syscall_trace_enter+0x537/0xd00
  ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x100/0x100
  SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
  ? do_sys_open+0x350/0x350
  ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xff0/0xff0
  do_syscall_64+0x182/0x390
  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
 RIP: 0033:0x7f7e39a1ae07
 RSP: 002b:00007ffc6f04c6d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc6f04c730 RCX: 00007f7e39a1ae07
 RDX: 00007ffc6f04c730 RSI: 00000000c0207601 RDI: 0000000000000007
 RBP: 00007ffc6f04c700 R08: 00007ffc6f04c780 R09: 0000000000000008
 R10: 0000000000000541 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000007
 R13: 00000000c0207601 R14: 00007ffc6f04c730 R15: 0000000000000012
 Object at ffff8801be248008, in cache kmalloc-4096 size: 4096
 Allocated:
 PID = 6734
  save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
  kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
  __kmalloc+0x171/0x2d0
  alloc_netdev_mqs+0x8a7/0xbe0
  vboxNetAdpOsCreate+0x65/0x1c0 [vboxnetadp]
  vboxNetAdpCreate+0x210/0x400 [vboxnetadp]
  VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x17f/0xff0
  SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x182/0x390
  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
 Freed:
 PID = 5600
  save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
  kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0
  kfree+0xe4/0x220
  kvfree+0x25/0x30
  single_release+0x74/0xb0
  __fput+0x265/0x6b0
  ____fput+0x9/0x10
  task_work_run+0xd5/0x150
  exit_to_usermode_loop+0xe2/0x100
  do_syscall_64+0x26c/0x390
  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff8801be248a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff8801be248b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff8801be248b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 fc fc fc fc
                                                     ^
  ffff8801be248c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  ffff8801be248c80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ==================================================================

---
 net/core/dev.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -7751,7 +7751,7 @@ void netdev_stats_to_stats64(struct rtnl
 {
 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*stats64) < sizeof(*netdev_stats));
-	memcpy(stats64, netdev_stats, sizeof(*stats64));
+	memcpy(stats64, netdev_stats, sizeof(*netdev_stats));
 	/* zero out counters that only exist in rtnl_link_stats64 */
 	memset((char *)stats64 + sizeof(*netdev_stats), 0,
 	       sizeof(*stats64) - sizeof(*netdev_stats));

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Derek Chickles <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 05a6b4cae8c0cc1680c9dd33a97a49a13c0f01bc ]

The code that detects a failed soft reset of Octeon is comparing the wrong value against the reset value of the Octeon SLI_SCRATCH_1 register, resulting in an inability to detect a soft reset failure. Fix it by using the correct value in the comparison, which is any non-zero value.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn23xx_pf_device.c |    2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_device.c    |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static int cn23xx_pf_soft_reset(struct o
 	/* Wait for 100ms as Octeon resets. */
 	mdelay(100);
 
-	if (octeon_read_csr64(oct, CN23XX_SLI_SCRATCH1) == 0x1234ULL) {
+	if (octeon_read_csr64(oct, CN23XX_SLI_SCRATCH1)) {
 		dev_err(&oct->pci_dev->dev, "OCTEON[%d]: Soft reset failed\n",
 			oct->octeon_id);
 		return 1;

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ int lio_cn6xxx_soft_reset(struct octeon_
 	/* Wait for 10ms as Octeon resets. */
 	mdelay(100);
 
-	if (octeon_read_csr64(oct, CN6XXX_SLI_SCRATCH1) == 0x1234ULL) {
+	if (octeon_read_csr64(oct, CN6XXX_SLI_SCRATCH1)) {
 		dev_err(&oct->pci_dev->dev, "Soft reset failed\n");
 		return 1;
 	}

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f630c38ef0d785101363a8992bbd4f302180f86f ]

When destroying a VRF device we cleanup the slaves in its ndo_uninit() function, but that causes packets to be switched (skb->dev == vrf being destroyed) even though we're pass the point where the VRF should be receiving any packets while it is being dismantled. This causes a BUG_ON to trigger if we have raw sockets (trace below).
The reason is that the inetdev of the VRF has been destroyed but we're still sending packets up the stack with it, so let's free the slaves in the dellink callback as David Ahern suggested.

Note that this fix doesn't prevent packets from going up when the VRF device is admin down.

[   35.631371] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   35.631603] kernel BUG at net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:285!
[   35.631854] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[   35.631977] Modules linked in:
[   35.632081] CPU: 2 PID: 22 Comm: ksoftirqd/2 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7+ #45
[   35.632247] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014
[   35.632477] task: ffff88005ad68000 task.stack: ffff88005ad64000
[   35.632632] RIP: 0010:fib_compute_spec_dst+0xfc/0x1ee
[   35.632769] RSP: 0018:ffff88005ad67978 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   35.632910] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff880059a7f200 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   35.633084] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffff82274af0
[   35.633256] RBP: ffff88005ad679f8 R08: 000000000001ef70 R09: 0000000000000046
[   35.633430] R10: ffff88005ad679f8 R11: ffff880037731cb0 R12: 0000000000000001
[   35.633603] R13: ffff8800599e3000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8800599cb852
[   35.634114] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88005d900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   35.634306] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   35.634456] CR2: 00007f3563227095 CR3: 000000000201d000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
[   35.634632] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   35.634865] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   35.635055] Call Trace:
[   35.635271]  ? __lock_acquire+0xf0d/0x1117
[   35.635522]  ipv4_pktinfo_prepare+0x82/0x151
[   35.635831]  raw_rcv_skb+0x17/0x3c
[   35.636062]  raw_rcv+0xe5/0xf7
[   35.636287]  raw_local_deliver+0x169/0x1d9
[   35.636534]  ip_local_deliver_finish+0x87/0x1c4
[   35.636820]  ip_local_deliver+0x63/0x7f
[   35.637058]  ip_rcv_finish+0x340/0x3a1
[   35.637295]  ip_rcv+0x314/0x34a
[   35.637525]  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x49f/0x7c5
[   35.637780]  ? lock_acquire+0x13f/0x1d7
[   35.638018]  ? lock_acquire+0x15e/0x1d7
[   35.638259]  __netif_receive_skb+0x1e/0x94
[   35.638502]  ? __netif_receive_skb+0x1e/0x94
[   35.638748]  netif_receive_skb_internal+0x74/0x300
[   35.639002]  ? dev_gro_receive+0x2ed/0x411
[   35.639246]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xc4/0xd2
[   35.639491]  napi_gro_receive+0x105/0x1a0
[   35.639736]  receive_buf+0xc32/0xc74
[   35.639965]  ? detach_buf+0x67/0x153
[   35.640201]  ? virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0x120/0x176
[   35.640453]  virtnet_poll+0x128/0x1c5
[   35.640690]  net_rx_action+0x103/0x343
[   35.640932]  __do_softirq+0x1c7/0x4b7
[   35.641171]  run_ksoftirqd+0x23/0x5c
[   35.641403]  smpboot_thread_fn+0x24f/0x26d
[   35.641646]  ? sort_range+0x22/0x22
[   35.641878]  kthread+0x129/0x131
[   35.642104]  ? __list_add+0x31/0x31
[   35.642335]  ? __list_add+0x31/0x31
[   35.642568]  ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40
[   35.642804] Code: 05 bd 87 a3 00 01 e8 1f ef 98 ff 4d 85 f6 48 c7 c7 f0 4a 27 82 41 0f 94 c4 31 c9 31 d2 41 0f b6 f4 e8 04 71 a1 ff 45 84 e4 74 02 <0f> 0b 0f b7 93 c4 00 00 00 4d 8b a5 80 05 00 00 48 03 93 d0 00
[   35.644342] RIP: fib_compute_spec_dst+0xfc/0x1ee RSP: ffff88005ad67978

---
 drivers/net/vrf.c |   11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -926,15 +926,10 @@ static int vrf_del_slave(struct net_devi
 static void vrf_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct net_vrf *vrf = netdev_priv(dev);
-	struct net_device *port_dev;
-	struct list_head *iter;
 
 	vrf_rtable_release(dev, vrf);
 	vrf_rt6_release(dev, vrf);
 
-	netdev_for_each_lower_dev(dev, port_dev, iter)
-		vrf_del_slave(dev, port_dev);
-
 	free_percpu(dev->dstats);
 	dev->dstats = NULL;
 }

@@ -1389,6 +1384,12 @@ static int vrf_validate(struct nlattr *t
 
 static void vrf_dellink(struct net_device *dev, struct list_head *head)
 {
+	struct net_device *port_dev;
+	struct list_head *iter;
+
+	netdev_for_each_lower_dev(dev, port_dev, iter)
+		vrf_del_slave(dev, port_dev);
+
 	unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, head);
 }
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 55281621b6047d2ffb934a0b984ab0cdb1ad1d76 ]

---
 drivers/net/virtio_net.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -2221,6 +2221,7 @@ static int virtnet_find_vqs(struct virtn
 	kfree(names);
 	kfree(callbacks);
 	kfree(vqs);
+	kfree(ctx);
 
 	return 0;
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sowmini Varadhan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0933a578cd55b02dc80f219dc8f2efb17ec61c9a ]

There are two problems with calling sock_create_kern() from rds_tcp_accept_one()
1. it sets up a new_sock->sk that is wasteful, because this ->sk is going to get replaced by inet_accept() in the subsequent ->accept()
2. The new_sock->sk is a leaked reference in sock_graft() which expects to find a null parent->sk

Avoid these problems by calling sock_create_lite().

---
 net/rds/tcp_listen.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int rds_tcp_accept_one(struct socket *so
 	if (!sock) /* module unload or netns delete in progress */
 		return -ENETUNREACH;
 
-	ret = sock_create_kern(sock_net(sock->sk), sock->sk->sk_family,
+	ret = sock_create_lite(sock->sk->sk_family,
 			       sock->sk->sk_type, sock->sk->sk_protocol,
 			       &new_sock);
 	if (ret)

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Huy Nguyen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d968f0f2e4404152f37ed2384b4a2269dd2dae5a ]

Latest change in open-lldp code uses bytes 6-11 of perm_addr buffer as the Ethernet source address for the host TLV packet. Since our driver does not fill these bytes, they stay at zero and the open-lldp code ends up sending the TLV packet with zero source address and the switch drops this packet.

