KEYS: fix atomicity issues with key flags
Subsystems (4)
v2 cover KEYS: fix atomicity issues with key flags
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
The first patch in this series fixes the race between updating and finding a negative key, which could be used by an unprivileged user to cause a kernel oops. That patch is Cc'ed to stable.
The remaining patches fix some other, more theoretical atomicity issues with accessing key->flags and key->expiry, then eliminate KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, which becomes unnecessary after the first patch.
Eric Biggers (6):
KEYS: fix race between updating and finding negative key
KEYS: load key flags atomically in key_is_instantiated()
KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in key_validate()
KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in
keyring_search_iterator()
KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in proc_keys_show()
KEYS: remove KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE
include/linux/key.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 2 +- security/keys/gc.c | 4 +--- security/keys/key.c | 24 +++++++++++++++------ security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 ++++- security/keys/keyring.c | 12 ++++++----- security/keys/permission.c | 7 +++--- security/keys/proc.c | 28 +++++++++++++----------- security/keys/request_key.c | 11 ++++++---- security/keys/trusted.c | 2 +- security/keys/user_defined.c | 2 +- 11 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
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2.14.1.992.g2c7b836f3a-goog
PATCH v2 1/6 KEYS: fix race between updating and finding negative key
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
In keyring_search_iterator() and in wait_for_key_construction(), we check whether the key has been negatively instantiated, and if so return the key's ->reject_error.
However, no lock is held during this, and ->reject_error is in union with ->payload. And it's impossible for KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE to be updated atomically with respect to ->reject_error and ->payload.
Most problematically, when a negative key is positively instantiated via __key_update() (via sys_add_key()), ->payload is initialized first, then KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE is cleared. But that means that ->reject_error can be observed to have a bogus value, having been overwritten with ->payload, while the key still appears to be "negative". Clearing KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE first wouldn't work either, since then anyone who accesses the payload under rcu_read_lock() rather than the key semaphore might observe an uninitialized ->payload. Nor can we just always take the key's semaphore when checking whether the key is negative, since keyring searches happen under rcu_read_lock().
Therefore, fix the bug by moving ->reject_error into the high bits of ->flags so that we can read and write it atomically with respect to KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED.
This will also allow KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE to be removed, since tests for KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE can be replaced with tests for nonzero reject_error. But for ease of backporting this fix, that is left for a later patch.
This fixes a kernel crash caused by the following program:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(void)
{
int ringid = keyctl_join_session_keyring(NULL);
if (fork()) {
for (;;) {
usleep(rand() % 4096);
add_key("user", "desc", "x", 1, ringid);
keyctl_clear(ringid);
}
} else {
for (;;)
request_key("user", "desc", "", ringid);
}
}Here is the crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffffd39a6b0
IP: __key_link_begin+0x0/0x100
PGD 7a0a067 P4D 7a0a067 PUD 7a0c067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 165 Comm: keyctl_negate_r Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1 #377
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
task: ffff9791fd809140 task.stack: ffffacba402bc000
RIP: 0010:__key_link_begin+0x0/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffffacba402bfdc8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: ffff9791fd809140 RBX: fffffffffd39a620 RCX: 0000000000000008
RDX: ffffacba402bfdd0 RSI: fffffffffd39a6a0 RDI: ffff9791fd810600
RBP: ffffacba402bfdf8 R08: 0000000000000063 R09: ffffffff94845620
R10: 8080808080808080 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ffff9791fd810600
R13: ffff9791fd39a940 R14: fffffffffd39a6a0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fbf14a90740(0000) GS:ffff9791ffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffffffffd39a6b0 CR3: 000000003b910003 CR4: 00000000003606e0
Call Trace:
? key_link+0x28/0xb0
? search_process_keyrings+0x13/0x100
request_key_and_link+0xcb/0x550
? keyring_instantiate+0x110/0x110
? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
SyS_request_key+0xc0/0x160
? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x5e/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
RIP: 0033:0x7fbf14190bb9
RSP: 002b:00007ffd8e4fe6c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f9
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000036cc28fb RCX: 00007fbf14190bb9
RDX: 000055748b56ca4a RSI: 000055748b56ca46 RDI: 000055748b56ca4b