The fix is to initialize these bytes to 0xff. The open-lldp code considers 0xff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff as the invalid address and falls back to use the host's mac address as the Ethernet source address.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_dcbnl.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -464,6 +464,8 @@ static void mlx5e_dcbnl_getpermhwaddr(st
 	if (!perm_addr)
 		return;
 
+	memset(perm_addr, 0xff, MAX_ADDR_LEN);
+
 	mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_address(priv->mdev, 0, perm_addr);
 }
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6a146f3a5894b751cef16feb3d7903e45e3c445c ]

Since the introduction of ULD (Upper-Layer Drivers), the MSI-X deallocating path changed in cxgb4: the driver frees the interrupts of ULD when unregistering it or on shutdown PCI handler.

Problem is that if a MSI-X is not freed before deallocated in the PCI layer, it will trigger a BUG() due to still "alive" interrupt being tentatively quiesced.

The below trace was observed when doing a simple unbind of Chelsio's adapter PCI function, like:
"echo 001e:80:00.4 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/cxgb4/unbind"

Trace:

kernel BUG at drivers/pci/msi.c:352!

  Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
  ...
  NIP [c0000000005a5e60] free_msi_irqs+0xa0/0x250
  LR [c0000000005a5e50] free_msi_irqs+0x90/0x250
  Call Trace:
  [c0000000005a5e50] free_msi_irqs+0x90/0x250 (unreliable)
  [c0000000005a72c4] pci_disable_msix+0x124/0x180
  [d000000011e06708] disable_msi+0x88/0xb0 [cxgb4]
  [d000000011e06948] free_some_resources+0xa8/0x160 [cxgb4]
  [d000000011e06d60] remove_one+0x170/0x3c0 [cxgb4]
  [c00000000058a910] pci_device_remove+0x70/0x110
  [c00000000064ef04] device_release_driver_internal+0x1f4/0x2c0
  ...

This patch fixes the issue by refactoring the shutdown path of ULD on cxgb4 driver, by properly freeing and disabling interrupts on PCI remove handler too.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_main.c |   16 ++++++---
 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_uld.c  |   42 ++++++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

@@ -2055,12 +2055,12 @@ static void detach_ulds(struct adapter *
 
 	mutex_lock(&uld_mutex);
 	list_del(&adap->list_node);
+
 	for (i = 0; i < CXGB4_ULD_MAX; i++)
-		if (adap->uld && adap->uld[i].handle) {
+		if (adap->uld && adap->uld[i].handle)
 			adap->uld[i].state_change(adap->uld[i].handle,
 					     CXGB4_STATE_DETACH);
-			adap->uld[i].handle = NULL;
-		}
+
 	if (netevent_registered && list_empty(&adapter_list)) {
 		unregister_netevent_notifier(&cxgb4_netevent_nb);
 		netevent_registered = false;

@@ -5086,8 +5086,10 @@ static void remove_one(struct pci_dev *p
 		 */
 		destroy_workqueue(adapter->workq);
 
-		if (is_uld(adapter))
+		if (is_uld(adapter)) {
 			detach_ulds(adapter);
+			t4_uld_clean_up(adapter);
+		}
 
 		disable_interrupts(adapter);
 

@@ -5164,7 +5166,11 @@ static void shutdown_one(struct pci_dev
 			if (adapter->port[i]->reg_state == NETREG_REGISTERED)
 				cxgb_close(adapter->port[i]);
 
-		t4_uld_clean_up(adapter);
+		if (is_uld(adapter)) {
+			detach_ulds(adapter);
+			t4_uld_clean_up(adapter);
+		}
+
 		disable_interrupts(adapter);
 		disable_msi(adapter);
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: WANG Cong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ffa423fb3251f8737303ffc3b0659e86e501808e ]

We are not allowed to block on the RCU reader side, so can't just hold the mutex as before. As a quick fix, convert it to a spinlock.

---
 drivers/net/tap.c |   18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ struct major_info {
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
 	dev_t major;
 	struct idr minor_idr;
-	struct mutex minor_lock;
+	spinlock_t minor_lock;
 	const char *device_name;
 	struct list_head next;
 };

@@ -416,15 +416,15 @@ int tap_get_minor(dev_t major, struct ta
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
-	mutex_lock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
-	retval = idr_alloc(&tap_major->minor_idr, tap, 1, TAP_NUM_DEVS, GFP_KERNEL);
+	spin_lock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
+	retval = idr_alloc(&tap_major->minor_idr, tap, 1, TAP_NUM_DEVS, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (retval >= 0) {
 		tap->minor = retval;
 	} else if (retval == -ENOSPC) {
 		netdev_err(tap->dev, "Too many tap devices\n");
 		retval = -EINVAL;
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
+	spin_unlock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
 
 unlock:
 	rcu_read_unlock();

@@ -442,12 +442,12 @@ void tap_free_minor(dev_t major, struct
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
-	mutex_lock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
+	spin_lock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
 	if (tap->minor) {
 		idr_remove(&tap_major->minor_idr, tap->minor);
 		tap->minor = 0;
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
+	spin_unlock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
 
 unlock:
 	rcu_read_unlock();

@@ -467,13 +467,13 @@ static struct tap_dev *dev_get_by_tap_fi
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
-	mutex_lock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
+	spin_lock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
 	tap = idr_find(&tap_major->minor_idr, minor);
 	if (tap) {
 		dev = tap->dev;
 		dev_hold(dev);
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
+	spin_unlock(&tap_major->minor_lock);
 
 unlock:
 	rcu_read_unlock();

@@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ static int tap_list_add(dev_t major, con
 	tap_major->major = MAJOR(major);
 
 	idr_init(&tap_major->minor_idr);
-	mutex_init(&tap_major->minor_lock);
+	spin_lock_init(&tap_major->minor_lock);
 
 	tap_major->device_name = device_name;
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eduardo Valentin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1bfb159673957644951ab0a8d2aec44b93ddb1ae ]

We currently get the following kmemleak report:
unreferenced object 0xffff8800039d9820 (size 32):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4295212383 (age 792.416s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):

    00 0c e0 03 00 88 ff ff ff 02 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 01 ff 11 00 02 86 dd 00 00 ff ff ff ff  ................
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff8152b4aa>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
    [<ffffffff811d8ec8>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xb8/0x1c0
    [<ffffffffa0389683>] __br_mdb_notify+0x2a3/0x300 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa038a0ce>] br_mdb_notify+0x6e/0x70 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa0386479>] br_multicast_add_group+0x109/0x150 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa0386518>] br_ip6_multicast_add_group+0x58/0x60 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa0387fb5>] br_multicast_rcv+0x1d5/0xdb0 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa037d7cf>] br_handle_frame_finish+0xcf/0x510 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa03a236b>] br_nf_hook_thresh.part.27+0xb/0x10 [br_netfilter]
    [<ffffffffa03a3738>] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x48/0xb0 [br_netfilter]
    [<ffffffffa03a3fb9>] br_nf_pre_routing_finish_ipv6+0x109/0x1d0 [br_netfilter]
    [<ffffffffa03a4400>] br_nf_pre_routing_ipv6+0xd0/0x14c [br_netfilter]
    [<ffffffffa03a3c27>] br_nf_pre_routing+0x197/0x3d0 [br_netfilter]
    [<ffffffff814a2952>] nf_iterate+0x52/0x60
    [<ffffffff814a29bc>] nf_hook_slow+0x5c/0xb0
    [<ffffffffa037ddf4>] br_handle_frame+0x1a4/0x2c0 [bridge]

This happens when switchdev_port_obj_add() fails. This patch frees complete_info object in the fail path.

---
 net/bridge/br_mdb.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -323,7 +323,8 @@ static void __br_mdb_notify(struct net_d
 			__mdb_entry_to_br_ip(entry, &complete_info->ip);
 			mdb.obj.complete_priv = complete_info;
 			mdb.obj.complete = br_mdb_complete;
-			switchdev_port_obj_add(port_dev, &mdb.obj);
+			if (switchdev_port_obj_add(port_dev, &mdb.obj))
+				kfree(complete_info);
 		}
 	} else if (port_dev && type == RTM_DELMDB) {
 		switchdev_port_obj_del(port_dev, &mdb.obj);

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bert Kenward <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c70d68150f71b84cea6997a53493e17bf18a54db ]

If we have more than 32 unicast MAC addresses assigned to an interface we will read beyond the end of the address table in the driver when adding filters. The next 256 entries store multicast addresses, so we will end up attempting to insert duplicate filters, which is mostly harmless. If we add more than 288 unicast addresses we will then read past the multicast address table, which is likely to be more exciting.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c |    8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -5034,12 +5034,9 @@ static void efx_ef10_filter_uc_addr_list
 	struct efx_ef10_filter_table *table = efx->filter_state;
 	struct net_device *net_dev = efx->net_dev;
 	struct netdev_hw_addr *uc;
-	int addr_count;
 	unsigned int i;
 
-	addr_count = netdev_uc_count(net_dev);
 	table->uc_promisc = !!(net_dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC);
-	table->dev_uc_count = 1 + addr_count;
 	ether_addr_copy(table->dev_uc_list[0].addr, net_dev->dev_addr);
 	i = 1;
 	netdev_for_each_uc_addr(uc, net_dev) {

@@ -5050,6 +5047,8 @@ static void efx_ef10_filter_uc_addr_list
 		ether_addr_copy(table->dev_uc_list[i].addr, uc->addr);
 		i++;
 	}
+
+	table->dev_uc_count = i;
 }
 
 static void efx_ef10_filter_mc_addr_list(struct efx_nic *efx)

@@ -5057,12 +5056,11 @@ static void efx_ef10_filter_mc_addr_list
 	struct efx_ef10_filter_table *table = efx->filter_state;
 	struct net_device *net_dev = efx->net_dev;
 	struct netdev_hw_addr *mc;
-	unsigned int i, addr_count;
+	unsigned int i;
 
 	table->mc_overflow = false;
 	table->mc_promisc = !!(net_dev->flags & (IFF_PROMISC | IFF_ALLMULTI));
 
-	addr_count = netdev_mc_count(net_dev);
 	i = 0;
 	netdev_for_each_mc_addr(mc, net_dev) {
 		if (i >= EFX_EF10_FILTER_DEV_MC_MAX) {

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nagarathnam Muthusamy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bdca8cc096203b17ad0ac4e19f50578207e054d2 ]

This patch adds the prototypes of assembly defined functions to asm-prototypes.h. Some prototypes are directly added as they are not present in any existing header files.

---
 arch/sparc/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h |   24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/sparc/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <asm/xor.h>
+#include <asm/checksum.h>
+#include <asm/trap_block.h>
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/ftrace.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/oplib.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+
+void *__memscan_zero(void *, size_t);
+void *__memscan_generic(void *, int, size_t);
+void *__bzero(void *, size_t);
+void VISenter(void); /* Dummy prototype to supress warning */
+#undef memcpy
+#undef memset
+void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n);
+void *memset(void *s, int c, size_t n);
+typedef int TItype __attribute__((mode(TI)));
+TItype __multi3(TItype a, TItype b);

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nagarathnam Muthusamy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d16c0649feb4fe4e814f44803df5a617769c3233 ]

The following regex in Makefile.build matches only one ___EXPORT_SYMBOL per line.

sed 's/.*___EXPORT_SYMBOL[[:space:]]*\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)[[:space:]]*,.*/EXPORT_SYMBOL(\1);/'

ATOMIC_OPS macro in atomic_64.S expands multiple symbols in same line hence version generation is done only for the last matched symbol. This patch adds new line between the symbol expansions.

---
 arch/sparc/lib/atomic_64.S |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

@@ -62,19 +62,23 @@ ENTRY(atomic_fetch_##op) /* %o0 = increm
 ENDPROC(atomic_fetch_##op);						\
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(atomic_fetch_##op);
 
-#define ATOMIC_OPS(op) ATOMIC_OP(op) ATOMIC_OP_RETURN(op) ATOMIC_FETCH_OP(op)
+ATOMIC_OP(add)
+ATOMIC_OP_RETURN(add)
+ATOMIC_FETCH_OP(add)
+
+ATOMIC_OP(sub)
+ATOMIC_OP_RETURN(sub)
+ATOMIC_FETCH_OP(sub)
 
-ATOMIC_OPS(add)
-ATOMIC_OPS(sub)
+ATOMIC_OP(and)
+ATOMIC_FETCH_OP(and)
 
-#undef ATOMIC_OPS
-#define ATOMIC_OPS(op) ATOMIC_OP(op) ATOMIC_FETCH_OP(op)
+ATOMIC_OP(or)
+ATOMIC_FETCH_OP(or)
 
-ATOMIC_OPS(and)
-ATOMIC_OPS(or)
-ATOMIC_OPS(xor)
+ATOMIC_OP(xor)
+ATOMIC_FETCH_OP(xor)
 
-#undef ATOMIC_OPS
 #undef ATOMIC_FETCH_OP
 #undef ATOMIC_OP_RETURN
 #undef ATOMIC_OP

@@ -124,19 +128,23 @@ ENTRY(atomic64_fetch_##op) /* %o0 = incr
 ENDPROC(atomic64_fetch_##op);						\
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(atomic64_fetch_##op);
 
-#define ATOMIC64_OPS(op) ATOMIC64_OP(op) ATOMIC64_OP_RETURN(op) ATOMIC64_FETCH_OP(op)
+ATOMIC64_OP(add)
+ATOMIC64_OP_RETURN(add)
+ATOMIC64_FETCH_OP(add)
+
+ATOMIC64_OP(sub)
+ATOMIC64_OP_RETURN(sub)
+ATOMIC64_FETCH_OP(sub)
 
-ATOMIC64_OPS(add)
-ATOMIC64_OPS(sub)
+ATOMIC64_OP(and)
+ATOMIC64_FETCH_OP(and)
 
-#undef ATOMIC64_OPS
-#define ATOMIC64_OPS(op) ATOMIC64_OP(op) ATOMIC64_FETCH_OP(op)
+ATOMIC64_OP(or)
+ATOMIC64_FETCH_OP(or)
 
-ATOMIC64_OPS(and)
-ATOMIC64_OPS(or)
-ATOMIC64_OPS(xor)
+ATOMIC64_OP(xor)
+ATOMIC64_FETCH_OP(xor)
 
-#undef ATOMIC64_OPS
 #undef ATOMIC64_FETCH_OP
 #undef ATOMIC64_OP_RETURN
 #undef ATOMIC64_OP

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nagarathnam Muthusamy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f5a651f1d5e524cab345250a783702fb6a3f14d6 ]

Missing symbol type for few functions prevents genksyms from generating symbol versions for those functions. This patch fixes them.

---
 arch/sparc/lib/checksum_64.S |    1 +
 arch/sparc/lib/csum_copy.S   |    1 +
 arch/sparc/lib/memscan_64.S  |    2 ++
 arch/sparc/lib/memset.S      |    1 +
 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ csum_partial_fix_alignment:
 
 	.align		32
 	.globl		csum_partial
+	.type		csum_partial,#function
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(csum_partial)
 csum_partial:		/* %o0=buff, %o1=len, %o2=sum */
 	prefetch	[%o0 + 0x000], #n_reads

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
 	 add		%o5, %o4, %o4
 
 	.globl		FUNC_NAME
+	.type		FUNC_NAME,#function
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(FUNC_NAME)
 FUNC_NAME:		/* %o0=src, %o1=dst, %o2=len, %o3=sum */
 	LOAD(prefetch, %o0 + 0x000, #n_reads)

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 	.text
 	.align	32
 	.globl		__memscan_zero, __memscan_generic
+	.type		__memscan_zero,#function
+	.type		__memscan_generic,#function
 	.globl		memscan
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__memscan_zero)
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__memscan_generic)

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
 __bzero_begin:
 
 	.globl	__bzero
+	.type	__bzero,#function
 	.globl	memset
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(__bzero)
 	EXPORT_SYMBOL(memset)

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nitin Gupta <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dbd2667a4fb9ce4f547982b07cd69dda127c47ea ]

The function assumes that each PMD points to head of a huge page. This is not correct as a PMD can point to start of any 8M region with a, say 256M, hugepage. The fix ensures that it points to the correct head of any PMD huge page.

---
 arch/sparc/mm/gup.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ static int gup_huge_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd
 		return 0;
 
 	refs = 0;
-	head = pmd_page(pmd);
-	page = head + ((addr & ~PMD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	page = pmd_page(pmd) + ((addr & ~PMD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	head = compound_head(page);
 	do {
 		VM_BUG_ON(compound_head(page) != head);
 		pages[*nr] = page;

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christophe Jaillet <[email protected]>

commit 57c00f2fac512837f8de73474ec1f54020015bae upstream.

If 'wiphy_new()' fails, we leak 'ops'. Add a new label in the error handling path to free it in such a case.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -6855,7 +6855,7 @@ struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *brcmf_cfg802
 	wiphy = wiphy_new(ops, sizeof(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info));
 	if (!wiphy) {
 		brcmf_err("Could not allocate wiphy device\n");
-		return NULL;
+		goto ops_out;
 	}
 	memcpy(wiphy->perm_addr, drvr->mac, ETH_ALEN);
 	set_wiphy_dev(wiphy, busdev);

@@ -6998,6 +6998,7 @@ priv_out:
 	ifp->vif = NULL;
 wiphy_out:
 	brcmf_free_wiphy(wiphy);
+ops_out:
 	kfree(ops);
 	return NULL;
 }

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter S. Housel <[email protected]>

commit 5ea59db8a375216e6c915c5586f556766673b5a7 upstream.

An earlier change to this function (3bdae810721b) fixed a leak in the case of an unsuccessful call to brcmf_sdiod_buffrw(). However, the glom_skb buffer, used for emulating a scattering read, is never used or referenced after its contents are copied into the destination buffers, and therefore always needs to be freed by the end of the function.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c |    7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ done:
 int brcmf_sdiod_recv_chain(struct brcmf_sdio_dev *sdiodev,
 			   struct sk_buff_head *pktq, uint totlen)
 {
-	struct sk_buff *glom_skb;
+	struct sk_buff *glom_skb = NULL;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	u32 addr = sdiodev->sbwad;
 	int err = 0;

@@ -727,10 +727,8 @@ int brcmf_sdiod_recv_chain(struct brcmf_
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		err = brcmf_sdiod_buffrw(sdiodev, SDIO_FUNC_2, false, addr,
 					 glom_skb);
-		if (err) {
-			brcmu_pkt_buf_free_skb(glom_skb);
+		if (err)
 			goto done;
-		}
 
 		skb_queue_walk(pktq, skb) {
 			memcpy(skb->data, glom_skb->data, skb->len);

@@ -741,6 +739,7 @@ int brcmf_sdiod_recv_chain(struct brcmf_
 					    pktq);
 
 done:
+	brcmu_pkt_buf_free_skb(glom_skb);
 	return err;
 }
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>

commit 6c64447ec58b0bac612732303f7ab04562124587 upstream.

The current approach, which is the wholesale efi struct initialization from a 'efi_xen' local template is not robust. Usually if new member is defined then it is properly initialized in drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c, but not in arch/x86/xen/efi.c.

The effect is that the Xen initialization clears any fields the generic code might have set and the Xen code does not know about yet.

I saw this happen a few times, so let's initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen and maintain no local duplicate, to avoid such issues in the future.