RBP: 000055748b56ca4a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000036cc28fb R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055748b56c8b0
R13: 00007ffd8e4fe7d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: c5 0f 85 69 ff ff ff 48 c7 c3 82 ff ff ff eb ab 45 31 ed e9 18 ff ff ff 85 c0 75 8d eb d2 0f 1f 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <48> 83 7e 10 00 0f 84 c5 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55
RIP: __key_link_begin+0x0/0x100 RSP: ffffacba402bfdc8
CR2: fffffffffd39a6b0--- include/linux/key.h | 12 +++++++++++- security/keys/key.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++------- security/keys/keyctl.c | 3 +++ security/keys/keyring.c | 4 ++-- security/keys/request_key.c | 11 +++++++---- 5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
include/linux/key.h +11 -1
@@ -189,6 +189,17 @@ struct key {#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 10/* set if key should not be removed */ #define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING 11/* set if key is a user or user session keyring */ +/* +* If the key is negatively instantiated, then bits 20-31 hold the error +* code which should be returned when someone tries to use the key +* (unless they allow negative keys). The error code is stored as a +* positive number, so it must be negated before being returned. +* +* Note that a key can go from negative to positive but not vice versa. +*/ +#define KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT 20 +#define KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK 0xFFF00000 +/* the key type and key description string * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria * - it should be a printable string
@@ -213,7 +224,6 @@ struct key {struct list_head name_link;struct assoc_array keys; }; -int reject_error; };/* This is set on a keyring to restrict the addition of a link to a key
security/keys/key.c +19 -7
@@ -401,6 +401,20 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (key_payload_reserve); +static void mark_key_instantiated (struct key *key,unsigned int reject_error) +{ +unsigned long old, new; + +do { + old =READ_ONCE (key->flags); + new = (old & ~(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE | +KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK )) | +KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED | + (reject_error ?KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE :0 ) | + (reject_error <<KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT ); + }while (cmpxchg_release (&key->flags, old, new) != old); +} +/* * Instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically. Must be * called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked. The target key's
@@ -431,7 +445,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,if (ret =0 ) {/* mark the key as being instantiated */ atomic_inc (&key->user->nikeys); -set_bit (KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED , &key->flags); +mark_key_instantiated (key,0 );if (test_and_clear_bit (KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT , &key->flags)) awaken =1 ;
@@ -580,10 +594,8 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,if (!test_bit (KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED , &key->flags)) {/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */ atomic_inc (&key->user->nikeys); - key->reject_error = -error; -smp_wmb (); -set_bit (KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE , &key->flags); -set_bit (KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED , &key->flags); +mark_key_instantiated (key, error); + now =current_kernel_time (); key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;key_schedule_gc (key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
@@ -753,7 +765,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, ret = key->type->update (key, prep);if (ret =0 )/* updating a negative key instantiates it */ -clear_bit (KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE , &key->flags); +mark_key_instantiated (key,0 );up_write (&key->sem);
@@ -987,7 +999,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) ret = key->type->update (key, &prep);if (ret =0 )/* updating a negative key instantiates it */ -clear_bit (KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE , &key->flags); +mark_key_instantiated (key,0 );up_write (&key->sem);
security/keys/keyctl.c +3 -0
@@ -1223,6 +1223,9 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error, error = ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)return -EINVAL ; +BUILD_BUG_ON (MAX_ERRNO > (KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK >> +KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT )); +/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been * assumed before calling this */ ret = -EPERM ;
security/keys/keyring.c +2 -2
@@ -598,8 +598,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)if (ctx->flags &KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK ) {/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ if (kflags & (1 <<KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE )) { -smp_rmb (); - ctx->result =ERR_PTR (key->reject_error); + ctx->result =ERR_PTR (-(int )(kflags >> +KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT ));kleave (" = %d [neg]" , ctx->skipped_ret); goto skipped; }
security/keys/request_key.c +7 -4