---
 arch/x86/xen/efi.c |   45 ++++++++++++---------------------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

@@ -54,38 +54,6 @@ static efi_system_table_t efi_systab_xen
 	.tables		= EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR  /* Initialized later. */
 };
 
-static const struct efi efi_xen __initconst = {
-	.systab                   = NULL, /* Initialized later. */
-	.runtime_version	  = 0,    /* Initialized later. */
-	.mps                      = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.acpi                     = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.acpi20                   = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.smbios                   = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.smbios3                  = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.sal_systab               = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.boot_info                = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.hcdp                     = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.uga                      = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.uv_systab                = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.fw_vendor                = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.runtime                  = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.config_table             = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
-	.get_time                 = xen_efi_get_time,
-	.set_time                 = xen_efi_set_time,
-	.get_wakeup_time          = xen_efi_get_wakeup_time,
-	.set_wakeup_time          = xen_efi_set_wakeup_time,
-	.get_variable             = xen_efi_get_variable,
-	.get_next_variable        = xen_efi_get_next_variable,
-	.set_variable             = xen_efi_set_variable,
-	.query_variable_info      = xen_efi_query_variable_info,
-	.update_capsule           = xen_efi_update_capsule,
-	.query_capsule_caps       = xen_efi_query_capsule_caps,
-	.get_next_high_mono_count = xen_efi_get_next_high_mono_count,
-	.reset_system             = xen_efi_reset_system,
-	.set_virtual_address_map  = NULL, /* Not used under Xen. */
-	.flags			  = 0     /* Initialized later. */
-};
-
 static efi_system_table_t __init *xen_efi_probe(void)
 {
 	struct xen_platform_op op = {

@@ -102,7 +70,18 @@ static efi_system_table_t __init *xen_ef
 
 	/* Here we know that Xen runs on EFI platform. */
 
-	efi = efi_xen;
+	efi.get_time                 = xen_efi_get_time;
+	efi.set_time                 = xen_efi_set_time;
+	efi.get_wakeup_time          = xen_efi_get_wakeup_time;
+	efi.set_wakeup_time          = xen_efi_set_wakeup_time;
+	efi.get_variable             = xen_efi_get_variable;
+	efi.get_next_variable        = xen_efi_get_next_variable;
+	efi.set_variable             = xen_efi_set_variable;
+	efi.query_variable_info      = xen_efi_query_variable_info;
+	efi.update_capsule           = xen_efi_update_capsule;
+	efi.query_capsule_caps       = xen_efi_query_capsule_caps;
+	efi.get_next_high_mono_count = xen_efi_get_next_high_mono_count;
+	efi.reset_system             = xen_efi_reset_system;
 
 	efi_systab_xen.tables = info->cfg.addr;
 	efi_systab_xen.nr_tables = info->cfg.nent;

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Hey Greg,

Why did you skip this patch for 4.11? IMO it should be applied there too.

Daniel

Are you sure it actually applied? (hint, it did not...)

If you want it in 4.11, or older kernels, please provide a working backport.

thanks,

greg k-h

And, in the future, if you want it to be applied to older kernels, or be notified if it can not be, please add a kernel version number in the stable marking:

	Cc: [email protected] # 4.0+

or use the Fixes: tag:
Fixes: SHASHAHSA ("short description")
which I pick up on and let you know if the patch does not actually apply back to the kernel that the fixes: tag was in.

hope this helps,

greg k-h

Sure thing! Thanks a lot!

Daniel

Sure thing! Thanks a lot!

Daniel

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And, in the future, if you want it to be applied to older kernels, or be notified if it can not be, please add a kernel version number in the stable marking:

	Cc: [email protected] # 4.0+

or use the Fixes: tag:
Fixes: SHASHAHSA ("short description")
which I pick up on and let you know if the patch does not actually apply back to the kernel that the fixes: tag was in.

hope this helps,

greg k-h

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OK, if it did not apply then probably there were some changes in the code here and there. Though, IIRC, fix itself is perfectly valid for 4.11. So, I will post updated patch for it.

Thanks,

Daniel

OK, if it did not apply then probably there were some changes in the code here and there. Though, IIRC, fix itself is perfectly valid for 4.11. So, I will post updated patch for it.

Thanks,

Daniel

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Are you sure it actually applied? (hint, it did not...)

If you want it in 4.11, or older kernels, please provide a working backport.

thanks,

greg k-h

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The thing is, this patch should probaly not even be in v4.12, as it should only make any difference if there's a separate _bug_ in the kernel.

This patch makes things more robust going forward, but I question that it needs to be in -stable.

Thanks,

Ingo

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Yeah, good point, I'm going to go drop it entirely from the 4.12-stable tree as it obviously isn't stable material, sorry for not catching that before.

thanks,

greg k-h

I should have caught the tag as well when applying the upstream patch to begin with.

Thanks!

Ingo

I should have caught the tag as well when applying the upstream patch to begin with.

Thanks!

Ingo

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Wait a minute. IIRC, Juergen told me last week that this patch fixes a bug found/assigned by/to him. Juergen? If it is true then I would apply it to stable. If I am wrong you can drop it.

Thanks,

Daniel

I'm not sure both patches (this one and upstream 457ea3f7e97881f) are needed. I have got a report about a failing boot and with both patches applied the boot is working. I will ask if 457ea3f7e97881f alone works, too. If it doesn't I'll request this patch to be added to stable again.

Juergen

I'm not sure both patches (this one and upstream 457ea3f7e97881f) are needed. I have got a report about a failing boot and with both patches applied the boot is working. I will ask if 457ea3f7e97881f alone works, too. If it doesn't I'll request this patch to be added to stable again.

Juergen

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Wait a minute. IIRC, Juergen told me last week that this patch fixes a bug found/assigned by/to him. Juergen? If it is true then I would apply it to stable. If I am wrong you can drop it.

Thanks,

Daniel

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Yeah, good point, I'm going to go drop it entirely from the 4.12-stable tree as it obviously isn't stable material, sorry for not catching that before.

thanks,

greg k-h

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Hey Greg,

Why did you skip this patch for 4.11? IMO it should be applied there too.

Daniel

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4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>

commit 457ea3f7e97881f937136ce0ba1f29f82b9abdb0 upstream.

Otherwise e.g. Xen dom0 on x86_64 EFI platforms crashes.

In theory we can check EFI_PARAVIRT too, however, EFI_MEMMAP looks more targeted and covers more cases.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -528,7 +528,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void
 		}
 	}
 
-	efi_memattr_init();
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP))
+		efi_memattr_init();
 
 	/* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */
 	if (efi.properties_table != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>

commit 457ea3f7e97881f937136ce0ba1f29f82b9abdb0 upstream.

Otherwise e.g. Xen dom0 on x86_64 EFI platforms crashes.

In theory we can check EFI_PARAVIRT too, however, EFI_MEMMAP looks more targeted and covers more cases.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -528,7 +528,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void
 		}
 	}
 
-	efi_memattr_init();
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP))
+		efi_memattr_init();
 
 	/* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */
 	if (efi.properties_table != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {

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4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srinivas Dasari <[email protected]>

commit 8feb69c7bd89513be80eb19198d48f154b254021 upstream.

Buffer overread may happen as nl80211_set_station() reads 4 bytes from the attribute NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE without validating the size of data received when userspace sends less than 4 bytes of data with NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE. Define nla_policy for NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE to avoid the buffer overread.

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy nl80211_p
 	[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_P2P_CTWINDOW] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_P2P_OPPPS] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+	[NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE] = {. type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_ACL_POLICY] = {. type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_MAC_ADDRS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_STA_CAPABILITY] = { .type = NLA_U16 },

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srinivas Dasari <[email protected]>

commit d7f13f7450369281a5d0ea463cc69890a15923ae upstream.

validate_scan_freqs() retrieves frequencies from attributes nested in the attribute NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES with nla_get_u32(), which reads 4 bytes from each attribute without validating the size of data received. Attributes nested in NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES don't have an nla policy.

Validate size of each attribute before parsing to avoid potential buffer overread.

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -6470,6 +6470,10 @@ static int validate_scan_freqs(struct nl
 	struct nlattr *attr1, *attr2;
 	int n_channels = 0, tmp1, tmp2;
 
+	nla_for_each_nested(attr1, freqs, tmp1)
+		if (nla_len(attr1) != sizeof(u32))
+			return 0;
+
 	nla_for_each_nested(attr1, freqs, tmp1) {
 		n_channels++;
 		/*

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srinivas Dasari <[email protected]>

commit 9361df14d1cbf966409d5d6f48bb334384fbe138 upstream.

nla policy checks for only maximum length of the attribute data when the attribute type is NLA_BINARY. If userspace sends less data than specified, the wireless drivers may access illegal memory. When type is NLA_UNSPEC, nla policy check ensures that userspace sends minimum specified length number of bytes.

Remove type assignment to NLA_BINARY from nla_policy of NL80211_ATTR_PMKID to make this NLA_UNSPEC and to make sure minimum WLAN_PMKID_LEN bytes are received from userspace with NL80211_ATTR_PMKID.

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -291,8 +291,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy nl80211_p
 	[NL80211_ATTR_WPA_VERSIONS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_PID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_4ADDR] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
-	[NL80211_ATTR_PMKID] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
-				 .len = WLAN_PMKID_LEN },
+	[NL80211_ATTR_PMKID] = { .len = WLAN_PMKID_LEN },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_DURATION] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_COOKIE] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_TX_RATES] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srinivas Dasari <[email protected]>

commit 0a27844ce86d039d74221dd56cd8c0349b146b63 upstream.

nla policy checks for only maximum length of the attribute data when the attribute type is NLA_BINARY. If userspace sends less data than specified, cfg80211 may access illegal memory. When type is NLA_UNSPEC, nla policy check ensures that userspace sends minimum specified length number of bytes.

Remove type assignment to NLA_BINARY from nla_policy of NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID to make these NLA_UNSPEC and to make sure minimum NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID_LEN bytes are received from userspace with NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID.

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ nl80211_bss_select_policy[NL80211_BSS_SE
 static const struct nla_policy
 nl80211_nan_func_policy[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
 	[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_TYPE] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
-	[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+	[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID] = {
 				    .len = NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID_LEN },
 	[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_PUBLISH_TYPE] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
 	[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_PUBLISH_BCAST] = { .type = NLA_FLAG },

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 6653ebd48f493efe3f3598ff3fe7b3d5451665df upstream.

This was missing for gfx6.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v6_0.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1688,7 +1688,8 @@ static void gfx_v6_0_gpu_init(struct amd
 	WREG32(mmBIF_FB_EN, BIF_FB_EN__FB_READ_EN_MASK | BIF_FB_EN__FB_WRITE_EN_MASK);
 
 	mc_shared_chmap = RREG32(mmMC_SHARED_CHMAP);
-	mc_arb_ramcfg = RREG32(mmMC_ARB_RAMCFG);
+	adev->gfx.config.mc_arb_ramcfg = RREG32(mmMC_ARB_RAMCFG);
+	mc_arb_ramcfg = adev->gfx.config.mc_arb_ramcfg;
 
 	adev->gfx.config.num_tile_pipes = adev->gfx.config.max_tile_pipes;
 	adev->gfx.config.mem_max_burst_length_bytes = 256;

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hu Huajun <[email protected]>

commit 02d50cdaff36c135d222015cffdca3ff11d168ea upstream.

When reading the cntpct_el0 in guest with VHE (Virtual Host Extension) enabled in host, the "Unsupported guest sys_reg access" error reported. The reason is cnthctl_el2.EL1PCTEN is not enabled, which is expected to be done in kvm_timer_init_vhe(). The problem is kvm_timer_init_vhe is called by cpu_init_hyp_mode, and which is called when VHE is disabled. This patch remove the incorrect call to kvm_timer_init_vhe() from cpu_init_hyp_mode(), and calls kvm_timer_init_vhe() to enable cnthctl_el2.EL1PCTEN in cpu_hyp_reinit().

---
 virt/kvm/arm/arm.c |    4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -1115,9 +1115,6 @@ static void cpu_init_hyp_mode(void *dumm
 	__cpu_init_hyp_mode(pgd_ptr, hyp_stack_ptr, vector_ptr);
 	__cpu_init_stage2();
 
-	if (is_kernel_in_hyp_mode())
-		kvm_timer_init_vhe();
-
 	kvm_arm_init_debug();
 }
 

@@ -1137,6 +1134,7 @@ static void cpu_hyp_reinit(void)
 		 * event was cancelled before the CPU was reset.
 		 */
 		__cpu_init_stage2();
+		kvm_timer_init_vhe();
 	} else {
 		cpu_init_hyp_mode(NULL);
 	}

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>

commit 00c14757f6abacd78cad9b2690a0e1f42e4b76c8 upstream.

This fixes a typo where the wrong loop index was used to index the kvmppc_xive_vcpu.queues[] array in xive_pre_save_scan(). The variable i contains the vcpu number; we need to index queues[] using j, which iterates from 0 to KVMPPC_XIVE_Q_COUNT-1.

The effect of this bug is that things that save the interrupt controller state, such as "virsh dump", on a VM with more than 8 vCPUs, result in xive_pre_save_queue() getting called on a bogus queue structure, usually resulting in a crash like this:

[  501.821107] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000084
[  501.821212] Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000004c7c6f8
[  501.821234] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[  501.821305] SMP NR_CPUS=1024
[  501.821307] NUMA
[  501.821376] PowerNV
[  501.821470] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap xt_CHECKSUM ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_conntrack ip_set nfnetlink ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ip6table_mangle ip6table_security ip6table_raw iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack libcrc32c iptable_mangle iptable_security iptable_raw ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas ipmi_powernv ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler powernv_op_panel kvm_hv nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc kvm tg3 ptp pps_core
[  501.822477] CPU: 3 PID: 3934 Comm: live_migration Not tainted 4.11.0-4.git8caa70f.el7.centos.ppc64le #1
[  501.822633] task: c0000003f9e3ae80 task.stack: c0000003f9ed4000
[  501.822745] NIP: c008000004c7c6f8 LR: c008000004c7c628 CTR: 0000000030058018
[  501.822877] REGS: c0000003f9ed7980 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (4.11.0-4.git8caa70f.el7.centos.ppc64le)
[  501.823030] MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>
[  501.823047]   CR: 28022244  XER: 00000000
[  501.823203] CFAR: c008000004c7c77c DAR: 0000000000000084 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 1
[  501.823203] GPR00: c008000004c7c628 c0000003f9ed7c00 c008000004c91450 00000000000000ff
[  501.823203] GPR04: c0000003f5580000 c0000003f559bf98 9000000000009033 0000000000000000
[  501.823203] GPR08: 0000000000000084 0000000000000000 00000000000001e0 9000000000001003
[  501.823203] GPR12: c00000000008a7d0 c00000000fdc1b00 000000000a9a0000 0000000000000000
[  501.823203] GPR16: 00000000402954e8 000000000a9a0000 0000000000000004 0000000000000000
[  501.823203] GPR20: 0000000000000008 c000000002e8f180 c000000002e8f1e0 0000000000000001
[  501.823203] GPR24: 0000000000000008 c0000003f5580008 c0000003f4564018 c000000002e8f1e8
[  501.823203] GPR28: 00003ff6e58bdc28 c0000003f4564000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[  501.825441] NIP [c008000004c7c6f8] xive_get_attr+0x3b8/0x5b0 [kvm]
[  501.825671] LR [c008000004c7c628] xive_get_attr+0x2e8/0x5b0 [kvm]
[  501.825887] Call Trace:
[  501.825991] [c0000003f9ed7c00] [c008000004c7c628] xive_get_attr+0x2e8/0x5b0 [kvm] (unreliable)
[  501.826312] [c0000003f9ed7cd0] [c008000004c62ec4] kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x64/0xa0 [kvm]
[  501.826581] [c0000003f9ed7d20] [c008000004c62fcc] kvm_device_ioctl+0xcc/0xf0 [kvm]
[  501.826843] [c0000003f9ed7d40] [c000000000350c70] do_vfs_ioctl+0xd0/0x8c0
[  501.827060] [c0000003f9ed7de0] [c000000000351534] SyS_ioctl+0xd4/0xf0
[  501.827282] [c0000003f9ed7e30] [c00000000000b8e0] system_call+0x38/0xfc
[  501.827496] Instruction dump:
[  501.827632] 419e0078 3b760008 e9160008 83fb000c 83db0010 80fb0008 2f280000 60000000
[  501.827901] 60000000 60420000 419a0050 7be91764 <7d284c2c> 552a0ffe 7f8af040 419e003c
[  501.828176] ---[ end trace 2d0529a5bbbbafed ]---

---
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xive.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1257,8 +1257,8 @@ static void xive_pre_save_scan(struct kv
 		if (!xc)
 			continue;
 		for (j = 0; j < KVMPPC_XIVE_Q_COUNT; j++) {
-			if (xc->queues[i].qpage)
-				xive_pre_save_queue(xive, &xc->queues[i]);
+			if (xc->queues[j].qpage)
+				xive_pre_save_queue(xive, &xc->queues[j]);
 		}
 	}
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>

commit e323369b2e204da4dc771bbddceef986f4bf85d5 upstream.

Unset-KVM and decrement-assignment only when we find the group in our list. Otherwise we can get out of sync if the user triggers this for groups that aren't currently on our list.

---
 virt/kvm/vfio.c |   13 ++++++-------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -246,21 +246,20 @@ static int kvm_vfio_set_group(struct kvm
 				continue;
 
 			list_del(&kvg->node);
+			kvm_arch_end_assignment(dev->kvm);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
+			kvm_spapr_tce_release_vfio_group(dev->kvm,
+							 kvg->vfio_group);
+#endif
+			kvm_vfio_group_set_kvm(kvg->vfio_group, NULL);
 			kvm_vfio_group_put_external_user(kvg->vfio_group);
 			kfree(kvg);
 			ret = 0;
 			break;
 		}
 
-		kvm_arch_end_assignment(dev->kvm);
-
 		mutex_unlock(&kv->lock);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
-		kvm_spapr_tce_release_vfio_group(dev->kvm, vfio_group);
-#endif
-		kvm_vfio_group_set_kvm(vfio_group, NULL);
-
 		kvm_vfio_group_put_external_user(vfio_group);
 
 		kvm_vfio_update_coherency(dev);

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

commit 866d7c1b0a3c70387646c4e455e727a58c5d465a upstream.

The GICv3 driver doesn't check if the target CPU for gic_set_affinity is valid before going ahead and making the changes. This triggers the following splat with KASAN:

[  141.189434] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in gic_set_affinity+0x8c/0x140
[  141.189704] Read of size 8 at addr ffff200009741d20 by task swapper/1/0
[  141.189958]
[  141.190158] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7
[  141.190458] Hardware name: Foundation-v8A (DT)
[  141.190658] Call trace:
[  141.190908] [<ffff200008089d70>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x328
[  141.191224] [<ffff20000808a1b4>] show_stack+0x14/0x20
[  141.191507] [<ffff200008504c3c>] dump_stack+0xa4/0xc8
[  141.191858] [<ffff20000826c19c>] print_address_description+0x13c/0x250
[  141.192219] [<ffff20000826c5c8>] kasan_report+0x210/0x300
[  141.192547] [<ffff20000826ad54>] __asan_load8+0x84/0x98
[  141.192874] [<ffff20000854eeec>] gic_set_affinity+0x8c/0x140
[  141.193158] [<ffff200008148b14>] irq_do_set_affinity+0x54/0xb8
[  141.193473] [<ffff200008148d2c>] irq_set_affinity_locked+0x64/0xf0
[  141.193828] [<ffff200008148e00>] __irq_set_affinity+0x48/0x78
[  141.194158] [<ffff200008bc48a4>] arm_perf_starting_cpu+0x104/0x150
[  141.194513] [<ffff2000080d73bc>] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x17c/0x1f8
[  141.194783] [<ffff2000080d94ec>] notify_cpu_starting+0x8c/0xb8
[  141.195130] [<ffff2000080911ec>] secondary_start_kernel+0x15c/0x200
[  141.195390] [<0000000080db81b4>] 0x80db81b4
[  141.195603]
[  141.195685] The buggy address belongs to the variable:
[  141.196012]  __cpu_logical_map+0x200/0x220
[  141.196176]
[  141.196315] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  141.196586]  ffff200009741c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  141.196913]  ffff200009741c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  141.197158] >ffff200009741d00: 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  141.197487]                                ^
[  141.197758]  ffff200009741d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
[  141.198060]  ffff200009741e00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  141.198358] ==================================================================
[  141.198609] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[  141.198961] CPU1: Booted secondary processor [410fd051]

This patch adds the check to make sure the cpu is valid.

---
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -645,6 +645,9 @@ static int gic_set_affinity(struct irq_d
 	int enabled;
 	u64 val;
 
+	if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (gic_irq_in_rdist(d))
 		return -EINVAL;
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>

commit 247462316f85a9e0479445c1a4223950b68ffac1 upstream.

When a process runs out of stack the parisc kernel wrongly faults with SIGBUS instead of the expected SIGSEGV signal.

This example shows how the kernel faults:
do_page_fault() command='a.out' type=15 address=0xfaac2000 in libc-2.24.so[f8308000+16c000] trap #15: Data TLB miss fault, vm_start = 0xfa2c2000, vm_end = 0xfaac2000

The vma->vm_end value is the first address which does not belong to the vma, so adjust the check to include vma->vm_end to the range for which to send the SIGSEGV signal.

This patch unbreaks building the debian libsigsegv package.

---
 arch/parisc/mm/fault.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ bad_area:
 		case 15:	/* Data TLB miss fault/Data page fault */
 			/* send SIGSEGV when outside of vma */
 			if (!vma ||
-			    address < vma->vm_start || address > vma->vm_end) {
+			    address < vma->vm_start || address >= vma->vm_end) {
 				si.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
 				si.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
 				break;

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

commit b0f94efd5aa8daa8a07d7601714c2573266cd4c9 upstream.