@@ -590,15 +590,18 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,int wait_for_key_construction (struct key *key,bool intr) {int ret; +unsigned long flags; ret =wait_on_bit (&key->flags,KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT , intr ?TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE :TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE );if (ret)return -ERESTARTSYS ; -if (test_bit (KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE , &key->flags)) { -smp_rmb (); -return key->reject_error; - } + +/* Pairs with RELEASE in mark_key_instantiated() */ + flags =smp_load_acquire (&key->flags); +if (flags & (1 <<KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE )) +return -(int )(flags >>KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT ); +return key_validate (key); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (wait_for_key_construction);
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2.14.1.992.g2c7b836f3a-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] KEYS: fix race between updating and finding negative key
security/keys/key.c int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen) · line 416
Quoted 13 lines · Eric Biggers
security/keys/key.c +13
-0+static void mark_key_instantiated (struct key *key,unsigned int reject_error) +{ +unsigned long old, new; + +do { + old =READ_ONCE (key->flags); + new = (old & ~(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE | +KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK )) | +KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED | + (reject_error ?KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE :0 ) | + (reject_error <<KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT ); + }while (cmpxchg_release (&key->flags, old, new) != old); +}
Sorry, I realized I screwed this up --- the flags like KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE need to be (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE). I'll send another version which will be better tested...
Eric
PATCH v2 2/6 KEYS: load key flags atomically in key_is_instantiated()
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
In key_is_instantiated(), we check for KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED set and KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE unset. But this was done as two separate bit tests which were not atomic with respect to each other, and had no memory barrier providing ordering. Therefore, it was theoretically possible for the function to incorrectly return true if called while the key was being negatively instantiated.
There also needs to be a memory barrier before anything which is only meaningful for positively instantiated keys, e.g. ->payload and ->datalen, can be read --- which some of the ->describe() methods do.
Fix both these problems by loading the flags using smp_load_acquire().
--- include/linux/key.h | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/key.h +5 -2
@@ -372,8 +372,11 @@ extern void key_set_timeout(struct key *, unsigned);*/ static inline bool key_is_instantiated (const struct key *key) { -return test_bit (KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED , &key->flags) && - !test_bit (KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE , &key->flags); +/* Pairs with RELEASE in mark_key_instantiated() */ +unsigned long flags =smp_load_acquire (&key->flags); + +return (flags &KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED ) && + !(flags &KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE ); }#define dereference_key_rcu (KEY ) \
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PATCH v2 3/6 KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in key_validate()
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
In key_validate(), load the flags and expiry time once atomically, since
these can change concurrently if key_validate() is called without the
key semaphore held. And we don't want to get inconsistent results if a
variable is referenced multiple times. For example, key->expiry was
referenced in both 'if (key->expiry)' and in 'if (now.tv_sec >key->expiry)', making it theoretically possible to see a spurious EKEYEXPIRED while the expiration time was being removed, i.e. set to 0.
--- security/keys/permission.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/keys/permission.c +4 -3
@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission);*/ int key_validate (const struct key *key) { -unsigned long flags = key->flags; +unsigned long flags =READ_ONCE (key->flags); +time_t expiry =READ_ONCE (key->expiry);if (flags & (1 <<KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED ))return -ENOKEY ;
@@ -99,9 +100,9 @@ int key_validate(const struct key *key)return -EKEYREVOKED ;/* check it hasn't expired */ -if (key->expiry) { +if (expiry) {struct timespec now =current_kernel_time (); -if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) +if (now.tv_sec >= expiry)return -EKEYEXPIRED ; }
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2.14.1.992.g2c7b836f3a-goog
PATCH v2 4/6 KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in keyring_search_iterator()
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Similar to the case for key_validate(), we should load the key ->flags and ->expiry once atomically in keyring_search_iterator(), since they can be changed concurrently whenever the key semaphore isn't held.