Architectures with a compat syscall table must put compat_sys_keyctl() in it, not sys_keyctl(). The parisc architecture was not doing this; fix it.

---
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscall_table.S |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@
 	ENTRY_SAME(ni_syscall)	/* 263: reserved for vserver */
 	ENTRY_SAME(add_key)
 	ENTRY_SAME(request_key)		/* 265 */
-	ENTRY_SAME(keyctl)
+	ENTRY_COMP(keyctl)
 	ENTRY_SAME(ioprio_set)
 	ENTRY_SAME(ioprio_get)
 	ENTRY_SAME(inotify_init)

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>

commit 33f9e02495d15a061f0c94ef46f5103a2d0c20f3 upstream.

Enabling parport pc driver on a B2600 (and probably other 64bit PARISC systems) produced following BUG:

CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5-30198-g1132d5e #156

task: 000000009e050000 task.stack: 000000009e04c000

YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI
PSW: 00001000000001101111111100001111 Not tainted

r00-03  000000ff0806ff0f 000000009e04c990 0000000040871b78 000000009e04cac0
r04-07  0000000040c14de0 ffffffffffffffff 000000009e07f098 000000009d82d200
r08-11  000000009d82d210 0000000000000378 0000000000000000 0000000040c345e0
r12-15  0000000000000005 0000000040c345e0 0000000000000000 0000000040c9d5e0
r16-19  0000000040c345e0 00000000f00001c4 00000000f00001bc 0000000000000061
r20-23  000000009e04ce28 0000000000000010 0000000000000010 0000000040b89e40
r24-27  0000000000000003 0000000000ffffff 000000009d82d210 0000000040c14de0
r28-31  0000000000000000 000000009e04ca90 000000009e04cb40 0000000000000000

sr00-03 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 sr04-07 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000

IASQ: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 IAOQ: 00000000404aece0 00000000404aece4
IIR: 03ffe01f ISR: 0000000010340000 IOR: 000001781304cac8
CPU: 0 CR30: 000000009e04c000 CR31: 00000000e2976de2
ORIG_R28: 0000000000000200
IAOQ[0]: sba_dma_supported+0x80/0xd0
IAOQ[1]: sba_dma_supported+0x84/0xd0
RP(r2): parport_pc_probe_port+0x178/0x1200

Cause is a call to dma_coerce_mask_and_coherenet in parport_pc_probe_port, which PARISC DMA API doesn't handle very nicely. This commit gives back DMA_ERROR_CODE for DMA API calls, if device isn't capable of DMA transaction.

---
 arch/parisc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h |   11 +++++++----
 drivers/parisc/ccio-dma.c             |   12 ++++++++++++
 drivers/parisc/dino.c                 |    5 ++++-
 drivers/parisc/lba_pci.c              |    6 ++++--
 drivers/parisc/sba_iommu.c            |   14 ++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 ** flush/purge and allocate "regular" cacheable pages for everything.
 */
 
+#define DMA_ERROR_CODE	(~(dma_addr_t)0)
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_PA11
 extern const struct dma_map_ops pcxl_dma_ops;
 extern const struct dma_map_ops pcx_dma_ops;

@@ -54,12 +56,13 @@ parisc_walk_tree(struct device *dev)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-	BUG_ON(!dev->platform_data);
 	return dev->platform_data;
 }
-		
-#define GET_IOC(dev) (HBA_DATA(parisc_walk_tree(dev))->iommu)
-	
+
+#define GET_IOC(dev) ({					\
+	void *__pdata = parisc_walk_tree(dev);		\
+	__pdata ? HBA_DATA(__pdata)->iommu : NULL;	\
+})
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_CCIO
 struct parisc_device;

@@ -741,6 +741,8 @@ ccio_map_single(struct device *dev, void
 
 	BUG_ON(!dev);
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc)
+		return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
 
 	BUG_ON(size <= 0);
 

@@ -814,6 +816,10 @@ ccio_unmap_page(struct device *dev, dma_
 	
 	BUG_ON(!dev);
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc) {
+		WARN_ON(!ioc);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	DBG_RUN("%s() iovp 0x%lx/%x\n",
 		__func__, (long)iova, size);

@@ -918,6 +924,8 @@ ccio_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct s
 	
 	BUG_ON(!dev);
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc)
+		return 0;
 	
 	DBG_RUN_SG("%s() START %d entries\n", __func__, nents);
 

@@ -990,6 +998,10 @@ ccio_unmap_sg(struct device *dev, struct
 
 	BUG_ON(!dev);
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc) {
+		WARN_ON(!ioc);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	DBG_RUN_SG("%s() START %d entries, %p,%x\n",
 		__func__, nents, sg_virt(sglist), sglist->length);

@@ -154,7 +154,10 @@ struct dino_device
 };
 
 /* Looks nice and keeps the compiler happy */
-#define DINO_DEV(d) ((struct dino_device *) d)
+#define DINO_DEV(d) ({				\
+	void *__pdata = d;			\
+	BUG_ON(!__pdata);			\
+	(struct dino_device *)__pdata; })
 
 
 /*

@@ -111,8 +111,10 @@ static u32 lba_t32;
 
 
 /* Looks nice and keeps the compiler happy */
-#define LBA_DEV(d) ((struct lba_device *) (d))
-
+#define LBA_DEV(d) ({				\
+	void *__pdata = d;			\
+	BUG_ON(!__pdata);			\
+	(struct lba_device *)__pdata; })
 
 /*
 ** Only allow 8 subsidiary busses per LBA

@@ -691,6 +691,8 @@ static int sba_dma_supported( struct dev
 		return 0;
 
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc)
+		return 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * check if mask is >= than the current max IO Virt Address

@@ -722,6 +724,8 @@ sba_map_single(struct device *dev, void
 	int pide;
 
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc)
+		return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
 
 	/* save offset bits */
 	offset = ((dma_addr_t) (long) addr) & ~IOVP_MASK;

@@ -813,6 +817,10 @@ sba_unmap_page(struct device *dev, dma_a
 	DBG_RUN("%s() iovp 0x%lx/%x\n", __func__, (long) iova, size);
 
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc) {
+		WARN_ON(!ioc);
+		return;
+	}
 	offset = iova & ~IOVP_MASK;
 	iova ^= offset;        /* clear offset bits */
 	size += offset;

@@ -952,6 +960,8 @@ sba_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct sc
 	DBG_RUN_SG("%s() START %d entries\n", __func__, nents);
 
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc)
+		return 0;
 
 	/* Fast path single entry scatterlists. */
 	if (nents == 1) {

@@ -1037,6 +1047,10 @@ sba_unmap_sg(struct device *dev, struct
 		__func__, nents, sg_virt(sglist), sglist->length);
 
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc) {
+		WARN_ON(!ioc);
+		return;
+	}
 
 #ifdef SBA_COLLECT_STATS
 	ioc->usg_calls++;

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>

commit 649aa24254e85bf6bd7807dd372d083707852b1f upstream.

This is because of commit f98db6013c55 ("sched/core: Add switch_mm_irqs_off() and use it in the scheduler") in which switch_mm_irqs_off() is called by the scheduler, vs switch_mm() which is used by use_mm().

This patch lets the parisc code mirror the x86 and powerpc code, ie. it disables interrupts in switch_mm(), and optimises the scheduler case by defining switch_mm_irqs_off().

---
 arch/parisc/include/asm/mmu_context.h |   15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -49,15 +49,26 @@ static inline void load_context(mm_conte
 	mtctl(__space_to_prot(context), 8);
 }
 
-static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static inline void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev,
+		struct mm_struct *next, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-
 	if (prev != next) {
 		mtctl(__pa(next->pgd), 25);
 		load_context(next->context);
 	}
 }
 
+static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev,
+		struct mm_struct *next, struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+	switch_mm_irqs_off(prev, next, tsk);
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+#define switch_mm_irqs_off switch_mm_irqs_off
+
 #define deactivate_mm(tsk,mm)	do { } while (0)
 
 static inline void activate_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next)

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>

commit 98dcea0cfd04e083ac74137ceb9a632604740e2d upstream.

liblockdep has been broken since commit 75dd602a5198 ("lockdep: Fix lock_chain::base size"), as that adds a check that MAX_LOCK_DEPTH is within the range of lock_chain::depth and in liblockdep it is much too large.

That should have resulted in a compiler error, but didn't because:

- the check uses ARRAY_SIZE(), which isn't yet defined in liblockdep so is assumed to be an (undeclared) function
- putting a function call inside a BUILD_BUG_ON() expression quietly turns it into some nonsense involving a variable-length array

It did produce a compiler warning, but I didn't notice because liblockdep already produces too many warnings if -Wall is enabled (which I'll fix shortly).

Even before that commit, which reduced lock_chain::depth from 8 bits to 6, MAX_LOCK_DEPTH was too large.

---
 tools/lib/lockdep/uinclude/linux/lockdep.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 
-#define MAX_LOCK_DEPTH 2000UL
+#define MAX_LOCK_DEPTH 63UL
 
 #define asmlinkage
 #define __visible

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Rientjes <[email protected]>

commit 9a04dbcfb33b4012d0ce8c0282f1e3ca694675b1 upstream.

The motivation for commit abb2ea7dfd82 ("compiler, clang: suppress warning for unused static inline functions") was to suppress clang's warnings about unused static inline functions.

For configs without CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING enabled, such as any non-x86 architecture, `inline' in the kernel implies that __attribute__((always_inline)) is used.

Some code depends on that behavior, see
https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/6/13/918:

net/built-in.o: In function `__xchg_mb':
arch/arm64/include/asm/cmpxchg.h:99: undefined reference to __compiletime_assert_99' arch/arm64/include/asm/cmpxchg.h:99: undefined reference to __compiletime_assert_99

The full fix would be to identify these breakages and annotate the functions with __always_inline instead of `inline'. But since we are late in the 4.12-rc cycle, simply carry forward the forced inlining behavior and work toward moving arm64, and other architectures, toward CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING behavior.

---
 include/linux/compiler-clang.h |    8 --------
 include/linux/compiler-gcc.h   |   18 +++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

@@ -15,11 +15,3 @@
  * with any version that can compile the kernel
  */
 #define __UNIQUE_ID(prefix) __PASTE(__PASTE(__UNIQUE_ID_, prefix), __COUNTER__)
-
-/*
- * GCC does not warn about unused static inline functions for
- * -Wunused-function.  This turns out to avoid the need for complex #ifdef
- * directives.  Suppress the warning in clang as well.
- */
-#undef inline
-#define inline inline __attribute__((unused)) notrace

@@ -66,18 +66,22 @@
 
 /*
  * Force always-inline if the user requests it so via the .config,
- * or if gcc is too old:
+ * or if gcc is too old.
+ * GCC does not warn about unused static inline functions for
+ * -Wunused-function.  This turns out to avoid the need for complex #ifdef
+ * directives.  Suppress the warning in clang as well by using "unused"
+ * function attribute, which is redundant but not harmful for gcc.
  */
 #if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_OPTIMIZED_INLINING) ||		\
     !defined(CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING) || (__GNUC__ < 4)
-#define inline		inline		__attribute__((always_inline)) notrace
-#define __inline__	__inline__	__attribute__((always_inline)) notrace
-#define __inline	__inline	__attribute__((always_inline)) notrace
+#define inline inline		__attribute__((always_inline,unused)) notrace
+#define __inline__ __inline__	__attribute__((always_inline,unused)) notrace
+#define __inline __inline	__attribute__((always_inline,unused)) notrace
 #else
 /* A lot of inline functions can cause havoc with function tracing */
-#define inline		inline		notrace
-#define __inline__	__inline__	notrace
-#define __inline	__inline	notrace
+#define inline inline		__attribute__((unused)) notrace
+#define __inline__ __inline__	__attribute__((unused)) notrace
+#define __inline __inline	__attribute__((unused)) notrace
 #endif
 
 #define __always_inline	inline __attribute__((always_inline))

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>

commit bbf29ffc7f963bb894f84f0580c70cfea01c3892 upstream.

Reinette reported the following crash:

  BUG: Bad page state in process log2exe  pfn:57600
  page:ffffea00015d8000 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x20200
  flags: 0x4000000000040019(locked|uptodate|dirty|swapbacked)
  raw: 4000000000040019 0000000000000000 0000000000020200 00000000ffffffff
  raw: ffffea00015d8020 ffffea00015d8020 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
  bad because of flags: 0x1(locked)
  Modules linked in: rfcomm 8021q bnep intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp efivars btusb btrtl btbcm pwm_lpss_pci snd_hda_codec_hdmi btintel pwm_lpss snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_soc_skl snd_hda_codec_generic snd_soc_skl_ipc spi_pxa2xx_platform snd_soc_sst_ipc snd_soc_sst_dsp i2c_designware_platform i2c_designware_core snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_sst_match snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec mei_me snd_hda_core mei snd_soc_rt286 snd_soc_rl6347a snd_soc_core efivarfs
  CPU: 1 PID: 354 Comm: log2exe Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7-test-test #19
  Hardware name: Intel corporation NUC6CAYS/NUC6CAYB, BIOS AYAPLCEL.86A.0027.2016.1108.1529 11/08/2016
  Call Trace:
   bad_page+0x16a/0x1f0
   free_pages_check_bad+0x117/0x190
   free_hot_cold_page+0x7b1/0xad0
   __put_page+0x70/0xa0
   madvise_free_huge_pmd+0x627/0x7b0
   madvise_free_pte_range+0x6f8/0x1150
   __walk_page_range+0x6b5/0xe30
   walk_page_range+0x13b/0x310
   madvise_free_page_range.isra.16+0xad/0xd0
   madvise_free_single_vma+0x2e4/0x470
   SyS_madvise+0x8ce/0x1450

If somebody frees the page under us and we hold the last reference to it, put_page() would attempt to free the page before unlocking it.

The fix is trivial reorder of operations.

Dave said:
"I came up with the exact same patch. For posterity, here's the test
case, generated by syzkaller and trimmed down by Reinette:

https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/log2.c

And the config that helps detect this:

https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/config-log2"

---
 mm/huge_memory.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1575,8 +1575,8 @@ bool madvise_free_huge_pmd(struct mmu_ga
 		get_page(page);
 		spin_unlock(ptl);
 		split_huge_page(page);
-		put_page(page);
 		unlock_page(page);
+		put_page(page);
 		goto out_unlocked;
 	}
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marcin Nowakowski <[email protected]>

commit c0d80ddab89916273cb97114889d3f337bc370ae upstream.

core_kernel_text is used by MIPS in its function graph trace processing, so having this method traced leads to an infinite set of recursive calls such as:

  Call Trace:
     ftrace_return_to_handler+0x50/0x128
     core_kernel_text+0x10/0x1b8
     prepare_ftrace_return+0x6c/0x114
     ftrace_graph_caller+0x20/0x44
     return_to_handler+0x10/0x30
     return_to_handler+0x0/0x30
     return_to_handler+0x0/0x30
     ftrace_ops_no_ops+0x114/0x1bc
     core_kernel_text+0x10/0x1b8
     core_kernel_text+0x10/0x1b8
     core_kernel_text+0x10/0x1b8
     ftrace_ops_no_ops+0x114/0x1bc
     core_kernel_text+0x10/0x1b8
     prepare_ftrace_return+0x6c/0x114
     ftrace_graph_caller+0x20/0x44
     (...)

Mark the function notrace to avoid it being traced.

---
 kernel/extable.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static inline int init_kernel_text(unsig
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int core_kernel_text(unsigned long addr)
+int notrace core_kernel_text(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	if (addr >= (unsigned long)_stext &&
 	    addr < (unsigned long)_etext)

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>

commit 2c80cd57c74339889a8752b20862a16c28929c3a upstream.

list_lru_count_node() iterates over all memcgs to get the total number of entries on the node but it can race with memcg_drain_all_list_lrus(), which migrates the entries from a dead cgroup to another. This can return incorrect number of entries from list_lru_count_node().

Fix this by keeping track of entries per node and simply return it in list_lru_count_node().

---
 include/linux/list_lru.h |    1 +
 mm/list_lru.c            |   14 ++++++--------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ struct list_lru_node {
 	/* for cgroup aware lrus points to per cgroup lists, otherwise NULL */
 	struct list_lru_memcg	*memcg_lrus;
 #endif
+	long nr_items;
 } ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
 
 struct list_lru {

@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ bool list_lru_add(struct list_lru *lru,
 		l = list_lru_from_kmem(nlru, item);
 		list_add_tail(item, &l->list);
 		l->nr_items++;
+		nlru->nr_items++;
 		spin_unlock(&nlru->lock);
 		return true;
 	}

@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ bool list_lru_del(struct list_lru *lru,
 		l = list_lru_from_kmem(nlru, item);
 		list_del_init(item);
 		l->nr_items--;
+		nlru->nr_items--;
 		spin_unlock(&nlru->lock);
 		return true;
 	}

@@ -183,15 +185,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(list_lru_count_one);
 
 unsigned long list_lru_count_node(struct list_lru *lru, int nid)
 {
-	long count = 0;
-	int memcg_idx;
+	struct list_lru_node *nlru;
 
-	count += __list_lru_count_one(lru, nid, -1);
-	if (list_lru_memcg_aware(lru)) {
-		for_each_memcg_cache_index(memcg_idx)
-			count += __list_lru_count_one(lru, nid, memcg_idx);
-	}
-	return count;
+	nlru = &lru->node[nid];
+	return nlru->nr_items;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(list_lru_count_node);
 

@@ -226,6 +223,7 @@ restart:
 			assert_spin_locked(&nlru->lock);
 		case LRU_REMOVED:
 			isolated++;
+			nlru->nr_items--;
 			/*
 			 * If the lru lock has been dropped, our list
 			 * traversal is now invalid and so we have to

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sahitya Tummala <[email protected]>

commit b17c070fb624cf10162cf92ea5e1ec25cd8ac176 upstream.

__list_lru_walk_one() acquires nlru spin lock (nlru->lock) for longer duration if there are more number of items in the lru list. As per the current code, it can hold the spin lock for upto maximum UINT_MAX entries at a time. So if there are more number of items in the lru list, then "BUG: spinlock lockup suspected" is observed in the below path:

spin_bug+0x90
do_raw_spin_lock+0xfc
_raw_spin_lock+0x28
list_lru_add+0x28
dput+0x1c8
path_put+0x20
terminate_walk+0x3c
path_lookupat+0x100
filename_lookup+0x6c
user_path_at_empty+0x54
SyS_faccessat+0xd0
el0_svc_naked+0x24

This nlru->lock is acquired by another CPU in this path -

d_lru_shrink_move+0x34
dentry_lru_isolate_shrink+0x48
__list_lru_walk_one.isra.10+0x94
list_lru_walk_node+0x40
shrink_dcache_sb+0x60
do_remount_sb+0xbc
do_emergency_remount+0xb0
process_one_work+0x228
worker_thread+0x2e0
kthread+0xf4
ret_from_fork+0x10

Fix this lockup by reducing the number of entries to be shrinked from the lru list to 1024 at once. Also, add cond_resched() before processing the lru list again.

---
 fs/dcache.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1133,11 +1133,12 @@ void shrink_dcache_sb(struct super_block
 		LIST_HEAD(dispose);
 
 		freed = list_lru_walk(&sb->s_dentry_lru,
-			dentry_lru_isolate_shrink, &dispose, UINT_MAX);
+			dentry_lru_isolate_shrink, &dispose, 1024);
 
 		this_cpu_sub(nr_dentry_unused, freed);
 		shrink_dentry_list(&dispose);
-	} while (freed > 0);
+		cond_resched();
+	} while (list_lru_count(&sb->s_dentry_lru) > 0);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(shrink_dcache_sb);
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cyril Bur <[email protected]>

commit 8d81ae05d0176da1c54aeaed697fa34be5c5575e upstream.

As of perl 5, version 26, subversion 0 (v5.26.0) some new warnings have occurred when running checkpatch.

Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/^(.\s*){ <-- HERE \s*/ at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 3544.

Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/^(.\s*){ <-- HERE \s*/ at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 3885.

Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/^(\+.*(?:do|\))){ <-- HERE / at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 4374.

It seems perfectly reasonable to do as the warning suggests and simply escape the left brace in these three locations.