--- security/keys/keyring.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/keys/keyring.c +4 -2
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) {struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;const struct key *key =keyring_ptr_to_key (object); -unsigned long kflags = key->flags; +unsigned long kflags =READ_ONCE (key->flags);kenter ("{%d}" , key->serial);
@@ -565,6 +565,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)/* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */ if (ctx->flags &KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK ) { +time_t expiry =READ_ONCE (key->expiry); +if (kflags & ((1 <<KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED ) | (1 <<KEY_FLAG_REVOKED ))) { ctx->result =ERR_PTR (-EKEYREVOKED );
@@ -572,7 +574,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) goto skipped; } -if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) { +if (expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= expiry) {if (!(ctx->flags &KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED )) ctx->result =ERR_PTR (-EKEYEXPIRED );kleave (" = %d [expire]" , ctx->skipped_ret);
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2.14.1.992.g2c7b836f3a-goog
PATCH v2 5/6 KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in proc_keys_show()
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
In proc_keys_show(), the key semaphore is not held, so the key ->flags and ->expiry can be changed concurrently. We therefore should read them atomically just once. Otherwise /proc/keys may show an inconsistent state, such a key that is negative ('N') but not instantiated ('I').
--- security/keys/proc.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
security/keys/proc.c +16 -12
@@ -179,7 +179,9 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)struct rb_node *_p = v; struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);struct timespec now; +time_t expiry;unsigned long timo; +unsigned long flags;key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;char xbuf[16 ];int rc;
@@ -217,12 +219,13 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)rcu_read_lock ();/* come up with a suitable timeout value */ -if (key->expiry =0 ) { + expiry =READ_ONCE (key->expiry); +if (expiry =0 ) {memcpy (xbuf,"perm" ,5 ); - }else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) { + }else if (now.tv_sec >= expiry) {memcpy (xbuf,"expd" ,5 ); }else { - timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec; + timo = expiry - now.tv_sec;if (timo <60 )sprintf (xbuf,"%lus" , timo);
@@ -236,18 +239,19 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)sprintf (xbuf,"%luw" , timo / (60 *60 *24 *7 )); } -#define showflag (KEY ,LETTER ,FLAG ) \ - (test_bit(FLAG, &(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-') +#define showflag (FLAGS ,LETTER ,FLAG ) \ + ((FLAGS & (1 << FLAG)) ? LETTER : '-') + flags =READ_ONCE (key->flags); seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ", key->serial, - showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED), - showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED), - showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD), - showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA), - showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT), - showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE), - showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), + showflag(flags, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED), + showflag(flags, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED), + showflag(flags, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD), + showflag(flags, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA), + showflag(flags, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT), + showflag(flags, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE), + showflag(flags, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), refcount_read(&key->usage), xbuf, key->perm,
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PATCH v2 6/6 KEYS: remove KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Now that a key's reject_error is stored in the flags word, we can check for nonzero reject_error rather than for KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE. Do this, then remove KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE.