---
 scripts/checkpatch.pl |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -3541,7 +3541,7 @@ sub process {
 				$fixedline =~ s/\s*=\s*$/ = {/;
 				fix_insert_line($fixlinenr, $fixedline);
 				$fixedline = $line;
-				$fixedline =~ s/^(.\s*){\s*/$1/;
+				$fixedline =~ s/^(.\s*)\{\s*/$1/;
 				fix_insert_line($fixlinenr, $fixedline);
 			}
 		}

@@ -3882,7 +3882,7 @@ sub process {
 				my $fixedline = rtrim($prevrawline) . " {";
 				fix_insert_line($fixlinenr, $fixedline);
 				$fixedline = $rawline;
-				$fixedline =~ s/^(.\s*){\s*/$1\t/;
+				$fixedline =~ s/^(.\s*)\{\s*/$1\t/;
 				if ($fixedline !~ /^\+\s*$/) {
 					fix_insert_line($fixlinenr, $fixedline);
 				}

@@ -4371,7 +4371,7 @@ sub process {
 			if (ERROR("SPACING",
 				  "space required before the open brace '{'\n" . $herecurr) &&
 			    $fix) {
-				$fixed[$fixlinenr] =~ s/^(\+.*(?:do|\))){/$1 {/;
+				$fixed[$fixlinenr] =~ s/^(\+.*(?:do|\)))\{/$1 {/;
 			}
 		}
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit eab09532d40090698b05a07c1c87f39fdbc5fab5 upstream.

The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders away from ET_EXEC binaries. (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the loader had been loaded.)

With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking at ET_DYN. However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space is unused.

For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are loaded above the mmap region. This means they can be made to collide (CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with pathological stack regions.

Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e. if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load instead of falling back to the mmap region).

To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP) are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by the loader. Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs.

For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers.

Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and suggestions on how to implement this solution.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h |   13 +++++----
 fs/binfmt_elf.c            |   59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

@@ -245,12 +245,13 @@ extern int force_personality32;
 #define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET
 #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE	4096
 
-/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed.  Typical
-   use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
-   the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
-   that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
-
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+/*
+ * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
+ */
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \
+						  0x100000000UL)
 
 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
    instruction set this CPU supports.  This could be done in user space,

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 6a9af90a3bcde217a1c053e135f5f43e5d5fafbd upstream.

Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions.

4MB is chosen here mainly to have parity with x86, where this is the traditional minimum load location, likely to avoid historically requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB would be used (since the NULL address is avoided).

For ARM the position could be 0x8000, the standard ET_EXEC load address, but that is needlessly close to the NULL address, and anyone running PIE on 32-bit ARM will have an MMU, so the tight mapping is not needed.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h |    8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -112,12 +112,8 @@ int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *t
 #define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET
 #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE	4096
 
-/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed.  Typical
-   use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
-   the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
-   that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
-
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+/* This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. */
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		0x400000UL
 
 /* When the program starts, a1 contains a pointer to a function to be 
    registered with atexit, as per the SVR4 ABI.  A value of 0 means we 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 02445990a96e60a67526510d8b00f7e3d14101c3 upstream.

Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions.

For 64-bit, align to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. On 32-bit use 4MB, to match ARM. This could be 0x8000, the standard ET_EXEC load address, but that is needlessly close to the NULL address, and anyone running arm compat PIE will have an MMU, so the tight mapping is not needed.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h |   12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -113,12 +113,11 @@
 #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE	PAGE_SIZE
 
 /*
- * This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed.  Typical
- * use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
- * the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
- * that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.
+ * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
  */
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3)
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		0x100000000UL
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 

@@ -173,7 +172,8 @@ extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(s
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 
-#define COMPAT_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(2 * TASK_SIZE_32 / 3)
+/* PIE load location for compat arm. Must match ARM ELF_ET_DYN_BASE. */
+#define COMPAT_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		0x000400000UL
 
 /* AArch32 registers. */
 #define COMPAT_ELF_NGREG		18

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 47ebb09d54856500c5a5e14824781902b3bb738e upstream.

Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions.

For 64-bit, align to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. On 32-bit use 4MB, which is the traditional x86 minimum load location, likely to avoid historically requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB would be used (since the NULL address is avoided).

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h |   13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -23,12 +23,13 @@
 #define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET
 #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE	PAGE_SIZE
 
-/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed.  Typical
-   use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
-   the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
-   that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
-
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	0x20000000
+/*
+ * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
+ */
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(is_32bit_task() ? 0x000400000UL : \
+						   0x100000000UL)
 
 #define ELF_CORE_EFLAGS (is_elf2_task() ? 2 : 0)
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit a73dc5370e153ac63718d850bddf0c9aa9d871e6 upstream.

Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions.

For 64-bit, align to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. On 32-bit use 4MB, which is the traditional x86 minimum load location, likely to avoid historically requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB would be used (since the NULL address is avoided). For s390 the position could be 0x10000, but that is needlessly close to the NULL address.

---
 arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h |   15 +++++++--------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -161,14 +161,13 @@ extern unsigned int vdso_enabled;
 #define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET
 #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE	4096
 
-/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed.  Typical
-   use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
-   the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
-   that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk. 64-bit
-   tasks are aligned to 4GB. */
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (is_compat_task() ? \
-				(STACK_TOP / 3 * 2) : \
-				(STACK_TOP / 3 * 2) & ~((1UL << 32) - 1))
+/*
+ * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
+ */
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(is_compat_task() ? 0x000400000UL : \
+						    0x100000000UL)
 
 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
    instruction set this CPU supports. */

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit da029c11e6b12f321f36dac8771e833b65cec962 upstream.

To avoid pathological stack usage or the need to special-case setuid execs, just limit all arg stack usage to at most 75% of _STK_LIM (6MB).

---
 fs/exec.c |   11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -220,8 +220,7 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct
 
 	if (write) {
 		unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
-		unsigned long ptr_size;
-		struct rlimit *rlim;
+		unsigned long ptr_size, limit;
 
 		/*
 		 * Since the stack will hold pointers to the strings, we

@@ -250,14 +249,16 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct
 			return page;
 
 		/*
-		 * Limit to 1/4-th the stack size for the argv+env strings.
+		 * Limit to 1/4 of the max stack size or 3/4 of _STK_LIM
+		 * (whichever is smaller) for the argv+env strings.
 		 * This ensures that:
 		 *  - the remaining binfmt code will not run out of stack space,
 		 *  - the program will have a reasonable amount of stack left
 		 *    to work from.
 		 */
-		rlim = current->signal->rlim;
-		if (size > READ_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4)
+		limit = _STK_LIM / 4 * 3;
+		limit = min(limit, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) / 4);
+		if (size > limit)
 			goto fail;
 	}
 

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Balbir Singh <[email protected]>

commit 1e2a516e89fc412a754327522ab271b42f99c6b4 upstream.

This patch fixes a crash seen while doing a kexec from radix mode to hash mode. Key 0 is special in hash and used in the RPN by default, we set the key values to 0 today. In radix mode key 0 is used to control supervisor<->user access. In hash key 0 is used by default, so the first instruction after the switch causes a crash on kexec.

Commit 3b10d0095a1e ("powerpc/mm/radix: Prevent kernel execution of user space") introduced the setting of IAMR and AMOR values to prevent execution of user mode instructions from supervisor mode. We need to clean up these SPR's on kexec.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/misc_64.S |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

@@ -614,6 +614,18 @@ _GLOBAL(kexec_sequence)
 	li	r0,0
 	std	r0,16(r1)
 
+BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+	/*
+	 * This is the best time to turn AMR/IAMR off.
+	 * key 0 is used in radix for supervisor<->user
+	 * protection, but on hash key 0 is reserved
+	 * ideally we want to enter with a clean state.
+	 * NOTE, we rely on r0 being 0 from above.
+	 */
+	mtspr	SPRN_IAMR,r0
+	mtspr	SPRN_AMOR,r0
+END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300)
+
 	/* save regs for local vars on new stack.
 	 * yes, we won't go back, but ...
 	 */

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

commit 88cda00733f0731711c76e535d4972c296ac512e upstream.

Contrary to popular belief, PPIs connected to a GICv3 to not have an affinity field similar to that of GICv2. That is consistent with the fact that GICv3 is designed to accomodate thousands of CPUs, and fitting them as a bitmap in a byte is... difficult.

---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi |   12 ++++--------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -75,14 +75,10 @@
 
 	timer {
 		compatible = "arm,armv8-timer";
-		interrupts = <GIC_PPI 13
-			(GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>,
-			     <GIC_PPI 14
-			(GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>,
-			     <GIC_PPI 11
-			(GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>,
-			     <GIC_PPI 10
-			(GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>;
+		interrupts = <GIC_PPI 13 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+			     <GIC_PPI 14 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+			     <GIC_PPI 11 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+			     <GIC_PPI 10 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 	};
 
 	soc {

4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dong Bo <[email protected]>

commit 48f99c8ec0b25756d0283ab058826ae07d14fad7 upstream.

Like arch/arm/, we inherit the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag across fork(). This is undesirable for a number of reasons:

* ELF files that don't require executable stack can end up with it anyway

* We end up performing un-necessary I-cache maintenance when mapping what should be non-executable pages

* Restricting what is executable is generally desirable when defending against overflow attacks

This patch clears the personality flag when setting up the personality for newly spwaned native tasks. Given that semi-recent AArch64 toolchains emit a non-executable PT_GNU_STACK header, userspace applications can already not rely on READ_IMPLIES_EXEC so shouldn't be adversely affected by this change.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ typedef struct user_fpsimd_state elf_fpr
 ({									\
 	clear_bit(TIF_32BIT, &current->mm->context.flags);		\
 	clear_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT);					\
+	current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;			\
 })
 
 /* update AT_VECTOR_SIZE_ARCH if the number of NEW_AUX_ENT entries changes */

@@ -187,6 +188,11 @@ typedef compat_elf_greg_t		compat_elf_gr
 					 ((x)->e_flags & EF_ARM_EABI_MASK))
 
 #define compat_start_thread		compat_start_thread
+/*
+ * Unlike the native SET_PERSONALITY macro, the compat version inherits
+ * READ_IMPLIES_EXEC across a fork() since this is the behaviour on
+ * arch/arm/.
+ */
 #define COMPAT_SET_PERSONALITY(ex)					\
 ({									\
 	set_bit(TIF_32BIT, &current->mm->context.flags);		\