--- include/linux/key.h | 20 ++++++++++++-------- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 2 +- security/keys/gc.c | 4 +--- security/keys/key.c | 4 +--- security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 +- security/keys/keyring.c | 2 +- security/keys/proc.c | 2 +- security/keys/request_key.c | 2 +- security/keys/trusted.c | 2 +- security/keys/user_defined.c | 2 +- 10 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
include/linux/key.h +12 -8
@@ -181,13 +181,12 @@ struct key {#define KEY_FLAG_REVOKED 2/* set if key had been revoked */ #define KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA 3/* set if key consumes quota */ #define KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT 4/* set if key is being constructed in userspace */ -#define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE 5/* set if key is negative */ -#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR 6/* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */ -#define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED 7/* set if key has been invalidated */ -#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 8/* set if key is built in to the kernel */ -#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 9/* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */ -#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 10/* set if key should not be removed */ -#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING 11/* set if key is a user or user session keyring */ +#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR 5/* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */ +#define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED 6/* set if key has been invalidated */ +#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 7/* set if key is built in to the kernel */ +#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 8/* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */ +#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 9/* set if key should not be removed */ +#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING 10/* set if key is a user or user session keyring */ /* * If the key is negatively instantiated, then bits 20-31 hold the error
@@ -376,7 +375,12 @@ static inline bool key_is_instantiated(const struct key *key)unsigned long flags =smp_load_acquire (&key->flags);return (flags &KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED ) && - !(flags &KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE ); + !(flags &KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK ); +} + +static inline bool key_is_negative (const struct key *key) +{ +return key->flags &KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK ; }#define dereference_key_rcu (KEY ) \
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +1 -1
@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)size_t datalen = prep->datalen;int ret =0 ; -if (test_bit (KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE , &key->flags)) +if (key_is_negative (key))return -ENOKEY ;if (datalen <=0 || datalen >32767 || !prep->data)return -EINVAL ;
security/keys/gc.c +1 -3
@@ -135,9 +135,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)key_check (key);/* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */ -if (test_bit (KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED , &key->flags) && - !test_bit (KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE , &key->flags) && - key->type->destroy) +if (key_is_instantiated (key) && key->type->destroy) key->type->destroy (key);security_key_free (key);
security/keys/key.c +1 -3
@@ -407,10 +407,8 @@ static void mark_key_instantiated(struct key *key, unsigned int reject_error)do { old =READ_ONCE (key->flags); - new = (old & ~(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE | -KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK )) | + new = (old & ~KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK ) |KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED | - (reject_error ?KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE :0 ) | (reject_error <<KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT ); }while (cmpxchg_release (&key->flags, old, new) != old); }
security/keys/keyctl.c +1 -1
@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) key =key_ref_to_ptr (key_ref); -if (test_bit (KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE , &key->flags)) { +if (key_is_negative (key)) { ret = -ENOKEY ; goto error2; }
security/keys/keyring.c +1 -1
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)if (ctx->flags &KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK ) {/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ -if (kflags & (1 <<KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE )) { +if (kflags &KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK ) { ctx->result =ERR_PTR (-(int )(kflags >>KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT ));kleave (" = %d [neg]" , ctx->skipped_ret);
security/keys/proc.c +1 -1
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)showflag (flags,'D' ,KEY_FLAG_DEAD ),showflag (flags,'Q' ,KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA ),showflag (flags,'U' ,KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT ), -showflag (flags,'N' ,KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE ), + (flags &KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK ) ?'N' :'-' ,showflag (flags,'i' ,KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED ),refcount_read (&key->usage), xbuf,
security/keys/request_key.c +1 -1
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)/* Pairs with RELEASE in mark_key_instantiated() */ flags =smp_load_acquire (&key->flags); -if (flags & (1 <<KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE )) +if (flags &KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_MASK )return -(int )(flags >>KEY_FLAGS_REJECT_ERROR_SHIFT );return key_validate (key);
security/keys/trusted.c +1 -1
@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)char *datablob;int ret =0 ; -if (test_bit (KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE , &key->flags)) +if (key_is_negative (key))return -ENOKEY ; p = key->payload.data[0 ];if (!p->migratable)
security/keys/user_defined.c +1 -1
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)/* attach the new data, displacing the old */ key->expiry = prep->expiry; -if (!test_bit (KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE , &key->flags)) +if (!key_is_negative (key)) zap =dereference_key_locked (key);rcu_assign_keypointer (key, prep->payload.data[0 ]); prep->payload.data[0 ] =NULL ;
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